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In the 1950s, North Dakota experienced its rst oil boom in the Williston 
Basin, on the western side of the state. The region experienced unprece-
dented social and economic changes, which were carefully documented in 
a 1958 report by four researchers at the University of North Dakota. Since 
then, western North Dakota has undergone two more booms, the most 
recent from 2008 to 2014. Sixty Years of Boom and Bust republishes the 
1958 report and updates its analysis by describing the impact of the latest 
boom on the region’s physical geography, politics, economics, and social 
structure.
Sixty Years of Boom and Bust addresses topics as relevant today as they 
were in 1958: the natural and built environment, politics and policy, 
crime, intergroup relations, and access to housing and medical services. In 
addition to making hard-to-nd material readily available, it examines an 
area shaped by resource booms and busts over the course of six decades. 
As a result, it provides unprecedented insight into the patterns of develop-
ment and the roots of the challenges the region has faced.
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Preface
How to Read this Book 
Kyle Conway
In 1958, the University of North Dakota published The Williston Report: The 
Impact of Oil on the Williston Area of North Dakota. Written by four UND profes-
sors, Robert Campbell, Samuel Kelley, Ross Talbot, and Bernt Wills, the book 
described the dramatic changes brought about by the discovery of oil on the 
western side of the state in 1951. They wrote about the impact of oil, from 
its discovery until 1954, on the region’s physical geography, politics, economy, 
and social structure, providing a methodologically rigorous analysis, rich with 
statistics, maps, and photographs.
Sixty Years of Boom and Bust: The Impact of Oil in North Dakota, 1958–2018 
reproduces the five chapters and two appendices of The Williston Report, which 
have now entered the public domain. It also adds chapters about the same 
themes as they relate to the boom that the region underwent from 2008 to 
2014. The book has two goals: first, to provide a historical perspective for citi-
zens and policy makers in the state, and second, to provide a longitudinal study 
useful to others wishing to understand resource booms. No study of resource 
booms, it should be noted, has looked at as wide a range of impacts over as long 
a period of time.
There are at least two ways to read this book, from beginning to end or selec-
tively and strategically. Readers who take the first approach will discover that 
the first chapters on physical geography, politics, and economics are data-rich 
and provide a solid contextual foundation for the final chapters on social 
change. Those who read strategically might start with the final chapters about 
social change, the topic most discussed in accounts of the boom in newspa-
pers such as the New York Times or on websites such as Buzzfeed or HuffPost. 
These chapters are more focused on narrative, in contrast to the more tech-
nical examinations offered in the first chapters. Rick Ruddell and Heather Ray’s 
chapter “Social Impacts of Oil Development” (chapter 10) would be an espe-
cially propitious starting point, as it provides an even-handed overview of the 
effects of the boom, in contrast to the sensationalism of many of the articles 
in the popular press.
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Figure 0.1. The cover of The Williston Report (source: author’s personal 
collection)
3
Figure 0.2. Clarence Iverson No. 1, the first successful commercial well in 
North Dakota (source: James N. Holter, Williston, North Dakota)
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A couple of explanatory notes are necessary here. First, with respect to the 
beginning and end points of the most recent boom, for the sake of consis-
tency and readability, I decided in my capacity as the volume’s editor to treat 
the boom as beginning in 2008 and ending in 2014, despite the changes (all 
minor) that this decision necessitated in certain chapters. These years are heu-
ristically useful bookends: the contrast between North Dakota’s prosperity 
and the recession in the rest of the United States began to be felt in 2008 (the 
country having officially entered a recession in December 2007), and the price 
of crude oil dropped below the threshold necessary to make drilling new wells 
profitable in 2014. But the dates are somewhat arbitrary. As certain chapters 
show (for example, the 2018 introduction and David Flynn’s chapter, “The Eco-
nomic Consequences of Oil Development”), oil production was growing before 
2008, and both the number of active wells and the number of barrels produced 
continued to climb for several years after 2014. The number of barrels of oil 
produced even rebounded in 2018.
Second, although the 2018 chapters all update the 1958 chapters, some also 
consider the older report as an object of historical concern. This is especially 
true of the narrative-oriented chapters at the end of the book. Whereas the 
1958 chapters about the physical geography of the region, its politics, and 
its economy each have only one 2018 counterpart, Campbell’s 1958 chapter 
“Social Change in the Basin” has four, and they, more than those that precede 
them, are critical in their historiographic approach. This fact, I think, is due at 
least in part to the attention paid by the popular press to the social changes 
in western North Dakota during the most recent boom. It reminds us that we 
should ask how we know what we think we know, both as we read the 1958 
chapters, whose unacknowledged biases the 2018 chapters work to reveal, and 
as we read those from 2018, whose unacknowledged biases we as contempo-
rary readers might be inclined to share.
Sources and Acknowledgments
The task of recreating the 1958 Report involved quite a few people whom I wish 
to thank here. First, I would not have discovered the book if the HathiTrust 
Digital Library (https://www.hathitrust.org/Record/001313629), working 
with Google Books, had not made a scanned version available and discoverable. 
Second, although HathiTrust’s e-book included a text version derived from an 
optical character recognition (OCR) scan, it was only one source—and not 
even the primary one—for the reconstructed text. Instead, I worked with an 
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international team of researchers to recreate the book manually. I focused on 
the text, the first draft of which Dave Haeselin gave to his students to proof-
read and copyedit during a course on digital publishing at the University of 
North Dakota. My research assistant Raphaela Nehme, a master’s student in 
the Department of Communication at the University of Ottawa, painstakingly 
entered—by hand, and with exceptional accuracy—all of the data from the re-
port’s charts, of which there were more than one hundred. Roxanne Lafleur, a 
media librarian at the University of Ottawa, scanned all of the images from my 
paper copy of The Williston Report, demonstrating an unrivaled level of techno-
logical wizardry and aesthetic judgment. Finally, Shane Gomes copyedited the 
final, revised manuscript and fixed the details that I, having read it too many 
times, could no longer see.
Beyond the technical aspects of recreating the book, there were administra-
tive tasks that made its production possible. Kelly-Anne Maddox in the Faculty 
of Arts at the University of Ottawa helped me prepare an application for a 
publishing grant, which I received from the University of Ottawa. Finally, Bill 
Caraher, my former colleague at the University of North Dakota and founder 
and director of the Digital Press at the University of North Dakota, champi-
oned this book from the very beginning. 
A sincere thank you to every one of these collaborators. A sincere thank you, 
also, to all of the contributors, whose goodwill and attention to detail made 
this book possible.
A Few Final Technical Notes
First, the book is being published in 2020, meaning the “2018” in the updated 
chapter titles is a symptom of wishful thinking. (I began work on the book in 
2017.) During the revision process, the authors and I updated certain statistics 
past 2018, leading to a slight incongruence between the title and the chapter 
content. Second, I have made a few minor changes to the text of the 1958 
Report, largely to correct typos, add missing information, or standardize the 
presentation and layout from one chapter to the next. None of these affect the 
content of the report. Likewise, the 1958 Report numbered all of its figures and 
tables consecutively, from one chapter to the next. I maintained this system 
in the 1958 chapters, but used a different system restarting the count at the 
beginning of each of the 2018 chapters.




Bernt L. Wills, Ross B. Talbot, Samuel C. Kelley, 
Jr., and Robert B. Campbell1
From the time of its earliest permanent occupance until 1951 the area of 
this study had been an agricultural area. Directly or indirectly, almost 
every resident had relied primarily upon the thin cover of soil, upon 
the vagaries of a capricious weather and upon the biological rhythm of 
plant and animal life for his livelihood and for his welfare.
The people there were products of this land. Several generations in 
that place had brought about a pattern of living, an adjustment of man 
to land which was established and mature. It was a way of life based 
upon neighborhoods and communities where major problems were 
common problems, where not only rancher and farmer, but banker, 
lawyer, doctor, school man, storekeeper—almost everyone there—knew 
this way of life, understood it and was a part of it. By most standards 
these people were well off, and evidence is lacking that they were less 
content with their lot in life than were those in other areas.
That this area was a possible source of oil had been known to geol-
ogists and oilmen since the 1920’s. The people of the area were quite 
familiar with the sight of oil derricks and drilling rigs, for numerous 
unsuccessful attempts to find oil had been made.2 Most of the people 
had become quite inured to talk of oil by the winter of 1950–51 and few 
really expected that anything so unusual as the discovery of oil in their 
area would upset the even tenor of their lives.
In January, 1951, Amerada Petroleum Corporation reported the re-
covery of a single pint of oil on a test of its Clarence Iverson wildcat well 
on the Nesson Anticline of the Williston Basin. That recovery, small 
1 The first section of this chapter is by Bernt L. Wills. The summaries are by the 
authors of the chapters which follow.
2 It was in 1920 that the Pioneer Oil and Gas Company drilled North Dakota’s 
first dry hole, township location 154 N, R 100 W. The Amerada successful effort 
of 1951 was at nearby T155 N, R 95 W. So near but yet so far!
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though it was, stirred oilmen throughout the United States. To them 
it indicated the probable opening of a new oil province, the Williston 
Basin.
On April 4, 1951, Amerada Petroleum Corporation brought in its 
discovery well, Clarence Iverson No. 1, with an initial production of 
over 300 barrels in 17 hours, and the oil boom was on.
The onslaught of the boom activity disturbed the established pat-
terns in the impact area. What seemed to be multitudes of strangers 
invaded and over-ran the town and rural areas alike. The influx in-
cluded not only members of the oil fraternity—the oil operators, oil 
scouts, oil well promoters, the geologists, drillers, lease buyers, royalty 
buyers, brokers, etc., but also many people whose coming was related 
only in a secondary way to the oil activity itself. These ranged from un-
skilled workers willing to work at anything to an instructor in aesthetic 
dancing, and from persons who would cheerfully work outside the law 
to professional welfare and religious workers.
Demand for housing far outran supply. All available space was 
pressed into service. Garages, granaries, and sheds were converted into 
living quarters and business places. Improvised shacks, as well as sub-
stantial structures, were constructed and utilized. Hundreds of house 
trailers were brought into the area.
Community services were jammed; schools were clogged and put 
on a shift basis, transportation and communication systems were 
strained, roads suffered damage from the heavy truck traffic. Repair 
work could hardly keep up with the rapid wear. Thus the permanent 
residents of the area found that costs of public services rose sharply 
while the services declined.
Business activity in the towns soared. The newcomers brought both 
capital and demand for goods. Dozens of new establishments came 
into being, from small lunch counters and service stations to large oil-
field equipment supply houses. In some instances these establishments 
extended well beyond the towns, as along the three-mile highway from 
U.S. Highway 10 into the town of Tioga.
In the oil producing area itself the cultural landscape changed as 
steel derricks rose in ever increasing numbers, as drillers and geophys-
ical crews sought and found the limits of the pools. Pipe lines were laid 
to sidings. Loading racks were erected. Storage tanks went up at wells 
and at local terminal points. Warehouses, company offices, and “camps” 
were built at desired locations. As gas pressure weakened at producing 
wells, the wells were put on pumps and the enormous jacks (for these 
are deep wells) became distinctive features of the landscape. At night 
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the oil fields literally sparkled with the lights of the burning gas flares 
which dotted the area like so many torches.
To these landowners on whose property oil was found, or who re-
ceived high payment for mineral rights, the oil development meant 
increased wealth and opportunity for “the more abundant life.” To many 
of the others it yielded little more than bitterness. Often the original 
residents found themselves in the position of a minority group. The 
newcomers often had markedly different backgrounds from the older 
residents; often they were of different political or religious persuasion. 
When the earlier residents sought employment in the oil development 
program they found only the lower paid, less skilled jobs open to them, 
for the big oil concerns commonly brought their own trained labor 
supply into the area.
The almost frenzied activity of the boom gradually subsided and by 
1955 conditions could be described as quite well stabilized or settled. 
The conditions, however, were not those of 1950, for the effects of oil 
development are long-lasting. To all, new or old, the oil development 
OIL WELLS AND PIPELINE NEAR TIOGA, N.D., SUMMER, 1954  — 
This is a representative scene of the major North Dakota oil producing area. The 
pipe line is the 24-inch line being laid to the Tioga refinery. Note that farming 
operations generally continue throughout the field. COURTESY GNDA
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meant readjustment and change. To the state it meant increased wealth 
and a partial check on the declining trend of the state’s population. To 
the oil producing area it also meant release from almost complete de-
pendence upon an agricultural economy.
Summary
The effects of the oil development have invaded every aspect of life in 
the “Basin.” They have influenced the demographic structure, the po-
litical balance, the social organization, employment and standards of 
living, and the physical attributes of the area.
These impacts are considered in summary form in the following 
paragraphs. The chapters which follow treat of them in greater detail.
AMERADA’S FIELD CAMP AND TIOGA, N.D, SUMMER, 1954 — In 
the foreground is the Amerada Camp, first its supply dump (largely pipe, or 
casing); in the center of the camp are warehouses and offices followed by 30 




The area of this study, the “impact area,” consists of much of eastern 
Williams County and western Mountrail County in northwestern 
North Dakota. The principal oil fields comprise an area about 35 miles 
long (north-south) by 5 miles wide, located about 40 miles east of the 
city of Williston, North Dakota. (FIGURE 1)
Geologically, this is a portion of a filled basin—the Williston Basin. 
The most important oil trap is the Nesson Anticline, and at the time 
of this study most of the producing wells are located on that structure. 
Topographically this is a plains area, largely overlain by glacial drift. 
This region has a semi-arid continental type of climate, with rel-
atively cold winters and hot summers. The average annual rainfall at 
Williston is slightly less than 15 inches.
Transportation Network Impacts
The major routes of supply of this area are the main line of the Great 
Northern Railway, Federal Highway No. 2, and State Highway No. 
40. (FIGURE 1) Very little change in the pattern of the major routes 
of supply occurred outside of the oil fields as a result of oil develop-
ment, but within the oil producing areas the changes were marked. In 
FIG. 1—Oil Fields of Williston and Mountrail Counties
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those areas approximately 200 miles of all-weather roads were added 
between April, 1951 and July, 1954. This added mileage consisted of 
township and county roads and of “well-access” roads. The latter type 
were built by the petroleum companies, of which the most active was 
the Amerada Petroleum Corporation.
A direct consequence of the oil development activity was the ad-
ditional wear and damage done to road surfaces by the increase in 
vehicular traffic (this increase was in both number and weights of 
vehicles), and by the attendant increases in maintenance costs. The 
exact amount of the road wear and cost which can be attributed to oil 
development is difficult, if not impossible, to measure, but that it was 
considerable is certain.
Demographic Impacts
The impact of the oil industry on population numbers and characteris-
tics in Williams and Mountrail counties was of varying significance. In 
general, notable effects were experienced in the rural non-farm centers 
(Ray, Tioga, and Tioga Environs) and in the urban center (Williston) 
which were ideally located to serve as residential, service, and focal 
points in the oil field and associated developments. The remainder of 
the two counties, including the rural impact townships and Stanley, 
was noticeably less affected.
The following basic changes in population characteristics seem to 
be especially significant.
1. Williams County had a percentage population increase of 26.8% 
between 1950 and 1954, whereas Mountrail County had a decrease 
of 5.5%. Rural non-farm settlements and urban Williston showed 
marked increases due to the direct influence of the oil industry; 
the remainder of both counties maintained the downward trend 
characteristic of purely rural North Dakota counties.
2. There were changes in the proportion of younger persons relative 
to other age groups in those significantly affected centers, with a 
trend towards a generally younger population.
3. A relatively large number of people in Ray, Tioga, and Tioga Envi-
rons occupied trailers, illustrating the migratory nature of a fairly 
large sector of the labor force.
4. Large numbers of workers and families were attracted to the area 
from considerable distances. In each of the rural non-farm and 
urban centers a rather large proportion of the population has 
been drawn from noncontiguous states.
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5. The great increase in workers engaged in the mining and con-
struction, service, and trade classifications reflects the nature of 
the development and the increased requirements for various ser-
vices and facilities.
6. The fluid nature of the population and frequent population fluc-
tuations have resulted in a trend towards a lower but more stable 
population level. This trend became evident in late 1954.
Social Impacts
The large increase in population, particularly as it represented an 
influx of “alien” people to the Basin, was expected to create social prob-
lems, situations for which there would be feelings of dissatisfaction and 
around which would develop conflicts in attitudes. It was anticipated 
that these attitudes would be readily observable in the opinions of the 
inhabitants of the area and in the actions of their organizations and 
agencies. Only to a limited extent were these expectations borne out by 
the observations.
It was true in Williston that the already existing organizations did 
not make general efforts to embrace the newcomers into their member-
ships; but it was also true that there were no overt antipathies toward 
the newcomers on the part of organization leaders. There were con-
flicts in Ray and Tioga about specific issues, but the participants in the 
conflicts were not identified by background and length of residence as 
much as by “conservatism” or “backwardness” and their opposites. The 
most general negative attitude about the people involved probably was 
that held by the rural residents toward the town merchants, who were 
considered to have “sold out” to the oil people. The nearly complete 
absence of negative categorical attitudes of “natives” and “newcomers” 
regarding each other in Williston is indicated by the latters’ opinions 
about the former and the opinions of both groups as to whether or not 
the newcomers had been accepted. Both attitudes were positive to the 
extent of 99% and 96% respectively.
There was a surprising absence of social problems arising out 
of the changed situations. The housing situation was the one most 
clearly considered problematic, although it appeared that housing in 
general (rather than specific residences) was most often the situation 
opined about. There were very few comments about small, dilapidated, 
dirty residences in the area, despite the general awareness of a “tight” 
housing situation. (Apparently no plans for low-rental housing were 
being made either by public agencies or private building firms; all 
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construction appeared to be aimed at high-rental levels, thus creating 
what turned out to be a new problem rather than a solution.)
Criminal and immoral behavior did not develop to the level of gen-
eral problem conditions, and there was a virtual absence of comment 
regarding it. There were a few expressions of negative attitudes about 
the oil people, but they were limited primarily to rural residents’ com-
ments about the bad-check writing of oil field workers.
The really apparent changes, some of which took on the nature of 
social problems, were to be found in public agency requirements. The 
school systems and the post office (in Williston, at least) were seriously 
taxed to keep abreast of the changes. Building could not be accom-
plished at sufficient speed, thus a series of makeshift arrangements 
had to suffice; schools had to operate on a split day in the small towns 
and the Williston post office had to reorganize its operations and to 
remodel its working space. (Other agencies encountered less startling 
and less pressing changes with the possible exception of government 
road construction and maintenance agencies).
In general, the change was widespread in the circumstances of the 
Williston Basin residents, but the definition of these circumstances 
as problematic was not sufficient to bring about even more sweeping 
changes. Conflicts appeared to be local and confined to specific issues, 
which were resolved with so little lasting prejudice that negative atti-
tudes about the “alien” inhabitants were not apparent to a noteworthy 
degree.
Political Impacts
The discovery and development of an important natural resource is al-
most certain to involve the phenomenon of political power. In Bertrand 
Russell’s words, “power may be defined as the production of intended 
effects.”3 When a new oil field is opened there is tremendous activity by 
those who desire to produce certain “intended effects.” Such was the 
case in the Williston area. First, some of the major oil producers moved 
into the new boom area to secure legal authority to develop the oil field. 
Then it became necessary to protect investments through the passage of 
favorable legislation and the creation of a sympathetic public opinion. 
This strategy was not novel on the part of the oil companies but con-
stituted what has been called the utilization of “anticipated reactions.” 
The large oil producers formed an association called the North Dakota 
3 Bertrand Russell, Power—A New Social Analysis (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, Ltd., 1938), p. 35.
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Oil and Gas Association; some landowners and businessmen organized 
the Williams County Landowner’s and Royalty Owner’s Association 
and other like interest groups. At the state level, the State Legislative 
Research Committee delved into the problem of proposing oil legisla-
tion that would be in the interests of the State of North Dakota. Out of 
the crucible of the legislative process came oil legislation which was a 
mixture of the efforts of pressure groups, legislative committees, law-
yers, research directors, prominent politicians, and influential citizens. 
The unstable power situation in the North Dakota legislature meant 
that compromise was a necessity but the oil companies were successful, 
for the most part, in securing tax and conservation features in oil and 
gas legislation that were compatible with their best interests.
In the administration of the oil laws new frictions and contentions 
arose. The issue of well-spacing was threshed out but the decisions 
reached did not always meet with the concurrence of some of the land 
owners. The role of the State Geologist became more complex and 
confusing as scientific judgments and political and economic interests 
became intertwined. The importance of the North Dakota Industrial 
Commission in the field of oil policy was soon apparent and, more 
recently, the role of the Public Service Commission became increas-
ingly important due to the construction of pipe lines and the wholesale 
price of natural gas products. The value of state-owned land in the oil 
areas assumed a new significance as its revenue-producing capacity in-
creased very considerably with the discovery of oil.
The public’s role in this new venture was interesting and perplexing. 
The results of a questionnaire survey, which was conducted by the au-
thors of this study, strongly indicated that most people in the Williston 
area actually did not understand even the main features of the legis-
lation pertaining to oil. Also, in an effort to create a favorable climate 
of opinion for their activities, the oilmen created a local unit of the Oil 
Industry Information Committee in order to “educate” the youth and, 
to a lesser extent, the adults about the production and distribution of 
oil. Their efforts were well-planned and intelligently executed but there 
is some question as to whether the techniques constituted education or 
propaganda. This study attempts to analyze that issue.
What might be termed the “power elite” has not changed notably 
since the advent of oil. The executives of the major oil producers have 
been added to the existing power structure in the Williston area com-
posed primarily of prominent bankers, lawyers, and businessmen. 
Thus a new and dynamic element was grafted onto the already existing 
power structure within the local communities and principally within 
the city of Williston.
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As one would expect, the rapid influx of population caused some 
disruption and overburdening of the local governmental and non-gov-
ernmental facilities in the Williston area. The public schools were 
particularly hard pressed; the cities had to increase their municipal 
services for considerable numbers of new customers. The changes in 
the “old way of life” and the increases in taxes caused the demand for a 
different form of city government in Williston, the election of a new city 
council in Ray, and some intra-community conflicts in Tioga.
Neither politics nor public administration, of course, stand alone. 
The economic basis of politics in the Williston area was quickly ap-
parent. Much of the political controversy centered around the ancient 
question of who was going to get what, and how. Social changes in 
terms of in-migration, the interaction of different cultures, the in-
creased public welfare burdens, etc., were not as vast as expected, 
but these changes may have a rather substantial long-run effect upon 
voting patterns and habits. The geography of the area is certain to have 
an impact upon future political events. If the oil fields are considerably 
extended and increasingly productive the changes in voting patterns of 
the electorate may again be modified.
As of the end of this study (1955), it appeared that oil had not caused 
any political revolution in North Dakota. The picture should be some-
what clearer after the counting of the ballots that will be cast in the 
November election in 1956.
Economic Impacts
The economy of the Williston Basin is characterized by agriculture. 
The peculiarities of climate and rainfall limit the agriculture of the 
area to dry-farming and grazing. Nearly 80 percent of the value of farm 
products sold in 1954 were derived from field crops, mainly cash grains 
and the remainder from livestock and livestock products.
This type of agriculture, which is characteristic of the Great Plains, 
requires extensive farming on a very large scale. Average farm size in 
Williams County is over 830 acres, yet the typical farm is operated on a 
family basis with a large capital outlay for mechanical equipment and 
little outlay for hired labor. Nearly 90 percent of all farms in Williams 
County were operated by full or part owners. Only 60 percent of all 
farms employed any hired labor in 1954 and only 15 percent spent more 
than $500 for farm wages.
The non-agricultural sector of the area’s economy is engaged ex-
clusively in the distribution of goods and services to the farm sector. It 
produces, locally, almost nothing that is consumed by the area. Prior 
to the development of petroleum extraction, manufactures and mining 
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were limited to printing and publishing, domestic food processing and 
the extraction of lignite on a limited scale. Nearly all private employ-
ment and income was derived from occupation in trade, service, and 
transportation.
In this type of economic situation, extensive agriculture tends to 
evict people from farms in an area where the number of other employ-
ment opportunities is dependent upon the size of the farm population 
and farm income. The out-migration that results produces a popula-
tion decline and a consequent reduction in income and employment.
The discovery of oil in this area has had two primary effects upon 
the economy of the area. First, it has created supplemental income to 
farm families through the sale of mineral leases and mineral rights, 
and to a smaller number of persons through royalty payments on land 
with producing wells. This supplementary income has permitted the 
repayment of mortgage obligations on farm land, the purchase of new 
farm equipment, and general farm improvements. In many cases it 
has provided the capital outlay necessary to eliminate the farm from 
sub-marginal status.
Second, it has provided additional job opportunities directly and 
indirectly as it has employed individuals in well drilling activity, in the 
servicing of oil extraction, and in the impact of an expanding popu-
lation upon the trade and service industries. Between 1947 and 1954, 
manufacturing employment in Williams County increased by nearly 90 
percent and value added by manufacture nearly 300 percent. Employ-
ment in retail and wholesale trade increased by 30 percent and sales 
by 70 percent. The major expansion in indirect employment was in the 
service industries. In this industrial sector, employment increased by 
more than 60 percent and service receipts had a gain of 226 percent 
over 1947.
 As these values suggest, the oil development has stimulated the 
local economy to levels of activity in excess of that expected under the 
economic condition existing prior to 1951. However, it is apparent that 
the initial impact of the development has acted as an autonomous 
factor inducing change that is not warranted by the long-term poten-
tial of petroleum extraction in the area. The local economy is beginning 
to feel the effects of the induced over-investment in business invento-
ries, in land, and in extended credit. A favorable combination of factors 
such as winter climate had, however, acted to reduce the rate of growth 
induced by the discovery and thus to decrease the magnitude of the 
adjustment below that which has been observed in other “boom” areas. 
It appears quite likely that oil will provide a sustaining factor in this 
economy in the future and that much of the adjustment to the altered 
economic structure is already accomplished.

Chapter 2
Introduction: Sixty Years of Boom 
and Bust
Kyle Conway
It is a disorienting experience, in light of the western North Dakota’s 2008–14 
boom, to read the 1958 Williston Report six decades later. In many ways it is 
unexpectedly current. “Community services were jammed,” the authors wrote, 
“schools were clogged and put on a shift basis, transportation and commu-
nication systems were strained, roads suffered damage from the heavy truck 
traffic” (p. 8, as reprinted in this volume). Their observation is not too dif-
ferent from one made by the New York Times Magazine in 2013 when it wrote, 
“[The boom] has minted millionaires, paid off mortgages, created businesses; 
it has raised rents, stressed roads, vexed planners and overwhelmed schools” 
(Brown 2013).
In other ways, the report is surprisingly different. For instance, during the 
recent boom, human trafficking and drug use both increased (Ruddell 2017; 
Berg Burin, current volume). In contrast, the authors of the 1958 report wrote, 
“There were no indications available to the researchers that there had been a 
notable increase in, or even the presence of, organized criminal or immoral 
activity—gambling houses, theft rings, ‘protection’ or houses of prostitution” 
(Campbell, p. 262). Where drugs were concerned, they wrote only about al-
cohol, saying, “drunkenness was prevented from developing to the problem 
proportions it might have reached by a combination of already existing circum-
stances” and strategies, including “a system of quick pick-ups in the ‘skidrow’ 
section” near the bars in downtown Williston and the tendency by judges to 
“[penalize] to the maximum offenders of the drinking laws” (p. 261).
Perhaps the key difference between the two booms is the way people re-
late to historical events. People affected by the 1951 boom (which lasted until 
1954) did not have other boom experiences to refer back to—they had to 
figure things out as they went along. In contrast, many people affected by the 
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2008–14 boom still remembered the region’s boom from the 1980s, and some 
even remembered the one from the 1950s. In the 1950s, most people did not 
feel that history was repeating itself. In the 2000s, many did. Thus, reading the 
1958 Report feels uncanny because it is simultaneously familiar and foreign. 
We have been down this path before, even if it looks a bit different this time.
Sixty Years of Boom and Bust explores the similarities and differences be-
tween the booms from 1951–4 and 2008–14 and asks what sixty years of 
history can teach us about North Dakota today, where the vicissitudes of the 
oil market keep the region constantly on the edge of a new boom—or a new 
bust. The biggest difference, as these chapters show, is scale, in two senses. 
First, the 1950s boom affected only two counties, but the most recent boom 
affected the entire state and surrounding region. Second, hydraulic fracturing 
(or “fracking”) made it possible to extract an ever-greater amount of oil from 
the ground: 6 million barrels in 1954 compared to about 400 million in 2014 
(North Dakota Industrial Commission 2016, xiv). Of course, these factors are 
related: improved extraction tools increased output and allowed oil companies 
to expand the geographic reach of their operations. 
After an overview of the history of oil in North Dakota, this introductory 
chapter examines the question of scale, describing both the rates of oil pro-
duction and the industrial logic behind them, which can be characterized as 
high-risk, high-reward. It also describes, in broad strokes, the social impact of 
this industrial logic, or the way it influenced interactions between newcomers 
and longtime residents. It shows how both production and its social impacts 
are shaped by contradictory forces. With respect to production, these forces 
are observable in the logic of the built-in contraction: one driver of the need 
for new wells was the technology of the wells themselves, which quickly lost 
capacity. With respect to social interactions, they are observable in forces re-
lated to class and to how long residents have lived in the region. This chapter 
ends with a consideration of what it means to read The Williston Report sixty 
years after it was published through the lens of twenty-first century concerns, 
a theme that the book’s conclusion will develop more fully. As the preface men-
tions, no study of resource booms has looked at as wide a range of impacts over 
as long a period of time, and in this respect, the 1958 chapters and their 2018 
counterparts hold up a useful mirror for North Dakotans (and others) today 
who wish to examine the situation in which they find themselves.
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History of Oil in North Dakota
Western North Dakota sits atop the vast Bakken oil formation or play (as 
people in the industry call a group of oil fields), which stretches across two 
states, North Dakota and Montana, and into two Canadian provinces, Man-
itoba and Saskatchewan. The oil—more than 7 billion barrels of it (USGS 
2013)—is contained within layers of shale, which workers frack by injecting 
a slurry of water, chemicals, and sand at high pressure to open cracks through 
which oil and natural gas flow more freely.1
Although the first boom began in the 1950s, geologists and “oilmen,” as the 
vocabulary of the era would have it, had known there was oil to extract since 
the 1910s. The Pioneer Oil and Gas Company drilled the first well—which 
was dry—in 1916, an effort that was reproduced many times over the next 
four decades (Robinson [1966] 2017, 457). It was only in 1951 that a well 
was finally successful, on a farm near Tioga that belonged to Clarence Iverson. 
A few months later, a number of successful wells were drilled on the farm of 
Henry O. Bakken (Dalrymple 2012). The formation was named after him, but 
not immediately. In fact, the name Bakken does not appear at all in the 1958 
Report. Instead, the area was referred to simply as the Williston Basin, as it 
had “the general shape of a basin or dish. The bottom of the ‘dish’ [lay] under 
western North Dakota for the most part” (Wills, p. 36). (As Brad Rundquist 
and Greg Vandeberg show in their chapter in this volume, the Williston Basin 
and the Bakken Formation are not identical, although they do overlap quite a 
bit. See their map on p. 69.)
The 1950s boom was followed by another in the 1980s. Rundquist and Van-
deberg attribute the first to the discovery of oil itself, and the second to the 
spike in oil prices due to the embargo by the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the 1970s (p. 82). Both were hampered by 
technological problems that fracking would eventually solve. Oil companies 
had to drill vertical wells and hope to hit an already fractured vein in the shale. 
If their guess was off, they might miss the vein and the well would be dry. 
Technologies developed in the early 2000s, such as steerable rotary bits, mul-
tipad drilling (where “multiple descending wells from a single surface location 
eliminate the need for rig transfers between locations”), and zipper fracking 
(where “two or more parallel wells are drilled by perforating each at alternating 
intervals”) made it possible to drill wells faster and extract more oil from them 
1 Russell Gold’s (2015) The Boom is perhaps the best description of the history and 
technology of fracking.
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(Maugeri 2013, 8), leading to the 2008–14 boom. Oil companies could direct 
their drills toward oil-rich shale and create fissures within it to release the dif-
ferent forms of petroleum.
As a result, the differences between the 2008–14 boom, which Rundquist 
and Vandeberg describe as the “technology boom” (p. 83), and those of 
the 1950s and 1980s were dramatic. Rick Ruddell and Heather Ray, in their 
chapter in this volume, characterize the first two as “minor” (p. 272): the 
1950s boom lasted forty-eight months and affected two counties, while the 
1980s boom lasted sixty months and affected four counties. In contrast, they 
describe the most recent boom as “major.” By their estimation, it began in 2007 
and had not ended as of 2019, lasting 152 months and affecting seventeen 
counties. The relative scale of the two booms is clear: the most recent one was 
of an entirely different magnitude, so much so that “the findings of research 
about rapid growth communities prior to 2000 provide limited insight about 
contemporary booms” (Ruddell and Ray, p. 272).
Scale of Change: Geography
The difference in scale is observable in at least two places: the area in which 
drilling took place and the amount of oil produced. The 1958 Williston Report 
focused on just two counties—Williams and Mountrail—and within those, 
just four towns or regions—Williston, Ray, Tioga, and what the authors called 
the “Tioga environs,” an area near Tioga that had been undeveloped until the 
boom (Wills, p. 52). Of these towns, Williston was by far the largest. It was 
the commercial center to which people would travel from the other towns, even 
if they could buy what they needed closer to home (Kelley, p. 192). In 1950, 
before the boom, it had about 7,400 residents, a population that grew to 9,700 
by 1954 (Wills, p. 56). About 30 percent of its new residents came from 
outside Williams and Mountrail counties, and about 10 percent from farther 
away than North Dakota’s neighboring states (Wills, p. 61; Kelley, p. 214)
Ray and Tioga, in contrast, were much smaller, although they grew at faster 
rates. By the end of the boom in 1954, Ray had about 1,500 residents, twice its 
population in 1950, while Tioga had about 1,600, more than three times its 
population in 1950 (Campbell, p. 246; Williston Report, Appendix B, p. 371). 
Whereas many of the new residents in Williston worked as managers (the 
town became a center of operations, according to Campbell, p. 250), those 
who came to Ray and Tioga were more likely to work in the oilfields, and they 
were more likely to come from farther away. Tioga attracted “the more nearly 
permanent oil field workers—the better paid, supervisory field personnel”; 20 
23
percent of its new residents were from farther away than a contiguous state. 
Ray attracted “the transient and temporary employees” who worked the rigs; 
45 percent of its new residents were from farther away than a contiguous state 
(Wills, p. 60; Campbell, p. 250).
Direct comparisons with the 2008–14 boom are difficult because people 
studying the affected areas have measured different things, but demographic 
estimates and analysis of the geographic distribution of jobs still reveal the 
magnitude of change, both between booms and in the years of the most recent 
boom. Williston, where most of the oil-related jobs were (63 percent near the 
height of the boom in 2011), grew dramatically. Before the boom, it had about 
13,000 residents. In 2013, its population was between 30,000 and 38,000, 
depending on which demographic model researchers used and whether they 
counted the surrounding townships. Before the price of oil began to fall in 2014, 
demographers were even predicting a population of 42,000 (or 54,000 with 
the surrounding townships), although only about two thirds were permanent 
residents (Hodur and Bangsund 2013). People came from farther away than 
during the 1951–54 boom, as a number of indirect measures show. Between 
the 2011–12 and 2013–14 school years, for instance, the Williston Public 
School District #1 had students transfer in from almost all fifty U.S. states, in 
addition to Cameroon, Ghana, Indonesia, the Philippines, Honduras, Turkey, 
Nigeria, Taiwan, China, Russia, Mexico, Canada, and islands in the south Pa-
cific Ocean (Conway 2016, 38–9). Similarly, the North Dakota Department 
of Transportation registered 255 prequalified contractors from twenty-eight 
states: ninety-seven from North Dakota, fifty-eight from Minnesota, eighteen 
from South Dakota, and between one and seven from most of the western U.S. 
states (Nowatzki 2014).
Also in contrast to the 1950s boom, oil jobs were distributed more widely 
across the state. About 20 percent were in Dickinson, two hours south of Wil-
liston, and 15 percent in Minot, two hours east (Hodur and Bangsund 2013, 
9). Similarly, the economic effects were also distributed more broadly, in some-
thing of a ripple effect. Within one hundred miles of the Bakken, there was 
an increase in wages, although not as large as within the Bakken itself, and 
within two hundred miles, there was a decrease in unemployment (Batbold 
and Grunewald 2013, 14). As a result, Williston’s role was different than in 
the 1950s. Although its importance grew during the boom (it generated more 
sales tax revenue than Fargo, the state’s biggest city), it was not as economi-
cally central to the Bakken because the effects of the boom stretched so far into 
the rest of the state (see Flynn, current volume).
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Scale of Change: Oil Production
The difference in levels of production can be explained in large part by the dif-
ferent technologies oil companies had at their disposal during the two booms. 
“Throughout the area of this study the oil producing formations are relatively 
deep,” explain the authors of The Williston Report (p. 36); “most of the wells 
find ‘pay depths’ at below 8,000 feet and some at below 11,000 feet. This factor 
of depth is very important, for it constitutes a critical cost factor in the pro-
duction of oil.” The problem was that the technology was such that there was 
“no way to prove the presence of an oil reserve except to drill for it” (Kelley, p. 
195). Still, despite the risks, the potential rewards were enough to attract a 
large number of speculators:
Well drilling is an expensive operation, in particular when drilling depths 
are great. The cost of an exploratory well may range from 50,000 dollars to 
twice or three times that amount.2 The probability of success for a wildcat 
well is probably about 10 percent for the nation as a whole. On the other 
hand, the potential rewards are sufficient to induce many gamblers, large 
and small, to join the game. (Kelley, p. 195)
The rates of oil production from 1951 to 1954 reflect the limits that tech-
nology and risk placed on exploration. Williams County, of which Williston 
is the seat, produced 25,000 barrels of oil in 1951 and 6,025,000 in 1954, as 
shown in Table 2.1 (adapted from Kelley, p. 200).
TABLE 2.1. 
PRODUCTION OF CRUDE PETROLEUM, NORTH DAKOTA AND SE-
LECTED AREAS, 1951–4 (THOUSANDS OF BARRELS)
   1951 1952 1953 1954
Williams County  25 1,481 4,248 4,135
Mountrail County  0 91 900 1,253
Other   0 26 218 637
North Dakota (TOTAL) 25 1,598 5,466 6,025
By the time of the 2008–14 boom, technology such as steerable bits (which 
could be directed toward oil-rich shale) and fracking (which could force the oil 
2 Roughly $430,000–$1,200,000 in 2018 dollars, assuming an annual inflation rate 
of between 2 and 2.5 percent. As a point of comparison, in 2012, individual wells 
cost about $8–11 million to drill (Reddall 2012). The success rates made possible by 
fracking have also made it possible for oil companies to take greater financial risks.
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out once the drill had cleared a path to it) had advanced in ways that dimin-
ished some of the earlier risk. As a result, the state produced more than fifty 
times as much oil as during the 1951–4 boom. In 2012, it produced a little 
more than 240 million barrels of oil. In 2013, that number rose to about 314 
million. In 2014: 397 million. In 2015: 432 million (North Dakota Industrial 
Commission 2016). (See Figure 2.1.) Production declined in 2016, but by 2018, 
it had increased again, breaking records for monthly production in August of 
that year (Dalrymple 2018; Brady 2018).
These numbers bear further scrutiny, however. For production to increase at 
this rate, companies needed to drill wells at a furious pace because they quickly 
became inefficient. In a sense, the bust that started in 2014 was built into the 
boom from the very beginning: it had merely been hidden by the accelerated 
rates of drilling. In other words, the boom was premised on a contraction.
What exactly does this observation mean? Fracked wells produce oil most 
quickly during the first month after they come on-line. After a year, their pro-
duction drops as much as 50 percent, and after two years, as much as 70 percent. 
As a result, during the height of the Bakken boom, oil companies had to drill 
about ninety new wells a month just to hold production steady (Maugeri 2013, 
1–3), and the number of active wells ballooned from about 4,200 in 2008 to 
more than 13,700 in 2015 (North Dakota Industrial Commission 2016, xiv). 
Figure 2.1. Total annual oil production in North Dakota, 1951–2016 (source: 
North Dakota Industrial Commission 2016)
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Figure 2.3. Average annual oil production per well in North Dakota, 1951–
2016 (source: North Dakota Industrial Commission 2016)
Figure 2.2. Total number of active wells per year in North Dakota, 1951–2016 
(source: North Dakota Industrial Commission 2016)
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(See Figure 2.2. For a useful point of comparison, note that there were about 
three and a half times as many wells in 2015 as there were at the height of 
the 1980s boom, and nearly thirty times as many as during the 1950s boom.) 
In other words, many of the jobs created during the most recent boom were 
those of the people who worked the drilling rigs. Their work was in demand 
because oil companies knew the wells they drilled would slow down in a rela-
tively short time.
At the same time, however, the technology for extracting oil from shale was 
becoming more efficient, making it possible to drill wells faster and extract 
more oil from them (Maugeri 2013, 8). In the Bakken, these improvements 
translated into wells that produced twice as much oil annually as those from 
the 1980s boom (North Dakota Industrial Commission 2016, xiv). (See Figure 
2.3. Note that the statistics from the 1950s are thrown off by the fact that 
there were very few wells, which has the effect of inflating the annual average 
production per well.)
Although new technologies helped mitigate the risk oil companies incurred, 
the rates and tendencies of employment remained relatively volatile. Because 
production in shale-based fracked wells declines so quickly, oil companies feel 
drops in the price of oil acutely. As Maugeri explains, “starting production 
when the market is down means selling the bulk of a [well’s] total production 
for cheap without possibility of recovery” (2013, 11). At the same time, drilling 
new wells can be done quickly: “it takes only a few months from obtaining a 
drilling license to bringing a well online” (Maugeri 2013, 11). Thus, companies 
stop and start as oil prices fluctuate, the break-even point during the 2008–14 
boom being about $85 a barrel (Maugeri 2013, 14).
It was during the drilling stages that the fastest population growth oc-
curred in the Bakken “as a greater number of workers were required to drill the 
wells and to construct the infrastructure, such as plant structures, railways, 
and pipelines that move these commodities” (Ruddell and Ray, p. 276). To 
hedge against the volatility of oil prices, companies relied on “fly-in, fly-out” 
(or “FIFO”) workers, who could quickly start wells when called upon to do so 
but go elsewhere when production slowed. In this way, the new technologies 
for fracking shale made it possible for companies to treat their workforce as 
flexible. In effect, they could hedge against risk while maximizing gain by trans-
ferring the burden of the risk onto their workers, whose fortunes rose and fell 
with the price of oil.
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Social Impacts
As both the 1951–4 and 2008–14 booms showed, this high-risk, high-reward 
logic had impacts on the communities within whose bounds oil was found. 
During the most recent boom, the reliance on FIFO workers, for instance, 
which solved problems for oil companies while creating them for workers, had 
destabilizing effects on the boomtown communities “by reducing informal so-
cial controls, which in turn [increased] disorder and crime” (Ruddell and Ray, 
p. 276).
But the booms also revealed the complex, sometimes ambiguous nature of 
social integration. To give an example, on the one hand, respondents to the 
surveys administered for the 1958 Report thought that newcomers had been 
welcomed: “a total of 96% of the old residents and 95% of the new residents 
thought that newcomers had been accepted” (Campbell, p. 252). In a similar 
vein, the perception that booms were places characterized “a general laxity of 
law enforcement or, at least, of a greater incidence of loose spending for illegal 
and barely legal pleasures” proved to be wrong, as Williston increased its police 
budget during the boom (Campbell, p. 259).
On the other hand, according to the 1958 Report:
Conflicts on the personal level in Ray and Tioga were more apparent than 
in Williston not only in … political issues but also in general attitudes 
about people of one sort or another. One woman, whose son was a leader 
in the fight for the water system,3 reported that her neighbor had not 
spoken to her for a year as the consequence of the fight. Others referred to 
the “backwardness” of the native residents, to the “riff-raff” who came in 
to work the oil fields, and to the destruction of the close friendly relations 
between town and country since the business had begun to cater to oil 
workers, such statements reflecting an outspoken but numerically small 
group of people. (Campbell, p. 250)
Studies of the 2008–14 boom reveal similar contradictions. On the one 
hand, a recent, survey-based study showed that a range of demographic char-
acteristics, including gender, race, and years of residency, were not statistically 
significant predictors of longtime residents’ attitudes toward newcomers 
3 The dispute in question took place in Tioga and concerned whether the town 
needed a municipal water and sewer system and, if so, who should pay for it. See 
Talbot, p. 133.
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(Huynh, Robinson, Mrozla, Dahle, Archbold, and Marcel 2019). Instead, sig-
nificant predictors included longtime residents’ perceptions of crime: those 
who thought it had increased were less likely to perceive newcomers positively. 
Conversely, longtime residents who “viewed their community as a friendly 
place, believed that most people in their community can be trusted, and … [at-
tempted] to interact with new residents in their community were also more 
likely to have positive perceptions of new residents” (Huynh et al. 2019, 1003).
On the other hand, there is ample evidence to suggest that the boom 
produced anxiety for longtime residents in the region (see Ruddell and Ray, 
current volume). Frequently that anxiety focused on specific places, such as 
the Walmart on the north end of Williston. When the boom began, the store’s 
“parking lot became an informal campground” and then grew “increasingly 
crowded and rowdy, which resulted in safety concerns” (Caraher and Weber 
2017, 75; see also Caraher, Weber, and Rothaus, current volume). Many 
women felt they could not go there without men following them around (El-
igon 2013). Whether the perception resulted from a statistically significant 
increase in crime is difficult to determine, for reasons related to challenges in 
measuring the region’s population and the scant records of crime before the 
boom. Still, as Rick Ruddell (2017, 48) writes, “a 20% increase in crime may 
not be statistically significant, but that change has a substantial impact on the 
operations of the police, courts, and corrections.”
How to interpret these apparent contradictions? For one thing, it is likely 
that longtime residents felt—and feel—anxiety in some situations, but not 
all, and that the way researchers asked questions influenced what they said. It 
is entirely possible that respondents thought outsiders were welcome in a gen-
eral sense but still felt anxious when they walked through the Walmart parking 
lot. For another, these contradictions hint at the complexity of the impact of 
oil on the region, as companies and governments have hedged against the risk 
of the bust that is always on the horizon. The Williston Report and the follow-up 
chapters in this volume have only just begun to unravel this complexity. Con-
sider the points where the 2018 chapters go beyond those from 1958. Andrea 
Olive, for instance, describes how new technologies have meant more explo-
ration and, consequently, more environmental impact and more agencies 
involved. The 1958 Report describes the role of the Industrial Commission, 
which formulated conservation regulations, the North Dakota state geologist, 
who directed the State Geological Survey, and the Public Service Commission, 
which regulated public utilities. Also involved, but to lesser degrees, were the 
Tax Commission, the Board of University and School Lands, and the Bank of 
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North Dakota, the latter two having lands under lease (Talbot, p. 120–3). 
Olive expands this list to include the Water Commission, the Department of 
Health, the Department of Labor, the Game and Fish Department, and the 
Parks and Recreation Department (p. 164). The addition of these agencies 
attests to the boom’s reach and the need North Dakotans felt to address the 
impact of oil extraction on their lived and natural environments. Consider, too, 
the healthcare-related needs in the Bakken in the 2000s. While The Williston 
Report mentions hospitals only once (to discuss their economic impact [Kelley, 
p. 213]), Karin Becker, in her chapter, provides a clear picture of the workforce 
shortages and need for mental health services at seven sites across the state. 
Finally, consider the increase in human trafficking that occurred during the 
2008–14 boom. As noted above, the 1958 Report claimed that prostitution 
was not a problem in the Williston Basin. As Nikki Berg Burin argues in her 
chapter, not only was it a problem during the most recent boom, but there is 
reason to think it was also a problem six decades prior, the claims of the 1958 
authors notwithstanding.
Reading the 1958 Report Sixty Years Later
The Williston Report reveals as much about its time in what it does not say as in 
what it does. Contemporary readers bring a set of expectations to the text that 
its authors did not share, as the final chapters of this book demonstrate. For 
instance, the authors of the 1958 Report defined social problems as “any situ-
ation which is reported by people involved in it as undesirable and, therefore, 
about which they express a negative opinion” (Campbell, p. 254). Not wanting 
to impose their own sense of what constituted a problem, they relied instead 
on their informants. This choice had the effect, as Bill Caraher, Bret Weber, 
and Richard Rothaus (current volume) point out, of reproducing the basic as-
sumptions underpinning the region’s broader social structure, for instance by 
ignoring structural issues affecting the scarcity of adequate housing, which the 
authors treated as an individual, rather than social, problem. Similarly, as Nikki 
Berg Burin argues, there is reason to be skeptical about the authors’ claims that 
prostitution was not a problem. Although contemporary scholars do not have 
the same direct access to the situation as the authors of the original report, the 
laws passed in Bismarck about prostitution suggest that there was a problem 
to which lawmakers were reacting. Thus “we have to be careful consumers of 
[this] research” in reading the 1958 Report now, as Ruddell and Ray write (p. 
272). 
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Hence the value of the updated chapters, which reveal a number of patterns 
that remained latent in 1958. Such patterns relate to the logics that support 
the oil industry, in particular the way it has shifted the burden of risk onto 
workers (who fly in and out, contingent on companies’ needs) and onto the 
communities where they operate (which have to invest in infrastructure and 
housing in ways that obligate them well beyond the likely end of the boom) 
(see also Conway 2018). The concluding chapter examines these things left 
unsaid, related to social problems and risk. It also examines two of the most 
conspicuous absences from the original report, Native Americans and the en-
vironment, as well as a point where they intersect in current debates, namely 
the conflicts about oil pipelines. In this way, given the perspective provided by 
the passage of time, the mirror Sixty Years of Boom and Bust holds up is—one 
hopes!—broader and more revealing than that of the book that inspired it.
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Physical Attributes of the Area
Bernt L. Wills
Geographic Location
The oil producing area is relatively small. For the most part it consists 
of a field about thirty-five miles long (north-south) and about five 
miles wide (east-west) located astride much of the common boundary 
between Williams and Mountrail counties in northwestern North 
Dakota. Several smaller fields lie nearby. A surrounding area of con-
siderably larger size felt the impact of oil development very strongly, 
however, and is included within the area of this study. The oil field, the 
additional major impact area, and other significant features are shown 
on the map, Figure 2. It will be noted that the oil field lies about forty 
miles east of Williston, the county seat of Williams County, and about 
twenty-five miles west of Stanley, the county seat of Mountrail County.
Topography
This area constitutes a part of the Missouri Plateau, a sub-province of 
the Great Plains, and for the most part is a region of undulating plains. 
Toward the southern portion of the area a change of slope conditions 
occurs and the topography becomes much more rugged. There rela-
tively high escarpments overlook deep coulees and valleys and finally 
face upon the broad floodplain of the Missouri River. Glacial drift blan-
kets most of the area except in the bluff section in the south where 
underlying formations are exposed. These formations consist chiefly 
of shales, some sandstones, and occasional layers of “scoria.”1 Gravel 
deposits are quite common throughout the area.
1 This “scoria” is not that of most geologic literature, but is the term applied 
locally to a naturally baked clay bed.
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Geologic Situation
The Williston Basin is a geologic basin, although, as indicated above, 
it is a plains region topographically. It is a filled basin whose upper 
sedimentary formations encompass more than half of North Dakota, 
plus parts of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Montana, and South Dakota. 
This large areal extent is shown in Figure 3.
As the name implies, the Williston Basin has the general shape 
of a basin or dish. The bottom of the “dish” lies under western North 
Dakota for the most part, and in its thickest sections the sedimentary 
formations in that area have a total thickness of over 15,000 feet. This 
dipping of strata and depth situation is graphically illustrated in the 
diagrammatic geologic cross-section of North Dakota, Figure 4. This 
drawing represents the eastern portion of the dish or basin. Westward 
the basin and its structures incline upward upon the geologic exten-
sions of the Rocky Mountains.
Within the basin are structures which serve as oil traps. Of these 
the important one, for the purposes of this study, is the famous Nesson 
anticline. This structure lies east of Williston, North Dakota, trends 
roughly north-south, and is the present site of the producing wells of 
this area.
Throughout the area of this study the oil producing formations are 
relatively deep; most of the wells find “pay depths” at below 8,000 feet 
and some at below 11,000 feet. This factor of depth is very important, 
for it constitutes a critical cost factor in the production of the oil.
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FIG. 2—Williston Research Area
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FIG. 3—The Williston Basin
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FIG. 4—Diagrammatic Geologic Cross Section of  North Dakota from 
Tioga to Grand Forks
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Climate
The climate of this area, as of any area, affects not only the agricultural 
pursuits, but the efficiency and economy of men and machines in vir-
tually all fields of endeavor. It affects the comfort and the cost of living 
of the labor force. It affects the cost and convenience of transportation 
of men and of goods. In this last regard crude oil transportation is no 
exception, for climate affects depths to which pipe lines must be laid, 
as well as cost of laying and maintaining road beds for trucks or trains.
Because of its location near the center of the North American conti-
nent, Williston and vicinity has a semi-arid continental type of climate 
with relatively cold winters and warm to hot summers. During the long 
hot summer days readings of 100°F are not uncommon, but nights are 
usually cool and conducive to rest and sleep. Sunstroke is virtually un-
heard of in this dry region, and because of the dryness of the air even 
the hottest days are not as uncomfortable as they would otherwise be. 
The record maximum temperature of 110°F occurred in July of 1936. 
The average temperature for the month of July in Williston is 69.4°F. 
In winter temperatures below zero are common. The record minimum 
–50°F also occurred in 1936. When temperatures are low, however, the 
air is generally dry, with little or no wind, and the weather is clear and 
invigorating. The average temperature for the month of January in Wil-
liston is 7.9°F. Variable weather characterizes this area for it lies in the 
track of cyclonic air masses which move eastward across the continent.
This oil producing area is the driest part of the state of North Dakota. 
The weather station at Tioga, with an annual average precipitation of 
14.3 inches, has the lowest average reading of any station in the state. 
The average at Williston is 14.66 inches. Winter is the dry season. Few 
places so far north in the United States receive so little snowfall. Spring 
and early summer is the time of maximum precipitation.
The wind blows much of the time, usually from a westerly direction, 
and with an average hourly speed of about eight miles. The absence of 
violent windstorms in this area is indicated by the fact that the highest 
wind speed ever recorded at Williston was 60 miles per hour. However, 
blizzards are not uncommon in winter, and when they occur outside 
activity is brought to a halt. Fogs are infrequent and cloudy days are 
few. It is therefore, healthy, invigorating climate, favorable to physical 
and mental activity.
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Transportation Patterns and Oil Developments2
Major Transportation Routes
Figure 2 shows the major routes of supply of the area of this study. 
This pattern was not altered by the discovery and development of oil. 
It will be noted that the area is crossed by a single railroad, the main 
line of the Great Northern Railway, which serves, in order from east 
to west, the towns of Stanley, Ross, Manitou, White Earth, Tioga, Ray, 
Wheelock, Epping, Spring Brook, and Williston, each a focal point of 
local trade in the area. A branch line of the Great Northern Railway 
extends northwestward from Stanley through Powers Lake and thence 
north of the major oil producing area (FIGURE 1). This branch line is 
of minor significance to the oil producing area but the main line is very 
important.
The area is crossed only one federal road, U.S. Highway No. 2. This 
is the only continuous, first class road which crosses the area. It, like 
the railroad, connects Williston and Stanley and crosses essentially the 
same territory but follows the lines of the township and section sur-
veys, therefore nearly always running straight north-south or straight 
east-west, consequently being of somewhat greater length than the rail 
line. It misses several of the towns of the area, including Tioga.
Similarly the area of this study is served by only one state road, 
State Highway No. 40. This road runs north from U.S. Highway No. 
2 through the town of Tioga and thence northward through the Tioga 
field. It became a very heavily used road following the discovery of 
oil, and as a result had much increased maintenance costs including 
additions of gravel. It was hard surfaced from the junction with U.S. 
Highway No. 2 to Tioga in 1953; thus for three and one half miles it is 
a first-class highway.
The remaining roads shown on Figure 2 as being major routes of 
supply are gravelled county roads. The first of these, in importance, is 
the so-called Ferry Road, which extends north-south across the Beaver 
Lodge Field from U.S. Highway No. 2 to the ferry on the Missouri River. 
The other is called the Scenic Highway. It runs eastward from Williston 
through the southern portion of this study area and is of particular im-
portance to the Cafce and Hofflund Fields. It is rather fittingly named, 
as it skirts the breaks of the river and crosses small bad-lands areas.
2 Most of this section on transportation is condensed from the exhaustive work 
done on this subject by Donald H. Poole, “The Impact of Oil Upon the Road 
Patterns and Road Surfaces which Serve the Tioga-Beaver Lodge Oil Pools” 
(unpublished research paper, Department of Geography, Northwestern Uni-




FIG. 5—Tioga Beaver Ledge Fields: Major Routes of Supply
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FIG. 6—Transportation Patterns, 1949
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Comparison of Road Patterns, 1949 and 1954
A comparative study of the road systems of 1949 and 1954 as shown 
in Figures 5 and 6 point out three significant facts: (1) as previously 
stated, the basic road patterns remained unchanged, (2) most of the 
construction occurred within the oil producing districts, (3) most of 
the construction consisted of well-access roads, although there was 
some extension and improvement of township and county roads.
It may be noticed that the maps in Figures 5 and 6 show certain pat-
terns which are identical on each of those but which are omitted from 
Figure 4. Figure 4 shows the major arteries, and the additional roads 
shown on Figures 5 and 6, while very important locally, are tributary to 
the major routes.
One relatively minor change in road pattern occurred south of the 
Beaver Lodge Field. Here new construction in 1954 resulted in the re-
routing of the Scenic Highway two miles northward, in that area, and 
thence eastward along the southern boundary of Dry Fork Township. 
The older road was abandoned to the backwaters of the Garrison Dam 
project.
Road Patterns Within the Oil Fields
Figures 7 and 8 show in considerable detail the road patterns within 
the oil producing districts, as of July, 1954. It is significant that most of 
the road mileage shown on these maps is a direct result of oil discovery 
and development. For the most part these roads are well-access roads 
and feeder lines to the major routes of travel.
These roads are graded and are intended for all-weather use al-
though some are lacking in special surfacing. Many are scoria topped 
and some are gravelled. The added mileage due to oil development is 
about 100 miles, and this added mileage is almost entirely the result of 
expenditures by the oil interests, particularly the Amerada Petroleum 
Corporation, which controls about 85% of the production.
As shown on the maps, most of the oil wells, and most of the added 
road mileage, are found in 8 townships. Six of those are in Williams 
County and two are in Mountrail.
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FIG. 7—Transportation Pattern, 1954
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Traffic Flow—Traffic count data are available for 1950 through 
June, 1954, for U.S. Highway No. 2; but for State Highway No. 40 the 
data are available only for the years 1951 and 1953 (TABLE I). No traffic 
count data are available for roads of the county system, nevertheless 
certain roads of the county system do carry a considerable portion of 
the traffic, including the oil traffic. This is especially true of those in 
the Beaver Lodge Field, and on the basis of field observation it may 
reasonably be assumed that the traffic count on certain of the county 
roads, such as the Ferry Road, would approximate the figures given for 
State Highway No. 40.
FIG. 8—Tioga Field: Road Pattern and Well Location
47
An analysis of Table I shows a pronounced increase in vehicular 
traffic for each of the years following the discovery of oil. However, it is 
necessary to remember that this increase in traffic includes all vehicles 
using the roads, not merely those involved in the oil activity. Thus to a 
certain, but to an indeterminate, amount other factors combined with 
the oil activity to account for the increases.
Perhaps more important than volume of traffic and its increase, 
as results of oil development, was the increase in weights of vehicles 
used on the roads. Oil drilling rigs and associated equipment are very 
ponderous and weighty, and heavy loads on heavy trucks and dollies 
are an integral part of oil development. Thus, almost every facet of the 
oil program brought increased burdens and wear upon a road system 
which had been built to serve a relatively simple agricultural economy.
Table I
TRAFFIC COUNT—U.S. HIGHWAY NO. 2
WILLISTON TO STANLEY
Comparison of Average Daily Traffic for All Days of each month at 
Automatic Traffic Counter
   1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
January  335 437 450 936 766
February 370 417 641 968 909
March  502 356 749 1060 928
April  697 814 1200 1346 1103
May  630 815 1236 1361 1185
June  929 1043 1473 1767 1688
July  1194 1265 1854 1961
August  1176 1253 1860 2125
September 1011 1016 1498 1732
October  828 923 1389 1464
November 665 800 1219 1162
December 541 500 1084 924
Annual Average —— —— —— —— ——
24 Hr. Traffic 740 809 1221 1401 ......
State Highway No. 40—Annual Average 24 Hr. Traffic
1951—Junction No. 2 to Tioga 610
Tioga to McGregor Junction 370
1953—Junction No. 2 to Tioga 2615
Tioga to McGregor Junction 590
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Roadway Construction and Maintenance
Road construction in the area under survey was renewed in 1951 fol-
lowing the discovery of oil. New road construction by Williams and 
Mountrail counties was insignificant for their highway expenditures 
were directed to maintenance of existing roads. However, considerable 
construction was done by the state of North Dakota and by the Am-
erada Petroleum Corporation.
FIG. 9—Beaver Lodge Field: Road Pattern and Well Location
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Table II shows actual expenditures for road construction and for 
maintenance during the period 1950–June, 1954, by the state of North 
Dakota, by Amerada Petroleum Corporation and by Williams County. 
The expenditures by Williams County are almost entirely for mainte-
nance. Table III shows the expenditures for Williams County by the 
state of North Dakota for each year.
An analysis of these tables shows a significant increase in expendi-
tures during the period of oil development. Percentagewise the greatest 
costs are involved in routine surface operations.
As in the case of increased traffic, not all of the increase in mainte-
nance costs can be attributed to the oil development program, but that 
the oil program contributed cannot be questioned.
The harshness of the cold winter season and one of its effects on 
road maintenance is evidenced by the percentage of maintenance costs 
involved in controlling snow and ice. For the four-year period 1950–
1954 approximately 15 per cent of all maintenance expenditures were 
so utilized.
TABLE II
N.D. HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION COSTS, JANUARY, 1950 TO 
JUNE, 1954 BY AGENCY AND BY TYPE OF EXPENDITURE
State of North Dakota
Highway No. 40
Tioga to Jct. ½ mile south of McGregor (1952) - 14 miles ..............$18,002.30
Tioga Jct. to Tioga (1953) - 3½ miles   .............................................36,772.63
Highway No. 2
Ross to Stanley (1953) - 8 miles ........................................................81,151.82
Tioga Jct. to Ross (1953) - 18 miles ..................................................241,304.27
Ray east to Tioga Jct. (1954) - 10½ miles  ........................................145,428.25




Period from April, 1950 to June, 1954
Construction of Roads.................................................................... $475,285.43
Maintenance of Roads .................................................................... 121,604.06
Removal of Snow    .........................................................................  42,986.00         
          ———— 
       $639,875.49
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ROAD AND BRIDGE EXPENDITURES
Williams County
  Federal Aid Other Road Expenditures—County
1954–55  $62,535.36 $380,281.70
1953–54  105,633.36 291,491.25
1952–53  55,970.86 257,596.78
1951–52    236,312.97
1950–51    259,231.16
  ———————————
  $224,140.18 $1,424,913.86    
     224,140.18
    ——————
    $1,649,154.04
Pipelines
The preceding discussion has dealt solely with surface transportation, 
and in the early days of the oil development program that was the only 
means of transportation, even for the crude oil. By 1955, however, vir-
tually all of the crude produced in the study area was being transported 
by buried pipe lines.
The system is as follows: In the oil fields there is a collection system 
wherein pipe lines three or four inches in diameter, lead from the 
wells to larger (six and eight inch) main lines which carry the oil to 
Tioga. At Tioga there is a pumping station which starts the oil on its 
way to Mandan, North Dakota, approximately 175 miles distant. From 
Tioga the oil moves southward through a ten inch line to the Ramberg 
pumping station in the Beaver Lodge field. From there the line ex-
tends southward as a 12 inch line approximately 70 miles to the Keene 
pumping station south of the Missouri River. From Keene the oil is 
pumped southeastward approximately 95 miles through a 16 inch line 




MAINTENANCE EXPENDITURES FOR WILLIAMS COUNTY 
BY THE NORTH DAKOTA STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, 
1950–1954
  1950 1951 1952 1953
Routine Roadway 
Surface Operations $16,822.00 $15,598.00 $37,045.00 $49,737.00
Shoulders and 
Side Approaches 76.00 19.00 77.00 216.00
Roadside and 
Drainage 3,068.00 2,848.00 3,869.00 2,469.00
Removal of 
Weeds and Brush 1,651.00 2,324.00 2,692.00 4,386.00
Traffic Services 1,005.00 3,113.00 1,673.00 5,728.00
Sand, Ice and 
Snow Control 1,332.00 1,662.00 1,691.00 2,115.00
Sand, Ice and 
Snow Removal 5,379.00 6,263.00 5,742.00 4,291.00
Prorated Accounts 1,098.00 915.00 2,861.00 2,344.00
Special Roadway 
Surface Operations ...... ...... 26,205.00 ......
  $30,432.00 $32,742.00 $81,856.00 $71,286.00
January through June, 1954
Routine Roadway Surface Operations ...................... $15,674.00
Roadside and Drainage.............................................. 566.00
Removal of Weeds and Brush ................................... 134.00
Traffic Services .......................................................... 2,465.00
Sand, Ice and Snow Control ...................................... 547.00
Sand, Ice and Snow Removal .................................... 1,919.00
    ——————
    $21,305.00
Similarly the natural gas from the oil fields, formerly “flared” into 
the atmosphere, is now brought by a pipe line collection system to the 
Signal Oil and Gas Company’s Tioga-Beaver Lodge Gasoline plant at 
Tioga where propane, butane, natural gasoline and sulphur are ex-
tracted from the gas. The remaining “sweetened” natural gas is sent by 
pipe line for domestic and industrial uses to points east as far as Minot, 
west to Williston.
Surplus gas not used when produced is piped into Montana where 
it is returned underground into natural storage.
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Population Characteristics of Williams and Mountrail Counties3
In recent decades, North Dakota has been one of those few states expe-
riencing a decline in population. This fact has in large measure resulted 
from the prevailing character of the American agricultural scene, in 
a state where a relatively narrow agricultural economy is dominant. 
Fewer and larger farms with an increase in the numbers of non-resi-
dent farm operators has resulted in a steady decline in rural settlement 
with an accompanying increase in the urban areas, and an exodus of 
youth from the state due to limited opportunities. The development 
of any newly found resources is bound to stimulate hope in such an 
area. This trait has been notable in the enthusiastic manner with which 
the opening of the Williston Oil Basin was greeted. The population 
features associated with this event provide an indication of how such 
developments may or may not assist in easing the state’s problems.
General Characteristics
Williams and Mountrail Counties, the principal counties affected by the 
oil industry to 1954, have traditionally been noted for their wheat and 
cattle industries. Reflecting the extensive system of land use essential 
in this subhumid zone, the settlement pattern consisted of dispersed 
farmsteads, occasional hamlets, and a single small urban center. Then, 
as now, the populations of both counties were classified as rural farm 
or rural non-farm with the lone exception of Williston. Since 1930, 
the general trend in population has seen a steady decline in rural farm 
residents, a fairly constant population level being maintained in the 
rural-nonfarm hamlets, and a constant rise occurring in Williston.
It is against this distribution of people that the recent alterations in 
terms of arrangement and numbers developed. The effects of the oil in-
dustry have brought numerous changes to this general area; however, 
significant developments have been limited to a rather small portion of 
the two counties. This area where the bulk of activity has taken place 
includes Williston, functioning as the supply and service center; Tioga, 
Tioga Environs, and Ray, the small villages located in the heart of the 
oil area, all in Williams County; the Impact Townships of both coun-
ties; and the county seat of Mountrail County, Stanley (FIGURE 2). 
These centers will on occasion be referred to as the oil affected areas.
3 This section was written by Richard V. Smith. It is based upon the data col-
lected by the University of North Dakota field research team in the summer of 
1954.
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The Number of Inhabitants
Between 1950 and 1954, the population of Williams County increased 
by 26.8% while that of Mountrail County decreased by 5.5% (TABLE 
IV).4 However, a basic pattern of change existed in both counties. The 
statewide trend of declining rural numbers persisted here, both within 
the oil impact townships and throughout the remainder of the rural 
area. In marked contrast to this rural reduction is the sharp increase 
noted in each of those nonfarm centers affected by the oil development.
TABLE IV
WILLISTON BASIN AREA: NUMBER OF INHABITANTS 
1950–1954
 POPULATION   PER CENT CHANGE
 1940 1950 1954 1940–50 1950–54
WILLIAMS
Williston 5,790 7,378 9,717 +27.4 +31.7
Ray 579 721 1,479 +24.5 +105.1
Tioga 385 456 1,608 +18.4 +252.6
Tioga Environs ...... ...... 931 ...... ......
Impact 
Townships1 1,915 1,392 1,236 –27.3 –11.2
Other Rural2 6,018 4,923 4,372 –18.2 –11.2
Hamlets 1,628 1,572 1,500 –3.4 –4.6
Total 
Williams Co. 16,315 16,442 20,843 +0.8 +26.8
Total Oil Areas3 8,669 9,947 14,971 +14.7 +50.5
MOUNTRAIL
Stanley 1,058 1,486 1,645 +40.5 +10.7
Impact 
Townships1 720 562 528 –21.9 –6.0
Other Rural2 6,362 4,675 4,224 –26.5 –9.6
Hamlets 2,342 2,695 2,500 +15.1 –7.2
Total 
Mountrail Co. 10,482 9,418 8,897 +10.1 –5.5
Total Oil Areas3 1,778 2,048 2,173 +15.2 +6.1
1. Depicted in Fig. 2
2. Rural farm areas other than impact townships.
3. Williston, Ray, Tioga, Tioga Environs, Impact Townships in Williams County. 
Stanley and Impact Townships in Mountrail County. 
SOURCE: 1940—United States Bureau of the Census.
1950—United States Bureau of the Census
1954—Projections from sample census. 
4 Appendix A  is devoted to a discussion of the methods used in obtaining 1954 
figures.
54
Rates of increase in these centers reflect their location with respect 
to the principal areas of interest and the functions which each center 
performed in this development. Tioga, Tioga Environs, and Ray ben-
efited enormously as logical sites for settling migrants involved in the 
establishment and operation of the fields. Williston became the central 
supply and focal point for the oil industry, while Stanley absorbed the 
overflow resulting from crowded facilities in the other, more ideally lo-
cated, towns.
In general it would seem that Williams County has, at least for the 
present, benefited considerably in terms of population change. Moun-
trail County, on the other hand, exhibits a pattern typical at the moment 
of most rural North Dakota counties, with the steady rural decline and 
the relatively slight but steady growth of the county seat. This general 
picture of alterations in population directly reflects the advantages 
possessed by Williams County as the area of principal interest and the 
logical site for location of installations and personnel.
Age and Sex Composition
While all of those areas affected by the oil industry possessed a net pop-
ulation increase, with the exception of the rural impact townships, the 
relative importance of that increase varied from area to area as noted 
above. This same pattern exists with reference to the proportions of 
people in the several age groups. In general, those areas most affected, 
the rural non-farm villages, showed significant relative increases in the 
younger age groups. Two age groups are particularly notable: first, that 
from 20–29 years with 19.6% of the total population in 1954 against 
12.9% in 1950, and secondly, that from 0–4 with 18.1% in 1954 com-
pared with 11.1% in 1950. (TABLES V, VI, VII). This pattern would 
seem to reflect the oil industries’ need for a considerable youthful el-
ement in the labor force, composed in this instance of young married 
men whose children were within the youngest age category.
Complementing these changes was the relative decline in the other 
age groups. Most significant of these was the sharp decline in the oldest 
group, those over 65 years of age. The trend in these rural non-farm 
centers was towards a much more youthful population level.
Urban Williston possessed a stabler pattern, though relative in-
creases enhanced the importance of the 0–4 and 5–19 groups. Again the 
complementing factor was a decline in the 30–64 and 65 age groups.
In contrast to these non-farm centers, the rural impact townships 
retained expected rural characteristics. Reflecting the continuing 
55
agricultural occupation of the people, a generally older age pattern ex-
isted. No marked changes occurred in the age groups between 1950 
and 1954.
The age composition of these oil affected areas indicates the ex-
tent to which individual areas were altered by these developments. 
As the impact of the new industry increased in terms of areas, more 
pronounced effects on the age groupings were felt, with a trend to a 
younger age level.
Significant changes in the ratio of men to women are not apparent. 
Both the total and relative importance of each group remained rela-
tively constant in population totals, age group totals, and between the 
several areas concerned. The one notable exception to this character-
istic occurs in Williston where in the 20–29 age group, the number 
of males increased whereas the relative number of females declined 
markedly.
Marital Status and Relation to Head of Household
Marital status characteristics varied considerably from area to area, 
depending in large measure upon the type of activities carried on and 
upon the intensity of the oil industry’s impact. In general, there is a 
higher percentage of married males in the more urbanized areas while 
the reverse is true for females, though on a much reduced scale (TABLE 
VIII). In the former case, about 40% of the rural-farm male population 
was single compared with only 17–20% of the women in such areas. In 
the urban area the figure for both sexes is similar, about 20%. In the 
rural non-farm areas, these figures vary considerably depending upon 
the stability of the area; for example, in Tioga 28.9% of the men were 
single whereas in Ray 21.5% were single. Similar variations might be 
noted, but the pattern remains essentially that of the generalization 
stated above.
Relation to the head of the family presents a relatively constant pic-
ture throughout the counties. Certain variations from the standard are 
notable, however, as for instance the higher percentages of sons than 
daughters in the rural farm areas; no doubt this is an adjustment to 
the labor requirements inherent in agriculture (TABLE IX). Lodgers 
and hired workers as members of households are found in the area of 
maximum migratory labor, the rural non-farm centers.
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TABLE V
WILLISTON: NUMBER OF INHABITANTS BY AGE AND SEX, 
1950 AND 1954
Age MALE    FEMALE   TOTAL
   1950  1954  1950  1954  1950  1954
  No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
0–4
  485 13.1  785 15.9 420 11.4 713 14.9 905 12.3 1498 15.4
5–19
  861 23.3 1191 24.1 878 23.8 1359 28.4 1739 23.6 2550 26.2
20–29
  543 14.7 805 16.3 629 17.1 665 13.9 1172 15.9 1470 15.1
30–64
  1405 38.1 1720 34.8 1411 38.3 1651 34.5 2816 38.2 3371 34.7
65 and over
  400 10.8 346 7.0 346 9.4 297 6.2 746 10.0 643 6.6
No data
  ...... ...... 89 1.9 ....... ..... 96 2.1 ....... ..... 185 2.0
TOTAL
  3694 100 4936 100 3684 100 4781 100 7378 100 9717 100




RURAL NONFARM:* NUMBER OF INHABITANTS BY AGE AND 
SEX, 1950 AND 1954
Age  MALE   FEMALE   TOTAL
   1950  1954  1950  1954  1950  1954
   No. % No.  % No.  % No.  % No.  % No.  %
0–4
  150 10.8 507 16.7 145 11.4 518 19.8 295 11.1 1025 18.1
5–19
  351 25.2 703 23.1 362 28.5 645 24.6 713 26.8 1348 23.8
20–29
  174 12.5 556 18.3 169 13.3 555 21.2 343 12.9 1111 19.6
30–64
  510 36.6 962 31.6 460 36.2 682 26.0 970 36.4 1644 29.0
65 and over
  208 14.9 134 4.4 134 10.6 147 5.6 342 12.8 281 4.9
No Data
  ............ 179 5.9 ............ 75 2.8 ............ 254 4.6
TOTAL
  1393 100 3041 100 1270 100 2622 100 2663 100 5663 100
* Ray, Tioga, Tioga Environs, Stanley.




RURAL FARM:* NUMBER OF INHABITANTS BY AGE AND SEX, 
1950 AND 1954
Age  MALE    FEMALE    TOTAL
   1950  1954  1950  1954  1950  1954
  No.  % No. % No. % No.  % No.  % No. %
0–4
  131 11.8 104 10.4 124 14.6 100 13.2 255 13.0 204 11.6
5–19
  272 24.6 268 26.8 240 28.3 224 29.3 512 26.2 492 27.8
20–29
  139 12.6 124 12.4 105 12.4 108 14.2 244 12.5 232 13.1
30–64
  444 40.1 412 41.3 315 37.1 264 34.6 759 38.8 676 38.3
65 and over
  120 10.9 84 8.3 64 7.6 64 8.3 184 9.5 148 8.5
No Data
  ............ 8 0.8 ............ 4 0.4 ............ 12 0.7
TOTAL
  1106 100 992 100 848 100 760 100 1954 100 1764 100
*Impact Townships of Williams and Mountrail County




PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL STATUS FOR THOSE 
14 YEARS YEARS OF AGE AND OVER, 1954
 Williston Ray Tioga Tioga Stanley Williams Montrail
     Environs  County County
MALE (number) 
 3262 503 641 354 569 496 204
Marital Status (percent)
Married 73.6 73.0 56.0 64.6 70.6 54.8 54.9
Single  20.6 21.5 28.9 21.5 25.4 40.3 39.2
Divorced or
 separated 0.4 0.6 1.5 ...... ...... ...... ......
Widowed 4.3 1.8 3.0 ...... 4.0 3.2 5.9
No Data 0.1 3.1 10.5 13.9 ...... 1.6 ......
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
FEMALE (number)
 3140 429 446 241 557 352 160
Marital Status (percent)
Married 71.2 80.0 78.9 96.1 64.9 75.0 67.5
Single 18.3 11.4 13.5 3.9 18.0 17.0 20.0
Divorced or
 separated 1.4 2.1 ...... ...... 0.5 ...... 2.5
Widowed 8.5 5.7 7.0 ...... 9.5 6.8 10.0
No Data 0.6 0.7 0.5 ...... 7.1 1.1 ......
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
MALE & 
FEMALE (number) 
 6402 932 1087 595 1126 848 364
Marital status (percent)
Married 72.4 76.2 65.4 76.9 67.7 63.2 60.4
Single 19.4 16.8 22.6 14.6 21.6 30.7 30.8
Divorced or 
 separated 0.9 1.3 0.9 ...... 0.2 ...... 1.1
Widowed 6.4 3.6 4.7 ...... 6.8 4.7 7.7
No Data 0.4 2.0 6.4 8.5 3.6 1.4 ......
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Projections from sample census. 
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TABLE IX
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF RELATION TO HEAD OF 
FAMILY, 1954
 Williston Ray Tioga Tioga Stanley Impact Areas 
    Environs  William & Mountrail
Head 27.5 26.6 25.1 28.7 28.3 26.1
Wife 22.5 23.9 21.7 23.8 23.1 20.0
Son 21.8 26.2 21.1 18.8 21.7 28.6
Daughter 20.8 18.5 20.2 20.8 21.0 18.6
Lodger-Hired 
 Worker 2.1 3.5 8.8 6.4 3.7 0.7
Relatives 2.1 1.2 2.2 0.5 1.9 5.4
No Data 3.2 ...... 0.7 1.0 0.3 0.7
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(Number) 9717 1479 1608 931 1645 1764
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.
Persons and Families by Dwelling Types
The relative stability of population numbers is in part indicated by the 
type of dwelling occupied (TABLE X). In basically more stable areas 
such as Williston and the rural farm impact townships, dwelling types 
were almost exclusively of a permanent single or multiple nature.
TABLE X
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF PERSONS BY RESIDENCE TYPE, 
1954
  Total  Single  Trailer  Multiple  Other 
  Persons Persons Persons Persons Persons
Williston Number 9717 7025 408 2274 10
 Percent 100.0 72.3 4.2 23.4 0.1
Ray Number 1479 686 558 229 6
 Percent 100.0 46.4 37.7 15.5 0.4
Tioga Number 1608 1093 343 172 ......
 Percent 100.0 68.0 21.3 10.7 ......
Tioga Number 931 253 465 100 113
Environs Percent 100.0 27.2 50.0 10.7 12.1
Stanley Number 1645 1073 321 239 12
 Percent 100.0 65.2 19.5 14.5 0.8
Impact Number 1236 1205 17 14 ......
Willians Percent 100.0 97.5 1.4 1.1 ......
Impact Number 528 528 ...... ...... ......
Mountrail Percent 100.0 100.0 ...... ...... ......
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.
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However, in those areas of maximum relative recent population 
increase, the rural non-farm centers, this pattern is in large measure 
reversed. Here, the recent importation of labor for development and 
operation of the oil fields has resulted in severe taxing of available per-
manent dwellings. Here also have settled those workers whose jobs 
are in large part related to the development of a single aspect of the 
installations and whose tenure in a given area is likely to be of a rather 
short duration. As a consequence the number of trailers was of great 
significance in those areas. In 1954 in Ray 37.7% of the population 
occupied trailers, in Tioga 21.3%, and in the Tioga Environs 50%. Mul-
tiple dwellings are of recent origin in all of these areas except Williston, 
where this type of dwelling is more common. The numbers living in 
multiple dwellings become progressively less as less urbanized condi-
tions are encountered.
The average household size throughout the area of study was rel-
atively constant (SEE TABLE XI). Larger household units (3.8) were 
found in rural farm areas, the smaller in the more urbanized areas 
(3.65). This pattern is roughly similar to the general range of household 
sizes normally found.
Migration Characteristics
The bulk of the population increase in Williams and Mountrail Coun-
ties has resulted from in-migration stimulated by the development of 
the oil industry. The general pattern throughout the area of study re-
flects the degree to which the industry has affected each of these areas. 
As would be expected, the rural farm impact townships have been the 
stablest areas, with slightly over 80% of their population having been 
resident in 1950 (TABLE XII). Williston, the largest and most diverse 
center, had 66.7% of its 1954 population having been resident in 1950. 
Stanley, the least affected of the rural non-farm areas, had 61.4% of 
its population then resident. Ray and Tioga, both basically altered in 
character by the proximity of the fields, had 39.7% and 34.6% respec-
tively having been resident in 1950. Tioga Environs has the distinction 
of having been nonexistent in 1950, hence owing its new settlement 
exclusively to the oil industry.
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TABLE XI
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF FAMILIES, BY RESIDENCE, TYPE, 
AND AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD SIZE, 1954
  Total  Single  Trailer  Multiple  Other  Average
  Families Families Families Families Families Household
       Families
Williston
 Number 2662 1858 112 689 3 3.65
 Percent 100.0 69.8 4.2 25.9 0.1
Ray
 Number 390 192 145 50 3 3.79
 Percent 100.0 49.2 37.1 12.9 0.8
Tioga
 Number 433 297 102 34 ...... 3.71
 Percent 100.0 68.7 23.5 7.8 ......
Tioga Environs
 Number 248 68 135 9 36 3.75
 Percent 100.0 27.3 54.5 3.6 14.6
Stanley
 Number 467 305 82 71 9 3.52
 Percent 100.0 65.4 17.6 15.1 1.9
Impact Williams
 Number 325 312 8 5 ...... 3.80
 Percent 100.0 96.0 2.6 1.3 ......
Impact Mountrail
 Number 136 136 ...... ...... ...... 3.87
 Percent 100.0 100.0 ...... ...... ......
SOURCE: Projections from sample census. 
Each of these areas drew a part of its population increase from 
nearby tributary areas; however, the bulk of the increase was attracted 
from some distance. A portion of these in-migrants came from the re-
mainder of North Dakota and from contiguous states. However, very 
considerable proportions have come from more remote states, mainly 
the principal oil states of the southern Great Plains. In this latter cat-
egory, 10.2% of Williston’s 1954 population, 44% of Ray’s, 21.4% of 
Tioga’s, and 55.6% of Tioga Environs were attracted from these more 
distant points. By and large, these individuals were permanently con-
nected with the larger oil companies engaged in the development of the 
Williston Oil Basin, and in some considerable part might be considered 
a floating element of the population; that is, being continually on call 
for transfer to some new site of development. The importance of this 
group and the nature of their functions will probably be reflected in the 
persistent shifts and fluctuations of the population totals of the centers 
where they are now resident.
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TABLE XII
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF INHABITANTS BY 1950 
RESIDENCE 
 Williston Ray Tioga Tioga Stanley Williams Mountrail 
      Environs County County
MALE:
Same 66.7 36.8 35.2 ..... 59.1 83.8 85.7
Within Area 4.9 4.7 9.8 10.3 10.1 4.8 3.2
Other 
North Dakota 11.4 8.5 25.4 24.4 16.0 0.6 7.9
Contiguous 
States 5.6 2.3 8.5 6.4 3.4 3.0 1.6
All Other 11.2 47.7 21.1 58.9 11.3 7.8 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(Number) 4151 650 805 382 697 648 248
FEMALE:
Same 66.8 43.2 33.9 ...... 63.6 76.0 77.8
Within Area 5.9 5.7 12.9 7.8 12.8 9.1 13.0
Other 
North Dakota  13.0 9.7 23.4 35.9 12.8 0.8 7.4
Contiguous
States 5.1 1.7 8.1 4.7 3.1 4.1 1.8
All Other 9.3 39.7 21.7 51.6 9.1 8.0 ......
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(Number) 4068 525 578 296 705 460 204
MALE AND FEMALE:
Same 66.7 39.7 34.6 ...... 61.4 80.1 82.1
Within Area 5.4 5.2 11.2 9.2 11.4 6.6 7.7
Other 
North Dakota 12.2 9.0 24.5 29.6 14.3 0.7 7.7
Contiguous 
States 5.4 2.1 8.3 5.6 2.7 3.5 1.7
All Other 10.2 44.0 21.4 55.6 10.0 8.7 .8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(Number) 8219 1175 1383 678 1402 1108 452
SOURCE: Projections from sample census. 
The bulk of the in-migrants to this area were in the age groups from 
5–9, 20–29, and 30–39 years, again reflecting the relatively youthful 
manpower needs of the industry and the composition of these workers’ 
families (TABLE XIII). In terms of the male-female ratio, the total 
in-migrants were about 55% male and 45% female.
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Employment and Labor Force Characteristics
The current characteristics of the population’s economic activities are 
dealt with in a later section of this report. The concern here is with 
the changes in industry group status of workers as indicated by their 
activities in 1950 and 1954.
In the urban area, Williston, the industrial group categories showing 
the greatest increase were mining and construction, trade and services. 
The increases in these categories reflect initially the development of 
the oil fields and secondly the increases in those activities which di-
rectly serve the industry and the individuals employed by the industry. 
In general, recruits into these activities were drawn rather equally from 
original residents of the area and from migrants. (TABLES XIV, XV).
TABLE XIII
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF INHABITANTS BY AGE BY 1950 
RESIDENCE
 5-9 10-13 14 15-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-64 65+ No  TOT.
          Data
WILLISTON:
Resident 13.1 9.3 1.7 8.7 12.6 15.8 13.1 14.3 9.9 1.5 100.0
Migrant 18.5 5.8 0.8 4.1 31.6 22.5 9.2 4.7 2.4 0.4 100.0
No Data 2.3 2.3 ...... 13.7 38.6 31.8 9.1 2.2 ...... ...... 100.0
RAY:
Resident 9.3 7.6 2.3 8.1 19.7 9.9 13.4 11.2 17.4 1.1 100.0
Migrant 18.0 7.0 1.5 6.5 34.5 25.5 4.0 3.0 ...... ...... 100.0
No Data ...... ....... ...... ..... 33.3 50.0 ...... 16.7 ...... ...... 100.0
TIOGA AND TIOGA ENVIRONS:
Resident 12.7 6.9 2.3 11.2 15.0 15.4 15.8 8.5 10.8 0.8 100.0
Migrant 15.5 6.7 1.5 5.7 26.8 23.2 12.8 3.7 0.2 3.9 100.0
No Data ...... ...... 7.4 11.1 29.7 11.1 22.2 18.5 ...... ...... 100.0
STANLEY:
Resident 9.6 8.1 3.8 10.2 15.0 9.3 12.3 13.8 12.6 5.3 100.0
Migrant 19.7 4.9 ...... 4.9 37.7 23.8 6.5 1.6 ...... 0.9 100.0
No Data 4.8 14.3 4.8 4.8 19.1 43.0 ...... 9.2 ...... ...... 100.0
WILLIAMS AND MOUNTRAIL COUNTY:
Resident  13.6 8.3 1.2 8.0 12.4 13.6 14.2 16.9 10.9 0.9 100.0
Migrant 24.4 4.9 2.4 4.9 30.0 19.6 2.4 9.8 2.4 ...... 100.0
No Data ...... 8.3 ...... 16.7 33.3 16.7 8.3 16.7 ...... ...... 100.0
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TABLE XIV
WILLISTON: RESIDENCE AND INDUSTRY GROUP FOR EM-
PLOYED PERSONS, 1950 AND 1954
 Residents Migrants No Data Total
 1950 1954 1950 1954 1950 1954 1950 1954
Industry
Agriculture
 247 214 94 25 ...... ...... 341 239
Mining & Construction
 176 305 204 292 ...... 16 380 613
Manufacturing, Durable
 13 9 4 12 ...... ...... 17 21
Manufacturing, Non-Durable
 36 66 24 21 ...... 4 60 91
Transportation, Communications, & Public Utilities
 357 401 69 107 ...... 4 426 512
Trade
 421 603 78 263 ...... 65 499 931
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate
 57 89 25 32 ...... 8 82 129
Service
 386 458 66 107 ...... 21 452 586
Public Administration
 439 98 262 48 ...... 16 701 162
No Data
 200 83 131 49 ...... ...... 331 132
TOTAL
 2332 2326 957 956 ...... 134 3289 3416
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.
Industrial group classifications for those workers residing within 
the oil field itself (rural non-farm and rural farm) indicated a simpler 
pattern. The major change occurred in the mining and construction 
category, which accounted for 16.2% of the workers in 1950 and 37.4% 




IMPACT AREAS OTHER THAN WILLISON: RESIDENCE AND 
INDUSTRY GROUP FOR EMPLOYED PERSONS, 1950 AND 1954
Ray, Tioga and Tioga Environs, Stanley, Williams & Mountrail Impact Townships:
 Residents Migrants No Data Total
 1950 1954 1950 1954 1950 1954 1950 1954
Industry
Agriculture
 639 641 99 31 ...... 12 738 684
Mining & Construction
 81 199 314 658 ...... 123 395 980
Manufacturing, Durable
 ..... ....... 6 ...... ...... ...... 6 ......
Manufacturing, Non-Durable
 3 5 11 ...... ....... ...... 14 5
Transportation, Communications, & Public Utilities
 79 112 41 79 ...... 6 120 197
Trade
 168 243 88 131 ...... 6 256 380
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate
 9 20 6 12 ....... ...... 15 32
Service
 72 133 45 60 ...... 3 117 196
Public Administration
 228 43 188 11 ...... 5 416 59
No Data
 147 32 213 46 ...... 6 360 84
TOTAL
 1426 1428 1011 1028 ...... 161 2437 2617
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.
Indicated Changes 1954–1955
During the summer of 1955, a field survey was made to observe changes 
occurring since the exhaustive field study of 1954, from which the fore-
going statistics were derived. The impression left by this check survey 
and reinforced by the statements of numerous residents of the area was 
that a contraction in activities had developed.
Available evidence indicates that the peak of the oil boom was ex-
perienced during the summer of 1954, followed by a decline initiated 
by the exit of refinery and pipe line construction workers, and rig crews 
as drilling moved south of the Missouri River. In a more positive sense, 
the attitude was simply that the area was reaching a level of stability 
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adjusted to the present apparent potentials of the area and the likely 
exploitation of the oil resource in the near future.
The significance of this would seem to lie in the characteristic labor 
demands of the oil industry. During the exploration and development 
stages a very sizable labor force is required. However, this long term 
phase following that initial development, that is, the production stage, 
is marked by much reduced labor requirements in a rather highly 
mechanized industry. This character of the industry remains valid as 
long as subsidiary industries based on the resource do not locate in the 
area. As of this writing such developments have not taken place.
Population trends during the year following the field study and 
census are distinctly downward. The extent of this decline varies mark-
edly from area to area with the most notable changes having occurred 
in Ray and Tioga Environs. In the former, a local official estimated that 
the decline had reached something over 300 people. This estimate was 
supported by a count of the temporary housing units in Ray which re-
vealed the following: of the four trailer courts within the town limits, 
one remained full; a second had 23 units, compared to a 1954 peak 
of 59; and the fourth had 13 units; a third had 33 units, compared to 
a 1954 peak of 102 units; a third had 33 units, compared to a peak of 
59; and the fourth had 13 units and a capacity of 18. Ray’s decline is 
further supported by such events as the mid-year cancelling of one of 
the two original first grade sections in the local school, the considerable 
number (17 of 34) of empty units in a modern housing development of 
duplexes, and the fact that just five new permanent residences were 
built during the period from September, 1954 to July, 1955.
Similar patterns are evident on a lesser scale in the other centers. It 
would seem that the centers in question are reaching a lower but more 
stable population level which is likely to persist for some time.
Chapter 4
The Geographic Setting of the 
Bakken Oil Shale Play 
Bradley C. Rundquist and Gregory S. Vandeberg
Introduction
Oil development in northwestern North Dakota has expanded greatly since 
the 1958 Williston Report, with oil fields covering most areas of the counties 
including the towns of Williston and Stanley. Petroleum development on a re-
gional scale has also changed from the Williston Basin in 1958 to the Bakken 
Formation at present, with much overlap between the two. This chapter fo-
cuses on the changing physical and human geography of the region, including 
oil production and population dynamics of the top four oil-producing coun-
ties in North Dakota: McKenzie, Mountrail, Dunn, and Williams (Figure 4.1). 
Because the cost of oil extraction from the Bakken Formation is higher than 
most other shale oil plays where horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing 
(or “fracking”) are used, the region is particularly prone to boom-to-bust cy-
cles. Longtime North Dakota geographer Bernt Wills’s contribution to the 
Williston Report on the “Physical Attributes of the Area” (chapter 3) was 
published when the 1950s boom was on the wane. Just as Wills reflects back 
upon the effect of the 1950s oil boom on northwestern North Dakota, the 
authors of this chapter, also North Dakota geographers, analyze the impact of 
the 2008–14 boom post peak. 
Geographic Setting
Bernt Wills’s 1958 chapter described petroleum production in the region 
as centered along the east-west boundary between Williams and Mountrail 
counties in a region approximately five miles wide and thirty-five miles long 
(Figures 4.1 and 4.2; see also Figure 3 in chapter 3). The Williston Basin was 
the main geologic formation of interest, with oil wells extending between 
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8,000 and 11,000 feet below the surface along the Nesson Anticline (p. 36). 
Agriculture was the main economic driver for the area before the successful 
production of oil (300 barrels in seventeen hours) from the Clarence Iverson 
No. 1 well on April 4, 1951. The report detailed an average temperature of 
69.4°F for July in Williston, and 7.9°F in January (p. 40). The average annual 
precipitation was 14.66 inches at Williston, with winter being the dry season.
The 1958 Williston Report documented changes in the cultural landscape 
with the construction of roads, oil drilling derricks, tanks and pump jacks 
associated with petroleum production. Transportation changes in the 1950s 
included the construction of 200 miles of new “all weather” secondary county, 
township, and oil company service roads, mostly in the oil producing areas. The 
major highways, U.S. Highway 2 and State Highway 40, were “hard surfaced,” 
with the remaining roads being gravel (p. 41). Roads are typically oriented 
north-south or east-west along section lines and township boundaries. Most 
of the new road construction costs were expended by the state of North Da-
kota and the Amerada Petroleum Corporation, with Williams and Mountrail 
counties concentrating on maintenance and upkeep costs due to increased 
road traffic. Most of the oil was transported by pipelines by 1955, including a 
10-inch line that was constructed to Mandan. 
Population changes varied between Williams and Mountrail counties be-
tween 1950 and 1954. Williams County population increased by 26.8 percent, 
whereas Mountrail County lost 5.5 percent of its total population from 1950 
to 1954 (p. 53). At the same time, the cities of Williston and Stanley gained 
population, and the rural areas saw a decrease in population. The age groups 
of 0–4 years and 20–29 years increased in the non-farm rural areas. The ratio 
of men to women stayed similar between 1950 to 1954, with 49.2 percent 
women in 1954 compared to 50.8 percent men of all ages. There was a notable 
increase of men (14.7 percent to 16.3 percent) in the 20–29 age group in Wil-
liston, compared to a decrease of the number of women (17.1 percent to 13.9 
percent) (p. 56). Population increases were mostly the result of in-migration. 
Topography
North Dakota’s core oil producing counties are within the Northwestern Glaci-
ated Plains and the Northwestern Great Plains ecoregions (Bryce et al. 1998). 
These ecoregions are part of the Great Plains physiographic province mapped 
by Fenneman (1931). The northern parts of the counties are covered by gla-
cial deposits and consist of a flat-lying landscape interspersed with small hills 
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Figure 4.1. Core oil producing counties in North Dakota in the context of the 
Williston Basin and Bakken Formation (source: author)
Figure 4.2. Oil fields of Williams and Mountrail Counties, North Dakota, by 
year opened (source: author)
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and glacially-formed kettle lakes (knob and kettle topography), especially in 
Mountrail County (Bluemle 2000). Large glacial erratic boulders are common. 
The southern parts of Williams and Mountrail counties, known as the Cou-
teau Slope, consist of a hilly and eroded landscape that forms bluffs along the 
northern border of the level terraces of the Missouri River Valley (Fenneman 
1931; Bluemle 2000). The present location of the Missouri River in this region 
marks the southern boundary of the most recent continental glacier advance 
in the area of the Wisconsinan stage of glaciation that ended about 10,000 
years before present (Bluemle 2000). McKenzie and Dunn counties are within 
the Missouri Plateau and Little Missouri badlands and are characterized by 
rolling hills and very heavily eroded hilly areas adjacent to the Little Missouri 
River (Bryce et al. 1998; Bluemle 2000) (Figure 4.3).
Geology
The Williston Basin is a subsurface geologic structure with its base in Precam-
brian crystalline rocks of the Canadian Shield (Gerhard et al. 1982; Gibson 
1995). The basin is somewhat elongated in a northwest to southeast direction 
and underlies portions of Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Montana, North Dakota 
Figure 4.3. Little Missouri River Valley and badlands topography, North Unit, 
Theodore Roosevelt National Park, ND (source: G. Vandeberg 2005)
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and South Dakota (Figure 4.1). The deepest part of the basin is more than 
16,000 feet below the surface and contains a thick sequence of sedimentary 
rocks that have been faulted or folded to create structures important for pe-
troleum production, as well as petroleum-rich geologic formations (Figure 4.4). 
The basin is not visible on the land surface. 
Recoverable petroleum requires specific geologic conditions: the presence 
of a source rock and a reservoir rock. Petroleum is typically produced from 
organic-rich rock such as shale (source), and accumulates in a more porous 
Figure 4.4. Generalized stratigraphic structure of the Williston Basin. Rock 
units shaded lightly are petroleum-bearing, and those shaded darkly are gas-
bearing. (source: North Dakota Geological Survey 2000)
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(reservoir) rock such as sandstone or limestone (carbonates). Faults and 
other structures within the rock formations help to trap and accumulate the 
petroleum in specific locations. These structures are especially important for 
oil production in North Dakota, where the Nesson, Antelope, Little Knife, and 
Cedar Creek anticlines and the Red Wing Creek geologic structure are major 
producing locations (Bluemle 2000). Most of the early petroleum production 
in North Dakota covered by the 1958 Report and extending into the 1990s 
was in carbonate rocks of the Madison Formation (Figure 4.4) (Bluemle 
2000). Today, one of the most important formations for the production of oil 
within the Williston Basin is the Bakken Formation (Smith and Bustin 1995; 
Schmoker 1996; Zamiran, Rafieepour, and Ostadhassan 2018). 
The Bakken Formation consists of three members: the lower member is 
an organic-rich shale (source rock), the middle member consists of variable 
siltstones and sandstones (reservoir rock) that are finely cemented, and the 
upper member is organic-rich shale (LeFever et al. 1991; Smith and Bustin 
1995). The formation has a maximum thickness of 150 feet in the Williston 
Basin with depths greater than 7,000 feet below the surface in North Dakota 
(LeFever et al. 1991; Abarghani et al. 2018). The main reservoir thickness of 
the middle member is up to 87 feet (LeFever et al. 1991; Sonnenberg and 
Pramudito 2009). The middle member of the Bakken has a low permeability, 
meaning that pore spaces within the rock are poorly connected, and therefore 
fracturing is required to recover substantial amounts of oil from the formation 
(Sonnenberg and Pramudito 2009). Furthermore, the limited thickness of the 
middle member means that standard vertical wells have had limited success in 
petroleum recovery from the unit. The advance of horizontal drilling and frac-
turing has allowed for the increased development of oil from the Bakken, as 
well as other oil shale fields in the United States such as the Eagle Ford shale in 
Texas (Gaswirth and Marra 2015; Hao et al. 2018). The first horizontal well in 
the Bakken was drilled in North Dakota in 1987, and most of the wells drilled 
in the Williston Basin since that time have been horizontal (Bluemle 2001). 
Multiple wells are currently being drilled from the same drilling pad, limiting 
the footprint of drilling in the basin (Shrestha et al. 2017).
Climate
The Köppen-Geiger Climate Classification System (Köppen 1918; Geiger 1954, 
1961) is the most commonly used method to classify climates at continental 
and global scales. Researchers have applied the system to a wide range of 
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climate and climate change studies and have updated world maps to account 
for new data. Under a widely cited Köppen-Geiger update for 1951–2000 
(Kottek et al. 2006), the Bakken region is in a transitional zone between Cold 
Semi-Arid Steppe (BSk) in its western portion to Warm-Summer Humid Con-
tinental (Dfb) to the east. That is, Bakken Formation climates range from cold 
and dry (but not as dry as a desert) in the west to continental (large seasonal 
variations in temperature) with precipitation distributed throughout the year 
(no monsoon) in the east. Nearly all of North Dakota outside of the western 
Bakken is classified Dfb (Kottek et al. 2006).
Weather observers have kept records for the Williston area (BSk) since 1894. 
Mean annual precipitation at Williston is 14.40 inches, although it has varied 
between a low of 6.13 inches in 1934 to a high of 22.04 inches in 1896 (NOAA 
2018). By decade since 1960, precipitation has been near the long-term average 
except for the 1980s and the 2010s (Table 4.1). In the 1980s, the area was part 
of a larger region of the Midwest that experienced an extended drought that 
was most severe in 1983. The Williston area received below-average precipi-
tation from 1979 to 1981 and 1983 to 1985, with only 9.52 inches falling in 
1983. The 2010s so far have been wetter than average, highlighted by 21.28 
inches received in both 2010 and 2013 and 19.23 inches in 2011 (NOAA 
2018). Average annual rainfall in the 2010s has been more variable than in any 
other decade since the 1960s (Table 4.1).
TABLE 4.1. AVERAGE PRECIPITATION AND TEMPERATURE STATISTICS 
FOR THE WILLISTON AREA SINCE 1960 (SOURCE: U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL ATMOSPHERIC AND OCEANIC ADMINIS-
TRATION, NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE, NOWDATA 2018)
Decade Mean Standard deviation Mean Mean
 annual of mean annual Monthly Monthly
 precipitation  precipitation  Temp. Temp.
 (inches) (inches) January (°F) July (°F)
    
1960s 14.09 2.95 7.55 70.68
1970s 14.67 3.07 5.01 69.89
1980s 12.72 3.61 12.91 73.35
1990s 14.84 2.84 8.80 67.96
2000s 14.38 1.84 12.56 71.62
2010s (to 2017) 
 15.70 4.04 14.38 71.78
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Minot (Dfb), about 110 miles to the east on the eastern edge of the Bakken 
Formation, generally experiences more rainfall annually and cooler tempera-
tures than Williston (Table 4.2). The weather at Minot is also more variable 
in terms of mean annual rainfall and mean monthly temperature. When data 
from the Minot International Airport (collected since 1948) are used to fill 
data gaps in the Minot Experiment Station record (collected since 1905), mean 
annual precipitation is 16.88 inches (NOAA 2018). Precipitation by decade 
since 1960 shows that the 2010s have been the wettest and most variable 
(Table 4.2). High variability in the 2010s is, to date, attributed to extreme con-
ditions this decade, with a record high 32.35 inches of precipitation in 2013 
and a drought in 2017 when only 11.34 inches fell. The year 2017 was the 
driest in Minot since 1992, and the ninth driest year since 1905 (NOAA 2018).
TABLE 4.2. 
AVERAGE PRECIPITATION AND TEMPERATURE STATISTICS FOR 
MINOT SINCE 1960 (SOURCE: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, NA-
TIONAL ATMOSPHERIC AND OCEANIC ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL 
WEATHER SERVICE, NOWDATA 2018)
Decade Mean Standard deviation Mean Mean
 annual of mean annual Monthly Monthly
 precipitation  precipitation  Temp. Temp.
 (inches) (inches) January (°F) July (°F)
    
1960s 16.08 3.95 4.72 68.83
1970s 19.60 4.55 3.46 68.54
1980s 17.91 3.70 10.96 69.44
1990s 18.68 4.71 7.28 66.60
2000s 16.01 3.37 12.04 69.17
2010s (to 2017) 
 21.67 6.36 11.79 69.43
Mean annual snowfall in Williston is 38.0 inches. February is, on average, the 
month with the most snowfall at 7.1 inches, followed by January at 6.7 inches 
and April at 6.6 inches. Annual accumulation of snowfall has varied from 8.0 
inches in winter 1908–9 to 107.2 inches in winter 2010–11 (NOAA 2018). 
Minot’s mean annual snowfall is slightly higher at 39.1 inches. January tends 
to be the snowiest at Minot, with 7.1 inches falling on average, followed by 
March at 6.7 inches and 6.6 inches in December (NOAA 2018). 
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Because it is located near the center of a continental land mass, the Bakken 
region experiences extreme annual variability in temperatures. Williston’s 
coldest month is January, with a mean monthly temperature of 9.3°F, and its 
warmest month is July at 70.2°F (NOAA 2018). The record daily high of 110°F 
occurred on July 5, 1936, and the record low of –50°F has occurred twice: on 
February 16, 1936, and December 23, 1983 (NOAA 2018). In 1936, then, there 
was a 160°F swing in temperature from the daily low on February 16 to the 
daily high on July 5. The 2010s have witnessed the warmest January tempera-
tures since the 1960s (Table 4.1).
January (7.5°F) and July (68.6°F) are also the coldest and warmest months 
at Minot (NOAA 2018). A record daily high of 109°F was recorded twice at the 
Minot Experiment Station: on June 20, 1910, and July 11, 1936. The station’s 
record low of –49°F was measured on February 15, 1936 (NOAA 2018). As in 
the Williston area, Minot experienced an enormous swing in seasonal tem-
peratures in 1936. January and July mean monthly temperatures in Minot 
during the 2010s are among the warmest since the 1960s (Table 4.2).
Land Cover and Land Uses
The dominant land covers in the core oil-producing counties are grassland 
(pastureland) and cropland, and the primary land uses are livestock grazing 
and crop production. There is more pastureland than cropland in Dunn and 
McKenzie counties and more cropland than pastureland in Mountrail and 
Williams counties (Table 4.3). The most recent continental glaciation covered 
most of Mountrail and Williams counties, leaving behind topography and soils 
well suited for crop production. The development of the oil industry has re-
sulted in conversion of some pasture and cropland to oil well pads, oil field 




TRENDS IN AGRICULTURE IN CORE OIL PRODUCING
 COUNTIES FOR SELECTED YEARS SINCE 1925 
(SOURCES: USDA CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE 
1925, 1950, 1982, 2012)
  1925 1950 1982 2012
DUNN
 Number of farms 1,459 1,157 697 628
 Average farm size 668 acres 1,063 acres 2,005 acres 1,642 acres
 Total cropland 353,862 acres 447,947 acres 448,598 acres 374,287 acres
 Total pastureland 365,146 acres 767,542 acres 978,778 acres 646,709 acres
  Cattle and calves 38,851 55,629 84,773 79,898
 Corn for grain 20,607 bu 39,764 bu 32,325 bu 936,778 bu
 Wheat for grain 2,068,041 bu 1,298,357 bu 2,792,201 bu 5,811,485 bu
McKENZIE
 Number of farms 1,721 1,234 778 574
 Average farm size 520 acres 968 acres 1,506 acres 1,854 acres
 Total cropland 309,068 acres 513,200 acres 499,163 acres 425,625 acres
 Total pastureland 433,083 acres 651,731 acres 669,212 acres 614,787 acres
 Cattle and calves 35,181 53,883 71,151 92,383
 Corn for grain 28,710 bu 7,481 bu 48,285 bu 54,510 bu
 Wheat for grain 2,145,564 bu 1,839,371 bu 4,391,154 bu 6,214,714 bu
MOUNTRAIL
 Number of farms 1,927 1,484 881 670
 Average farm size 383 acres 770 acres 1,147 acres 1,438 acres
 Total cropland 405,747 acres 673,481 acres 693,423 acres 578,761 acres
 Total pastureland 202,983 acres 431,128 acres 297,917 acres 347,622 acres
 Cattle and calves 28,182 26,576 36,697 28,797
 Corn for grain 3,399 bu 1,630 bu 8,984 bu 332,630 bu
 Wheat for grain 2,963,171 bu 3,391,231 bu 6,927,065 bu 9,951,091 bu
WILLIAMS
 Number of farms 2,195 1,157 971 758
 Average farm size 414 acres 1,063 acres 1,196 acres 1,403 acres
 Total cropland 482,666 acres 447,947 acres 811,330 acres 739,086 acres
 Total pastureland 259,034 acres 767,542 acres 335,128 acres 279,947 acres
 Cattle and calves 32,678 23,923 33,999 22,574 
 Corn for grain 10,297 bu 2,345 bu (D) 301,553 bu
 Wheat for grain 2,842,544 bu 3,544,688 bu 8,690,944 bu 13,521,568 bu
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Indigenous Population
Several Indigenous groups lived in or made use of the region just prior to 
Euro-American settlement. With overlapping territories, they were the As-
siniboine (Nakota), Absarokee (Crow), Lakota, and Hidatsa, among others 
(Robinson 1966). In the early 1800s, the Anishinabe (Chippewa) from the 
Turtle Mountain region of north-central North Dakota hunted seasonally in 
today’s western Williams County and areas of northeastern and north cen-
tral Montana (North Dakota State Historical Society 2018). The Mandan and 
Sahnish (Arikara) were found farther south along the Missouri River at the 
time, but moved into the region by the mid-1800s following the devastating 
smallpox epidemic in 1837 that killed an estimated 90 percent of the Mandan 
and 70 percent of the Hidatsa (Meyer 1977; Parker 2011).
Lands of the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara (MHA) Nation are now within 
the Fort Berthold Reservation, which was established in 1870. The area of the 
reservation is 988,000 acres, with 457,837 acres owned either by individual 
tribal members or communally by the affiliated tribes. The size of MHA land 
holdings has been reduced significantly from the approximately 12 million 
acres assigned to the Three Affiliated Tribes by the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie. 
More than 152,000 acres of the reservation were taken in the 1950s during the 
construction of the Garrison Dam and creation of Lake Sakakawea, much of 
which was agriculturally productive riparian land (Meyer 1977; Parker 2011). 
The reservation is contained within McLean, Mountrail, Dunn, McKenzie, 
Mercer, and Ward counties. Tribal headquarters are now in New Town within 
Mountrail County. New Town was platted in 1950 as a replacement for the 
towns of Sanish and Van Hook, both of which were flooded by the creation of 
Lake Sakakawea. The population of the Fort Berthold Reservation was 5,874 
in 2000, 6,341 in 2010, and 7,611 in 2015 (Taft 2017). The median age of its 
residents was 29.3 in 2000, 31.0 in 2010, and 29.3 in 2015 (Taft 2017).
Established in 1975, the Trenton Indian Service Area (TISA) is a semi-inde-
pendent extension of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa. Because there 
was not enough land within the Turtle Mountain Reservation to satisfy the 
provisions of the General Allotment (or Dawes) Act of 1887 and subsequent 
amendments, the U.S. government allotted parts of Divide, Williams and McK-
enzie counties, as well as areas in northeastern Montana, to Turtle Mountain 
Band members (North Dakota State Historical Society 2018). TISA, head-
quartered in Trenton about 14 miles west of Williston, provides a governing 
structure and services to the descendants of Chippewa who settled on those 
allotted lands, although TISA is legally bound to the Turtle Mountain Reserva-
tion centered at Belcourt, 250 miles to the east.
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Pre-Oil Euro-American Population and the Arrival of Railroads
The Euro-American population of the region grew throughout the late 1800s 
and early 1900s because of land availability, railroad access, and weather that 
was favorable most years for crop and forage production. It is challenging to 
estimate population in the region before 1910 because contemporary county 
names and boundaries, which serve as census enumeration units, were not yet 
set. All four counties examined were created within the Dakota Territory in the 
1870s and 1880s. Following statehood in 1889, however, Dunn County was 
annexed by Stark County, and Mountrail County by Ward County. The state 
legislature eliminated McKenzie County because of the lack of settlement. The 
first Williams County, established in 1873, was replaced by a second in 1891, 
encompassing an entirely different geographic area. Dunn County reappeared 
in 1901, its current boundaries finally set in 1908. The North Dakota legisla-
ture recreated McKenzie County in 1905 and Mountrail County in 1909. The 
area of today’s Divide County was split from Williams County in 1910.
The populations of what are now Mountrail and Williams counties grew 
faster than those of Dunn and McKenzie counties for a few reasons. First, 
lands in Mountrail and Williams counties are more suited to crop cultivation, 
a factor that favored those areas for homesteading. Second, those counties had 
access to railroad transportation much earlier than Dunn and McKenzie. The 
St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Manitoba Railway (StPM&M, renamed the Great 
Northern Railway by 1889) extended its main line from Minot through Moun-
trail and Williams counties in 1887 (Hidy, Hidy, Scott, and Hofsommer 1988), 
two years before North Dakota statehood. StPM&M’s push through Moun-
trail and Williams counties was part of its “Long March to Montana” in 1887, 
when an incredible 545 miles of track was laid from Minot to Great Falls (Hidy 
et al. 1988). Development companies associated with the railroad founded 
many towns along the new railway: Tagus, Palermo, Stanley, Ross, Manitou, 
and White Earth in Mountrail County, and Tioga, Temple, Ray, Wheelock, Ep-
ping, Spring Brook, Williston, Trenton, and Buford in Williams County (Rand, 
McNally and Co. 1911; Wick 1999). In 1911, the Great Northern built a nearly 
51-mile branch from its main line in Stanley to Wildrose in Divide County 
(Hidy et al. 1988), which led to the founding of Lostwood and Lund’s Valley 
(Rand, McNally and Co. 1911; Wick 1999). The town of Plaza, founded in 1906 
in Mountrail County, was the terminus of a Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Sault 
Ste. Marie (“Soo”) branch out of Max (Rand, McNally & Co. 1911; Wick 1999) 
until 1914, when the line was extended to Sanish through the newly formed 
towns of Wabek, Parshall, and Van Hook. Coulee was founded on the Great 
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Northern branch from Berthold in Ward County to Ambrose in Divide County 
(Rand, McNally and Co. 1911; Wick 1999). All of the rail lines in Mountrail and 
Williams are still in operation.
The first rail service in McKenzie County came from the west in 1913 when 
the Great Northern extended a line thirty miles from Fairview, Montana, to 
Arnegard, North Dakota, and an additional 7.5 miles to Watford City in 1914 
(Hidy et al. 1988). Burlington Northern abandoned that entire stretch in 1992 
(North Dakota Public Service Commission 2018). Dunn County received rail 
service in 1914 when the Northern Pacific Railway laid 34 miles of track west 
from Golden Valley in Mercer County to Kildeer in Dunn County, resulting in 
the founding of Dodge, Werner, and Dunn Center and the relocation of Hal-
liday (Rand McNally 1942; Wick 1999). Burlington Northern abandoned 41 
miles of that line, including all within Dunn County, in 1984 (North Dakota 
Public Service Commission 2018).
By 1920, the foreign-born in McKenzie, Mountrail, and Williams counties 
were predominantly Norwegian, although there were also notable populations 
from Canada, Denmark, Germany, Russia (primarily Black Sea Germans), and 
Sweden (Sherman and Thorson 1988). Williams County recorded 77 Syrians 
(Lebanese), with another 22 in Mountrail County (Sherman and Thorson 
1988). Dunn County had more Germans from Russia than Norwegians, as 
well as notable representations of Austrians (Ukrainians) and Hungarians 
(Banat and Burgenland Germans) (Sherman and Thorson 1988).
After peaking in about 1930, the region’s population declined both during 
and after the “Great Drought” of the mid-1930s. Although the region declined 
overall, migration into larger towns meant continued growth, albeit slow, of 
regional trade centers like Williston, Dickinson, Bismarck, and Minot. Smaller 
trade centers lost population because fewer farm families on the surrounding 
landscapes (Table 4.3) meant less demand for the goods and services they pro-
vided. For example, Williston grew by 13.4 percent between 1930 and 1940 
while its county, Williams, shrank by 16.6 percent. Nearby small towns like 
Tioga and Ray lost 11.5 percent and 6.8 percent of their residents, respectively 
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1941).
Agriculture
As the number of farms and farm families declined across North Dakota, the 
average size of a farm increased steadily (Table 4.3), the result of larger and 
more efficient agricultural machinery and improved agricultural technologies. 
Still, the average size of a farm in northwestern North Dakota has been large 
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relative to the rest of the state since at least 1925. The USDA Census of Agri-
culture reported statewide average farm sizes of 452 acres in 1925, 630 acres 
in 1950, 1,104 acres in 1982, and 1,268 acres in 2012, while McKenzie Coun-
ty’s average farm size was 520 acres in 1925, 968 acres in 1950, 1,506 acres in 
1982, and 1,854 acres in 2012 (Table 4.3). 
Larger-than-average farms in today’s “oil patch” are attributable to the re-
gion’s dry climate that generally limits crop yields per acre. For example, Cass 
County, in the more humid southeastern corner of the state, was North Dako-
ta’s top corn-producing county in 2012 with 44.9 million bushels (an average 
yield of 129 bushels per acre), while yield in similarly-sized Mountrail County 
was 332,630 bushels (64 bushels per acre) (USDA 2012). Cass County’s wheat 
yield in 2012 was 5.3 million bushels, averaging 56 bushels per acre, while 
Mountrail County harvested about 10 million bushels at 36 bushels per acre 
(USDA 2012). North Dakota ranks second in the U.S. in wheat production 
behind only Kansas (National Agricultural Statistics Service 2017). Among 
the state’s counties, Mountrail ranked twelfth and Dunn nineteenth in spring 
wheat, while Williams led the state in the production of Durum wheat (Na-
tional Agricultural Statistics Service 2017). 
Cattle ranching has been an important economic activity in the Bakken 
region since the 1880s, with cattle thriving on extensive tracts of grassland, 
including the Little Missouri National Grassland (LMNG) managed by the U.S. 
Forest Service. At more than 1 million acres, the LMNG is the largest grass-
land area in the United States, and a significant portion is located in McKenzie 
County. In 2016, Dunn County ranked fourth among the 53 counties in North 
Dakota in the number of cattle and calves, while McKenzie was sixth, Moun-
trail was eighteenth, and Williams was twenty-ninth (National Agricultural 
Statistics Service 2017). North Dakota ranked sixteenth among U.S. states in 
cattle and calves on hand as of January 1, 2017 (National Agricultural Statis-
tics Service 2017). 
Oil Development
Oil was first discovered in North Dakota with the completion of the Clarence 
Iverson well in Williams County on April 4, 1951, to a depth of 11,660 feet 
(Bluemle 2001). This well, located about 8.5 miles south of Tioga and 11 miles 
east of Ray (SW ¼, SW ¼, Sec. 6, T. 155 N., R. 95 W), was the start of many 
more oil wells drilled and developed in the 1950s and subsequent years. Based 
on data from the North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources, 2014 was 
the peak year for the maximum number of wells spudded (that is, those that 
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companies began drilling), at 2,656 for all counties, with 2,277 of these wells 
in Dunn, McKenzie, Mountrail and Williams counties (Figure 4.5). Figure 4.5 
clearly shows the periods of high drilling activity centered on the years 1959, 
1968, 1981 and 2014. Note that the study area counties have a substantial per-
centage of the total wells drilled beginning in about 2008, with development 
of the Bakken Formation oil in full swing.
The years 1966, 1984, and 2015 show three peaks in North Dakota crude 
oil production (Figure 4.6). The yearly production in 1966 was more than 27 
million barrels (42 gallons per barrel), versus more than 52 million barrels in 
1984. More than 432 million barrels of oil were produced in 2015, with al-
most 90 percent of the production coming from the four counties of this study. 
Daily oil production in North Dakota first exceeded 1 million barrels in 2014. 
The U.S. Geological Survey (2015) has estimated that 7.38 billion barrels of 
oil remain in the Bakken and Three Forks formations, so oil development is 
expected to continue, depending upon crude prices.
Boom-to-bust Population Trends
Agricultural economics help to steer the population dynamics of northwestern 
North Dakota, but the boom-to-bust cycles of oil economics have been the 
dominant factors since the discovery of oil there in 1951. Zealous investors 
who rushed to develop the new oil field drove the state’s first oil boom, called 
Figure 4.5. Number of oil wells spudded per year, 1951–2018 (source: North 
Dakota Oil and Gas Division 2018)
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the “discovery boom” (Bluemle 2001). The 1950s, however, were a time of 
global overproduction of petroleum, which meant low market prices for oil. 
This eventually prompted U.S. producers to band together to limit supply, 
increase prices, and ensure that every producer received a fair market share 
(Bluemle 2001). The discovery boom ended in about 1960, but slower-paced 
development of the oil economy of the region continued. 
The first boom had a significant but localized impact on population. The lo-
cation of the Clarence Iverson well in Williams County was near Tioga and Ray. 
Between 1950 and 1954, Tioga’s population grew by 253 percent and Ray’s 
by 105 percent (Table 4.4). Williston and Stanley grew noticeably during that 
same time, although Mountrail County lost population overall. Wills (p. 53) 
concluded that Tioga and Ray “benefited enormously as logical sites for set-
tling migrants involved in the establishment of the [oil] fields,” while Williston 
became a central supply point for the nascent oil industry and Stanley, located 
about 26 miles east of the discovery well, absorbed overflow population from 
Tioga and Ray. With later limits on production, the population of those towns 
regressed significantly by 1970.
The second boom, called the “oil price boom,” began in the mid-1970s 
with the discovery of a significant new oil field in 1972 (the Red Wing Creek 
Figure 4.6. Number of barrels of oil produced per year in North Dakota and in 
study area counties (Dunn, McKenzie, Mountrail, and Williams), 1951–2018 
(source: North Dakota Oil and Gas Division 2018)
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Structure in McKenzie County about 40 miles south of Williston) and the suc-
cess of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in limiting 
petroleum production by its member nations. OPEC’s oil embargo forced the 
price of a barrel of oil from about $4 in 1973 to $9 in 1974 (Bluemle 2001). 
The increase made Williston Basin exploration profitable, and exploration led 
to the opening of several additional fields in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
During the second boom cycle, the state’s oil production peaked in 1981 at 45 
million barrels. By 1982, oil prices began to fall, accelerated by overproduction 
by OPEC. The second boom ended by early 1986.
The impact of the second boom on the region is most evident in the 20 
percent increase in the population of Watford City between 1970 and 1980. 
Watford City is about twenty miles north of the Red Wing Structure (Table 
4.4). McKenzie and Williams counties experienced 16 percent and 15 percent 
increases in population, respectively, while Williston grew by about 19 percent 
(Table 4.4).
The period from the mid-1980s to 2006 was one of out-migration. Census 
records show that every core oil-producing county lost population between 
1980 and 1990 and between 1990 and 2000 (Table 4.4). From 1980 to 2000, 
Dunn County lost 22.2 percent of its residents, while McKenzie lost 19.6 per-
cent, Mountrail 13.6 percent, and Williams 11.1 percent. While the larger city 
of Williston lost 6.2 percent between 1980 and 2000, the region’s smaller cities 
suffered the most: Watford City declined by 32.3 percent, Ray by 30.3 percent, 
Tioga by 29.6 percent, and Stanley by 21.6 percent (Table 4.4).
The third boom, called the “technology boom” because of the heavy reliance 
on horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, began in about 2006 with 
the discovery of the Parshall oil field (near the town of Parshall in Mountrail 
County). That find occurred during a period of high oil prices (more than $100 
per barrel between October 2007 and August 2014). The break-even price 
for Parshall oil at the time was about $38, by far the lowest among Bakken 
fields, making extraction especially lucrative. The boom continued until oil 
prices crashed globally between August 2014 ($103 per barrel) and February 




POPULATION STATISTICS FOR CORE OIL PRODUCING 
COUNTIES AND SELECTED COMMUNITIES, 1940–2016 
(SOURCES: U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1940, 1950, 2000, 2010; WILLS, CUR-
RENT VOLUME; AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 2012–16)
Population and Percent Change (in parentheses)
1940 1950 1954 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2016
WILLIAMS
16,315 16,442 20,843 22,051 19,301 22,237 21,129 19,761 22,398 31,643
 (0.8) (26.8) (5.8) (-12.5) (15.2) (-5.0)  (-6.5) (13.3) (41.3)
Williston
5,790 7,398 9,717 11,866 11,230 13,336 13,136 12,512 14,716 23,902
 (27.8)  (31.4) (22.1) (-5.4) (18.8) (-1.5) (-4.8) (17.6) (62.4)
Ray
579 721 1,479 1,049 776 766 603 534 592 483
 (24.5) (105.1)  (-29.1) (-26.0) (-1.3) (-21.3) (-11.4) (10.9) (-18.4)
Tioga
385 456 1,608 2,087 1,667 1,597 1,278 1,125 1,230 1,126
 (18.4) (252.6) (29.8) (-20.1) (-4.2) (-20.0) (-12.0) (9.3) (-8.5)
MOUNTRAIL
10,482 9,418 8,897 10,077 8,437 7,679 7,021 6,631 7,673 9,675
 (-10.2) (-5.5) (13.3)  (-16.3) (-9.0) (-8.6) (-5.6) (15.7) (26.1)
Stanley
1,058 1,486 1,645 1,795 1,581 1,631 1,371 1,279 1,458 2,328
 (40.5)  (10.7)  (9.1) (-11.9) (3.2)  (-15.9)  (-6.7) (14.0) (59.7)
Parshall
570 935 − 1,216 1,246 1,059 943 981 903 1,125
 (64.0) − (30.1) (2.5) (-15.0) (-11.0) (4.0) (-8.0) (24.6)
McKENZIE
8,426 6,849 – 7,296 6,127 7,132 6,383 5,737 6,360 10,718
 (-18.7) − (6.5) (-16.0) (16.4) (-10.5) (-10.1) (10.9) (68.5)
Watford City
1,023 1,371 – 1,865 1,768 2,119 1,784 1,435 1,744 4,596
 (34.0) − (36.0) (-5.2) (19.9) (-15.8) (-19.6) (21.5) (165.5)
DUNN
8,376 7,212 – 6,350 4,895 4,627 4,005 3,600 3,536 4,284
 (-13.9) −  (-12.0) (-22.9) (-5.5) (-13.4) (-10.1) (-1.8) (21.2)
Killdeer
650 698 – 765 615 790 722 713 751 903
 (7.4) −  (9.6) (-19.6) (28.5) (-8.6) (-1.2) (5.3) (20.2)
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During the third boom, oil-producing counties all grew (Table 4.4). Williston 
and other towns also grew between 2000 and 2010, as well as 2010 and 2016. 
For example, Watford City grew by 166 percent, Williston by 62 percent, and 
Stanley by 60 percent (Table 4.4). Such statistics are more impressive when 
one considers the likelihood of population declines between late 2014 and 
early 2016, a period of relatively low oil prices. Ray and Tioga show decline be-
tween 2010 and 2016, suggesting that populations in those Williams County 
towns began to decline earlier than in other parts of the Bakken region.
Demographics
The three oil booms and subsequent busts since 1951 have affected the age 
and sex structures of the region. From 1950 to 1960 in Williston, the number 
of preschool-aged children (0–4 years old) increased by 83 percent (Table 4.5) 
and school-aged children and young adults (5–19 years) increased by 100 per-
cent (some older teenagers arrived in Williston for work, not for school). The 
“working age” population (20–65 years of age) in Williston went from 3,988 
in 1950 to 5,534 in 1960, a 39 percent increase. The male working age group 
increased by 36 percent while the female group rose 41 percent (Table 4.5). 
Williston’s male-to-female ratio for 20- to 29-year-olds was 89 per 100 in 1950 
and 72 per 100 in 1960, while the 30–64 age group held at 1:1 (Figure 4.7). It 
is curious that Williston’s male-to-female ratio for the 20–29 age group de-
creased during the first oil boom, but the census reveals an increase of only 33 
men compared to 167 women in that age cohort between 1950 and 1960. Oil 
production sites, dominated by male workers, were near Tioga and Ray. For 
census years 1950 and 1960, Williston’s male-to-female ratios for all age co-
horts were less than the state averages (Figure 4.7), meaning there were fewer 
men per women there than in the state overall. The median age in Williams 
County went from 29.1 years in 1950 to 25.4 years in 1960, compared to the 
statewide median age of 26.2 years in 1960 (Figure 4.8). The percentage of 
married people increased while the percentage of single people decreased in 
Williams County between 1950 and 1960 (Table 4.6), suggesting that those 
entering the county for oil-related work at the time were either married when 




 WILLISTON POPULATION BY AGE GROUP AND SEX, DURING THE 
FIRST (1950–60) AND THIRD (2000–16) OIL BOOMS 
(SOURCES: U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1940, 1950, 2000, 2010; WILLS, CUR-
RENT VOLUME; AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 2012–16)
 1950 1960 2000 2010 2016
Age Male Female M F M F M F M F
0–4 485 420 869 814 381 383 556 547 1,086 909
5–19 861 878 1,719 1,756 1,451 1,440 1,385 1,364 2,402 1,906
20–29 543 629 576 796 686 698 1,350 1,086 2,930 2,279
30–64 1,405 1,411 2,073 2,089 2,667 2,702 3,381 2,932 5,842 4,383
65+ 400 346 576 598 807 1,297 835 1,280 871 1,294
Total 3,694 3,684 5,813 6,053 5,992 6,520 7,507 7,209 13,131 10,771
Figure 4.7. Number of men per 100 women for Williston and the state of North 
Dakota since 1950 (source: U.S. Census Bureau 2010; U.S. Census Bureau, 
American Fact Finder 2016)
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TABLE 4.6. 
SEX AND PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL STATUS FOR THOSE 
14 OR 15 YEARS OF AGE AND OLDER,1 1950–60 AND 2000–16 
(SOURCES: U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1950, 1960, 2000; AMERICAN COM-
MUNITY SURVEY 2012–16)
   DUNN   McKENZIE 
 1950 1960 2000 2016 1950 1960 2000 2016
MALE 2,493 2,074 1,419 1,836 2,585 2,559 2,146 4,329
Married 60.3% 62.9% 62.0% 52.3% 59.0% 62.8% 61.7% 45.9%
Single/
Never Married2 36.1% 33.5% 21.6% 32.4% 36.2% 32.0% 27.3% 36.7%
Divorced 3.5%3 0.9% 6.9% 10.7% 4.9%3 2.0% 7.3% 10.5%
Widowed  2.7% 3.5% 4.5%  3.2% 3.7% 2.7%
FEMALE 2,197 1,861 1,397 1,628 2,109 2,199 2,192 3,700
Married 67.7% 70.2% 60.4% 60.4% 71.6% 72.4% 60.2% 52.9%
Single/
Never Married2 25.4% 21.3% 20.1% 20.5% 17.8% 17.1% 19.2% 28.8%
Divorced 7.0%3 0.6% 7.3% 10.6% 10.6%3 1.2% 7.4% 10.5%
Widowed  7.9% 12.1% 8.5%  9.4% 13.2% 7.9%
  MOUNTRAIL  WILLIAMS 
 1950 1960 2000 2016 1950 1960 2000 2016
MALE 3,741 3,427 2,515 4,191 6,275 7,167 7,656 13,686
Married 55.8% 62.9% 59.1% 45.9% 61.6% 68.6% 58.2% 49.5%
Single/
Never Married2 38.0% 31.3% 28.1% 42.4% 32.4% 26.1% 27.9% 36.2%
Divorced 6.2%3 1.7% 10.2% 9.9% 6.0%3 7.6% 10.4% 12.9%
Widowed  4.1% 2.6% 1.8%  3.6% 3.5% 1.5%
FEMALE 2,936 3,140 2,615 3,376 5,465 6,967 8,088 11,031
Married 70.8% 68.6% 54.9% 45.3% 69.6% 70.5% 56.3% 56.1%
Single/
Never Married2 18.9% 19.5% 21.5% 33.6% 19.2% 18.0% 21.1% 25.5%
Divorced 10.3%3 1.9% 7.5% 12.3% 11.2%3 1.7% 9.9% 10.3%
Widowed  10.1% 16.1% 8.6%  9.9% 12.7% 8.1%
1 14 years of age was the cut-off in the 1950 and 1960 U.S. censuses; 15 years of 
age was the cut-off in the 2000 census and the 2012–16 American Community 
Survey (ACS). 
2 The term “single” was used in the 1950 and 1960 censuses; the term “never 
married” was used in the 2000 census and the 2012–16 ACS. 
3 The “divorced” and “widowed” categories were combined in the 1950 census.
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Census years 1970 and 1980 can be used to characterize the mid-1970s to 
mid-1980s boom. The male-to-female ratio for 20- to 29-year-olds living in 
Williston rose from 84 per 100 in 1970 to 118 per 100 in 1980 (Figure 4.7). 
The number of men aged between 20 and 29 years increased by 159 percent 
during the 1970s, while women of the same age increased by 84 percent. 
Clearly the second oil boom in the region brought more young men to Wil-
liston than did the first, and there was no corresponding boom in pre-school 
or school-aged children: 0- to 4-year-olds increased by 1.6 percent between 
1970 and 1980 and 5- to 19-year-olds actually decreased by 24 percent. The 
median age in McKenzie County dropped from 28.2 in 1970 to 27.3 in 1980, 
while Mountrail and Williams counties saw reduced rates in the aging of their 
populations (Figure 4.8).
Regional changes in age and sex structure since 1950 are most evident 
during the most recent boom (2006 to 2014). For example, Williston grew by 
91 percent between 2000 and 2016, driven primarily by a 276 percent increase 
in 20- to 29-year-olds and a 161 percent increase in 0- to 4-year-olds, likely the 
children of the 20- to 29-year-olds, and a 90 percent increase in 30- to 64-year-
olds (Table 4.5). The core oil-producing counties all exhibited median ages 
greater than the state median between 1990 and 2010. According to Census 
Bureau estimates, McKenzie, Mountrail, and Williams counties fell to less than 
or equal to the state median by 2016 (Figure 4.8).
Figure 4.8. Median age for core oil-producing counties and the state of North 
Dakota since 1950 (source: U.S. Census Bureau 2010; U.S. Census Bureau, 
American Fact Finder 2016)
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The male-to-female ratios for the period indicate that more men than 
women have moved to Williston in recent years in the 20- to 29-year-old and 
30- to 64-year-old cohorts (Figure 4.7). For example, in the 20–29 age group 
there were 98 men per 100 women in 2000, increasing to 129 per 100 in 2016 
(Figure 4.7). The 30–64 age group increased from 99 men per 100 women in 
2000 to 133 per 100 in 2016 (Figure 4.7). Ratios are greater in Stanley, where 
most age groups went from less than 100 men per 100 women in 2000 to 
2016 when all age cohorts were at more than 100 per 100 (Figure 4.9). The 
2016 ratio for 20- to 29-year-olds in Stanley was more than 200 men per 100 
women (Figure 4.9). 
The percentage of both married men and married women declined between 
2000 and 2016 in all four core oil-producing counties, with corresponding 
increases in the number of those who have never married (Table 4.6). For ex-
ample, in McKenzie County the percentage of married men went from 61.7 
percent in 2000 to 45.9 percent in 2016, suggesting that more than 70 percent 
of the 15+-year-old males added to the county’s population between 2000 
and 2016 were never married. To put that into perspective, there were 1,589 
never-married men in McKenzie County in 2016 compared to 1,066 never- 
married-women (Table 4.6), or 149 never-married men per 100 never-married 
women.
Figure 4.9. Number of men per 100 women for Stanley and the state of North 
Dakota since 2000 (source: U.S. Census Bureau 2010; U.S. Census Bureau, 
American Fact Finder 2016)
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In 2016, 9.5 percent of all people in North Dakota (10.0 percent of men and 
9.1 percent of women) were divorced, numbers lower than those in most of 
the oil patch (Table 4.6). In most cases, the change in the percentage of those 
divorced increased by more than 2.5 percent between 2000 and 2016. Data 
for McKenzie County show 157 divorced men and 162 divorced women in 
2000, rising to 455 divorced men and 389 divorced women in 2016. While 
some people arrived in the county already divorced, there has been an increase 
in the number of divorce filings: 136 during 2000, 155 during 2010, and 200 
during 2016 (North Dakota Supreme Court 2018). 
The most current statistics for the region compared to state averages (Table 
4.7) indicate that people living there have higher median household incomes 
but also higher median home values and rent. Among residents of McKenzie 
and Williams counties, the proportion of people born in North Dakota is about 
10 percent lower than the state average, while the proportion of those born in 
another U.S. state is higher (Table 4.7). The proportion of oil patch residents 
born outside of the United States is less than in the state as a whole (Table 4.7).
By far, most regional residents are white, but in some counties the propor-
tion of American Indians is significant (Table 4.7). The percentage of people 
identifying as Hispanic or Latino of any race is higher in the four-county area 
than the state as a whole. The proportion of Black/African-American residents 
is low compared to the state as a whole, with the exception of Williams County 
(Table 4.7). 
TABLE 4.7. 
SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATISTICS FOR CORE OIL-PRODUCING 
COUNTIES, 2016 AND 2017 
(SOURCES: U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2016; AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
SURVEY 2012–16; NORTH DAKOTA JOB SERVICE WORKFORCE INTEL-
LIGENCE NETWORK 2018)




income2 $59,114 $66,964 $78,179 $68,082 $90,080
Median value of 
owner-occupied 
housing units2 $164,000 $162,700 $202,800 $161,400 $224,000
Median rent for  
occupied buildings 
paying rent2 $736 $900 $895 $723 $915
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 North Dunn McKenzie Mountrail Williams
 Dakota
Mining, quarrying,
 and oil and gas 
extraction, 20173 
 Jobs 17,841  506 1,448 1,261  8,027
 Percent of all jobs 4.3% 25.5% 16.0% 22.1%  30.0% 
Average weekly 
wage for mining, 
quarrying, and oil 
and  gas extraction, 
20173 $1,944 $1,929 $1,817 $1,914 $1,996
Average annual 
wage, all job types, 
20173 $50,313 $68,365 $70,987 $65,544 $74,287
PLACE OF BIRTH2
     
North Dakota 64.6% 61.0% 53.1% 68.8% 54.9%
Other U.S. state 32.1% 37.0% 46.1% 29.4% 42.2%
Outside of 
United States 3.3% 2.0% 0.9% 1.8% 2.9%
RACE1
     
White 87.9% 85.5% 83.0% 67.2% 87.3%
Black or 
African American 2.9% 1.0% 1.6% 1.1% 4.6%
American Indian or 
Alaska Native 5.5% 9.6% 11.9% 28.4% 3.8%
Asian 1.5% 1.5% 1.0% 0.3% 1.1%
Native Hawaiian or Other 
Pacific Islander 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Other Race or Two 
or More Races 2.1% 2.5% 2.6% 3.0% 3.3%
Hispanic or Latino 
(of any race) 3.6% 4.9% 7.8% 7.2% 6.8%
1 U.S. Census Bureau (2016)
2 American Community Survey (2012–16)
3 North Dakota Job Service Workforce Intelligence Network (2018)
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Environmental Impacts
The development of oil in the Bakken and other formations requires hydraulic 
fracturing to increase the permeability of the formations and the ability to 
remove oil. Water, proppant (sand or other granular material), and chemicals 
are pumped down a well under high pressure to fracture the formation, and 
to hold open the fractures to allow for oil or gas to flow more readily through 
the system (Haines et al. 2017). The amount of water required for fracturing 
in the Bakken in North Dakota has increased from 770 million gallons in 2008 
to 4,274 million in 2012 (Shrestha et al. 2017), and will continue to increase 
with each additional well that is drilled and developed. Estimates of water re-
quirements for hydraulic fracturing of wells show that from 2.5 million to 6.0 
million gallons of water are required for each well (Table 4.8). This is no small 
impact for an area of limited precipitation, surface water, and ground water 
resources. Currently, most of the water used in well development is coming 
from the Missouri River or ground water (Shrestha et al. 2017).
TABLE 4.8. 
VALUE ESTIMATES FOR WATER AND PROPPANT USE FOR OIL WELL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE BAKKEN 
(SOURCE: HAINES ET AL. 2017)
Input Value Minimum Mode Maximum Mean
Water per well 
for hydraulic 
fracturing 
(million gallons) 2.5 4.0 6.0 4.17
Proppant (sand, granular material) 
to water ratio 
(lb/gal) 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.2
Water per well 
for drilling and 
cement (million gallons) 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.15
One of the byproducts of hydraulic fracturing, well development, and pe-
troleum extraction is brine water. Brine water has high concentrations of ions 
such as chloride, bromide, and sodium and other toxic elements that make 
it unsuitable for use for agriculture or drinking water (Lauer, Harkness, and 
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Vengosh 2016; Shrestha et al. 2017). This water must be reinjected to keep it 
from contaminating local surface water and ground water sources. The brine 
water is often transported to the injection sites via pipelines. As drilling has 
increased, so has the number of brine spills within North Dakota, from about 
200 in 2007 to more than 800 in 2014 (Shrestha et al. 2017). Brine spill data 
for the four counties of the study area indicate a maximum spill amount of 
96,835 barrels in 2015 (Figure 4.10). The 2015 data includes a 70,000 barrel re-
lease of brine water into Blacktail Creek in Williams County in January (Lauer, 
Harkness, and Vengosh 2016). 
Oil spill amounts have also increased as production and the number of wells 
have increased. The year 2013 had the highest amount of spillage within the 
study area at 32,602 barrels (Figure 4.11). There was an oil spill of more than 
20,000 barrels in October 2013 from a pipeline rupture near Columbus in 
Burke County, North Dakota, just north of Mountrail County, that has been 
identified as the “largest oil spill on U.S. soil” (Golgowski 2013). Oil spills have 
also been associated with rail derailments, since up to 75 percent of all North 
Dakota Bakken production in 2013 was delivered by rail to Canada, the eastern 
United States, and the Gulf Coast (Reed 2013). At least 47 people were killed 
in the town of Lac-Mégantic, Quebec, when 72 tanker cars of Bakken crude 
derailed and ignited (Reed 2013). Numerous other explosive derailments of 
Figure 4.10. Contained and uncontained brine water spills in Dunn, McK-
enzie, Mountrail, and Williams counties (source: North Dakota Department 
of Health 2018)
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Bakken crude have resulted in inquiries regarding the volatility of the oil and 
the safety of tanker cars being used in both the United States and Canada 
(Reed 2013; Thomas 2015).
Major Conclusions
The review of the geographic setting of petroleum production in western 
North Dakota shows several conclusions and differences when compared 
to the 1950s as documented by the 1958 Report. First, oil production has 
switched to the Bakken Formation starting in the 1980s, with much higher 
production rates and number of wells. Just over 1,214 petroleum wells were 
present as of 1958 in the western part of North Dakota, whereas in 2016, 
there were more than 14,000. Oil production was at almost 18 million barrels 
for the state in 1958, and more than 380 million barrels in 2016. Second, oil 
production has greatly expanded from a 5-mile by 35-mile area in Williams and 
Mountrail counties in 1958 to oil fields covering most of Williams, Mountrail, 
McKenzie and Dunn counties in 2016, including production within the major 
cities of Williston, Stanley, and Watford City. This in turn has greatly increased 
the number and length of oil service roads throughout the region compared 
Figure 4.11. Oil spill volumes by year in Dunn, McKenzie, Mountrail, and 
Williams counties (contained and uncontained) (source: North Dakota De-
partment of Health 2018)
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to 1958. Third, climatic factors of precipitation and temperature have become 
more variable since the 1950s. The mean January temperature for Williston 
in the 1950s was 9.3°F and 70.2°F in July. The mean January temperature for 
Williston from 2010 to 2017 was 14.4°F and 71.8°F in July. Precipitation mean 
values for the 2010 to 2017 period in Williston were also slightly higher at 
15.70 inches than the 1950s mean of 14.40 inches. Fourth, population demo-
graphics for the 2010s are different from the 1950s. Williston experienced a 
62 percent increase in population from 2000 to 2010, and Stanley experienced 
68 percent growth during this same period. The disparity between the number 
of men versus women also was greater in this period, with 129 men per 100 
women in the 20–29-year-old range in 2016, and 133 men per 100 women in 
the age group of 30 to 64. The number of married men and women declined 
from 2000 to 2016. Finally, Wills’s chapter in the 1958 Report concludes that 
a decline in construction and oil field activities had occurred by 1955. Cur-
rent oil field and construction activities in the study area in 2019 have also 
constricted since the major drilling and oil field developments in 2014–15. 
Many infrastructure projects such as new roads, hospitals and schools have 
been completed, and the oil development has matured.  The completion of new 
pipelines such as the Dakota Access Pipeline have reduced the need for trans-
portation of crude via train or truck.
In summary, the discovery of oil in the Bakken region of North Dakota in 
1951 heralded boom-to-bust cycles that were heavily influenced by global 
geopolitics and economics. Drivers of landscape and demographic change 
that are largely outside of the control of the state and region have confronted 
the area’s longer-term residents with change so rapid and at such magnitude 
that carefully planned responses were often not possible, especially during the 
most recent boom. On top of significant demographic shifts, the landscape 
of the region has been altered dramatically, most notably through the losses 
of agricultural and range lands to land covers associated with oil production. 
In addition, the weather of the region has been more variable in recent years 
when compared to the historical record. It’s fair to say that all of these phe-
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I. Introduction: Scope, Method, and Limitations
Just what politics are; where they begin; where do, and should they 
end, have been questions of endless controversy over ages of time. If we 
can believe Lucy Stark—the courageous but bewildered wife of Willie 
Stark in Robert Penn Warren’s All the King’s Men1—politics eventually 
entwines itself in every phase of human affairs, even the most private. 
But this study of the politics of oil in the Williston Basin is vastly more 
limited in scope than that. Essentially it will attempt to do four things—
show how oil has caused the formation of new political associations and 
modified existing ones; describe the impact of oil upon existing units of 
government; explain the formation and execution of oil policy; and an-
alyze the effects of oil upon the existing political power structure. In all 
instances the description and analysis is necessarily somewhat general.
This is not the place to enter into a controversy about empiricism 
versus values, but basically this study is empirical. It may proceed 
somewhat contrary to accepted scientific method as no hypotheses will 
be advanced except during the last two sections of this chapter. Conse-
quently much of the study is descriptive. This is admittedly a somewhat 
“safer” method for the social scientist but it has advantages. In a rel-
atively unexplored field, description is necessary in order to provide 
an adequate frame of reference. Subsequently, it is then possible to be 
analytical in a more meaningful manner.
Lastly, it must be understood that the writer is not a physical scien-
tist and not a student in the technology of oil. Many of the issues to be 
discussed in this chapter—well spacing, compulsory unitization, and 
other geological and geophysical issues—are well beyond the technical 
competence of the social scientist. Where such matters remain in the 
1 Robert Penn Warren, All the King’s Men (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 
1946), p. 355.
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physical realm an attempt will be made to describe, in general terms, 
the conflicting attitudes, coupled with some information on the actions 
of other states in comparable matters. However, where these issues 
enter into the governmental process the discussion will be more an-
alytical. This dichotomy between the areas of the responsibility of the 
physical and social scientists is difficult to define, and just as difficult 
to abide by, but a careful attempt will be made not to make judgments 
where no empirical evidence is advanced, and not to tread in technical 
fields of knowledge where the author has no competence.
II. A Brief Survey of North Dakota Politics and Government
The North Dakota political scene has some unique features of its own, 
so a brief, general statement seems necessary at this point.
Since joining the Union, North Dakota has been a one-party state. 
That one political party—in this instance the Republican party—has 
practically dominated the politics of the state. In only two instances 
since the turn of the century have Democrats been elected to the office 
of governor2 and both times that was with the considerable aid of dissi-
dent Republican elements. In the 1955 session of the State Legislature 
the Democrats had four of its party candidates elected to the Senate 
and that was such an extraordinary event that the members actually 
caucussed once.
As almost invariably true in one-party states, the primary elec-
tion is the “real” election. Candidates in the Republican column who 
are nominated in the June primary are almost always elected in the 
November general election. Furthermore, and as usually is the case, 
the dominant party is divided into factions. In North Dakota the two 
principal factions of the Republican party have been the Non-Partisan 
League (NPL) and the Republican Organizing Committee (ROC). In 
one form or another, this division has existed in North Dakota politics 
since the formation of the NPL in 1915. Some names of organizations 
have changed; leadership dominates, then wanes; but the basic divi-
sion seems to continue. However, and this is where oil politics presently 
plays a role and may play a more important one, there are many and 
varied forms of political discontent in North Dakota at the present 
time. The NPL split into what might conventionally be termed liberal 
and conservative factions;3 the ROC is divided into those who want to 
2 John Burke, 1907–1912 and John Moses, 1939–1944.
3 The terms “radical,” “liberal,” and “conservative” are used herein to denote the 
degree of social, economic, and political changes that are desired. That is, the 
conservatives favor the status quo, or very cautious change, etc. In no instance 
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dissolve the factions and amalgamate into a single Republican party 
and those who are quite satisfied with the status quo; the Democratic 
party is largely controlled by conservatives who are not very dynamic in 
their party activities, but a younger, energetic, liberal group is actively 
attempting to gain control; there is a small, but powerful, group in the 
State Senate who consider themselves to be “genuine” Republicans and 
these individuals are seeking to erase the factionalism within the Re-
publican party if it will enhance their interests.
To further complicate the political scene, the North Dakota Farmers 
Union has, since 1947, played a forceful, albeit somewhat erratic, role 
in state politics. Political associations—more commonly termed “pres-
sure groups” or “interest groups”—are exceedingly common and often 
immensely powerful in the American political scene, but the Farmers 
Union is somewhat unique.4 North Dakota is the most predominantly 
agrarian state in the United States and, in 1954, the Farmers Union had 
42,233 dues-paying members out of a total population—21 years and 
over (1950)—of 366,590. Numerically, the Farmers Union is the largest 
pressure group in North Dakota and generally conceded to be by far the 
most effectively organized. As will be discussed later, this organization 
is definitely involved in the oil politics of the state. Its position is some-
times rather ambiguous and unpredictable but this is probably due to 
an ironic sequence of events. The strength of the Farmers Union is west 
of the Red River Valley and it is very powerful in the Williston Basin 
area. However, its left to left-of-center ideology has been somewhat 
rebuked, where oil legislation is involved, by farmers who have oil on 
their land or, more importantly, are certain that they will have.
Another feature of the North Dakota political scene which im-
pressed this author during his research was the amount of intra-state 
sectionalism in North Dakota politics. This phenomenon seems more 
apparent in western North Dakota than elsewhere. There seems to 
prevail an attitude, notably among the political leaders, that political 
strategy must be based to an important degree upon their own sectional 
interests. Political alignments and re-alignments are often discussed in 
just those terms. Here, again, we shall see the impact of oil politics.
The governmental system of North Dakota—state, city, county, 
and special districts—is not particularly different from the national 
are the terms used in the sense of being anti-democratic. See Clinton Rossiter, 
Conservatism in America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1955), passim, but 
especially his introduction wherein these terms are more strictly defined.
4 The North Dakota Farm Bureau is a new and growing organization in the 
state—10,196 members in 1954—but its strength in the Williston Basin area 
is negligible.
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political pattern. However, a brief description of one feature of the 
state government is necessary due to its impact upon oil politics. The 
theory of separation of powers, coupled with a system of checks and 
balances, has been carried to such lengths in North Dakota that many 
of the state executive officers constitute what has been termed, in an-
other instance, “the headless fourth branch of government.” That is, 
many heads of departments and commissions are elected and thereby 
not constitutionally responsible to the governor, or are selected in such 
manner that executive responsibility becomes most difficult. This dif-
fusion of political authority and responsibility has, as will be explained 
later, been an important factor in the development of oil policy, and its 
subsequent administration.
III. Oil and the Legislative Process
Oil was discovered in North Dakota not long after the adjournment 
of the 1951 Session. This meant that no action would be taken on the 
development of new oil policies until early 1953, unless the governor 
decided to call a special session. The issue was not terribly and imme-
diately pressing. There was already in the North Dakota statutes a 1941 
law providing for the regulation of the production and conservation 
of oil but it was apparent that 1953 would be a crucial year. Important 
questions had to be acted on—taxes, well-spacing, administrative au-
thority, conservation practices, etc. The political factions began to sound 
about as political observers predicted, with the latter basing their judg-
ments on historical observations. The ROC desired a low tax in order 
to foster, from their viewpoint, an “infant” industry and thereby attract 
more capital into North Dakota. The NPL was in a dilemma. The oil 
companies were, to some NPL legislators, predatory interlopers, but to 
those who represented the areas where oil was flowing, or likely to be, 
the issue was not so simple. An economic basis of politics quickly man-
ifested itself in the form of a “pork chopper” attitude and the radicalism 
of some of the NPL’ers subsided rather considerably, particularly in re-
gards to oil taxes.
The Formation of New Pressure Groups
As would be expected, oil brought into formation new pressure groups. 
Of these, the most powerful are the North Dakota Oil and Gas Associ-
ation (hereafter NDOGA) and the Williams County Land Owners and 
Royalty Owners Association (WCLOA). Newer, and of less influence 
thus far, are the Tioga Land Owners Association, the North Dakota 
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Independent Producers and Royalty Owners Association, and the 
McKenzie County Mineral Owners Association.
The NDOGA was formally organized in Bismarck, North Dakota, 
on August 21, 1952.5 It is an unincorporated, non-profit association 
and designed to assist in the discovery, production, development, and 
conservation of oil and gas in the state. Membership is restricted to 
corporations, partnerships, or associations who are engaged in any 
phase of the oil industry. Membership is $25.00 per year and each 
represented enterprise is restricted to one vote, although it may pur-
chase any number of memberships for its officers and employees. At an 
annual convention, a Board of Directors composed of 40 members is 
elected. After receiving the nominations of a Nominating Committee, 
the Board selects the executive officers, including the President; the 
President then appoints a ten-person Executive Committee with the 
advice and consent of the Board. The office staff is a full-time Executive 
Secretary and a clerk-typist, although, during the legislative sessions, 
lobbyists are employed to represent the organization.6 By the summer 
of 1955 the NDOGA had 400 members and this included practically 
all the major oil producers in the United States, as well as representa-
tives of other phases of the oil industry, and officers from most of the 
major banks in Williston, Bismarck, Minot, and Jamestown. Besides 
attempting to influence the formation and administration of oil policy 
the organization conducts a public relations campaign aimed at the 
general public and its own members. A monthly News Letter is rather 
extensively distributed; the Proration Schedules and Oil Production 
Reports of the State Industrial Commission are disseminated to the 
NDOGA members, as are other pertinent and important publications. 
Oil displays are organized and displayed at fairs, conventions, and 
other such gatherings throughout the state.
The Williams County Land Owners and Royalty Owners Asso-
ciation was formed as a counteracting influence to the NDOGA and 
creates what David Truman has termed a “competing claim” relative 
to the latter organization.7 In the opinion of the WCLOA the other 
interest group represents the “majors” (the large oil companies) and 
thereby, in some instances, the NDOGA overlooks, or disregards, the 
interests of the owner of the land on which oil is, or may be, produced.
5 North Dakota Oil and Gas Association, Articles Association and By-Laws, 
dated August 21, 1952.
6 Five persons registered with the Secretary of State during the 1955 legislative 
session as lobbyists for the NDOGA.
7 David Truman, The Government Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 
1951), p. 150 and passim.
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From all appearances the WCLOA is not nearly as well organized 
or administered as the NDOGA. Membership is $5.00 year and ap-
parently there have been as many as 400–500 members. However, the 
records were not available to the writer. Annual meetings are held; a 
seven-person board is elected; and, since the origin of the WCLOA, 
Mr. Iver Solberg, State Senator from Williams County and a farm-
er-landowner near Ray, has been its President. To some extent the 
seemingly rather inefficient operation of the WCLOA is due to its lim-
ited objectives. Apparently the principal, if not the sole, purpose of the 
organization is to fight the major oil companies on the spacing issue. 
This controversy will be elaborated on later in this chapter.
Oil and the North Dakota Legislative Research Center
The North Dakota Senate had in 1951, by the passage of Senate Reso-
lution 6, instructed the Legislative Research Committee to study and 
make recommendations to the next legislature relative to the issue of 
the development, taxation, and conservation of oil, along with other re-
sources.8 This Committee is comprised of six members of the House, five 
from the Senate. Since its inception in 1945 it has been used extensively 
and effectively for the study of problems which are usually important 
but contentious. The full Committee generally appoints a sub-com-
mittee to make the actual study. In this instance two Senators—Mr. 
Clyde Duffy and Mr. Iver Solberg, along with one Representative—Mr. 
R.H. Lynch—constituted the sub-committee. Three public hearings 
were held—two in Bismarck and the other in Williston; advice and ma-
terial were secured from the Interstate Oil Compact Commission; Dr. 
Wilson Laird, State Geologist, made an on-the-spot study of oil regula-
tions and administration in some of the major oil producing states; and 
the Research Director, Mr. C. Emerson Murry, along with members of 
the sub-committee, drafted 13 legislative measures concerned with oil. 
Several of the proposed bills need not concern us here but it is neces-
sary to note the principal features of the proposed bill for the taxation 
of gas and oil:
1. A gross production tax was recommended rather than an ad 
valorem tax. The latter would have been very difficult to admin-
ister as accurate assessment of unproduced oil is hazardous, if 
not impossible.
8 State of North Dakota, Report the North Dakota Legislative Research Com-
mittee, 33rd Legislative Assembly, 1953, pp. 39, 43.
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2. The tax rate was set at 4¼%—4% on the value of the oil when 
produced and the ¼% for costs of administering the regulatory 
program, although this latter amount was not to be ear-marked 
but to go into the State’s General Fund.
3. The oil tax revenues, excluding the one-quarter per cent, were 
to be allocated as follows:
a. of the first $200,000 in tax revenues, 75% to the county 
where the oil was produced and 25% into the state’s gen-
eral fund.
b. for the next $200,000 the recommended allocation was 
50-50.
c. thereafter the state was to be allocated 75% and the county 
25%.
The full committee reported out this tax bill with unanimous agree-
ment. It had drafted a bill which, in the opinion of the Committee, 
protected the interests of the state and local governmental units but 
at the same time did not discourage the oil producers from a rapid and 
efficient development of oil resources. A gross production tax rate of 
5% was proposed but it was finally lowered one notch to encourage 
the oil producers to drill with full speed.9 Also, the bill provided for no 
exemptions from property taxes except for the permanent equipment 
of the well-site and the oil itself.
The allocation of tax revenues was also debated. The system of re-
distribution seemed to favor the oil producing counties more than was 
true in other states (for example, in Oklahoma the ratio is 80-20 in 
favor of the state). However, Senator Solberg, who represented Wil-
liams County in the Senate, believed that the real property tax base 
would not increase rapidly enough to provide the increased revenue 
that would be needed for roads, schools, etc. His position prevailed.
The Committee adopted, essentially, the “model” oil and gas con-
servation bill that had been drafted by the Interstate Oil Compact 
Commission.10 This proposed regulatory act grants considerable au-
thority to the state agency that is responsible for its administration. 
However, the Committee did not include the compulsory, field-wide 
unitization feature of the model act—in substance, this permits, under 
certain circumstances, an oil field to be operated as a single unit under 
9 North Dakota’s gross production tax is, at 4¼%, higher than most other 
states. See Interstate Oil Compact Commission, Gross Production and Sever-
ance Taxes Imposed by Various States (Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, no date).
10 Interstate Oil Compact Commission, A Form For an Oil and Gas Conserva-
tion Statute (Oklahoma City, 1950), 33 pages.
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a single operator—but it did provide for voluntary unitization and also 
included provisions for the determination of market demand and the 
regulation of oil production.
The Alignment of Political Forces of the 1953 Session
A brief account of the confusion and delay in organizing both houses of 
the State Legislature needs to be included herein as the outcome had a 
considerable impact on the subsequent oil legislation.
In the Senate, no faction had a clear majority. There were 49 sena-
tors. The ROC controlled 24 votes; the NPL had 21. There were three 
dissident Republicans—Carroll Day, Franklin Page, and Kenneth 
Pyle—and there was a solitary Democrat, Mrs. Harry O’Brien. The 
ROC could have organized the Senate with one more vote, but, for rea-
sons that need not be advanced in this study, the ROC chose not to 
invite any of the four to its caucus. After some consternation and delay 
it was agreed between the NPL and the four that they would form a 
coalition, with R.M. Streibel as majority floor leader, and organize the 
Senate. This was done and the coalition never split its vote, that is, not 
on issues that had been previously decided upon in caucus, except on 
the gross oil production tax bill.
Organizing the House was hardly less confusing. Briefly, the NPL 
had a clear majority but its intra-factional split was becoming more and 
more obvious. When the House NPL members caucussed for Speaker 
of the House, Mr. Halvor Rolfsrud was nominated. However, Rolfsrud 
represented the insurgent element of the NPL. The “Old Guard” group 
was determined not to be thwarted so its leaders entered into an agree-
ment with the House ROC members to support Walter Bubel, an “Old 
Guard” Leaguer, as Speaker. This idea prevailed and when the vote 
was counted in the House it was 69 for Bubel, 40 for Rolfsrud, three 
passed and one did not vote.11 Thus, the coalition of ROC—Old Guard 
Leaguers controlled the House during the 1953 session.
The “ifs” of history are usually interesting, albeit perhaps useless, 
but a different legislative organization would almost certainly have 
produced different oil legislation.
11 State of North Dakota, Journal the House, Thirty Third Session of the Legis-
lative Assembly (Bismarck, Bismarck Tribune, 1953), pp. 6–10.
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The Enactment of Oil Legislation at the 1953 Session
There was very little doubt in any politician’s mind that oil was to be 
a, if not the, major political issue at the 1953 legislature session. It also 
seemed reasonably clear that the usual political compromises would 
have to be made. The ROC was rather definitely committed to a low oil 
tax in order, from its point of view, to aid the growth and development 
of an oil industry in North Dakota.12 The insurgent NPL’ers believed 
that large capital investors, nearly all of them from out-of-state, were 
moving into North Dakota to exploit a natural resource which actually, 
according to their “picture”—to use Lippmann’s term—belonged to all 
the people of the state. There were other conceptions of course, and 
of those two just stated, some legislators probably used them as ratio-
nalizations in order to disguise their own self-interest. Also, an oil tax 
makes an excellent political issue in the sense of personal popularity 
and prestige and this factor can never be overlooked in understanding 
the political process in a democracy.
The Legislative Research Committee’s gross oil production tax bill 
was introduced on January 16, 1953, became Senate Bill Number 41, and 
was sent to the Committee on Finance and Taxation.13  Forty-four days 
later (February 8, 1953) the bill emerged “without recommendation” 
12 The word “low” is somewhat of a value term as used in this sentence. The 
ROC considered the tax to be “moderate.”
13 It is not considered necessary to document very extensively this account of 
legislative action on oil measures. The printed sources are the Grand Forks 
Herald and, to lesser extent, the Fargo Forum, Bismarck Tribune, Williston 
Herald, Non Partisan League Leader, North Dakota Union Farmer, and the 
official House and Senate Journals. Also, the author would like to acknowledge 
some of the persons whom he interviewed on this subject of oil legislation. 
Their assistance was cordially granted and most helpful. They were: W. Da-
vidson, Sr., President of the American State Bank in Williston; Carroll Day, 
State Senator from the 6th District in Grand Forks County and leader in the 
Senate Coalitions in 1953 and 1955; C. Emerson Murry, Director of the Legis-
lative Research Committee; Iver Solberg, State Senator from Williams County; 
Harry Polk, publisher of the Williston Herald; Arley Bjella, attorney in Wil-
liston and member of the State ROC Executive Board; Arthur Link, former 
chairman of the McKenzie County Farmers Union and presently State Repre-
sentative from the 41st District; James Key, chairman of the Democratic party 
in Williams County; Clair Amsberry, prominent Farmers Union member and 
Vice-Chairman of the Williams County Democratic party; and Walter Burk, 
Williston attorney who is acting Secretary for the Williams County Land Own-
er’s and Royalty Owner’s Association and President of the Upper Missouri 
Development Association. Many other persons were very cooperative and gen-
erous with their time and information but in the field of oil politics the above 
named interviewees were of the most assistance.
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for passage after the adoption of about two pages of amendments. The 
most vital change was the proposal of a 5¾% gross production tax with 
½ of 1% for administration of the tax. While the bill was in Committee 
the lobbyists had been laboring diligently. Mr. C.E. Boone, a vice-presi-
dent of Amerada Oil Corporation and a skilled lobbyist, maintained an 
office at Bismarck during all of the session. In his testimony before the 
Senate Finance Committee on January 27, he recommended a 3¼% 
gross oil production tax. Mr. William Pearce, a Bismarck attorney rep-
resenting the NDOGA, declared any such tax to be unconstitutional 
as it taxed owners instead of property. Mr. Harold Pollman, lobbyist 
for the WCLOA, testified, on February 8, in favor of a 4¼% tax if the 
oil producers, including the landowners, were permitted a 27½% de-
pletion allowance.14 The position of the Farmers Union was somewhat 
ambiguous. At its 1951 State Convention, the Union had advocated a 
“moderate” severance tax on oil.15 After Mr. Quentin Burdick, counsel 
for the North Dakota Farmers Union, had completed his trip through 
the oil states he wrote a series of articles for the North Dakota Union 
Farmer in the last of which he stated that “it is the writer’s opinion, 
that in no event should the initial tax be less than 5%.”16 At the Senate 
hearings on S.B. 14, Burdick testified in favor of a 6, 7, or 8% gross 
production tax if there was to be a depletion allowance, but, apparently, 
not claiming then to represent the Farmers Union.17 Mr. Alex Lind, a 
longtime North Dakota politician, principal lobbyist for the Farmers 
Union, a resident of Williston, and a landowner in Williams County, 
was a persistent advocate of a tax no higher than 4¼%. During this 
period, according to the late Senator Day, the Senate coalition group 
had caucussed and decided to push for a 6¼% tax reasoning that, in the 
opinion of the caucus, “The Standard Oil Company of Indiana could 
stand more tax.”18 In any respect the proposed amendments were voted 
14 In essence, depletion allowance permits the oil companies and other owners 
of mineral rights to deduct a certain percentage from their income tax, on the 
income received from oil, and be taxed only on the remainder. Federal law has 
such a provision but North Dakota, prior to 1953, did not. The theoretical jus-
tification for the depletion allowance is that the oil that is produced depletes 
the capital investment and consequently such a provision is necessary in order 
to attract more and adequate risk capital.
15 North Dakota Farmers Union, Policy and Action Program—1952 (James-
town, 1952), p. 24.
16 Burdick, op. cit. p. 16.
17 Grand Forks Herald, February 13, 1955.
18 Interview with Senator Day, July 1955. He also stated that there was some 
dissension within the Senate Coalition regarding the allocation of revenues 
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on the next day and adopted but not before Senator J.A. Bridston (5th 
District—Grand Forks County) had moved for a 4¼% tax.19 However, 
Senator Gilman Klefstad (ROC) made a substitute motion for 5% and 
Bridston then withdrew his motion. The vote on the substitute motion 
was 24-25. The Coalition had not lost a vote. After the clincher motion 
was applied by Senator R.M. Streibel, S.B. 41 went to the House.20 Po-
litical pressure continued to be applied. The Williston Junior Chamber 
of Commerce conducted a statewide newspaper advertising campaign 
favoring a 4¼% tax and a 27½% depletion allowance.
Then, on February 28, 250 western North Dakota farmers and 
businessmen “snake danced” through the Senate and House Chambers 
demonstrating in favor of a 4¼% tax.21 Prior to that energetic proce-
dure, this group had held a meeting with Mr. Harry Polk as chairman, 
in the Bismarck City Auditorium. Of the approximately 300 persons 
present, newspapermen estimated, from a show of hands, that about 
three-fourths of the demonstrators were farmers. There was count-
er-agitation on March 1st when 25 persons, primarily Farmers Union 
county and local officers from Burke and Divide Counties, attended a 
House hearing and advocated “at least 5¾%.”22 But, on March 3rd, the 
House Committee on Finance and Taxation voted out S.B. 41 with a 
recommended 4¼% tax, and the next day the vote on accepting the 
amendment was 70-41 in favor. Of the Representatives from Williams, 
Mountrail, and McKenzie Counties (at that time the “oil counties”) only 
Mr. T.O. Rodhe of New Town voted against the lower tax, and on the 
vote for final passage, 81-14, Mr. Rodhe did not vote at all. Thus, if the 
Senate Coalition group refused to accept the lower tax, the bill would 
have to go to Conference Committee. At this juncture the oil lobbyists, 
led in this instance by W.S. Davidson, Sr., President of the American 
State Bank in Williston, threatened to file recall petitions against Sen-
ator Solberg unless he changed his vote. In fact, several interviewees 
stated that Davidson stood directly behind Solberg (the latter’s Senate 
seat being right next to the outer rail) with recall petitions in hand 
while the vote was being taken. Solberg switched; the vote was 25-24 
received from the tax but in order to obtain the support of Senator Solberg, and 
other “oil” Senators, it was decided not to disturb that feature of the bill.
19 State of North Dakota, Journal of the Senate, 33rd Session (Bismarck; State 
Capitol, 1953), see Index, p. XIV.
20 The purpose of the clincher motion is to make reconsideration of a bill more 
difficult.
21 Grand Forks Herald, February 28, 1953. There is some question as to whether 
a “snake dance”, or anything like it actually occurred.
22 Ibid., March 2, 1955.
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in favor of the House Amendment; and the oil tax was to be 4¼%.23 The 
ROC governor, C. Norman Brunsdale, was a leading advocate of the 
lower tax so a veto was not even considered a possibility. Senator Day, 
in an interview with the author in July, 1955, claimed that even Mr. 
C.E. Boone, after consulting his superiors in the Amerada Petroleum 
Corporation, had agreed to accept 5¼%. (He also made this statement 
at a talk given in the Spring of 1953 at the University of North Dakota.) 
Further, he claimed that at no time during the Senate hearings was 
there a single pressure group that was willing to support the 6¼% tax 
advocated by the Senate Coalition.
S.B. 41 was the “showdown” bill, so to speak, for all oil legislation 
and it proved to be the only instance in which the Coalition refused 
to abide by a decision made in its caucus.24 On the issue of depletion 
allowances, Senators Clyde Duffy and Milton Rue introduced S.B. 89 
and S.B. 203, respectively. Rue’s bill was indefinitely postponed. The 
legislative process concerning S.B. 89 was rather comparable with S.B. 
41. The bill was reported out of the Senate Committee on Finance and 
Taxation with a “do pass” recommendation for a 27½% depletion al-
lowance. Senator Streibel moved to change it to 25% and his motion 
passed. After Senator Rue attempted to rescind the change, and failed, 
S.B. 89 passed the Senate by 49-0. Then the House changed the bill 
back to 27½%. On March 3rd, the Senate concurred again by a vote of 
25-24 as Senator Solberg switched his vote although Senators Hagen 
and Olson continued to vote with the Coalition. However, Senator Day 
insisted that the Coalition group decided not to make a concerted fight 
for the lower depletion allowance.
S.B. 32 was the “model” oil and gas conservation bill. Although an 
extremely important and potent piece of legislation it did not encounter 
any considerable difficulties in either House. As stated earlier in this 
chapter, the compulsory unitization feature was deleted but oil lobbyists 
appearing before the Legislative Research Committee were agree-
able to voluntary unitization. The Committee on Natural Resources 
in both Houses made only minor changes. In the Senate hearings on 
the bill, Mr. Harold Pollman and Mr. Milton Higgins testified in favor 
of including a 40 acre spacing provision in the law. Dr. Wilson Laird, 
State Geologist, testified to the contrary, that is, he advocated that the 
23 Senator Orville Hagen of McKenzie County and Senator Axel Olson of 
Mountrail County stayed with the Coalition on the 25-24 vote, but on the vote 
for final passage of the amended bill, 28-21, Hagen voted “aye.”
24 Senate Journal, op. cit. pp. 720–724, has the remarks of Senators Schrock, 
Day, Duffy, Bridston, Streibel, and Nordhaugen after the final passage of S.B. 
41. Also, Senator Nordhaugen’s statement is on pp. 463–465.
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Industrial Commission be authorized to make administrative rulings 
as to proper spacing—such was then, and still is, the procedure. Mr. 
Boone stated that the issue should be decided between landowners and 
operators.25 Charges and denials between Mr. Higgins and Dr. Laird 
apparently became rather heated but the Committee made no changes 
in regard to spacing procedure.
S.B. 35 was introduced by the Legislative Research Committee and 
was designed to regulate oil brokers. A few of the brokers had proven to 
be unethical and financially irresponsible so the use of the state’s police 
power seemed necessary to the Committee. There was some discussion 
of licensing the oil brokers, but this seemed to pose several administra-
tive difficulties and it would not have necessarily enabled the injured 
parties to have received any compensation. The bill was passed after 
considerable opposition and a substantial number of amendments. 
The NDOGA opposed the bill and Harold Pollman, representing the 
WCLOA, recommended licensing of oil brokers rather than bonding. 
The former organization apparently testified against S.B. 35 in order to 
get the support of the small oil producers for S.B. 32. When the Senate 
Judiciary Committee completed its hearing it recommended that the 
$10,000 bonding provision be changed to $3,000. The Senate and 
House approved this change, along with several others, and the bill re-
ceived little other opposition.
There were other “oil” bills of some importance that were introduced 
and passed at the 1953 Legislative Session but the process outlined 
above accounts for the most important and controversial items of oil 
legislation.
The Relative Inactivity of the 1955 Session
The “built-in” confusion of the North Dakota political system con-
tinued in the 1955 legislative session. The 1954 elections brought 
rather moderate successes for the ROC. Its majority in the House was 
substantial—the ROC nominee for Speaker being elected 64-45, four 
members not voting. But in the Senate, the Coalition of 1953 was again 
successfully formed. The NPL had maintained its strong minority 
group; the “independent” Republicans had lost one cohort—Senator 
Pyle, but there were now three Democrats in the Senate and toward the 
end of the session that figure was increased by the special election of 
another Democrat. Senator Day was elected the leader of the Coalition 
group.
25 Grand Forks Herald, February 8, 1953.
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The 1955 Session encountered a substantial number of serious 
problems but the issues concerning oil were very few. This situation 
was probably created by two main factors. With the two Houses con-
trolled, in essence, by opposite factions it was rather evident that no 
major policy changes would be made in the field of oil. Also, public 
opinion—in the sense of interested and articulate groups—on the oil 
issue was sort of at the fulcrum point. The initial lust and enthusiasm 
for oil had rather died away as drilling was greatly diminished and “dry 
holes” became more frequent. The politician was not too certain how 
to move on the oil issue. This was a year of watching and waiting. But a 
few interesting pieces of oil legislation were introduced, although none 
by the Legislative Research Committee.
Senators Solberg, Dewing, Hagen and Olson dropped in a bill on 
January 27, 1955, to prohibit the flaring of gas. This became S.B. 148 
and it had a short but lively career. Many persons in the state, and in the 
State Legislature, were increasingly concerned about the flaring of nat-
ural gas in the oil fields. For some considerable time the gas had been 
flared at the well-site but by the late summer of 1954 the Signal Oil and 
Gas Company had completed its plant at Tioga. After that development 
the gas was piped into the Signal plant whereupon the butane, pro-
pane, and sulphur were removed but the natural gas that remained was 
still burned. Only a few days before Senator Solberg’s bill was intro-
duced, he, and several other Senators, had offered concurrent Senate 
Resolution “H” which urged the effective utilization of natural gas and 
stated that approximately 30 million cubic feet of gas was being flared 
each day in North Dakota oil fields, including the Signal plant.26 Just 
what Senator Solberg and the other Senators had in mind when they 
introduced S.B. 148 is not known positively by the writer but it seems 
fairly clear that it was an attempt to bring pressure upon Amerada and 
the Montana-Dakota Utilities Company, or some other utility, to nego-
tiate a contract for the sale of the gas. The bill prevented the flaring of 
refined or dry natural gas and imposed a fine of $500 a day on each vio-
lator. Mr. Pearce (NDOGA), Mr. Richard Cook (Superintendent, Signal 
Oil and Gas Company), and Mr. C.E. Boone (Amerada) testified before 
the Senate Committee on Industry and Business that passage of the bill 
would force the cessation of production of both crude oil and natural 
gas; that no other state had such a law; and that there were not any 
adequate storage facilities for natural gas in North Dakota. Then on 
February 8, the Montana-Dakota Utilities Company announced that it 
had consummated a contract with Amerada, subject to the approval of 
26 Fargo Forum, January 27, 1955.
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the North Dakota Public Service Commission, for the purchase of all 
the gas produced at the Signal plant. The following day S.B. 148 was 
reported out of the Committee with a recommendation for indefinite 
postponement and such a report, in the North Dakota legislature, is 
tantamount to killing a bill.
Then, on January 28, Senators Schoeder, Berube, and Tuft—all of 
them influential in the Farmers Union—introduced a bill to increase 
the gross oil production tax by 2% and this additional revenue was all 
to go into the state’s general fund. At its 1954 State Convention, the 
Farmers Union had proposed a “higher rate” for the oil production tax 
with the revenues to be used for “schools and social services.”27 At the 
January, 1955, meeting of the Farmers Union Board of Directors that 
group recommended to the legislature that the tax be increased to 6¼%. 
This recommendation was, in substance, the content of S.B. 181. How-
ever, in his biennial message to the state legislature in early January, 
1955, Governor Brunsdale had opposed any increase in the gross oil 
production tax. Also, the Senate Coalition, in caucus, had decided not 
to make the oil tax an issue at the session ostensibly because the House 
was ROC and no increase in the tax had even a slim chance of passage. 
Furthermore, the Farmers Union seemed to be again working at cross 
purposes. Mr. Stanley Moore, the assistant lobbyist for the Farmers 
Union, was working hard to garner votes for S.B. 181 but Mr. Alex Lind 
seemed convinced that the existing tax was equitable, and conducted 
himself accordingly. Mr. Boone stated before the Senate Committee 
on Finance and Taxation that Amerada had a gross investment of 
$71,000,000 in North Dakota on which it had earned a profit of only 
$18,500,000 and claimed therefore that a tax increase was not justifi-
able. Mr. Ernest Fleck, an attorney for the NDOGA, was of like opinion 
and said that the oil industry had an investment of $450,000,000 in 
North Dakota but that the oil production rate in the state was less than 
one-half of one percent of United States production. Thus he agreed 
that the higher tax would only impede the growth of the oil industry in 
the state. The bill came out of committee “without recommendation” 
and, when the bill came before the Senate for action, Senator Hagen 
moved for indefinite postponement contending that a higher tax was 
“poor psychology, when we’re trying to attract industry to our state.”28
 On January 31, Senator Day introduced a bill (S.B. 214) which 
would have authorized the Public Service Commission to regulate nat-
ural gas rates at the wellhead. As was the case with S.B. 148, the bill 
27 North Dakota Farmers Union, Policy and Action  Program—1955, p. 36.
28 Grand Forks Herald, February 19, 1955.
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seemed designed to act as a further lever against the oil companies in 
an attempt to make them negotiate more rapidly for the utilization of 
the wasted natural gas. Also, as Senator Day remarked in a personal 
interview, “the bill might have been introduced to get natural gas for 
Grand Forks.” In any respect the oil lobbyists acted quickly and sharply. 
Hearings were held in the evening in the famous Room 200 at the Pat-
terson Hotel. Mr. William H. Hunt, the Texas oil multi-millionaire, flew 
in for the hearings. Mr. Pearce, representing the NDOGA, and several 
independent producers spoke against the bill by using the following 
arguments—no state has such a regulation; it would be difficult to ad-
minister; such a law would impede wildcatting, etc. Mr. Boone claimed 
that there was no monopoly in the production of natural gas.29 The bill 
emerged from the Committee on February 16 with a recommendation 
for “indefinite postponement.” Senator Dewing, a close friend and co-
alition supporter of Senator Day, moved that the Committee report be 
adopted and this was done without a roll call vote.
The 1955 Session of the State Legislature adjourned without acting 
on any other major oil bills, and of those that were considered none 
were passed.
IV. The Administration of Oil Policy
Before the beginning of this century, Woodrow Wilson theorized on the 
future role of public administration in modern government. He pre-
dicted correctly the increasing emphasis on bureaucracy and observed 
the hazards of attempting to separate politics from administration.30 
For, as some sage has remarked, “policy is often made in the interstices 
of administration.” Thus it has been with the oil policy in North Da-
kota, to a certain extent. A legislature cannot foresee all of the facets 
and ramifications of the policies it enacts; so, wisely, the law in most 
instances is given sufficient flexibility to meet changing conditions. 
This means that when a legislature has adjourned the political process 
moves over to the administrative agencies and the struggle for control 
and influence continues.
In North Dakota there are principally four state administrative 
agencies concerned with the execution of oil policies—the Industrial 
Commission, State Geologist, Public Service Commission, and the Tax 
Commissioner.
29 Grand Forks Herald, February 10, 1955.
30 Woodrow Wilson, “The Study of Administration,” Political Science Quarterly 
(1877), Vol. II, pp. 197–222.
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A. The Industrial Commission
Both the 1941 and 1953 state laws for the control of oil and gas re-
sources gave the Industrial Commission the primary authority for the 
formulation of oil conservation regulations. The Commission was cre-
ated in 1919 for the primary purpose of supervising the state-owned 
industries. It is an ex-officio organization composed of the Governor, 
Attorney General, and Commissioner of Agriculture and Labor. 
Because of its powers, and its control over some patronage, the Com-
mission has always been kept closely in mind by the politicians when 
it comes to “slate-making time” at the pre-primary conventions. Since 
1950, with the exception of the brief period that Mr. Paul Benson was 
Attorney General after the resignation of Mr. E.T. Christiansen, the 
NPL has controlled the Industrial Commission, although not the office 
of Governor.31 But in no instance, unless one includes the 1954 elec-
tion of Mr. Leslie Burgum to the office of Attorney General, has the 
insurgent group in the NPL had much authority in the Industrial Com-
mission. For better or worse, this situation has strongly affected policy. 
That is, the conservative Leaguers and the ROC have determined the 
Commission’s actions. In the field of oil conservation the authority of 
the Commission is largely due to its powers of issuing drilling permits, 
determining market demand and regulating production, and deciding 
upon spacing issues. The Commission’s procedure follows the rather 
set pattern that has been established in order to comply with the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution—due notice, hearing, appeals to the regular courts, etc. The 
principal problems of the Commission have been concerned with well 
spacing and market demand rulings, particularly the former.32
The oil spacing issue has been a lively one in North Dakota and 
still is. When a “pool” is determined for particular area, the Commis-
sion makes a temporary spacing ruling, which is in effect for not more 
than 18 months. After the expiration of that time period, it must make 
a “permanent,” or proper, spacing rule. The Commission is guided in 
its actions, officially at least, by the testimony of interested parties at 
the hearings and the advice of the State Geologist. The controversy has 
arisen over the demands of the mineral rights owners for the drilling 
31 It should be noted that the Governor has veto power over the decisions of the 
Commission.
32 An interesting, although rather confusing, analysis of the well-spacing issue 
is found in a volume which contains the transcripts of hearings held by the 
North Dakota State Industrial Commission in Bismarck from January 16–18, 
1952, Hearing on Eighty Acre Spacing for Beaver Lodge Pool (Bismarck: State 
of North Dakota, 1952), 256 pages.
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of more wells. This demand has often been echoed, if not originally ad-
vanced, by the businessmen in areas where drilling rigs are becoming 
scarce and, consequently, so are the customers. An interviewee in Tioga 
claimed, to the writer, that $8,000 had been collected from the local 
businessmen and the small independent producers to fight the tempo-
rary 80 acre spacing in the Tioga and Beaver Lodge fields from being 
changed at the October, 1955, meeting of the Industrial Commission to 
a “permanent” 80 acre spacing rule. This group would certainly prefer 
a permanent 40 acre spacing rule. However, by the time the October 
meeting had come and gone it was apparent that the $8,000 had not 
been collected by the Tioga Field Mineral Association. That organiza-
tion did not offer any testimony by technical witnesses at the hearing 
and the Industrial Commission thereupon issued a “permanent” 80 
acre spacing order.
The persons in the Williston area who are most aroused over the 
situation are primarily concerned with having more wells in order, 
in their opinion, to have more income.33 Spacing, of course, is not an 
end in itself. It is ostensibly a conservation measure designed to main-
tain the highest possible “maximum efficient rate of production,” and, 
thereby, to drain the field as thoroughly as possible. The usual spacing 
order of the Commission reads—“one well to 80 acres in order to drain 
efficiently, all of the recoverable oil from the sand pool, assure orderly 
and uniform development and avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells, 
and prevent waste in a manner that will protect correlative rights.”34
But the Commission has not been able to reconcile the differing 
conflicts of interest. The WCLOA has vociferously charged that the 
larger spacing ruling (primarily 80 acres)35 is solely for the benefit of 
the major oil producers as the latter presently do not need the oil and 
want to avoid the expense of extra drillings. The findings of the State 
Geologist seem to concur generally with the major oil producers, but 
he—the State Geologist—believes that the allocation formula is equi-
table to all parties concerned as the amount of oil allocated to a given 
33 But there does seem to be a serious question of ethics involved here. In any 
respect, a few of the landowners who were interviewed claimed that verbal 
promises were made that the drilling on their land would be based on 40 acre 
spacing. There seems to be adequate evidence to state that these and other such 
types of practices occurred but by whom, and to what extent, is much more 
difficult to ascertain.
34 State of North Dakota, Minutes of the Industrial Commission, May 10, 1954. 
Case No. 60, Order No. 67 (Fryburg-Madison Pool).
35 The rulings vary with geological condition, etc. The Newburg field in Bot-
tineau County has 40 acre spacing; most other fields have an 80 acre ruling; 
the Sanish field has 160 acre spacing.
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well is based on acreage and an increase in the size of the spacing unit 
increases, in proportion, the allowable quota for each well. His critics 
seem to have an unquenchable belief that an “independent” geologist 
should be hired to make a “scientific” ruling rather than an economic 
one. The WCLOA claims that other states have 10, 20, 40 acre spacing, 
which in some instances is true,36 but comparisons are rather futile un-
less many geophysical factors are closely correlated. Factional politics 
also play an important role as the NPL has become an advocate, for the 
most part, of 40 acre spacing while the ROC adheres more closely to 
the findings of the geologists for the state and the oil producers.
The market demand features of the oil conservation law are also a 
source of conflict. The avowed purpose of a market demand provision 
is to prevent waste of a natural resource by permitting only enough oil 
to be produced as will “clear” the market. The Interstate Oil Compact 
Commission (IOCC) believes that this is not an involved decision to 
make—“it is not difficult to determine the current demand for crude oil 
and the increasing or decreasing trend in that demand.”37 Probably that 
is correct in North Dakota as the Standard Oil Purchasing Company at 
Mandan is, by all odds, the largest single purchaser of the oil; in fact, 
almost the sole purchaser.
A market demand law may well be necessary for proper conserva-
tion, an orderly market, and adequate risk capital,38 but in the short 
run it means that an oil well may be able to produce its quota for the 
month in a few days.39 Also, as long as the monthly quota remains lower 
than the capacity of the wells to produce, and the formula remains un-
changed, the discussion over spacing seems rather academic. But that 
judgment is not concurred in by many landowners, businessmen, etc., 
in the Williston area. When the question of proper spacing for the 
Tioga and Beaver Lodge fields was discussed before, and decided by, 
the Industrial Commission in the fall of 1955 a considerable amount of 
political conflict was expected, but failed to develop. The landowners 
were apparently divided as to the strategy which should be followed.
36 Letter, from Mr. Lawrence R. Alley, Assistant Executive Secretary, Interstate 
Oil Compact Commission, to the author, August 25, 1955.
37 Interstate Oil Compact Commission, Oil for Today—And For Tomorrow 
(IOCC, Oklahoma City, 1953), p. 66.
38 Ibid., p. 69.
39 These quotas are based on a calculation which takes into account the acreage 
of the field and the depth of the well, among other factors. That is, the larger 
the spacing rule in that field, and the deeper the depth of the individual well, 
the greater the production quota. See the Industrial Commission of North 
Dakota, General Rules and Regulations for the Conservation of Crude Oil and 
Natural Gas, adopted December 1, 1953, Rule 505, p. 53–54.
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B. The State Geologist and State Geological Survey
The professor of geology at the University of North Dakota is also, 
ex-officio, the state geologist. As pertains to oil, he directs the activities 
of the State Geological Survey and “as supervisor, is charged with the 
enforcement of regulations and orders of the Industrial Commission 
governing North Dakota oil and gas resources.”40 In the administra-
tion of the duties and responsibilities of his office, the State Geologist, 
Dr. Wilson M. Laird, has organized the survey into three divisions—
geology, administration, and conservation.41 It is in the conservation 
activities of the last named division that Dr. Laird has encountered 
political difficulties. In his role as what might be termed the “principal 
advisor” to the Industrial Commission on geological matters, politics 
and science have become somewhat intertwined. Some individuals 
and organizations in the Williston Basin area have, and do, charge Dr. 
Laird with too close cooperation with the major oil producers and with 
failing, as one politician phrased it, “to assist the landowners of North 
Dakota whom he supposed to represent.” This matter of representa-
tion raises vital administrative questions. Who is Dr. Laird supposed 
to represent? From his point of view, his responsibilities are to admin-
ister the provisions of chapter 38-08 (Control of Gas and Oil Resources 
of the 1953 Supplement to the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943) 
in as scientific and objective a manner as possible. But his findings, 
notably in the field of well-spacing and conservation, have led him to 
reach in many instances the same conclusions as the major oil pro-
ducers. To those who consider their interests and conclusions to be 
contrary to those of the producers, Dr. Laird is not performing in a 
manner that is most beneficial for the citizens of the state. This is a 
serious and delicate matter and the author has only the competence to 
state the issues, not decide them. The concept of “state interest,” like 
its larger counterpart—the “national interest”—has always been vague 
and confusing. The following questions are some of the important ones 
asked by influential persons in the Williston area and they indicate 
that a consensus of opinion has not been reached on several matters 
regarding oil production and conservation. Is Amerada, for example, 
not really concerned with conservation in the spacing issue but rather 
wants to keep North Dakota oil off the market and thereby protect her 
investments and production in foreign nations and other states? Does 
40 State of North Dakota, North Dakota Blue Book (Bismarck: Bismarck Tri-
bune, 1954), p. 90 and Chapter 38-0804 of the 1953 Supplement to the North 
Dakota Revised Code 1943.
41 Grand Forks Herald, June 20, 1954.
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80 acre space most efficiently and completely drain the oil fields where 
such an order is in effect, or is much oil left that will never be recovered 
and thereby jeopardize the interests of mineral owners, the state, and 
the nation? Is justice here not decided in the interests of the stronger, 
that is, stronger in terms of political pressures, public relations, finan-
cial resources, etc.?
C. Public Service Commission
The Public Service Commission in North Dakota has the responsibility 
for the regulation of public utilities in the state. Its powers of issuing li-
censes, permits, certificates of convenience and necessity, setting rates, 
and the like, make it a potent force in the economic life of North Da-
kota. The three members of the commission are elected for overlapping 
six year terms—assuming that it is not a special election. Because of the 
authority of the office and the patronage that is to be dispensed, control 
of this commission is avidly sought for by the political factions.
The commission has not played a particularly important role in oil 
politics in the state but recently there have been attempts to secure the 
Commission’s approval for the construction of natural gas pipelines to 
certain cities and villages in North Dakota. The political and legal ma-
neuvers that followed have somewhat shifted the conflicts centering 
around oil politics from the Industrial Commission to the Public Ser-
vice Commission.
On November 27, 1953, the North Dakota Natural Gas Transmis-
sion Company (hereafter NDNGT) applied to the Commission for a 
certificate of convenience and necessity in order to build a pipeline 
from the Signal Plant at Tioga which would serve many of the major 
cities and towns in the northern section of the state east of Tioga and, 
also, in the Red River Valley area. This project was estimated in cost 
at $10,700,000. The Commission issued its findings of fact, conclu-
sions, and order on May 24, 1954.42 In essence, the plan was approved 
if the NDNGT would meet nine conditions. These need not be reiter-
ated here but they imposed substantial demands upon NDNGT in such 
matters as underground storage facilities, standby wells, and some 
financial features which were not satisfactory with the Commission. 
NDNGT claimed that it could not comply with six of the 16 stipula-
tions set forth by the Commission and applied for an extension of time, 
which was granted. Then on June 21, 1954, the Northern Natural Gas 
Company of Omaha proposed to the Commission the construction of a 
42 See North Dakota Public Service Commission, Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth 
Annual Report, for the biennial period ending June 30, 1954, pp. 93–112.
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somewhat similar line at a cost of $18,280,700. These companies were 
apparently unable to meet the standards established by the Commis-
sion and all the while a presumably vital natural resource was being 
flared away. It was not until June 23, 1955, that the issue began to 
jell.43 On that date, Montana-Dakota Utilities Company announced an 
agreement with Amerada on the use of the natural gas being flared at 
the signal gas plant. This was to be, if approved, a five million dollar 
pipeline extending east to Minot and west to Williston. Hearings be-
fore the Commission were held during parts of August. There seemed 
to be general approval of the proposal as far as it went but the eastern 
cities in the state were, in some instances, rather ardently opposed to 
the idea.
There were some interesting developments in this Montana-Dakota 
arrangement which indicate a “politics of business.” W.S. Davidson 
Sr., President of the American State Bank in Williston and a definite 
power in state politics, is reported to be the largest stock-holder in 
Montana-Dakota Utilities Company. The former owners of the Minot 
Gas Company were the sponsors for the NDNGT. Also, Mr. Ralph F. 
Davis, a natural gas consultant, studied the availability of gas situa-
tion for the Montana-Dakota Utilities Company and claimed there was 
only enough gas to satisfy Williston, Minot, and the cities and towns 
in-between. Two days after this was announced by Montana-Dakota 
Utilities, the president of Amerada denied, by telegram, the lack of 
availability of gas.
In considering oil politics within the state, the most important 
development was the division that occurred within the Public Ser-
vice Commission over the proposed pipelines of Montana-Dakota 
Utilities Company from Tioga to Williston and from Tioga to Minot. 
The former pipeline involves interstate commerce and is thereby a 
matter to be decided by the Federal Power Commission but the latter 
line is a matter of intrastate commerce. To summarize a lengthy and 
complicated dispute, the North Dakota Public Service Commission au-
thorized, in late November, 1955, the Tioga-Minot pipeline, but subject 
to several restrictions regarding price and future commitments which 
Montana-Dakota Utilities and Amerada would not accept. To further 
confuse the situation, that pipeline was already being constructed; the 
Public Service Commission was trying to bring contempt proceedings 
against the public utility as no construction certificate had been issued; 
and many users of gas in the Minot area were protesting the ostensible 
shortage of gas. The day before Christmas, 1955, District Judge A.J. 
43 Williston Herald, June 23, 1955; Minneapolis Tribune, June 25, 1955.
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Gronna authorized Montana-Dakota Utilities Company to begin im-
mediately the distribution of natural gas in Minot.
Whatever the final outcome, this matter was becoming more and 
more embroiled in North Dakota politics. One member of the Public 
Service Commission, an interim appointee of the Governor following 
the death of an elected member, was to run for election in 1956 to a full 
six year term on the Public Service Commission, and, on this aforemen-
tioned issue, his vote had been favorable to the position of Amerada 
and Montana-Dakota Utilities Company. In the 1956 election the issue 
of pipelines, rates, etc., was almost certain to be an influential cam-
paign issue.44
D. The Tax Commission
The general provisions of the North Dakota Oil and Gas Gross Pro-
duction Tax Law (chapter 57-51, North Dakota Revised Code, 1953 
Supplement) were outlined in Section III, Part B, of this chapter. The 
State Tax Commissioner, an elected officer, is responsible for the ad-
ministration of the act.45 Table Number XVI provides statistical data 
concerning the collection and distribution of revenue received under 
the provisions of the law. In comparative terms the tax has not been 
much of an income producer as yet. That is, the state sales tax brought 
in $12,696,000 for the fiscal year 1954 compared to the $335,831 that 
oil tax accounted for in almost a two year period. Also the ¼ of 1% 
for administration has not been equal to the actual increase of admin-
istrative costs. For 1952–54, the State Geological Survey’s budget was 
$310,000. Actually the Survey had no full-time employees prior to 
1951, other than the State Geologist, and his activities were principally 
those of a teacher. By 1954 the staff had increased to 18 full-time and 
eight temporary employees.46
Although the administration of the oil tax law is basically a ministe-
rial function there are a couple of features which need to be mentioned. 
It is clear from information received at the Tax Commissioner’s office 
that there are instances where the discretionary powers of the Tax 
Commissioner in the interpretation of the law are of considerable 
44 For more detailed information regarding this dispute, reference is made to 
Case No. 5351 and Case No. 5353, Public Service Commission, State of North 
Dakota.
45 Table No. XVI.
46 Grand Forks Herald, June 20, 1954.
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importance.47 In addition, the tax is somewhat novel in that it appears 
to be collected 100%. The reason for this apparently perfect collec-
tion is due to the source of collection, that is, the tax is collected at the 
refineries.
E. Other State Agencies
Two other state agencies that have been directly affected by oil discov-
eries in North Dakota are the Board of University and School Lands and 
the Bank of North Dakota. The Land Department had 723,000 acres 
under lease by the end of 1954. Income from leases and royalties since 
1936 has totaled $4,332,448. The revenue from leases is apportioned 
to state schools and institutions while the income from royalties goes 
into a permanent fund for reinvestment. The Bank of North Dakota 
has collected $1,421,634 since it first leased mineral acreage in 1948. A 
million dollars of these receipts was used to cover a transfer payment to 
the motor vehicle fund directed by the state legislature in 1953.48
Both of the above organizations are ex-officio and politics, in the 
sense of struggle for control, are moderately evident, but oil has, thus 
far, played a minor role.
TABLE XVI
NORTH DAKOTA OIL AND GAS GROSS PRODUCTION TAX 
COLLECTIONS AND ALLOCATIONS, 1954–1955, BY COUNTIES 
   TAXES COLLECTED ALLOCATED AS 
   FOLLOWS TO STATE GENERAL FUND 
County Total taxes To each 1/4% tax Per Total to 
 collected  county per per 57-5115 State
 from each 57-5115 57-5115  General
 county (2) (1) (2) Fund
Billings $18,450.92 $13,024.16 $1,085.35 $4,341.41 $5,426.76
Bottineau 6,073.87 4,287.44 357.29 1,429.14 1,786.42
Bowman 1,332.25 933.35 77.77 311.13 388.90
Burke 6,427.35 4,536.95 378.07 1,512.33 1,890.40
McKenzie 54,588.67 38,533.19 3,211.11 12,844.38 16,055.48
Mountrail 225,955.72 159,498.16 13,291.51 53,166.05 66,457.57
Stark .63 .44 .04 .15 .19
Williams 750,956.99 449,651.15 44,173.95 257,130.89 243,826.06
TOTAL $1,063,786.40 $670,464.84 $62,575.09 $330,735.48 $335,831.79
SOURCE: Office of the North Dakota Tax Commissioner, July, 1955.   
   
47 Letter, Office of the Tax Commissioner, to the Carter Oil Company, April 20, 
1955; and Letter, Office of Tax Commissioner, to the Hunt Oil Company, Au-
gust 14, 1953.
48 Grand Forks Herald, December 28, 1954.
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V. The Impact of Oil Upon City Government
The discovery of oil in the Williston Basin area in April, 1951, enabled 
almost any student of government to forecast the need for expansion of 
municipal facilities and services in that area. This growth was certain 
to be accompanied by increasing financial problems. The unanswerable 
question seemed to be—how much? Hindsight is invariably simpler 
and more accurate than foresight but even now it is difficult, and per-
haps too soon, to state whether the expansion of municipal activities in 
Williston, Ray, and Tioga was overly optimistic or unduly pessimistic. 
This section of the study is not intended to provide an economic anal-
ysis of the public finance problems that were, and are, involved. Rather 
it is to trace the growth of municipal services in the three cities and to 
relate and account for the serious conflicts that arose over municipal 
issues and institutions. Included within this discussion of municipal 
government are the operations of the independent school districts. 
Although separate units of government from the municipalities, the 
problems of the school districts are comparable in cause and scope to 
those of the cities.
Williston
(1) Expansion of Services and Facilities and the Problem of Finances
The United States Bureau of the Census declared Williston had a pop-
ulation in 1950 of 7,378. In a prior section this study indicated that by 
1954 the population was approximately 9,717. This meant, in terms of 
municipal services, that the city needed more and improved streets, 
sewer and water main extensions, additional storm sewers, and im-
proved waterworks, and more street lights—the new sewer system, 
alone, cost $350,000.49 In addition to these rather obvious necessities, 
Williston had drawn the plans and secured city approval for a new Ar-
mory building with probable construction in 1956, had funds to build 
a city garage, and had remodeled the city hall.50 These capital improve-
ments do not include new buildings and additions to the educational 
system, or other non-governmental civic enterprises. Some of this ac-
tivity would certainly have occurred if oil had never been discovered 
but the tempo of change was much greater because of that event.
49 League of North Dakota Municipalities, Bulletin, February, 1954, Vol. XXII, 
Bulletin II, p. 39. Apparently some of the residents complained about the im-
position of a sewage charge because Mr. Willard Webster stated that the charge 
was “unavoidable” as $150,000 of the costs of the new sewer here were to come 
from special assessments and $200,000 from revenue. The Williston Herald 
opposed the bond issue (April 1954) in a front page editorial.
50 Williston Herald, June 28, 1955 and June 29, 1955.
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This building and improvement program meant that by May 31, 
1955, the city owed $2,237,500 in general obligation and revenue 
bonds, refunding special assessment warrants, and special assessment 
warrants other than those of the refunding type.51 (SEE TABLE XVII)
TABLE XVII
WILLISTON BONDED INDEBTEDNESS, MAY 31, 1955
 Amount of Issue Funds on Hand
General obligation bonds $153,000.00 $118,347.87
Revenue bonds 226,000.00 77,896.09
Refunding special assessment warrants 1,578,000.00 481,103.21
Other special assessment warrants 280,500.00 72,857.03
 —————— —————
TOTAL $2,237,500.00 $750,204.20
 Even considering this substantial expansion of city facilities and 
consequent debt, Mr. H.L. Grimstvedt considered the city to be on a 
sound financial basis in May, 1955.52 No events seem to have transpired 
since that time to cause a revision of opinion.
Property valuations—real and personal—have experienced a sub-
stantial steady increase; mill levies have remained relatively stable 
since 1952; and revenues have consequently moved upward. (SEE 
TABLE XVIII)
TABLE XVIII
WILLISTON PROPERTY MILL LEVIES, VALUATION AND EX-
PECTED TAX REVENUES, 1950–1955
Fiscal  Combined*  Taxable Expected
Year Mill Levies Valuation Revenue
1950 96.86 $4,837,541.00 $468,564.00
1951 98.93 5,185,454.00 512,996.00
1952 120.07 5,801,790.00 ......
1953 125.08 6,845,675.00 ......
1954 123.36 7,511,671.00 926,634.00
1955 ...... 13,423,649.00 (Est.) ......
* State, County, City, Park, School, Special   
Table XIX shows how tax revenues, appropriations, and actual ex-
penditures (including special projects) increased; how the demands for 
51 Ibid., June 25, 1955.
52 Ibid.
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more services advanced the costs of strictly governmental services, and 
how they moved upward. The figures are self-explanatory and compar-
ative percentage estimates would not be particularly meaningful.
TABLE XIX
WILLISTON TAX REVENUES, APPROPRIATIONS AND EXPEN-
DITURES, FISCAL YEARS 1950–1951 TO 1954–1955
Fiscal Year Total Tax  Total  Total
Year Revenues Appropriations Expenditures
50–51 $105,112.67 $163,828.00 $124,058.60
51–52 122,688.77 196,769.00 175,982.12
52–53 200,466.03 269,270.00 243,241.66
53–54 219,118.26 337,392.61 955,957.00*
54–55 252,695.96 426,815.19 ......
* This includes $489,554.23 for the construction fund plus $126,320.00 for 
bonds.
The problems of the Williston school district are different in type, 
but not magnitude, from those of the city. Two elementary schools had 
to be built; another school was enlarged; a new parochial school was 
completed; a $300,000 high school gymnasium was constructed by 
early 1954 and two classrooms were used there during the 1954–55 
school year. In July, 1952, there were $275,000 in outstanding school 
bonds; $325,000 more were added in 1952–53 and another $118,000 
in 1953–54. By mid-year in 1955 the school district had a bonded in-
debtedness of $687,000 due to its construction and improvements 
program. (SEE TABLE XX)
TABLE XX
WILLISTON SCHOOL DISTRICT ENROLLMENTS AND TAX 
RATES, FISCAL YEARS 1950–1951 TO 1954–1955
Year Number of Students General Fund Mill Levy
1950–51 ..................................................... 21.57
1951–52 1,664 + 76 parochial students 23.54
1952–53 1,972 + 93 parochial students 25.04
1953–54 2,239 + 100 parochial students 25.7
1954–55 2,315 + 194 parochial students 25.99
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From the year 1952–53 school year to the 1954–55 school year, the 
school system in Williston—public and private—experienced a little 
over a 44% increase. This was a serious enough problem in itself but the 
migratory nature of oil-drilling meant that the students were coming 
and going at a rate which made student integration and administrative 
efficiency even more complicated.
By the summer of 1955 the population cycle was at a sort of plateau 
stage but there seemed to be what might be termed a careful optimism 
among the public leaders in Williston about the financial condition of 
the city and the schools. The indebtedness was substantial and the oil 
boom was definitely tapering off but they looked for a period of stability 
which would enable them to meet their financial responsibilities, and 
continue to move forward, but at a slower pace.
(2) Internal Political Controversies and City Elections
As far as the author could ascertain, there was little evidence of oil 
politics, of a direct type, in the organization or operation of city govern-
ment in Williston. But there were two rather bitterly fought municipal 
elections in 1954—one special, the other regular—which were precip-
itated by the sudden and rapid growth of the city due to the oil boom. 
So, indirectly oil was certainly involved in local politics but it seems 
doubtful if the officers and employees of the different types of oil com-
panies played a very significant role.
The expansion of municipal services and the concomitant in-
crease in taxes and assessments were the seeds of some discontent.53 A 
number of the persons in the outlying areas of the city were dissatisfied 
with the services and the cost of those services. The charge was also 
made that organized labor had no representation on the Commission. 
Others claimed the Police Department was operated in an inefficient, 
even crude, fashion; and one interviewee stated that the rate of arrest 
had been five times that of any other city in North Dakota.54 All five of 
the Commissioners were, inadvertently it seems, living on the east side 
53 Since April, 1913, Williston has had a Commission form of government. Four 
Commissioners and president of the Commission are elected at large for five 
years, overlapping terms. The president has no veto power. The salary for each 
of the five officers is $780 per year.
54 One of the leaders for retaining the Commission form contended, in 
an interview, that the police chief was a “news-hound” and thus created an 
over-emphasis on the activities of the Police Department. Also, he believed that 
some of the new personnel lacked judgment and maturity.
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of the city and this created charges of favoritism.55 One of the former 
members of the City Commission had been, while a commissioner, an 
employee of the engineering firm which was consulted about a new 
sewer project. But he did not vote when the contract was decided on 
by the City Commission. Nevertheless, some claimed this was a serious 
“conflict of interest.” The City Attorney—Mr. Everett Palmer—con-
tended that the Commission had discussed the ethics and legality of 
his action and was advised by the Attorney-General of North Dakota 
that his (Mr. Webster’s) actions were legal. Also, an opposition leader 
stated, in a personal interview, that the former Commissioner’s partic-
ipation in the sewer contract matter was not made an election issue as 
there were no indications at all of illegal actions.
In any respect, 1801 citizens of Williston signed petitions favoring 
the aldermanic form of government and on February 23, 1954 the cit-
izens voted on the issue—“Shall the city of Williston change from its 
organization under the Commission system of government and be-
come a city under the Council form of government?” The leaders of 
the opposition apparently desired to have a Council-Manager form but 
disagreement within their own ranks dictated the expedient strategy of 
making a Mayor-Council form the first objective.
Pressure groups were formed on both sides. There were the 
“Women’s Vote for the Commission Form of Government,” and the 
“Committee for Progress”—all favoring the existing form. The opposi-
tion formed an organization called the “Civic Improvement League.” 
Mr. Palmer, the City Attorney, came to be the “…principal spokesman 
for the Commission Form of Government.”56 Mr. Walter Burk switched 
sides, at least the reformers declared so, and delivered a radio address 
just prior to the election in favor of the Commission form. The League 
of Women Voters worked diligently, seemingly in an impartial manner, 
gathering and publishing facts about the issues. A prominent doctor 
was, according to a leader for the aldermanic form, to provide the cam-
paign eve “punch blow” through a radio address favoring the change, 
but almost an hour before the broadcast he withdrew due to pressure 
from his associates and the bank he was connected with. Apparently 
the American State Bank “rode the fence” by contributing $50.00 to 
each side.
55 It should be pointed out that, at the time of their election, two of the Com-
missioners lived on the west side of the city and the third Commissioner lived 
on the far north side, north of Harmon Park. Afterward, however, the three of 
them bought or built new homes on the east side of the city.
56 Williston Herald, February 22, 1954. One of the city officials doubted if Mr. 
Palmer had taken a leading role in this particular issue at all.
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The reform group seemed to have a scarcity of funds for campaigning 
while the status quo group had considerable financial resources. By 
studying the advertising of the Williston Herald for five days (ex-
cluding Sunday as there is no edition that day) it was determined that 
the “for Commission” forces spent $1,031.40 on political advertising as 
compared to $28.80 for the “aldermanic” forces.57 After the ballots were 
counted on February 23, 1954, it was announced that the vote was 1041 
“yes” (in favor of aldermanic form) to 1195 “no” votes.
However, the conflict was not yet resolved as the regular election 
was now due on the 13th of April. A group of interested and promi-
nent citizens caucussed regarding a slate and decided not to support 
the existing President of the City Commission and two other Commis-
sioners whose terms were to expire. As its slate, this group selected Dr. 
L.M. Carlson, a Williston dentist, to run for the office of president, and 
Mr. A.J. Thomas and Mr. T.S. Bosh for the other two openings on the 
Commission. “Tony” Bosh was considered to be a representative of the 
organized labor. A few days before the election, Mr. W.N. Dittsworth, 
then president of the Commission, withdrew from the race; Mr. Oscar 
N. Lee, a Commissioner, declared himself not to be a candidate; and 
Mr. Harris Anderson, the other Commissioner and who was then in 
charge of the police and fire departments, did run but was defeated. 
Table XXI shows the results of the election.
TABLE XXI
WILLISTON COMMISSION ELECTION RETURNS, BY 
CANDIDATES AND BY WARDS, 
FOR THE ELECTION OF APRIL 13, 1955
Pres. of B/C 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th Totals
G.M. Carlson* 137 154 272 291 282 196 238 1570
Harry England 86 62 146 202 165 155 189 1005
W.N. Dittsworth ...... 1 2 ...... ...... ...... ...... 3
Comm.         
A.J. Thomas* 145 154 257 326 274 210 270 1636
Gust Stokke 64 59 103 170 108 105 105 714
Harris Anderson 48 50 144 96 179 91 139 747
C.A. Scott 46 38 49 91 93 70 108 495
T.S. Bosh* 124 126 230 294 206 198 189 1367
* Elected        
57 Ibid., February 17-18-19-20-22, 1954.
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Doctor Carlson died unexpectedly on June 27, 1955 so the Com-
mission had to call a special election. The “interested and prominent” 
leaders again caucussed and the contest was between Mr. Burk, Mr. 
H.M. Zahl—a former newspaper publisher—and Mr. Russ Nelson. The 
election was held on September 19, 1955 and Burk received 1393 votes 
to 455 for Zahl and 399 for Nelson.
Tioga
(1) Municipal Services and Finances
Tioga calls itself the “Oil Capital of North Dakota.” The oil boom began 
practically in the city’s front yard. This study has already noted what 
this discovery meant to Tioga in demographic, economic, and social 
terms. From a population in 1950 of 456 the city has leaped forward 
in a somewhat convulsive fashion to a point, by the summer of 1955, 
where a city official estimated the population to be 1200.58
There seems to have been, among the Tioga residents, a rather se-
vere ambivalence about this oil boom. Some were ardently attracted 
to the powerful dynamism of an oil economy while others were much 
more concerned about the destruction of a way of life which they had 
found quite satisfactory. This conflict will be elaborated on to a greater 
degree in the next section but this situation delayed the construction 
and operation of new municipal facilities.59
But the rate of progress had still been considerable. Special improve-
ment bonds of $743,000 value have been issued from 1951 to about 
mid-1955 for water, sewers, curbs and gutters, sidewalks, etc. Paving 
projects were not carried forth in a particularly speedy fashion but the 
change was persistent. A sizeable program was carried out in 1954 and 
in the late summer of 1955 bids were opened on paving, gutter, and 
storm sewer projects with the apparent low bids being $120,626 for 34 
blocks of paving curb and gutter and $13,505 for storm sewers.60 A new 
city hall, including a new jail, was constructed and, for the most part, 
in operation by January, 1954.
58 Our own research indicated that the population of Tioga in the summer of 
1954 was 1,608.
59 North Dakota League of Municipalities, Bulletin Vol. XXI, No. 11, November, 
1953, pp. 25–26. This article is a report of an earlier editorial from the Bis-
marck Tribune.
60 Ibid., September 1955, p. 41
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The general budget of the city went from $9,149.58 in 1952–53 
to $39,946.61 in 1954–55. There was no park district in 1952–53 but 
by 1954–55 one had been organized and its budget for that year was 
$1,976.
Construction and extension of school buildings advanced at a com-
parable pace. School bonds for the amount of $158,000 were issued in 
1954 and in May, 1955, the voters approved a $70,000 bond issue for 
new school buildings by a vote of 119-24. An election was to be held in 
the fall of 1955 as to whether or not the community desired a $400,000 
bond issue for a new high school.
All this building meant, almost surely, more taxes. But the mill levy, 
although high, was on the decline after 1953 as Table XXII indicates. 
Assessed valuations for the city increased from about $405,000 in 1951 
to $740,548 for 1955. The increase in valuation was even more substan-
tial for the Tioga School District, which includes farming areas outside 
Tioga, but the, perhaps, more realistic valuations have permitted a 
decrease in mill levies. Table XXIII also indicates that the pupil popu-
lation has increased over 300% since the discovery of oil.
TABLE XXII
TIOGA PROPERTY VALUATIONS AND TAX RATES, 1950–1955
Year Property Valuations  Mill Levies
1950 $153,430.00  112.44
1951 155,551.00  109.21
1952 196,095.00  124.11
1953 614,864.00  113.79
1954 740,548.00  110.75
1955 ......  100.00 (Est.)
TABLE XXIII
TIOGA SCHOOL DISTRICT ENROLLMENTS, PROPERTY 
VALUATIONS AND TAX RATES, 1950–1954
Year School  Property Valuation  General Fund 
 Population   Mill Levy
1950 ...... $412,466.00  54
1951 187  475,631.00  51
1952 350  1,102,418.00  51
1953 515  2,625,221.00  32
1954 601 ......  30.47
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(2) Internal Controversies and Elections
The conflicts have probably been more considerable in Tioga than in 
Ray but of a somewhat different variety. Tioga had been a village until 
1953 but, by an almost unanimous popular referendum held that year, 
it incorporated and became a municipality with a commission form 
of government. The city limits have not been extended to include the 
Signal gas plant because the property that is used by that plant be-
longs to the Great Northern Railroad Company and the strategy seems 
to be to build city improvements first and, perhaps later, annex more 
property.
An early, and apparently rather bitter, conflict concerned what 
was called the “wets and drys” issue. The “wets” wanted city water and 
sewage and the “drys” favored the status quo. Even after referenda were 
conducted and bond issues thereby authorized, a series of lawsuits 
were begun which sought writs of injunctions against these new im-
provements. There was a substantial amount of community animosity 
and neighbors were, even in the summer of 1954, sometimes quite irate 
toward each other over this issue, although the water system was in-
stalled in 1952.
Newcomers to the community were gradually being elected to 
the Tioga City Commission and the school board. In the summer of 
1955 there were two on each of the five-member boards. The elections 
have been relatively peaceful although a Catholic-Protestant conflict 
did arise in the 1955 election to the school board. Thirteen teachers 
voluntarily resigned from the school system and, because a Catholic 
was chairman of the school board, there were charges made that the 
vacancies would be filled from teachers of that faith. In the election, 
two Protestant candidates entered the race, one later withdrew, and 
the Protestant candidate received 25 more votes than the incumbent 
chairman. However, both were elected as there were two vacancies. 
Apparently many of the citizens of Tioga, including the editor of the 
Tioga Tribune who did some editorializing on the matter, looked upon 
this ruckus as sort of an unfortunate affair and it now seems to have 
substantially subsided.
The time of troubles is certainly not over for the governmental or-
ganizations in Tioga but the peak period seems to have passed.61 There 
has been a water shortage but the city installed a new pump in the 
south well to alleviate that problem. An influx of trailers had created 
61 Grand Forks Herald, February 17, 1953. The financial plight of the schools 
was apparently so serious in the winter of 1952–53 that some of the Tioga 
teachers received lOU’s rather than paychecks.
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a difficult sort of problem for the City Commission but an ordinance 
regulating trailer parking has mitigated that situation. There was a no-
ticeable reluctance to provide the city with natural gas after the Signal 
plant was in operation so in July, 1954, the City Commission let it be 
known that it was considering the construction of a municipal gas 
plant. During the following month the Montana-Dakota Utilities Com-
pany announced that natural gas service would be available in Tioga by 
October 15, 1954. This statement became a reality and, by the summer 
of 1955, 239 permits had been issued for the use of natural gas.
Ray
(1) Municipal Services and Finances
The city of Ray is several miles west of the original oil discovery areas 
but the boom soon pervaded the life of the whole community. The nat-
ural topography of the city favored additional development and there 
was available already a municipal water and sewage system to attract 
the oilmen and their families. 
Accurate statistical information was more difficult to secure in Ray 
but the general impressions were that the financial situation was less 
satisfactory than in Tioga. Leaders in the community stated, in per-
sonal interviews, that the bonded indebtedness for schools in Ray 
was up to the legal limit; that the mill levy was up to 141 (71–72 mills 
for school district,62 26 for City, and the rest State/County and minor 
levies); and that the City budget for 1954–55 was $22,000–$23,000. 
But the city of Ray had no bonded indebtedness in 1954, although it did 
incur one in 1955 of $13,800 in order to install new storm sewers. One 
of the residents provided the author with a statement of the property 
taxes for his own home and these figures indicated a gradual increase 
in property taxes from $82.09 in 1951 to $102.24 in 1955.
The activities of the Farmers Union Credit Union in Ray indicated 
the economic trend to some extent. In 1955, it had assets of $488,950 
and 771 members while in 1952 the assets were $390,000 and the 
membership was 625. However, if these statistics indicate pessimism 
as to the future it should be quickly stated that such did not seem to 
be the prevalent attitude in the summer of 1955, although there was 
a much more cautious optimism than a year previously. Table XXIV 
points out the increases in property valuations and mill levies.
62 He was including the mill levies for sinking, reserve, and building funds.
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TABLE XXIV
RAY PROPERTY VALUATIONS AND TAX RATES, 1950–1954
 
Year  Property Valuation Total Mill Levy
1950  $221,374.00  113.76
1951  234,786.00  130.45
1952  246,336.00  140.83
1953  333,693.00  140.69
1954  381,134.00  141.69
The schools had to meet a new and pressing situation. Three bond 
issues totalling about $225,000 had to be floated. One school burned; 
another started but could not be completed until another bond issue 
had been sold. However, again, the community leaders believed that 
the burden could be handled. The following table (TABLE XXV) 
outlines the general picture of school population increases and the fi-
nancial situation.
TABLE XXV
RAY SCHOOL DISTRICT ENROLLMENTS, PROPERTY 
VALUATIONS AND TAX RATES, 1950–1954
Year School  Property Valuation  General Fund 
 Population   Mill Levy
1950 ...... $505,673.00  45.00 mills
1951 246 528,920.00  42.50 mills
1952 393 620,274.00  40.65 mills
1953 413 679,808.00  40.00 mills
1954 413 ......  40.00 mills
There was, in 1955, criticism of high taxes. One community leader 
estimated that taxes had been doubled since the coming of oil; another 
thought the increase was 65–70%. This writer, at least, gained the gen-
eral impression that more skepticism toward the future was prevalent 
in Ray than in either Williston or Tioga.
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(2) Internal Controversies and Elections
The political schisms in Ray rather compared with those already 
noted in Tioga. The issue was largely between the “Old Guard” and 
the “Progressives,” or in other words, the “status quo” group versus the 
“reformers.” Prior to the April, 1954, election there was considerable 
criticism of the existing city commission. The then President of the 
Commission had occupied that position for 12 years but decided not 
to run for reelection, perhaps because of considerable criticism of his 
actions by some of the residents. A slate of “Progressives,” including a 
member of the Commission to run for the office of President, was put 
forward in the April election and all were voted into office. It seemed 
to be a rather prevalent opinion that the new Commission came about 
primarily because a majority of the citizens thought that community 
development was preceding too slowly. But in the referenda on com-
munity projects the storm sewer proposal was defeated 56-165 while 
the curbs and gutters proposal was approved by 142-81. The new Pres-
ident of the City Commission, Mr. Arnold Anderson, seemed confident 
that the schisms were not overly serious; rather they were largely those, 
he believed, of a small town nature in which everyone knows everyone 
else’s business and resulting frictions are the consequence.
Public Attitudes on Local Government Services and 
Educational Facilities
The Questionnaire Survey team spent most of the summer of 1954 in 
the Williston area. The different methodological aspects of this survey 
have been discussed in Appendix A. Two of the questions that were 
directed to the respondents provided some worthwhile data as to 
the opinions of the citizenry of Williston, Tioga, Ray, and the Impact 
Area relative to the condition of local government services, including 
education.
In regards to local governmental services, the question was—“Since 
the beginning of the oil boom have local government services im-
proved?” This question was varied slightly in Tioga and Ray in order 
to interject the possibility of a decline in the quality of the services but 
the changing of the question resulted in approximately the same type of 
answers so no distinction is included in Table XXVI following.
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TABLE XXVI
TYPES OF ANSWERS, BY WILLISTON BASIN LOCALITY RES-
IDENCE, TO THE QUESTION: “SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 
THE OIL BOOM HAVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES 
IMPROVED?”1
Types of  Williston 
Answers Impact
 Old2 New Either Total Tioga Ray Areas Totals
Improved 209 45 4 258 27 36 13 334
No Change 
or Declined 84 26 156 266 9 36 81 392
Both 4 1 ...... 5 1 ...... ...... 6
Don’t Know 53 49 2 104 10 27 4 145
TOTALS 350 121 162 633 47 99 98 877
1. This question was re-worded in Tioga and Ray but obtained the same kinds of 
answers.
2. The word “old” means that the interviewees lived in that particular city, or 
area, prior to 1951.
 
The results of the survey seemed to point to no particular change 
in attitudes about local governmental services because of the oil boom. 
But a substantial number—334 out of 877—believed that the services 
had improved and that was rather remarkable in itself considering the 
large expansion in population over a brief period of time. The status 
quo category (a minority indicated a decline in the quality of services) 
was preponderant but such an attitude might well be considered a 
commendation during such a period of development.
The question concerning educational institutions was phrased as 
follows—“Has the rapid increase in population affected educational 
facilities in your area? If ‘yes’—How?” For Tioga, the question was 
re-stated—“How have educational facilities been affected?” The al-
teration, in the case of Tioga, was made because the wording of the 
original question was somewhat leading. That is, stressing the fact that 
there had been rapid increase in population rather led the respondent 
to believe that the educational institutions might have been drastically 
affected. Table XXVII outlines the results on these particular questions.
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TABLE XXVII
TYPES OF ANSWERS, BY WILLISTON BASIN LOCALITY RESI-
DENCE, TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE PRESENCE AND 
NATURE OF CHANGES IN EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES
Types of answers  Williston   Impact
 Old New Either Total Ray Areas Total
No—no data ...... 1 ...... 1 3 39 43
No—data not 
available 7 8 ...... 15 ...... ...... 15
Yes, better—
improved teaching 1 1 ...... 2 3 1 6
Yes, better—
improved facilities 59 20 ...... 79 ...... 12 91
Yes, better—
improved 
administration ...... ...... ...... ...... 23 ...... 23
Yes, better—
data not available 2 ...... ...... 2 2 ...... 4
Yes, worse—
poorer teaching 3 3 ...... 6 2 2 10
Yes, worse—
poorer facilities 146 38 4 188 50 32 270
Yes, worse—
data not available 1 1 ...... 2 ...... 2 4
Both—some facilities 
better,  others worse 43 9 ...... 52 2 ...... 54
Both—
some teaching is better—
others worse ...... 2 ...... 2 ...... ...... 2
Both—no data  1 ...... ...... 1 ...... ...... 2
Indefinite—
teaching may be worse 1 ...... ...... 1 ...... ...... 1
Indefinite—
facilities may be worse 13 5 ...... 18 ...... 3 21
Indefinite—
data not available 27 16 ...... 43 ...... ...... 43
Indefinite—no data 4 1 ...... 5 18 6 29
No opinion—
data not available 17 30 ...... 47 ...... ...... 47
TOTALS 325 135 4 464 103 98 665
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It points to a dislike of the way that educational facilities have 
fared since oil discovery. Almost 43% believed that the schools were 
in worse condition and nearly all of the criticism was directed at what 
the respondents considered to be poorer facilities. But a rather sizeable 
proportion—nearly 18%—were of the opinion that education institu-
tions had improved in various ways. It would seem that, in the long 
run, oil discovery would improve the quality of educational institu-
tions, at least in terms of plant and equipment, due to the extensive 
building programs that have occurred. The key issue will probably be 
one of finances. That is, can the payments on the bond issues be met 
without lowering the quality of educational services?
VI. The Impact of Oil Upon the Government of Williams County
A new courthouse building was slowly coming to be an absolute neces-
sity in Williams county but the discovery of oil and the aura of wealth 
and power that followed hurried along its construction. Somehow this 
courthouse seems to symbolize the coming of a different era for this 
county. Probably the economic revolution will not be as rapid or thor-
ough as was originally contemplated, at least by a few, but it has been 
substantial.
A. Increased Governmental Activities
One needs to do very little research in order to arrive at an accurate 
generalization about Williams County government—oil discovery 
meant that all county governmental offices had more work to do and 
needed a larger budget. Presumably even the coroner was more active 
than before but this section will only deal with those offices which felt 
the impact quite severely.
The administrative personnel of the County Public Welfare Board 
seemed convinced that “oil” added greatly to their problems. It was one 
interviewee’s opinion that, in terms of public welfare costs, oil had been 
harmful. But the situation was apparently about what they had expected. 
The influx of oil workers, particularly from 1951 to 1954, meant more 
transients, more marital desertions, more stranded persons, and the 
like. However, it does not appear from statistics that the burden was as 
much as one might conjecture. For example, the “General Assistance”63 
63 Part of the Federal grant-in-aid program initiated by the Social Security Act 
of 1937.
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load was 40 families in 1953–54 as compared to 80 families in 1954–55. 
But the increase was probably due to lower farm income that year as 
much as a decline in oil development in the area. The oil workers were 
mostly from warmer climates and had lived in a somewhat different 
culture. Child welfare work became more of a problem due to a con-
siderable increase in child neglect, etc. Also, the “white collar” oilmen 
and their families were “accepted” but the laborers were much more 
isolated. Perhaps it was just a misleading stereotype but several of the 
interviewees made a definite distinction between the oil executives, 
etc., who were “educated and cultured,” and the oil workers, who were 
often characterized as “bums,” “drunks,” etc.64 This “black and white” 
distinction appears to be vastly overdrawn; in fact, there were a few 
interviewees who believed that the moral standards of the oil workers 
were superior to those of the “native” population, and these persons 
were not “outsiders.” But this aforementioned dichotomy was rather 
a commonplace finding. Where increased public welfare needs did 
arise—and that occurred primarily in Williston, Tioga, and Ray—many 
voluntary non-governmental associations were very helpful in assisting 
the needy and, thereby, in aiding the public welfare officials. Church 
organizations were, in some instances, quite effective in helping the oil 
workers; business organizations also contributed to the mitigation of 
their problems. The Public Welfare office constantly needed more staff 
personnel but it was most difficult to secure them, and that situation 
still existed in the summer of 1955.
Since 1947, Williams County has been a part of the Upper Missouri 
District Health Unit, as have the counties of Divide, McKenzie, and 
Mountrail. The headquarters for the District are in Williston. Oil has 
meant a noticeable increase in the activities of this public health or-
ganization but by the summer of 1955 the peak period seemed to have 
passed. Along with a District health officer, the authorized staff con-
sists of a sanitary engineer, two sanitarians, five public health nurses, 
and a clerk, but it has been difficult to recruit a full staff, particularly 
so in regards to the public health nurses. The District is financed by 
a ¾ mill levy and the income from the mill levy has increased due to 
the rise in property valuations. There was a considerable amount of 
work to be done in Tioga and Ray as the District had to approve plans 
for water and sewer systems, inspect plumbing, approve semi-private 
water supplies and sewage disposal systems for trailer camps, and 
certify restaurants and taverns as to health standards. Also, there was 
a substantial increase in the medical examinations (vision, hearing, 
64 This is a general statement and does not necessarily reflect the attitudes of 
the public welfare staff.
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general physical condition and immunizations) that had to be given in 
the rural and city schools. All of these functions would, of course, have 
been carried out even without the discovery of oil and the rapid influx 
of new workers, facilities, etc., but the burden and responsibilities were 
much greater because of this expansion.
Oil created a new type of responsibility for the County Agent. He ad-
vises, rather than dictates to, the farmer, but now his advice concerned 
such matters as mineral rights, royalty rights, compensation claims for 
damage to land and crops, and other such situations that arise between 
lessor and lessee in an oil development area.65 Oil was a unique and 
often exciting experience for the farmer. On occasion, his enthusiasm, 
coupled with a lack of legal knowledge, led to consequences that were 
not in his best interests. In order to assist the farmer to arrive at a more 
judicious decision the County Agent decided to provide him with some 
general but accurate instruction in the science and economics of oil 
development. To meet this situation, Mr. Don Hotchkiss, the County 
Agent, conducted 14–15 meetings throughout Williams County to fa-
miliarize farmers with mineral rights. The meetings were well-received 
and well-attended. Apparently the County Agent was so successful in 
this educational venture that a group of oilmen offered him a lucra-
tive job—contacting farmers about selling, leasing, etc., their mineral 
rights. He declined. According to the County Agent, the farmer in the 
oil area has, in general, not altered his attitudes or his techniques to any 
appreciable degree because of oil. There was an original burst of enthu-
siasm and a period of great expectations but as drillings slowed down 
and the oil fields proved to be restricted to rather limited areas the 
farmer began to develop a considerably more cautious “wait-and-see” 
attitude.
The County Superintendent of Schools has been an important 
participant in a rapidly moving educational system. Her responsibil-
ities have not increased proportionately due to the fact that the main 
changes occurred in city schools—Williston, Tioga, and Ray—which 
are largely beyond her jurisdiction, but the ministerial duties of her 
office have increased. There was a rapid upsurge in school population 
in the Pleasant Valley School District near Tioga, as indicated by Table 
XXVIII, but this situation was apparently well under control by 1955.
65 See S.N. Voelker and L.A. Parcher, Land Ownership Problems and Oil 
Development, North Dakota Agricultural College and U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Agriculture Economics Report No. 6 (Fargo: N.D. Agricultural 
College, December 1952) and Stanley Voelker, Mineral Rights and Oil Devel-
opment in Williams County, North Dakota, North Dakota Agricultural College 
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bulletin 395 (Fargo: North Dakota 
Agricultural College, September, 1954.)
142
TABLE XXVIII
PLEASANT VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT (RURAL TIOGA) 
ENROLLMENTS, PROPERTY VALUATIONS AND TAX RATES, 
FISCAL YEARS 1950–1951 TO 1954–1955
Year Students Property  General Fund 
  Valuation Mill Levy
1950–51 ...... $138,804.00 33
1951–52 13   160,200.00 33
1952–53 75   453,902.00 22
1953–54 44   561,048.00 20.03
1954–55 47 ...... ......
In general, the Superintendent of Schools considered the children 
of the oil workers to be reasonably well-behaved and usually rather 
apt pupils but the migratory sort of life that many of them had to lead 
meant some retardation. These pupils usually assimilated well and 
the “ins-outs” relationships were not considered to be at all a serious 
problem.
Oil has not caused any vast changes in School District No. 8 which 
is, in itself, larger than the State of Rhode Island.66 For the year 1954–55 
the gross oil production tax had brought in over $6,000 in revenue for 
the school district but increased tuition costs in the Williston school—
where some children outside of the Williston area must attend, and 
that includes a trailer camp west of Williston which is in the District 
No. 8 area—have been an additional burden on the District’s budget.
The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District in North Dakota, 
which has original jurisdiction over nearly all important civil and crim-
inal cases, had a somewhat busier calendar due to the discovery of oil, 
but, as Table XXIX indicates, perhaps not as much so as one might 
conjecture.
Lastly, the County Highway Department was faced with con-
structing and reconstructing many county roads, or at least assisting 
in the process. This interviewer heard quite variegated opinions about 
the conditions of secondary roads before and after the discovery 
of oil. Comments such as “we never had any roads to begin with,” to 
denunciations of the destruction of these roads by heavy oil drilling 
equipment, to opinions that the roads were much better in 1955 than in 
1950, were all garnered. Just in terms of finances it would seem that the 
66 There is an article on School District No. 8 in the Farm Journal, October 
1953, pp. 50–51, 183–85.
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oil production tax was not sufficient to meet the additional expenses 
incurred although there are many factors to be considered. However, 
in about a two year period (July 1, 1953–June 2, 1955), the amount of 
the fund allocated to counties which had been directed to roads to-
talled $179,860.40 while the highway appropriations increased from 
$307,610 in fiscal year 1952 to $490,860 in fiscal 1953. Still, this in-
crease might have been primarily due to an improved revenue situation.
TABLE XXIX
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CRIMINAL AND CIVIL 
CASES, 1951–1955
Time Period Number of Time Period Number of  
 Criminal Cases1   Civil Cases2
Jan.–Dec., 1951 46 Aug. 19–Dec. 31, 1952 122
Jan.–Dec., 1952 50 Jan. 9–Dec. 31, 1953 236
Jan.–Dec., 1953 66 Jan. 4–Dec. 31, 1954 204
Jan.–Dec., 1954 54 Jan. 5–June 15, 1955 115
Jan.–June, 1955 29   
 
1. Most of these persons were charged with “driving under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor.”
2. Most of the civil cases were “actions to quiet title” although this type of case is 
becoming less frequent, for example:     
Month Total Cases Actions to Quiet Title 
October, 1952 34   17 
October, 1953 23   6 
October 1954 27   5 
B. Financing Government
From what has been discussed thus far it becomes obvious that Wil-
liams County had to have more income in order to meet the increased 
governmental costs (SEE TABLE XXX). The tables are so self-explan-
atory that few comments need be made in the way of description or 
analysis.
Tax collections stayed remarkably high—100% in some areas—al-
though the percentage seemed to decrease as the anticipation of oil 
discovery lessened. For example, in the city of Tioga the collections 
were 99.84% in 1951, 98.09% in 1952, and 87.14% in 1953.
Table XXXI shows the funds that were actually appropriated for 
administering the various activities of government in Williams County. 
When one considers that in a four year period appropriations had in-




WILLIAMS COUNTY PROPERTY VALUATIONS, BY TYPE, AND 
TAX RATES, 1950–1954
Year Real Estate Personal  Public Utility  Total County
 Valuations Property Valuations Property Mill Levy
  Valuations  Valuations
1950 $9,406,404 $2,781,318 $3,365,187 $15,552,909 31.75
1951 9,709,184 3,168,281 3,448,721 16,336,186 34.16
1952 10,005,710 3,974,908 3,485,301 17,465,919 35.84
1953 11,249,553 4,972,631 3,718,131 19,940,315 36.33
1954 13,040,654 5,301,063 4,151,832 22,572,583 31.63
This study has practically excluded the impact of oil in other coun-
ties in the Williston Basin area, notably Mountrail and McKenzie 
counties, but a cursory investigation indicated that the effects were less 
in those counties than in Williams. It is impossible to predict at present 
whether this will continue to be true but the recent discoveries of oil in 
Bottineau, Burke, and Renville counties strongly indicate that oil de-
velopment in North Dakota is still in a period of flux.
TABLE XXXI
WILLIAMS COUNTY APPROPRIATIONS, BY TYPE OF PURPOSE, 
FISCAL YEARS 1951–1952 TO 1954–1955
 
General Protection Health Ag. and Relief Education Recreation Highway TOTAL
Gov’t to persons and Econ. Charities
 & propt. Sanitation Develop.
51-52
$116,700 $38,140 $7,778 $6,408 $97,890 $9,596 $...... $307,610 $584,122
52–53 
121,780 56,485 8,139 6,408 94,323 9,770 400 448,400 745,705
53–54 
134,186 57,473 13,049 6,702 93,839 10,414 ...... 485,075 800,038
54–55 
161,728 61,353 14,979 10,324 101,245 11,134 ...... 490,960 851,722
Totals by Purpose 
$534,394 $213,451 $43,944 $29,842 $387,297 $40,914 $400 $1,732,045 $2,981,587
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C. Federal Agencies and Oil Development
It was deemed to be somewhat outside the scope of, or at best periph-
eral to, this study to relate the changes made by oil discovery to the 
operation of Federal agencies. However, a general inquiry brought to 
the surface enough facts to state that the functioning of the Farmers 
Home Administration, the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation 
Committee (formerly the PMA), and the Soil Conservation Service was 
influenced by the discovery of oil. For example, the Williams County 
official for the Farmers Home Administration—Mr. John Freeman—
estimated that at least four farmers received sufficient income from 
the sale of mineral rights to pay off all their FHA loans; another ten 
farmers had made, and were making, enough from their oil leases to 
pay off their farm ownership loans. It is true that the emergency, sub-
sistence, and production loans increased from approximately $150,000 
in 1953–54 to $163,508 in 1954–55, but this was due primarily to the 
hail and drought that had struck in the northern and southwestern 
parts of Williams County. How much, if any, oil had changed the atti-
tudes of farmers toward soil conservation who are in the Little Muddy 
Soil Conservation District and the Eastern Williams Soil Conservation 
District, a soil scientist assigned to the Soil Conservation Service of-
fice would not, when interviewed, predict, but the logic of the situation 
was that more income would mean more conservation. An indication 
that farmers in the oil county had not radically revised their attitudes 
toward national farm policy was discovered in a perusal of the wheat 
referendum that was held on June 24, 1955, in the Tioga area. Those 
in favor of marketing quotas and acreage allotments totalled 153; only 
two farmers were opposed. The total vote for Williams County was 
2,150 for and 62 against.67
VII. Oil and the Political Power Structure in the Williston Basin Area
A. The Locus of Political Power and the Decision-Making Process
The general hypothesis of this section is that the political power struc-
ture in the Williston Basin area remains essentially the same today 
as it was prior to the discovery of oil.68 The one exception pertains to 
67 Tioga Tribune, June 30, 1955.
68 Power, herein, is defined as the ability of certain men to control and/or influ-
ence the actions of other men in obtaining the deference, goods, and services 
which the former desires. There are many definitions of power. See Floyd 
146
oil policy where the interests of the oilmen have added what might be 
termed a new dimension to the power structure.
The specific hypothesis of this section is—businessmen69 and some 
professional men, primarily lawyers, are the community leaders and 
largely determine oil policy, and attitudes toward oil policy, in the com-
munities of Williston, Tioga, and Ray.70 Such a supposition does not 
mean that these individuals and their associations are always in agree-
ment—there are conflicts—but the ideas that become formalized in 
laws and administrative decisions are mainly formulated and espoused 
by these individuals and groups.71 This hypothesis does not adequately 
account for the power of the Farmers Union in rural areas but, as has 
already been noted, the deviation here in terms of oil policy is not as 
drastic as one might expect.
In order to test this tentative theory regarding the locus of power 
and to determine those who are the decision-makers, the researcher 
must offer adequate and effective empirical data. The sources of that 
type of factual information, in this instance, are primarily two—the 
questionnaire type of survey which has already been referred to many 
times in this chapter, and personal interviews with those who were con-
sidered, by others as well as the writer, to be leaders in various phases of 
community political activities. The following brief analyses of certain 
power situations are presented as a substantiation of the above-stated 
hypotheses.
Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill: University of North Car-
olina Press, 1953), pp. 2-3-4-139; John Hallowell, Main Currents in Modern 
Political Thought (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1950), Chapter I; V.O. Key, 
Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 
1952), Chapter I.
69 The term “businessmen” includes the top officials of the different types of oil 
concerns.
70 See Hunter’s observations relative to “Regional City,” Ibid., pp. 81 and 102.
71 A prominent state official questioned seriously the validity of this hypothesis. 
He believes the evidence reveals that the Legislative Research Committee was 
“the” prime formulator of oil policy in North Dakota, notably the Committee’s 
role in the 1953 legislative session. But it is interesting to speculate as to what 
might have occurred if the proposals of the Legislative Research Committee 
and those of the business interests in the Williston area had been in substantial 
opposition.
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(1) Oil and Gas Legislation
The principal oil and gas legislation for North Dakota has already been 
discussed earlier in this chapter. What is to be considered at this junc-
ture is policy formation and public attitudes concerning the gross oil 
production tax. When one considers the pressures that were exerted 
upon the 1953 legislature, and especially upon Senator Solberg, the 
logical assumption would be that a low tax had the support of the con-
stituents, in the Williston Basin area. But, as Mr. Justice Holmes once 
wrote: “Logic is not the life of the law, but experience,” and such seems 
to be the situation in this instance. Parenthetically, it is not contended 
here that the results of the survey are by any means infallible, rather 
the contention is that the data is generally indicative as to whether or 
not the interviewee understands the issue. The following question was 
asked those who were interviewed in Williston, Ray, and the rural im-
pact areas: Question 10: Do you know what the main features of the 
state oil tax are? If “YES”—a. Do you believe that the gross production 
tax is too high or too low? Why? b. Are you in favor of the 27½% deple-
tion allowance? If “YES” or “NO”—why?
The results of the survey are disclosed by Table XXXII and it should 
be noted that those questionnaires on which no data on this question 
was contained have been excluded from the tabulation.
In analyzing these results one has to exclude the results received 
in Ray as the great preponderance of interviewees did not participate 
in answering this question, but for Williston, in particular, the results 
are noteworthy. Out of a grand total of 475 (143+332) respondents to 
this question 431 did not have any factual understanding of the issue. 
In other words, only slightly over 10% had any comprehension of the 
oil production tax at all and even they were undecided or showed no 
particular grasp of the issue. Perhaps a closer questioning of the inter-
viewees might have produced more enlightened answers but there is 
little reason to believe so. However, of those community political leaders 
who were interviewed, all could discuss this oil tax issue although there 
were a few instances where they were not certain as to how the refunds 
to the county were allocated. A rather certain conclusion seems to be 
that oil policy is understood by a very few, that is, those who—to use a 
phrase of John Dewey’s—have a “perception of the consequences.”72 In 
fact, it seems to be confined to the community leaders—businessmen, 
lawyers, politicians, newspapermen, officials of oil concerns, and the 
like. With them, the issue was created, articulated, and meaningful.




TYPES OF ANSWERS, BY WILLISTON BASIN LOCALITY RES-
IDENCE (AND LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN WILLISTON), 
TO THE QUESTIONS: “DO YOU KNOW WHAT THE MAIN 
FEATURES OF THE STATE OIL TAX ARE? IF ‘YES’: A. DO YOU 
BELIEVE THAT THE GROSS PRODUCTION TAX IS TOO HIGH 
OR TOO LOW? WHY? B. ARE YOU IN FAVOR OF THE 27½% DE-
PLETION ALLOWANCE? IF ‘YES’ OR ‘NO’: WHY?
 
    Williston  
 New  Old Ray Impact Areas  
Answers to the Question Residents  Residents1  (Old)
No—
Did not understand the issue 130 301 7 16
Yes, O.K.—no reason 4 10  2
No—not necessary    
Undecided—no reason  3  1
Others 9 18 6 10
Totals 143 332 13 29
1. Where the respondent did not signify whether he was “new” or “old” he has 
been included as “old.” There were few such instances.   
 
The future of this oil tax issue will be interesting to observe. In the 
summer of 1955, opinion on this matter among the leaders was in a 
process of re-thinking. Roughly half of those interviewed still believed 
that the present tax was proper; none desired a lower tax—or at least 
would not openly advocate such; the other half was moving toward 
higher tax but almost invariably no more than “1–2% more.” Whether 
this gradually changing opinion will create “higher oil tax atmosphere” 
in the 1957 legislative session remained to be seen.
(2) The Question of Factionalism
In The Federalist (No. 10), James Madison stated that “liberty is to fac-
tion what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires.” 
Then he proceeds to explain that although factions do, even must, exist 
in a republic it is still mandatory to control their effects.
The results of the survey seem to indicate that factions are actually 
considered to be non-existent by a very large majority of the respon-
dents in Williston, although this is much less true in Tioga. Further, the 
discussion in the earlier sections of this chapter point to the active and 
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effective operations of factions in different phases of policy-making. 
Here, again, the evidence points to apathy and indifference to public 
affairs on the part of the many. The results of the survey on this partic-
ular issue are presented in Table XXXIII.
TABLE XXXIII
TYPES OF ANSWERS, BY WILLISTON AND TIOGA RESIDENCE 
AND LENGTH OF RESIDENCE TO THE QUESTION AS TO 
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WERE LOCAL FACTIONS AND 
WHO CONSTITUTED THE FACTIONS 
 
 Williston Tioga 
Types of Answers   Old New Old  New
No    205 63 27 40
No opinion   108 57 8 10
Labor    1   3
Farm Organizations  1   
Religious Groups   7 1  1
Business Groups   1   3
Banking Groups   3 4  
Other (including combinations) 15 8 9 12
Total    341 133 44 69
GRAND TOTAL   474  113 
Less than 9.5% of those interviewed in Williston stated they believed 
there were factions but almost 33% acknowledged their existence in 
Tioga. This might indicate a more satisfied and static community at-
mosphere in Williston but incidents that have already been recounted 
in this chapter tend to a contrary opinion. One seems rather directed 
to the conclusion that the “interests” Madison refers to are definitely 
minorities and that the majority did not realize that the minorities 
were organized into factions and that these factions formulate public 
policies. His comment that “…measures are too often decided, not ac-
cording to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but 
by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority party” 
should perhaps be revised by interchanging the words “minor” and 
“majority” and then changing “minor” to read “minority.”
The results of this survey are not offered, by any means, as conclu-
sive evidence but are rather just another example of a growing body of 
data concerning this political reality.73
73 Hunter, op. cit. pp. 81, 102, 109, 148. Also David Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd 
(New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1953), particularly Chapter X, contains 
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(3) The Issue of Leadership
On the issue of oil policy, the leadership has come predominantly from 
the business community in the Williston Basin area, primarily bankers, 
the Williston Chamber of Commerce, and lawyers.74 Again, the “public” 
has been very limited but it is growing and the story of the techniques 
used in forming the public into a mold which is favorable to the oil 
companies needs to be related.
In 1946, all the oil companies in the United States which were 
members of the American Petroleum Institute formed, within the API, 
an Oil Industry Information Committee. After considerable research 
and assistance from some educators, there was begun a “Petroleum 
Industry School Program” that was designed to provide a reciprocal 
exchange of information and understanding between the oil industry 
and the schools.75 In the words of the OIIC, the objectives of its “school 
program” are:76
several useful insights and hypotheses bearing on this matter of political power 
in present-day America. But “veto groups” were not at all apparent in oil pol-
itics in North Dakota, except in regards to the spacing issue. However, to use 
Riesman’s term, the public was the “unorganized.”
74 At the state government level, a few of the politicians and government offi-
cials have provided a moderate amount of leadership.
75 It should be clearly stated here that the author believes there is considerable 
merit in the educational program of the American Petroleum Institute. The 
knowledge of most laymen will be substantially broadened by studying the ma-
terial. However, it is questionable if this is education. Are there no alternatives 
to the courses of action presently followed by the major oil companies? Have 
no controversies arisen over the organization and actions of the oil industry? 
What different arguments were advanced by those engaged in the conflict? 
The questionable nature of this kind of an educational approach seems to be 
indicated by the text that the Committee issued on the economics of petro-
leum. (American Petroleum Institute, What Makes This Nation Go. New York: 
American Petroleum Institute, 1955.) A fine example of Spencerian philosophy 
is noted in the statement that “…every month last year, many hundreds of busi-
nesses were forced out of the race. Many have failed to offer the right product at 
the right price, and have seen their customers drift away…” “In time, the profit 
motive weeds out the inefficient and encourages the best.” Ibid., p. 11. This may 
be true, or at least partially so, but are there not alternative philosophies as 
well as alternative analysis of what has actually occurred, that would need to be 
offered in a truly educational process?
76 American Petroleum Institute (OIIC), Conducting the Petroleum Industry 
School Program (New York: American Petroleum Institute, 1954), pp. 2–3.
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1. To provide information about the oil industry to the schools in var-
ious acceptable ways, with the expectation that teachers, students 
and parents may thereby better understand the industry’s contri-
bution to the well-being, security and improved standards of living 
of the American people.
2. To inform oil men about the schools and acquaint them with the 
people and problems of education, with the expectation that they 
will be stimulated to take greater personal interest in education 
and more effectively lend their support and cooperation to the 
schools at local, state, and national levels. 
The program has three basic and important characteristics:
FIRST: It has been developed from the outset in accordance with 
principles recommended by educators as a result of a study 
concerning business-sponsored educational materials. It has 
been designed to furnish teachers and students with accurate 
and objective information about the oil industry. It has been 
prepared to fit appropriately into regular courses of study.
SECOND: It is now being conducted on a basis planned to provide 
experience and guidance for sound expansion of the program 
during succeeding years. The ultimate goal is a nation-wide 
school program.
THIRD: Responsibility for contact with the schools, for distribu-
tion of the materials, and for providing the program services is 
placed with the local oil men.
Apparently the American Petroleum Institute had a survey con-
ducted of public attitudes toward the oil industry and discovered that 
many people knew about the Teapot Dome, the exploits of John D. 
Rockefeller Sr., and the like, but little about the vast dynamic develop-
ments in the oil industry.
Mr. Gregg Kildow, II, a sales officer of the Northern Mud Company 
in Williston, spearheaded the activities of the Oil Industry Informa-
tion Committee in the North Dakota oil areas. The Committee had 
(1955), approximately 80 members and each membership was $5.00, 
although that appears to be only a minimum charge. Members of this 
local OIIC organization have visited many of the high schools in Wil-
liams, McKenzie, Mountrail, Divide, Burke, Bottineau, and McHenry 
counties, talked to school assemblies, and informed the school super-
intendents and teachers of the study program which was offered, free of 
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charge, for their use.77 The printed materials have been prepared for ju-
nior and senior high school students, are attractively presented, and are 
comprehensive in coverage. The many phases of the oil industry from 
chemistry to the social sciences are discussed in individual booklets; 
film strips are included; movies on the oil industry may be borrowed 
at no cost; and teacher’s aids and a handbook are a part of the total 
package.
During the 1954–55 school year the Committee became particularly 
active. First, a panel of experts on all phases of the oil industry was orga-
nized. Then, during the school year, the panel visited high schools—10 
in 1954—and at scheduled assemblies they answered any questions 
regarding oil production, etc., which the students were interested 
in asking.78 Second, an essay contest was held with the theme being, 
“What Has Oil Done for Me?” Every school that participated received 
a $25 Savings Bond and an engraved plaque for the two winners—one 
junior and one senior high school student. Six hundred students partic-
ipated, and an area prize of a $50 bond for the best essay was awarded. 
A banquet was then held in Williston for the winners and their high 
school teachers. Third, a radio program—30 minutes every Monday 
night—called the “Oil Forum” was initiated. It was a mixed panel com-
posed of oil experts and local citizens. The local citizens would pose 
questions concerning the various phases of the oil industry and radio 
listeners would call in questions for the panel of experts to answer. The 
local OHC group paid for the radio time. From all appearances the ac-
tivities of this Committee have been well received. It cannot be foreseen 
at this time whether this Committee will take the lead when, and if, the 
issue of compulsory unitization of oil fields arises,79 but it appears that 
the issue will become important in the not too distant future. However, 
it does seem worth noting that the North Dakota OIIC was considered 
the best in the nation in 1954 by the American Petroleum Institute.
The Williston Chamber of Commerce has also been very active in 
taking the lead in advancing the interests of the oil industry and thereby, 
in the opinion of the Chamber, the interests of the region and the state. 
77 The committee, or its representatives, visited 24 high schools in 1954 and all 
placed orders with the committee for the free materials.
78 Mr. Kildow insists that “political” questions—such as a “proper” oil pro-
duction tax—were the only kind that received no answers. The line between 
political and non-political questions would be difficult to draw but he believes 
that it has been strictly adhered to.
79 See the booklet published by the American Petroleum Institute, The Conser-
vation of Petroleum, 1954, p. 10, and the Interstate Oil Compact Commission, 
Oil For Today—And For Tomorrow, op. cit., pp. 23, 30, 43, 57.
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Since 1953, one Director on the 15 member board of the Chamber of 
Commerce has been an oilman. The Chamber has lobbied for a low oil 
production tax, 27½% depletion allowance, and a market demand law; 
but opposed the anti-flaring bill. The activities of the Upper Missouri 
Development Association—this organization has been almost solely 
concerned with attempting to defeat an 1850 foot level for the Garrison 
dam—have been largely financed by the Chamber and this issue is pre-
sumed to be of significant interest to the oil companies as the additional 
flooding of land will increase drilling costs. The Chamber has assisted 
in the radio programs of the OIIC, pushed for a commercial airline stop 
at Williston which the oilmen desired, and sponsored an annual Oil 
and Farm Festival Day in Williston. It has been avowedly neutral in the 
oil spacing issue because, as has been previously discussed, there has 
been definite conflict here between the oil industry and the Williams 
County Landowner’s and Royalty Owner’s Association. With this last 
possible exception, the Williston Chamber of Commerce has energeti-
cally sponsored and promoted activities which were presumably in the 
interests of oil development in the Williston area.
The results of a survey question concerning leadership are inter-
esting and somewhat indicative. The question posed was—“What 
about town leaders? Who in your opinion are the town leaders?” Only 
the interviewees in Williston and Tioga were quizzed. The results are 
presented in Table XXXIV.
TABLE XXXIV
TYPES OF ANSWERS, BY WILLISTON AND TIOGA RESIDENCE 
(AND LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN WILLISTON), TO THE 
QUESTION AS TO WHO WERE LOCAL LEADERS
 
 Williston1  
Types of Answers  Old New Tioga
There are none  4 2 5
Don’t know  109 64 39
Business Groups  73 21 5
Professional Groups 13 2 8
Politicians and 
government officials 35 8 31
Other   5 1 4
Older Group  17 3 4
New Group  4 3 10
TOTAL   260 104 106
1. The “either” category are included in the “old” column.  
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Thus, approximately 47% of those polled in Williston did not know 
if there were any town leaders to provide the community with leader-
ship but the percentage was lowered to about 38% in Tioga. However, 
nearly 26% of those questioned in Williston considered business 
groups to be the source of leadership; in Tioga, that percentage had 
decreased to less than five. To this writer, it seemed rather remarkable 
that almost 30% of the respondents in Tioga selected politicians and 
government officials as the town leaders but that the percentage was 
less than twelve in Williston. But the results seem generally to sup-
port, either directly or indirectly, the original hypothesis—most people 
are not interested enough in community affairs to be concerned about 
leadership or else they look mainly to business groups to supply the 
necessary leadership.80
(4) The Farmer Versus the Corporation
In a hearing before the House Finance and Taxation Committee of the 
North Dakota state legislature in late February, 1953, Mr. C.E. Boone, 
a vice president of the Amerada Oil Company, was queried as to how 
the Northern Pacific Railroad Company was able to get a 30% royalty 
agreement with Amerada for any oil that might be discovered under the 
extensive tracts of land which the Northern Pacific owned in western 
North Dakota. Mr. Boone’s comment was: “there will always be excep-
tional deals.”81 Thus the farmer’s usual ⅛ or 12½% becomes 30% for the 
railroad, or, in other words this railroad receives about 2½ times the 
customary amount of oil income.
Again, Professors Voelker and Parcher write that “the most common 
primary term for leases granted by private owners in North Dakota is 
10 years, although many leases for 5 and 7 year terms have also been 
recorded. Where a state or a political subdivision holds the mineral 
rights, the leases are generally for 5 year terms.”82
Both of these situations have been related in order to exemplify the 
concept of power in the formation of oil policy. One might conjecture as 
to what would have happened if the farmers had organized themselves 
effectively into a “land bloc” which could then have presented itself to 
the oil companies as a genuine “countervailing power.”83
80 Riesman believes that “the only followers left in the United States today are 
those unorganized and sometimes disorganized unfortunates who have not yet 
invented their veto group.” Riesman, op. cit., p. 247.
81 Grand Forks Herald, March 2, 1953.
82 Voelker and Parcher, op. cit., p. 5.
83 The term is explained in some detail in John Kenneth Galbraith’s American 
Capitalism (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952).
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VIII. The Future of Oil Politics in North Dakota
In the early years of oil discovery in North Dakota there was an abun-
dant amount of speculation as to how oil would affect the political 
scene. The major postulate of this section is that oil has, thus far, meant 
more of the same. The northwestern area of North Dakota is strong 
Non-Partisan League country. The election returns point up the fol-
lowing general voting patterns in this area for the years 1950, 1952, 
and 1954. The NPL’ers vote for their candidates who have thus far filed 
in the Republican column in the primary and the Democrats are not 
much in evidence. In fact, many of the latter, as well as some indepen-
dents, vote for the NPL candidates. Then in the fall the Democratic 
candidates receive a vote four to ten times more than was true in the 
primary. Apparently that vote comes from NPL’ers who switch to the 
Democratic column, from some “stay-at-home-in-the-primary” Demo-
crats, and from those inscrutable, but prevalent, independents.
A. An Influx of Democrats
The political soothsayers in North Dakota have been conjecturing upon 
the voting habits of the new population that oil has brought into the 
state. The simple syllogism was—Southerners are Democrats; South-
erners have moved into North Dakota. North Dakota will receive an 
influx of Democrats. The election returns seem to indicate that the oil 
workers have not stayed in North Dakota long enough to meet residence 
requirements or that most have simply failed to exercise the franchise. 
The questionnaire was used again in an attempt to gain some further 
insight into this matter. In Williston, Ray, and the Impact Areas, this 
question was posed—“Would you please state your political party or 
factional affiliation, if any, in 1952? Today?” and the resulting answers 
were compiled and organized into Table XXXV.
The results of this survey appear to substantiate partially the hy-
pothesis although the years used were 1952 and 1954 and a pre-oil 
discovery year, such as 1950, was not a part of the question. The Dem-
ocrats, according to the survey, increased their strength in Williston 
by over 6% from 1952 to 1954, but the Republican, ROC, and Repub-
lican-NPL vote for 1954 (196 votes) is still substantially more than the 
Democrat and Democrat-NPL combination (146). The key vote then 
is in the “independent” and “undecided” categories (121 votes). Some 
political unrest and uncertainties are clearly evident from a percentage 
increase in the “undecided” vote from 5 in 1952 to 38 in 1954.
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The data obtained in the Impact Area are indecisive. There was a 
noticeable loss in the Republican and Republican-NPL vote but the re-
spondents seemed to be rather negative in terms of present intentions.
The statistics from Ray may be rather deceptive. It appears that 
slightly over 50% of the respondents were Democrats in 1952, although 
the percentage had decreased by 1954. However, the Democrats never 
carried Ray in any election from 1950 through 1954 for federal offices, 
or the office of governor. It is always possible that the Democrat vote 
stayed at home, but not likely.
All in all, there is only slight evidence of any influx of Democrats 
into North Dakota because of the discovery of oil. The potential Dem-
ocratic vote was of a migratory type and the more or less permanent oil 
personnel is not of sufficient numerical size to alter the existing pat-
terns to any appreciable degree. Nevertheless, the “independent” and 
“undecided” vote is significant and offers the potential for a consider-
able shift in the political intentions of the electorate.
TABLE XXXV
POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS, BY WILLISTON BASIN LOCALITY 
RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF RESIDENCE, 
FOR 1952 AND 1954
Types of Answers 
 Williston Impact Areas Ray
 Old New Totals Old New Totals 
 1952 1954 '52 '54 '52 '54 '52 '54 '52 '54 '52 '54 '52 '54
Democrat 90 97 44 44 134 143 14 15 1 1 15 16 54 46
Democrat-
NPL 2 3 ...... ...... 2 3 1 1 ...... ...... 1 1 1 2
Republican 100 84 31 33 144 117 13 9 1 ...... 14 9 19 19
Republican-
ROC 38 37 19 18 58 55 15 15 ...... ...... 15 15 6 5
Republican-
NPL 21 18 6 6 27 24 20 13 ...... ...... 20 13 2 2
Independ. 67 57 31 25 97 83 17 17 5 5 22 22 21 21
Other ...... 2 ...... 1 ...... 1 ...... 8 ...... ...... ...... 8 ...... 3
Undecided 4 23 1 15 5 39 3 4 ... ... 3 4 5 2
No Data ...... 1 ...... ...... 1 ...... ...... 1 ...... 1 ...... 2 1 9 
TOTALS 322 322 142 142 464 464 83 83 7 7 90 90 109 109
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B. Oil and Possible Political Realignments
Without exception, those political leaders in Williston and sur-
rounding areas who were interviewed stated that the oil companies 
and their interests were being supported by the ROC. Some believed 
that the coming of oil had definitely been instrumental in the increased 
strength of the ROC in the Williston area. But others thought a reac-
tion was setting in, especially among the farmers, due to increased farm 
labor costs, poorer farm roads, higher legal fees, the arbitrary attitude 
and procedure of a few of the oil companies, and decreased drilling. 
Heretofore, however, the ROC had supported the oil companies on 
every major oil policy issue and has not especially suffered at the polls 
for doing so.
There is considerable diversity of opinion as to the role the oil com-
panies have played thus far in direct support of the ROC. A prominent 
leader in the NPL said that the oil companies had remained aloof from 
any factional affiliation and would continue to do so on his advice. An 
important official in the ROC said that the oil companies, as such, had 
made no contributions to the ROC and he believed that individual 
oilmen, in 1954, had furnished not more than $500 of the Williams 
County ROC budget of around $3,500. But a well-known Williston 
lawyer “knew” that the Williams County ROC organization had con-
tributed $25,000 to beat Senator Carroll Day in the 1954 primary 
and that most of this money was from oil interests. However, Senator 
Day, in a personal interview, estimated the sum to have been around 
$15,000 and he was not certain as to its source, but “probably some of 
it came from oil interests.”84
This information is obviously somewhat contradictory and, just as 
obviously, someone is in error. What this means for the future one can 
only conjecture. If the NPL stays in the Republican column it appears 
more and more likely that the organization will favor a slightly higher 
oil tax. In such a case the oil interests may become more than lobbyists 
and actually participate, at least financially, in the factional fights. If 
the Democratic and NPL organizations merge, the issue of oil politics 
remains in doubt. One political leader who might be influential in this 
merger, or in preventing it, thought that the gross oil production tax 
should be increased up to even 50%, “such as is done in Saudi Arabia.” 
If this were openly advocated in the campaign, oil politics in North Da-
kota would really be at the explosive stage.
84 Senator Carroll Day was killed in an airplane crash on March 4, 1956.
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C. The Key—The Future of Oil in North Dakota
The future role of oil politics in North Dakota appears to be governed 
primarily by the future of oil development in this state. If a relatively 
static condition, such as was evident in the latter part of 1954 and 
during most of 1955, continues then oil interests are going to be a pow-
erful lobby but not “king oil” as some have claimed. But an expansion 
of the oil fields—such as might occur in Burke, Renville and Bottineau 
counties where wildcat wells have proved to be producers—might well 
change the political scene. It must be remembered that usually 12½% 
of the gross income from oil goes to the landowner, or the owner of 
mineral rights. If oil production becomes very widespread—and it is 
also worthy of note that, in statewide terms, “discovered” oil fields ac-
count for a very small percentage of total land area—the oil “public” 
will be expanded somewhat proportionately. Discovery of many new 
fields, or substantial enlargement of those already discovered, would 
also increase the political base of the oil interests. The reason for the 
increase in power is rather well summarized by recent story—“the last 
time you reported on him [a cousin] they had struck oil on his land and 
his liberalism was going down just as fast as the oil was coming up.”85
Thus we return to the ancient dialogue between Socrates and Thra-
symachus—“Listen, then, Thrasymachus began. What I say is that ‘just’ 
or ‘right’ means nothing but what is to the interest of the stronger party. 
Well, where is your applause?”86 Whether one applauds or not is ques-
tion of values.
85 The Leader, September 1, 1955.
86 Francis M. Cornford (ed.), The Republic of Plato (New York: The Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1945), p. 18.
Chapter 6
Political Impacts of Oil in an Era of 
Sustainability
Andrea Olive
The impacts of the recent (2008–14) oil boom in the Williston Basin are far-
reaching. They include increases in population and state revenue, and they 
have made transportation and infrastructure more complex and produced 
numerous environmental externalities (see, for example, Caraher and Conway 
2016; McGranahan, Allen, Fernando, and Kirkwood 2017; Ruddell, Jayasun-
dara, Mayzer, and Heitkamp 2014). The political impacts cannot be overstated, 
as the government of North Dakota is mainly responsible for regulating oil 
development in balance with social, economic, and environmental issues. The 
main concern is no longer developing an oil industry and economy in the state, 
as it was the 1950s, but instead balancing this booming industry with society’s 
best long-term interests—including economic (see Chapter 8) and social (see 
Chapters 10, 11 and 13) interests.
This chapter will provide a brief overview of North Dakota politics and the 
government administration of oil. Similar to Ross Talbot’s 1958 “Political Im-
pact” chapter, this one is also authored by a social scientist as opposed to a 
physical scientist or a scholar of oil technology, and the focus is still on gov-
ernment processes and regulation. This chapter tries to follow the structure 
and format of the original 1958 piece, but has had to include new actors (like 
Native Americans and their governance systems), new regulations, and an en-
tirely new emphasis on the environmental impacts of oil, given the realities of 
science, climate change, and sustainability. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the regulation of oil was centralized in a few gov-
ernment agencies, especially the North Dakota Industrial Commission. Today, 
regulation has moved from a narrow government model to a governance 
model whereby actors outside of state government are also involved in oil ad-
ministration. These new actors include not just other agencies inside the state, 
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but also Native American tribal councils and interest groups. In 2018, there are 
hundreds of laws associated with oil production in the state, as compiled into 
the state RuleBook (North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources 2017). 
The focus of this chapter will be four areas of policy where the government is 
trying to balance oil development with environmental protection: severance 
taxes, flaring regulations, water permits, and transportation policy. In each 
area the government and other actors have created new, and sometimes inno-
vative, regulations and rules to govern oil.
Brief Survey of North Dakota Politics and Government
While North Dakota has long been associated with Republican Party rule, be-
tween 1958 and 2018, Democratic-NPL politicians held the governorship for 
twenty-seven years. Historically, the Nonpartisan League (NPL) was a third 
party in North Dakota, but in the early 1950s that party split into two—one 
side merged into the state Republican Party and the other side merged with 
the Democratic Party of North Dakota to formally create the Democratic-NPL 
party in 1956. Thus, today North Dakota is a two-party state with the Re-
publicans and the Democratic-NPL. The latter held the governorship of the 
state with a continuous twenty year stretch between 1961 and 1981 and a 
seven-year stretch from 1985 to 1992. The governorship has since been domi-
nated by Republicans. The current governor is Doug Burgum, who was elected 
December 15, 2016, with 75 percent of the popular vote. The remainder of the 
executive branch’s main office holders, from the lieutenant governor to the ag-
riculture commissioner, are all members of the Republican party. See Table 6.1 
for a list of main executive offices. Some of these offices have longtime incum-
bents, such as Al Jaeger, who has been the secretary of state since 1993, and 
Kelly Schmidt, who has served as state treasurer since 2001. These individuals 
have served North Dakota through the entirety of the recent oil boom. 
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TABLE 6.1. 
OFFICE, PARTY, NAME, AND YEAR ELECTED FOR MAIN EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH POSITIONS 
Office  Party Name Year 
    Elected 
Governor  Republican  Doug Burgum 2016
Lieutenant governor Republican Brent Sanford 2016
Secretary of state Republican Al Jaeger 1993
Attorney general Republican Wayne Stenehjem 2017
State auditor Republican Josh Gallion 2017
State treasurer Republican Kelly Schmidt 2001
Agriculture commissioner Republican Doug Goehring 2009
Public Service commissioners Republican Julie Fedorchak  2012
   Randy Christman 2013
   Brian Kroshus  2017
Insurance commissioner Republican Adam Hamm  2007
Tax commissioner Republican Ryan Rauschenberger 2013
The state House and Senate are also both dominated by Republicans. At 
the outset of 2018, the House had eighty-one elected Republican and thirteen 
Democratic-NPL members, while the Senate had thirty-eight Republican and 
nine Democratic-NPL members. The congressional districts that comprised 
the Williston Basin have long been dominated by Republican officials. For 
example, during the sixty-third, sixty-fourth, and sixty-fifth legislative as-
semblies, District 1 in Williams Country had a Republican senator and two 
Republican representatives (North Dakota Legislative Branch 2018). However, 
at the federal level North Dakota has elected at least one U.S. senator from the 
Democratic-NPL party since 1959. And both U.S. senators from North Dakota 
were Democratic-NPL from 1989 to 2011, when Republican John Hoeven was 
elected. 
North Dakota is a predominantly rural state. There are fifty-three counties, 
and the U.S. Census Bureau classifies thirty-nine of them as completely rural, 
meaning there are fewer than 50,000 people (North Dakota Census Office 
2017). However, North Dakota’s population has experienced a significant 
increase in the past ten years. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates the state pop-
ulation to be 755,393 as of July 1, 2017. That is a 12 percent increase over 
the 2010 census population, and a significant gain since the twentieth century 
low of 617,000 in 1970 (Census Bureau n.d.a). Most of the recent newcomers 
have moved into the Williston Basin to work in the oil industry. When oil 
was discovered in the Williston Basin in 1951, the city of Williston had only 
162
7,000 people, while North Dakota had only 617,000 people. By 2010, the city 
of Williston had a population of 14,716, and by 2015 the population grew to 
26,426 (Census Bureau n.d.b). The demographics of North Dakota reveal that 
the population is mainly white (88 percent) with a median household income 
of $59,000 in 2016, which is above the U.S. average of $57,000 (Census Bureau 
n.d.a). 
While migration to North Dakota has occurred in step with oil production, 
the state maintains a vibrant Plains Indian heritage. In 2018, Native Ameri-
cans comprise about 5 percent of the population, or 31,000 individuals. There 
are five federally recognized tribes: the MHA Nation (Mandan, Hidatsa, and 
Arikara Nation), the Spirit Lake Nation, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, the 
Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate 
Nation, and the Trenton Indian Service Area (North Dakota Indian Affairs 
Commission n.d.). These tribes each have a reservation and govern them-
selves according to their own constitutions. However, in recent years Native 
Americans have started to run electoral campaigns for seats in North Dakota’s 
legislature (Fragoso 2016). Notably, in the 2016 election, Ruth Buffalo became 
the first Native American Democratic woman elected to the North Dakota 
Legislature. She beat the incumbent, Republican Randy Boehing, who had 
previously sponsored a bill to limit the Native vote in the state (see Figure 6.1). 
Administration and Governance of Oil Policy
The administration of oil policy is highly decentralized in the United States. 
The federal government has a minimal role to play in the exploration, produc-
tion, or refining of oil across the fifty states. Issues pertaining to interstate 
commerce and transportation as well as the protection of some environmental 
resources (such as air quality or water quality) involve federal agencies and 
regulations. However, oil is predominantly a state issue. As evidenced in the 
original “Political Impact” chapter, in 1958 North Dakota had four state admin-
istration agencies largely responsible for oil policy and administration—the 
Industrial Commission, the state geologist, the Public Service Commission, 
and the Tax Commission. In 2018 these offices are still central to the regula-
tion of oil, but governance has expanded to include other government agencies 
as well as Native Americans, non-governmental agencies, and federal agencies. 
While not all actors involved in the administration of oil can be reviewed here, 
it is worth highlighting the main actors in North Dakota. 
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State Agencies
The Industrial Commission, which was created in 1919 to manage certain util-
ities and industries, consists of the governor, attorney general, and agriculture 
commissioner. This commission includes the Oil and Gas Division, the Oil and 
Gas Research Program, the Pipeline Authority, and the Geological Survey divi-
sion. In this sense, it remains the key agency for oil and gas regulation in North 
Dakota. However, the Public Service Commission also oversees issues related 
to oil and gas production, including energy plant sitings, railroads, and pipeline 
safety. This commission comprises three elected officials who serve a six-year 
term. Finally, the Tax Commission is also important to oil and gas production 
as it oversees the different state taxes, such as production and extraction taxes, 
related to the oil industry in North Dakota. 
Outside of these main commissions, there is a plethora of other actors 
relevant to the administration of oil and gas in 2018. This is largely because 
oil production, especially hydraulic fracturing, is associated with numerous 
environmental risks. These include impacts on water quality and quantity, 
methane emissions (climate change), soil quality, air pollution, wildlife habitat 
destruction, and earthquakes. There is a small but growing literature on the 
Figure 6.1. Location of Native American reservations in North Dakota (source: 
ND Indian Affairs Commission n.d.; image source: David Veller) 
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environmental impacts in the Bakken Formation (see for example, Hill and 
Olson 2013; Horner et al. 2016; Olive 2018; Scanlon, Reedy, Male, and Hove 
2016; Shrestha et al. 2017; Thompson, Johnson, Niemuth, and Ribic 2015). 
In order to govern the areas that oil production impacts, other government 
agencies are now involved in oil regulation and policy. These include agencies 
such as the Water Commission, the Department of Health, the Department of 
Labor, the Game and Fish Department, and the Parks and Recreation Depart-
ment. For example, the Air Quality division of the North Dakota Department 
of Environment is responsible for granting construction permits to new proj-
ects that will impact air quality in the state. Likewise, the Water Commission is 
responsible for granting permits to withdraw surface and groundwater in the 
state for all recreational and industrial uses. This means that oil firms need a 
water permit before they can begin oil production. In the 1950s, the environ-
mental externalities of oil production were both smaller and less studied, so 
regulation was either nonexistent or appeared unnecessary. Today oil produc-
tion is known to have substantial impact on the environment and, therefore, 
requires a larger governance structure to oversee policy. 
Native Americans
Although missing from the 1958 “Political Impact” chapter, Native American 
tribes are important actors in North Dakota oil and gas administration in 
2018. As noted, there are more than 30,000 Native Americans living in the 
state as members of several Plains Indians tribes. There are five reservations, 
two of which cross into South Dakota (see Figure 6.1 for a map). Inside the 
Williston Basin, the Fort Berthold Reservation is 1,319 square miles with a 
2015 population of 6,840 people (North Dakota Census Office 2015). These 
peoples—the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nations (MHA Nation)—are di-
vided into six segments on the reservation. The Tribal Council has an elected 
representative of each segment, as well as a chair. These members then serve on 
the council’s five committees: natural resources, health and human resources, 
judicial, economic development, and education (MHA Nation n.d.b). The MHA 
Nation has a constitution, and the tribal council oversees policy on the Fort 
Berthold Reservation. The impact of oil and gas development on the Berthold 
Reservation is immense, and the regulation of the industry on reservation 
lands is notoriously complex (see Raymond 2011). 
The Indian Affairs Commission is the liaison between the executive branch 
of the North Dakota state government and the tribal councils. Part of the 
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commission’s mandate is also to “increase the economic self-sufficiency” of 
American Indians in the state (North Dakota Indian Affairs Commission n.d.). 
This would include encouraging management of oil and gas development on 
the reservations. Given the location of the Fort Berthold Reservation, it is not 
surprising that there are significant oil reserves beneath it. Crude oil produc-
tion on the reservation has been steadily increasing over the past ten years. 
Today there are more than 1,300 oil wells, which account for almost 20 percent 
of North Dakota’s oil production (Energy Information Administration 2018). 
However, the vast majority of these wells have been drilled and produced by 
non-Native American oil companies. 
In 2012, the MHA Nation received approval from the federal Department 
of the Interior to take control of part of its reservation land (which is held in 
trust by the federal government) to build an oil refinery (Smith 2012). This 
is known as the MHA Nation Clean Fuels Refinery, and it is operated by a 
tribal-owned entity called Thunder Butte Petroleum Services. Construction of 
phase one of the project was started in 2014 (see MHA Nation n.d.a). The MHA 
Nation also owns an oil company, the Missouri River Resources, and in 2015, 
it drilled its first tribe-owned well (Sisk 2016). As oil production continues in 
the state, Native American involvement will likely increase. An on-reservation 
oil refinery will be an important source of revenue for the MHA Nation, but 
also a much-needed refinery for the Bakken Formation and the state, which 
presently has only two oil refineries. 
Interest Groups 
Environmental groups, which have evolved over the twentieth century, are 
now significant actors in North American oil and gas politics (Dodge 2015; 
Dokshin 2016; Gullion 2015). In the context of North Dakota, they are prob-
ably associated mainly with opposition to the Dakota Access Pipeline and the 
Keystone XL pipeline (see Sisk 2016). However, at a smaller and more local level, 
environmental non-governmental groups act as pressure points and collabora-
tors in the governance of land, water, air, and other environmental resources 
in the state. For example, the Sierra Club Dacotah Chapter has led campaigns 
to advocate for and support flaring regulations in the state (see Sierra Club 
Dacotah Chapter n.d.). Similarly, the Dakota Resource Council has focused on 
oil and gas issues since the group’s founding in 1978. Their campaigns have in-
cluded advocacy for flaring regulations, pipelines, and public land conservation 
(see Dakota Resource Council n.d.). As the environmental risks of oil produc-
tion are becoming better known, participation by environmental groups is 
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increasing. In fact, in some states, like New York, environmental groups have 
led campaigns to ban hydraulic fracturing because of the associated environ-
mental externalities (Dodge 2015; Dokshin 2016). 
The oil industry has also formed its own interest groups to lobby the state 
government for pro-oil policy and regulations. The oil sector was the top con-
tributor to former-Governor Jack Dalrymple’s political campaigns. In 2012, 
Dalrymple raised $3.6 million total, with about 10 percent or $370,000 coming 
from oil interests (Kusnetz 2017). The North Dakota Petroleum Council is one 
of the largest and most prominent oil interest groups in the state. It represents 
about five hundred oil and gas companies and is overseen by a Board of Direc-
tors, chosen every four years at the group’s annual meeting. Their main goal is 
“promoting and enhancing the discovery, development, production, transpor-
tation, refining, conservation, and marketing of oil and gas in North Dakota” 
(North Dakota Petroleum Council n.d.). Whether the oil industry has become 
too rich and politically influential in the state is contested (Kusnetz 2017). But 
suffice it to say, the oil interest groups do wield substantial power. 
Federal Government
The federal government can also be an important actor in state administra-
tion of oil and gas by creating national regulations and standards for issues in 
federal jurisdiction. One example is the transportation of oil and gas through 
North Dakota. Pipelines and railways are an area of shared governance in the 
U.S. federal system. Railway and pipelines that cross state and international 
borders are always part of the federal domain. The U.S. Secretary of Transpor-
tation has general regulatory and enforcement authority regarding protection 
against risks to life and property posed by pipeline transportation and pipe-
line facilities (Murrill 2016). Similarly, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration (PHMSA), inside the Department of Transportation, is 
responsible for developing and enforcing regulations for the safe, reliable, and 
environmentally sound operation of pipeline transportation (Murrill 2016). 
This is a top-down system in which the federal government sets regulations 
that states are required to follow for all interstate railways and pipelines. How-
ever, for intrastate issues, the North Dakota Public Service Commission can 
“establish and enforce minimum safety standards for the design, construction, 
and operation” of pipelines and railways that distribute or move oil and gas 
(North Dakota Public Services Commission 2018). 
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The federal government is also responsible for interstate waters and safe 
drinking water in the country. The Clean Water Act and the Safe Drinking 
Water Act (SDWA) set federal regulations in these domains. In the context 
of the Williston Basin this is important because the Missouri River system 
crosses state lines and, therefore, permits to withdraw water are granted by 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Under the SDWA, North Dakota is required 
to meet drinking water quality standards as set out by the federal Environ-
mental Protection Agency (see Environmental Protection Agency n.d., 2016). 
These regulations are discussed further below. But similar to transportation, 
water is an issue that draws the federal government into oil administration in 
the fifty states. 
Oil Legislation 
Ever since oil was discovered in North Dakota in 1951, it has been a major 
issue on the government docket. Oil governance is decentralized, and states 
oversee much of the production and some of the transportation. As noted in 
other chapters (Rundquist and Vandeberg, current volume), one of the big-
gest differences between 1958 and 2018 is the size of the oil patch and the 
consequential environmental externalities that require government oversight. 
Essentially, states “must weigh fundamental trade-offs between aggressive 
pursuit of resource development and aggressive pursuit of environmental pro-
tections” (Rabe 2014, 8371). While there have been hundreds of oil regulations 
created in North Dakota since 1958, this section will focus on four areas of oil 
policy that speak to the challenge of balancing oil production with environ-
mental protection. 
Severance Taxes
Severance taxes put a cost on the extraction of natural resources, such as oil, 
as they are being removed or “severed” from the earth. The impetus behind 
these taxes is generally to capture revenue from a nonrenewable resource that 
is being permanently withdrawn and consumed (Rabe and Hampton 2014). 
In the U.S., states have a long history of applying such taxes to coal and other 
minerals. In the twentieth century, severance taxes were attached to oil and 
gas development in many U.S. states. Texas was the first to pass a severance 
tax in 1905, while Michigan and Louisiana followed in the 1920s. In the twen-
ty-first century, especially with the oil boom of the last decade, these taxes 
have garnered significantly more attention. Questions of how much states 
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tax extraction and how they choose to allocate those funds (that is, general 
revenue versus environmental or heritage funds) are now scrutinized more 
carefully by policymakers and academics (Rabe and Hampton 2014). 
North Dakota has overlapping severance taxes—an oil and gas production 
tax and an oil and gas extraction tax. These are imposed on the industry in lieu 
of property taxes. The state enacted its first production tax in 1953, when it 
set a 4.25 percent tax rate on the gross value of a well. And it enacted its first 
oil and gas extraction tax in 1980 through a ballot measure passed by voters 
in the general election. The oil extraction tax was set at 6.5 percent, which was 
to be distributed to the state general fund (45 percent), schools (45 percent), 
and a trust fund (10 percent) (see North Dakota State Tax Commission 1998). 
As of 2018, the oil and gas production tax is a 5 percent rate applied to the 
gross value of all oil produced at a well (with exemptions for Native American 
holdings within the boundaries of a reservation). The oil extraction rate fluctu-
ates between 5 percent and 6 percent depending on whether the average price 
of oil is above or below $90 a barrel for three consecutive months (see State of 
North Dakota State Tax Commission 2016). See Table 6.2 for recent changes 
to North Dakota’s severance tax scheme. 
TABLE 6.2. 
LEGISLATIVE CHANGES TO NORTH DAKOTA’S SEVERANCE TAX 
(2010–PRESENT) 
Year Legislation Summary
2010 HCR3054 and Development of a Legacy Fund and ballot 
 ballot measure measure that allocates 30 percent of oil and gas 
  revenues to the fund 
2013 SB2014 Allocates oil extraction development funds to  
  newly created energy conservation grant fund 
2013 HB1358 Changes revenue allocation to counties and 
  some cities 
2013 HB1278 Changes portion of production tax revenue to 
  newly created Heritage Fund 
2015 HB1476 Beginning January 1, 2016, the oil extraction  
  tax rate is reduced from 6.5 percent to 5 
  percent and a new “high price” trigger method 
  is created that raises the oil extraction tax rate  
  to 6 percent in a triggered-on environment.
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North Dakota has seen so many recent changes to these taxes where “the 
combination of growing social strains and abundant revenue intake has 
made Bismark a place for near-constant debate over revenue use” (Rabe and 
Hampton 2015, 404). The share of state severance tax revenue in total tax 
revenue has increased from almost 17 percent in 2005 to 46 percent in 2013 
(Rabe and Hampton 2014). This represents a significant amount of increasing 
government revenue—in dollars this is a jump from roughly $262,000 in 2005 
to $2.5 million in 2013 (Rabe and Hampton 2015). What this money can and 
should be used for is a contentious political debate. 
In 2010, the state’s referendum process led to a constitutional amendment 
(Section 26, Article X) to create the North Dakota Legacy Fund. The state puts 
30 percent of annual severance tax revenues into a designated fund, overseen 
by the elected state treasurer, that has no specific purpose or plan for expendi-
ture. Instead, the fund reflects “a broad political desire to set aside substantial 
portions of revenue for longer term needs, including those that might be tied 
to the impacts of share development or consequences of any future decline in 
production” (Rabe and Hampton 2015, 405; see also Gold 2012). The Legacy 
Fund was created in such a way that accumulating revenue was invested in 
stocks and bonds. No interest from the fund could be allocated or spent until 
2017. See Figure 6.2 for a depiction of how the fund is designed. 
Figure 6.2. The Legacy Fund rules and procedures (source: Great Plains Insti-
tute 2015)
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Outside of the 30 percent designated to the Legacy Fund, the separate stat-
utes of 2013 concern reallocation of some other portion of the severance tax 
funds. House Bill 1278 allocates money to a new “outdoor heritage fund” that 
protects water quality and nature resources. The fund will collect up to $40 
million per biennium to provide grants to state agencies, tribal governments, 
and interest groups that want to support wildlife and outdoor activities 
(North Dakota Industrial Commission n.d.). There is a hierarchy for funding 
projects that prioritizes projects that (1) create fish and wildlife habitat and 
provide access to hunters, (2) improve or restore water quality, soil quality, 
plant diversity, and other wildlife stewardship activities, (3) develop or en-
hance conservation of wildlife and fish habitat, and (4) develop parks or other 
recreation areas (North Dakota Industrial Commission n.d.). The money is 
overseen by the Outdoor Heritage Fund Advisory Board as part of the North 
Dakota Industrial Commission. By the end of December 2016, the board had 
distributed over 28 million dollars in seven grant cycles. The projects can be 
found on the Industrial Commission’s website. 
In 2013, another bill addressed reallocation of severance revenue. Senate 
Bill 2014 allocated money to “hub cities” where oil and gas development was 
having the biggest social or infrastructure impact. Specifically, the bill pro-
vided money for schools, fire departments, nursing homes, emergency medical 
services, policy services, and hospitals. There was also money for roads and 
highways in oil counties (Andrist 2013). However, this funding was still inad-
equate, leading Governor Jack Dalrymple, in 2014, to sign into law $1.1 billion 
in “surge funding”—as a “one time infusion of funding for infrastructure re-
pair and development in oil-producing areas” (Rabe and Hampton 2015, 404). 
How much revenue from severance taxes is allocated to counties that produce 
oil is an ongoing discussion in the state and a likely topic for each biennial leg-
islature. Counties that produce oil, such as those in the Williston Basin, argue 
that they require the most funding since they need more and better roads and 
have increased costs associated with water quality and other environmental 
issues (Dalrymple 2017). 
Flaring Regulations 
When oil is extracted from the Williston Basin, the wells also produce signif-
icant—and potentially valuable—natural gas. The Bakken also contains 6.7 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 530 million barrels of natural gas liquids 
(NGLs) (Energy Information Administration 2018). However, this produced 
gas is often considered just a byproduct of the oil producing process. Moreover, 
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natural gas production exceeds pipeline capacity in the state (Energy Infor-
mation Administration 2018). Thus, the gas is typically flared (burned) rather 
than collected for storage and transport. For environmental and safety rea-
sons, North Dakota prohibits venting, or releasing the gas into the air, without 
flaring or collecting it. Natural gas contains dangerous and toxic hydrocarbons 
such as propane and butane. It also contains methane, which is a very potent 
greenhouse gas (Energy Information Administration 2016). While flaring nat-
ural gas does create carbon dioxide, another greenhouse gas, it is less potent 
that methane, so it is considered better to flare gas than to release it. 
Over the past decade, North Dakota has carefully examined natural gas 
policy in light of oil production. From the state’s perspective, flaring gas is 
problematic not just because of the lost revenue and royalties, but because it 
is associated with environmental and public health externalities. Ideally, oil 
firms should be capturing the natural gas for energy. However, the low price of 
natural gas makes it unprofitable for the oil industry or the state to invest in 
the necessary infrastructure to capture, store, and use natural gas for energy. 
In 2014, the state did something to dramatically shift how gas is treated in 
the Williston Basin. The North Dakota Industrial Commission passed one of 
the country’s most aggressive laws to reduce gas flaring—Commission Order 
24665. Under this law, all operators must capture a minimum percentage of 
gas produced at their wellsites—starting at 77 percent of gas produced in 
2016 and climbing to 91 percent by 2020. These percentages must be met 
monthly by each firm. However, there is some flexibility in how firms can meet 
standards. Firms can allocate these captured percentages across all their wells 
in the region and they can bank excess gas captured for up to three months 
(Lade and Rudik 2017). 
As a result of this new regulation, both the production side and the pro-
cessing side of the industry are responding. Oil firms are now busy installing 
connecting wells to pipeline infrastructure in the Williston Basin. Essentially, 
they install small pipelines, or “gathering lines,” that connect the oil well site 
to larger pipelines that transport the captured gas to a processing plant (Lade 
and Rudik 2017). On the industry side there are two projects in the develop-
ment stages that could significantly add to North Dakota’s gas gathering and 
processing capacity. The first is the construction of a new plant in McKenzie 
County near Watford City capable of processing 200 million standard cubic 
feet of gas per day. The region has been void of processing capacity and, con-
sequently, is one of the worst areas for excess flaring (Jean 2018). The second 
project is a gas gathering system in McKenzie County, near Fort Berthold 
(Jean 2018). 
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Figure 6.4. Flared natural gas in North Dakota, as total percent of natural gas 
produced, 2002–19 (source: North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources 
2019)
Figure 6.3. Flared natural gas in North Dakota, 2002–19 (source: North Da-
kota Department of Mineral Resources 2019)
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Since the new regulations went into effect, flaring has fallen sharply in 
North Dakota. In March 2016, 10 percent of total natural gas production 
was flared, even as total natural gas production grew (Energy Information 
Agency 2016) (see Figures 6.3 and 6.4). However, in 2018, the state appears 
to still be struggling with flaring, as gas capture peaked and then plateaued 
around 88 percent (Nemec 2018). In December 2017, twelve companies failed 
to make their three-month target but have not faced any restrictions for two 
reasons. First, under the 2014 law, wells are allowed to produce unrestricted 
amounts of gas for the first ninety days, and second, regulators exempt wells 
that produce less than one hundred barrels daily from the main regulations 
(Associated Press 2017). With so many firms missing targets, the North Da-
kota Petroleum Council has reconvened its industry task force to deal with the 
issue, and the North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources is also studying 
flaring regulation (Nemec 2018). Natural gas flaring is a good example of a 
negative environmental externality in the oil patch, and so far, North Dakota 
has struggled to find the balance between growing the industry and regulating 
emissions. 
Water Regulations
Oil production is deeply tied to water quantity and quality issues. This is par-
ticularly true of hydraulic fracturing, where the fracking of a single well can 
use 2–8 million gallons of water and create wastewater that contains high 
levels of total dissolved solids (TDS) and must be treated, disposed of, or re-
cycled (Konkel 2016). In places like the Williston Basin, where a shale boom 
has occurred, “local water resources are impacted by this rapid development, 
through both an increased demand for water, which is used for oil extraction 
and to support the burgeoning population of workers, and an increased pro-
duction of saline wastewater from the oil-bearing formation” (Horner et al. 
2016, 3275). Indeed, the amount of water consumed annually for hydraulic 
fracturing activities in the Bakken play has increased more than five-fold, from 
770 million gallons to 4.27 billion gallons, over the five years from 2008 to 
2012 (Horner et al. 2016). North Dakota has no choice but to confront the 
water quality and water quantity issues created by oil production in the state. 
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Quality
For water quality, the Industrial Commission is responsible for regulations for 
wastewater storage and requirements for the protection of underground and 
surface water during the oil production process. Similar to other states, North 
Dakota requires oil firms to submit a list of chemicals using in the fracking pro-
cess to FracFocus.org. It is important that regulators know what chemicals the 
industry is pumping into the ground because 10 to 90 percent of fracking fluid 
is returned to the surface during production (Colborn, Kwiatkowski, Schultz, 
and Bachran 2011). In general, produced water (water that flows out of the 
shale during fracking) and extraction liquids that return to the surface have 
been stored in “open evaporation pits” until the well is shut down, potentially 
years later. Toxic chemicals are found in these pits and can pose a threat to 
wildlife, soil, and public health (Ramirez 2010; Trail 2006). Even where chem-
icals are re-injected underground—a growing practice in the Bakken, and 
common in the eastern United States—they can create a “potential sources 
of extremely toxic chemical contamination” (Colborn et al. 2011, 1054). The 
U.S. Safe Drinking Water Act is the main federal law protecting water quality 
across the country. However, the 2005 U.S. Energy Policy Act exempts from 
the Safe Drinking Water Act the phase during which water mixed with chemi-
cals is injected into the ground as part of the hydraulic fracturing process. This 
means that North Dakota has enforcement authority for underground water 
injections in the state. 
The production of wastewater during oil production cannot be understated. 
In North Dakota, wastewater produced per well is rising (about five times be-
tween 2005 and 2012) and is higher than that of other shale plays: produced 
water amounts are about 440,000 gallons per year for wells completed during 
2005–7, but 2.2 million gallons per year for wells completed in 2011 and 2012 
(Horner et al. 2016). Wastewater from the Bakken is among the most saline of 
all shale formations, and most of it is disposed through “deep-well injection,” 
meaning it is “pumped back underground into depleted oil formations or deep 
saline water reservoirs” (Horner et al. 2016, 3280). There are now over 400 
saltwater disposal wells operating in the state (Horner et al. 2016). Another 
disposal option is the reuse of wastewater for fracturing other wells, which 
is a practice common in some other shale plays such as the Marcellus in the 
eastern United States. However, in the Bakken no wastewater is recycled be-
cause of the high salinity of the formation’s water. Recent developments in 
water recycling designed specifically for the Bakken have been piloted with 
175
technical success but are not yet “economically competitive” (Horner et al. 
2016, 3280). Instead, there are now 479 saltwater disposal wells in the Bakken 
(Scanlon et al. 2016, 10273).
Wastewater spills are also an area of growing concern in the Williston Basin. 
In 2015 alone, there were “12 spills greater than 21,000 gallons (79,500 liters), 
five spills greater than 42,000 gallons (160,000 liters), and one spill of 2.9 mil-
lion gallons (11 million liters)” in North Dakota (Environmental Protection 
Agency 2016, 31). These spills were a result of either human or equipment 
failure, or leaks from hoses or storage equipment. In the Bakken, wastewater 
spills are reported to occur mainly during wastewater transportation by pipe-
line and during the filling or emptying of holding tanks (Lauer, Harkness, 
Vengosh 2016). These spills have been reported to impact both groundwater 
and surface water in the state. Studies of air and water quality surrounding 
Williston during the time of a large (11.4 million liter) wastewater spill in 
January 2015 described elevated levels of chemicals used in fracking, such as 
boron and strontium, with effects including fish deaths and estrogen inhibi-
tion in downstream fish (Cozzarelli et al. 2017). Other studies of wastewater 
spills in the Bakken have also detected naturally occurring radioactive mate-
rials, high salinity, and toxic trace elements (Lauer et al. 2016). 
North Dakota presents an ideal case to test for wastewater effects because 
there was virtually no twentieth century conventional oil production that led 
to soil and water contamination before the past ten years of unconventional 
development (Lauer et al. 2016). In 2017, the North Dakota House of Repre-
sentatives passed Bill 1409 to require that water quality tests be conducted 
prior to oil production (on a surface owner’s property) and reported to the 
North Dakota Department of Health, which then analyzes the test and adds 
the results to a database maintained by the department. This helps state reg-
ulators understand the impact of oil production on water quality with “before 
and after” data. 
Quantity
When it comes to water quantity, administration depends on the water source. 
Most of the water used for oil production in the Williston Basin is from public 
or private water distribution sites and trucked to the oil wellsite (Horner et al. 
2016). These distribution sites, or water depots, can source water from surface 
or groundwater. The State Water Commission administers and enforces water 
law, including permitting for different water uses throughout the state. The 
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permitting process includes assessing the availability of ground and surface 
water, the impacts on prior water users, the impacts on water quality and 
quantity, and the “probable long-term effects of climatic variation” on water 
supplies (see North Dakota State Water Commission n.d.). A water permit is 
required for all industrial uses of water in the state, but temporary permits 
(those that do not go through the entire impact process) can be granted for up 
to twelve months. 
North Dakota recognizes a hierarchy of appropriated water uses, with do-
mestic and municipal at the top, agricultural/irrigational second, industrial 
third, and recreational (related to fish and wildlife) lowest (Scanlon et al. 2016). 
While in theory this means water transfers from higher to lower priority uses 
are not allowed, a policy was developed in 2011 to “accommodate a change 
in purpose from irrigation to industrial water uses through temporary water 
permits (1 year maximum) termed ‘Industrial Use in Lieu Of Irrigation Policy’ 
(ILOP),” which generated thirty-three permits and supplied almost 30 percent 
of water used in fracturing—also reducing water truck traffic and wait times 
at depots (Scanlon et al. 2016). The program was phased out in most places by 
the end of 2015 due to expansion in pipelines and water depots (Scanlon et 
al. 2016).
The federal Army Corps of Engineers controls permits for interstate waters, 
such as the upper Missouri River system, which includes Lake Sakakawea. This 
river system is the largest and most reliable source of water in the Williston 
Basin. Since the Bakken Formation is so large, transportation of water from 
the river system can be costly. Thus, there are numerous oil firms that source 
their water from the nearest water depot, managed by the state (Horner et al. 
2016). 
As of 2018, there is enough water in the state for oil production, but no 
single source alone is adequate. Up to 3.7 billion gallons of groundwater can 
be withdrawn annually in North Dakota, but in 2012, 4.3 billion gallons were 
needed just for hydraulic fracturing in the Bakken (Horner et al. 2016). Thus, 
surface water withdrawals are necessary. Up to 10.3 billion gallons annually 
are permitted for withdrawal from surface waters in the state. Lake Sakakawea 
has at least 32.5 billion gallons of annual surplus water that are being made 
available by the Army Corps of Engineers (Horner et al. 2016). 
In 2017, the North Dakota House of Representatives passed HB1020, which 
makes changes to the operation and composition of the state water commis-
sion. The bill also mandates a legislative management study of industry water 
use in the oil and gas industry. 
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Transportation Regulations 
There are thousands of oil and gas pipelines that cross through North Da-
kota—some small gathering lines and some very large and internationally 
significant pipelines. However, despite all of these pipelines, oil producers were, 
and still are, sometimes forced to ship crude oil by rail or truck simply because 
production has outpaced pipeline capacity. In 2013, roughly 75 percent of 
crude oil produced in the state was shipped by rail. This number has fallen, and 
in 2016 only about 30 percent of oil was shipped on the railroad (Energy In-
formation Administration 2018). Rail and pipeline transport were roughly the 
same in 2012, before rail transport increased as pipeline transport decreased. 
The safety of oil transportation is a controversial and political issue in the 
United States and Canada. In 2013, a train carrying crude oil from North 
Dakota to a refining plant in New Brunswick, Canada, crashed and exploded 
in Lac-Mégantic, Quebec. The result was not just the destruction of thirty 
buildings in the downtown core, but more tragically the death of forty-seven 
people. This was the deadliest non-passenger train railway accident in Cana-
da’s history. The incident immediately put railway safety—and the Bakken 
Formation—on the front page of every newspaper in Canada and the United 
States. And the federal governments of both countries acted quickly to issue 
emergency orders. 
Nevertheless, in 2014 a train carrying 3.5 million gallons of oil crashed into 
a grain train and forced the evacuation of more than 1,000 residents in the 
town of Casselton, North Dakota. This event again led to more media coverage 
that focused attention on the Bakken Formation. A New York Times exposé 
appeared on Page A1 on January 26, 2014, about oil transportation in North 
Dakota. At the time, about 65 percent of oil produced in North Dakota’s Bakken 
was shipped on railway, often because of a shortage of pipelines. According to 
the Times, “Safety officials have warned for more than two decades that these 
cars were unsuited to carry flammable cargo: their shell can puncture and tears 
up too easily in a crash” (Krauss and Mouawad 2014). However, the problem 
was more than just tank cars, as the Times also brought to light the fact that 
“crude oil produced in the Bakken appears to be a lot more volatile than other 
grades of oil, something that could explain why the oil trains have had huge 
explosions” (Krauss and Mouawad 2014). 
As a result of these crashes and the U.S. federal government’s emergency or-
ders, the North Dakota Industrial Commission created new standards for oil 
being transported from the state. Order 25417 set new operating standards in 
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2014 for the equipment that separates production fluids into gas and liquid. 
These standards include “new parameters for temperatures and pressures 
under which the equipment must operate to ensure that light hydrocarbons 
are removed before oil is shipped to market.” The oil’s temperature must be 
raised to at least 110°F to boil off the most volatile fractions which become 
highly flammable or even explosive if they become separated in transit. North 
Dakota standards are now more stringent that federal regulations. Bakken 
crude oil must be at a vapor pressure of no more than 13.7 pounds per square 
inch (psi) whereas the federal standard is 14.7 psi. Order 25417 applies 
without exception to all Bakken crude oil produced in North Dakota (North 
Dakota Industrial Commission 2014).
To confront transportation problems, the state also opened a new oil refinery 
in 2015, with plans to open more in the future. In 2018 the state has two oil 
refineries, the Mandan Refinery in Mandan and the Dakota Prairie Refinery 
in Dickinson. But to keep pace with production and prevent transportation 
delays and risks, more refineries are necessary. Meridian Energy Group has 
proposed a facility, the Davis Refinery, in western North Dakota, just outside 
the Theodore Roosevelt National Park. In December of 2017, the North Da-
kota Department of Health Air Quality Division granted a draft permit to 
construct the refinery. The Billings county board already approved the project 
and necessary zoning for the facility in 2016. The process for a finalized permit 
to construct is ongoing (Meridian Energy Group 2018). 
Future of Oil Politics in North Dakota 
Oil production in the United States is experiencing a historic resurgence. This 
is due largely to the discovery of new deposits and the development of new 
technologies that enable oil recovery at cheaper rates. In November of 1970, 
the U.S. produced 10.04 million barrels of oil per day (see Figure 6.5). Between 
1970 and 2010, oil production steadily declined with few interruptions (a brief 
period in the 1980s, for example). However, since 2010, production—largely 
due to fracking technology—has been rising. In January 2018, the United 
States produced 10.2 million barrels of oil per day. North Dakota is producing 
about 1.2 million barrels per day—almost 10 percent of total production in 
the United States. Oil production in the Williston Basin is prospering. 
While the future of oil looks stable, the pressures of climate change are cre-
ating real political and social pressure across the country and throughout the 
world. In 2015, by executive order, President Obama created the Clean Power 
Plan—a policy aimed at reducing greenhouse emissions from electrical power 
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generators and coal-fired power plants in each U.S. state. This signaled a new 
era of climate change policy in the United States. In 2015, President Obama 
also signed the United Nation’s Paris Agreement, which further committed the 
United States to reducing its greenhouses gas emissions over the next thirty 
years (the Agreement goes into force in 2020). The election of Donald Trump 
in 2016 signaled yet another era in American climate change policy. Trump 
campaigned on a pro-energy (anti-environmental regulation) campaign and 
after sweeping into the White House, he quickly asked the Environmental 
Protection Agency to repeal the Clean Power Plan, which was under review by 
the U.S. Supreme Court. President Trump has spoken against the Paris Accord, 
and in June 2017 he announced that the United States would withdraw from 
the international agreement. (However, the earliest possible withdrawal date 
by a signatory to the 2015 agreement is November 4, 2020—so the United 
States technically remains a party to the convention.) Trump remains very 
skeptical of climate change and is against environmental regulations that slow 
U.S. energy production (Parker and Davenport 2016). During a 2016 campaign 
stop in Bismarck, Trump told a packed arena of thousands that he wants to 
see “more fossil fuel drilling and fewer environmental regulations” (Parker and 
Davenport 2016). Not surprisingly, in the 2016 election, Trump won North 
Dakota’s three electoral college votes with 63 percent of the popular vote in 
the state. In Williams County, Trump won 10,069 votes compared to Hillary 
Clinton’s 1,735 votes (New York Times 2017). 
Figure 6.5. Daily crude oil production in millions of barrels per day in the 
United States, 1920–2018 (source: Energy Information Administration 
2019)
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However, even in light of the Republican administration and Trump’s sup-
port in the Williston Basin, it seems clear that North Dakota oil production 
will be accompanied by increasing alternative energy production in the state. 
Like oil and gas, North Dakota also has abundant renewable energy resources, 
especially wind energy. In 2016, the state ranked fifth in the United States 
for electricity generation produced by wind energy (Energy Information Ad-
ministration 2018). And North Dakota still has significant undeveloped wind 
energy resources. In 2017, the Industrial Commission approved $1.1 million in 
research and development grants for three renewable energy projects—two 
involving portable solar development and one developing geothermal energy 
for residential use (North Dakota Industrial Commission 2017a). North Da-
kota is already one of the top ten ethanol-producing states with five ethanol 
plants, and among the top ten in biodiesel production capacity (Energy In-
formation Administration 2018). It also generates hydroelectricity through 
the Garrison Dam outside of Bismarck. The dam produces about 5–7 percent 
of the state’s net electricity (Energy Information Administration 2018). Al-
though the state is committed to oil production, it is not forgoing other energy 
production opportunities.
North Dakota is also pursuing carbon-and-capture storage (CCS) technology. 
It is a process whereby carbon dioxide emitted from large projects, such as 
coal-fired power plants, is captured, transported, and deposited underground. 
The purpose is to prevent the carbon dioxide from entering the atmosphere. 
However, it can also be used for “enhanced oil recovery” where that carbon 
dioxide is injected into the ground to help recover more oil. This is a process 
used in Saskatchewan to increase oil production in its portion of the Bakken 
while decreasing emissions from the province’s coal-fired power plants. In May 
2017 the state became the first to receive EPA approval for CCS. Essentially, 
North Dakota now has primary regulatory authority over the geologic storage 
of carbon dioxide (North Dakota Industrial Commission 2017b). Saskatch-
ewan already as a CCS facility in its Bakken region, just outside Estevan. In 
December 2017, the province signed a memorandum of understanding with 
Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming related to CCS technology. The four 
subnational jurisdictions will “collaborate on carbon capture, utilization and 
storage (CCUS) related to sharing of capacity, as well as regulatory expertise in 
the fields of carbon dioxide capture, transportation, storage and enhanced oil 
recovery” (Fraser 2017). 
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 The balance between oil production and environmental protection will be 
an ongoing political pursuit in the Williston Basin. Responsible oil production 
requires a plethora of actors and a complex governance system. The North 
Dakota administrative system has increased capacity and opened up avenues 
for non-government actors. While the main emphasis still appears to be in-
creasing oil production, there is now greater attention to the environment. 
The state has set aside severance funds specifically earmarked for outdoor 
heritage projects and has a legacy fund that could potentially be used to offset 
landscape changes or other environmental externalities of the oil patch. Water 
quality and quantity as well as flaring and transportation are now regulated by 
North Dakota’s government. The past ten years has shown that North Dakota 
is taking more seriously the environmental responsibility of oil production. 
And there is certainly more state regulation of the industry and the environ-
ment in 2018 than in 1958, at the time of the first Williston Report. However, 
the balance still tips toward fossil fuel production. North Dakota, like many 
U.S. states, has been unable to balance the industry’s booms with society’s 
long-term interests in an era of sustainability. 
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Chapter 7
The Economic Impact of Oil 
Development
Samuel C. Kelley, Jr.
An area that is committed to an economic function specialized in 
agriculture and in particular to a specialized commodity structure is in-
variably characterized by a level of income that is significantly lower and 
far more unstable than that of an economy founded on manufacturing 
activity. Extreme fluctuation and chronic depression in the commodity 
market accompanied by rapid technological change in methods of ag-
ricultural production have produced, in areas such as North Dakota, 
a low wage structure, persistent underemployment and standards of 
living that are not in accord with the dynamic growth present in other 
areas of the national economy.
Much of the current argument which treats the agricultural problem 
as one of improper allocation of resources to be corrected by the market 
mechanism is appropriate only to areas where alternative uses of re-
sources are technically possible. In those areas where the alternatives 
are limited, as in North Dakota and much of the Great Plains area, 
the alternative to continued employment in agriculture is migration 
to other geographic areas. The many forces which act to restrain pop-
ulation movements assure that the short term will be characterized 
by a labor force excessive relative to demand. For the long term the 
residual population of the declining area must continue to bear an un-
reasonably high and increasing overhead cost of the public and private 
services essential to the community welfare.
The impact of economic decline upon the population of the agricul-
tural areas of the nation is evident in the fervor with which they have 
sought protective legislation and in the intense competition through 
which they are now attempting to broaden the economic base of their 
communities. Throughout the South and increasingly in the Great 
Plains area, private and public agencies are engaged in gigantic promo-
tional efforts to attract nonagricultural industries. Offers of financial 
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assistance, tax offsets, land grants, low wage rates and “favorable” labor 
laws are the bait being used to attract new industries to areas in des-
perate need of additional employment opportunities and a bigger tax 
base.
Many of these areas are at a distinct disadvantage in the compet-
itive struggle. Their small populations offer no concentrated market; 
they are remote from the urban concentrations that consume a large 
part of the nation’s product; the labor force possesses few of the skills 
required in the complex of industrial production, and the physical re-
sources possessed by the area are usually exploited most economically 
by shipping them in unprocessed form to established manufacturing 
areas. Their primary asset is an abundant labor supply continuously 
supplemented by the technological displacement of farm workers.
A taxonomic description of the impact of oil discovery on a local 
economy is in itself of little value to anyone other than the local his-
torians and those eager members of the Chamber of Commerce who 
search for microscopic evidence of the utopian characteristics of their 
communities.
It may well be that the results of this study will serve no other pur-
pose. It is, however, our premise that the Williston Basin Area possesses 
some relatively unique characteristics and that these characteristics 
provide an analytical basis for inference that may be applied appropri-
ately in other situations and in other times.
The economic process which may be described here in terms of a 
real situation is the process of the induced response of an economy to a 
major autonomous change within it. In the majority of real situations 
the complexity of interrelationships between economic components 
and a wide variety of institutional restraints serves to confuse the ana-
lyst and to obscure the causal relationships between autonomous and 
induced changes.
From an economic viewpoint the characteristics that lend value 
to data derived from this area are the internal simplicity of the local 
economy and the simplicity of its relationship with other portions of 
the larger economy of which it is part.
It is in this type of economic environment that the Williston Basin oil 
development occurred. To interpret many of the economic phenomena 
within this development some general description of the environment 
is required. The Williston area is typical of the state in nearly every 
respect. The differences between it and other regions of the state are 
differences of magnitude rather than kind.
The two counties selected for analysis were selected primarily be-
cause at the time of the study they contained nearly all activity directly 
related to oil development in North Dakota. Fortunately, they also 
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comprise the most important components of the economy of the area 
and inferences can be drawn for the residual areas with a relatively high 
level of confidence as to their validity.
The Economic Area
The basic economy of these two counties and the counties contiguous 
to them is agricultural. Until the oil discovery in 1951, land was the only 
natural resource in use, and all labor resources were used in direct or 
indirect relation to its cultivation.
Even the structure of the area’s agriculture is simple. Limited rain-
fall, severe northern climate, conditions of topography, and isolation 
from major consumer markets have limited land use to the produc-
tion of two basic commodities, small grains and livestock. The same 
conditions have required an extensive use of land, and the area is char-
acterized by a relatively small number of very large farm units. Since 
the dry-farming techniques appropriate to the area permit extensive 
use of mechanical farm equipment, the labor requirements per farm 
unit are very small, normally being met by family labor.
This type of agriculture has limited the development of local man-
ufactures in two ways. First, the farm products are those which may be 
shipped to areas closer to primary consumer markets in unprocessed 
form more economically than in processed form. There is no processing 
of agricultural products in this area other than that required for imme-
diate domestic consumption. In fact, only a relatively small part of the 
local consumption of milled grains and livestock is satisfied by local 
production. Even the farmers of the region produce little for their own 
use, depending on the sale and export of their products in raw form and 
the import of finished goods.
A second way in which the development of local manufacture has 
been inhibited by the type of agriculture dominant in the region is that 
its limited and declining need for labor has produced a very low popu-
lation density. In 1950, McKenzie County had fewer than three persons 
per square mile; Mountrail five persons, and Williams fewer than 
eight. Further, the population of the area has declined continuously 
since 1930. The net number of persons leaving Mountrail County in 
the period 1940–1950 was equal to 24 percent of its 1940 population. 
The Williams County loss was nearly 14 percent, although the city of 
Williston had a population increase of over 27 percent in the period.
A sparse and declining population offers little opportunity for 
the development of domestic manufactures intended to serve local 
markets, such as are found in most areas of the United States. In the 
Williston Basin, this industry group has been limited to a few dairies, 
192
bakeries, job printers and newspapers. Virtually all other commodities 
used in the area are produced elsewhere and nearly all that is produced 
in the area is exported from the area in a raw state.
In essence, the area is a raw materials producing economy which 
trades its raw commodities for finished goods imported from “abroad.” 
Like most areas of the world’s economy which produce raw materials 
for export, the local welfare is directly dependent upon economic con-
ditions in other areas. Further, the dependence of the manufacturing 
economy on the welfare of this “basic” component is tenuous and re-
mote. The demand for the commodity materials which it supplies is 
relatively inelastic under ordinary conditions of economic activity. In 
contrast, the conditions of supply are extremely competitive. This kind 
of an economic relationship has tended to promote and to preserve a 
rather primitive economy with the type of economic institution charac-
teristic of the national scene at the turn of the century.
The primary employment is farming. The major secondary employ-
ment is in trade and transportation. Although farm establishments are 
very large in terms of land use relative to the national pattern, busi-
ness establishments are very small. The proprietorship, partnership 
and cooperatives are far more characteristic than the corporate form 
of business organization. No firm in the area other than major utilities 
employed more than 200 persons prior to oil discovery.
The communities of the area are also small. Williston, the only 
urban area in the two counties, had a 1950 population of less than 
8000, and there is no larger community within a radius of one hun-
dred miles. Williston is the trade center of the area and a very large 
percentage of the goods consumed in the area pass through it in much 
the same way that imports arrive at and are distributed from a port city 
in the more primitive economic areas of the world. To a lesser degree, 
much of the area’s product is collected for export through the facilities 
of this trade center.
The smaller communities of the area serve two basic functions. 
They are secondary areas of distribution for those consumer products 
which meet day-to-day needs such as groceries or farm materials and 
building supplies. They are also residential communities for retired 
farmers and for many of the numerous farmers and ranchers who do 
not live on their farms in the winter months.
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The Trade Area Structure
Some evidence of the relative importance of Williston as a center for 
trade and service to the Williams County area is contained in the re-
sults of a sample of farm families and residents of the major secondary 
communities. It should be noted that these data were collected in 1954 
and reflect a part of the developed changes induced by the oil activity.
Although Williston is approximately 50 miles from the oil field area 
(impact area), 73 percent of all families interviewed in this area bought 
their dress apparel from Williston merchants. Nearly all bought house-
hold furnishings in the same place, and more than a third did their 
banking in Williston banks. One development resulting directly from 
oil activity was the establishment of a medical clinic in Tioga, which 
is contained in this area, yet half of all residents in the area went to 
Williston for medical care.
Of all farm families in areas of Williams County, other than the 
eastern townships defined as the impact area, slightly more than half 
generally bought their groceries in Williston. Nearly 95 percent bought 
clothing there and went there for more medical care. About 90 percent 
thought of Williston as their center for bank transactions. Even more 
pertinent is the fact that in Tioga and Ray, the largest secondary trade 
centers in the area, two-thirds of all resident families purchased dress 
apparel and other consumer goods of the same class in Williston rather 
than in their own community.
The eastern edge of Williston’s trade area is a topographical fea-
ture, a long coulee running north and south through Mountrail County 
passing through the community of White Earth just east of the major 
producing oil fields. This barrier has interrupted the county and 
township roads which would normally permit a westward movement. 
Westward traffic must move on U.S. No. 2 or to the north of the county 
line.
Much of the area to the east of this feature is served by Stanley, the 
county seat of Mountrail County, or by Powers Lake to the north. The 
trade distribution in this area is not so sharply defined as in Williams 
County. Stanley is a much smaller community than Williston and is 
without the variety of business establishments found there. The smaller 
communities of the county, Parshall and Newtown, are able to compete 
in the types of consumer demand usually satisfied in nonurban places. 
More important, Minot in Ward County is the State’s third largest com-
munity and attracts many of the area’s consumers of durable consumer 
goods and higher quality non-durables. For the western range of town-
ships, Powers Lake is the dominant trade center. In all other areas of the 
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county, using clothing and medical care as illustrative of consumption 
items, Stanley serves about a third of all farm families, while Newtown 
and Parshall together serve about 15 percent and Minot 40 percent.
The concentration of the area’s trade and service activity is Wil-
liston; Stanley’s and Minot’s has been reduced in some ways and 
increased in others by the development of the oil extracting industry 
in the area. In a few cases, notably Tioga and Powers Lake and to a 
lesser extent Ray, the influx of population and the daily presence of 
large numbers of oil field workers has resulted in the establishment of 
new trade and service establishments and in the modernization and 
expansion of others. However, the majority of these establishments are 
bars, restaurants and grocery stores or service establishments of the 
business repair type. In several of the relatively few cases of additions 
to merchandising establishments, the new establishment has been a 
branch outlet for an existing firm in Williston.
In contrast to this slight diversification of trade in the area, Wil-
liston has experienced a greater increase in new establishments and 
in new lines of service than has the remainder of the area. This is pri-
marily a result of the fact that although Williston is nearly 50 miles 
from the major oil discoveries, it occupies the center of the apparent 
geological area for oil prospects. By 1954, only the fringes of the area 
had been developed, in the Tioga area on the east and in the Montana 
fields on the west. In appraising both the existing situation and future 
possibilities, the major producers and the firms supplying materials for 
drilling activity selected Williston as their base of operations as a result 
of its location as well as its size.
In this sense, the trade structure of the area has not been modified 
by oil activity. Although growth in a few areas such as Tioga has been 
great relative to the past, Williston continues to dominate business 
activity in the area. The major economic impact of the development, 
changes in employment, income, sales and receipts, can be measured 
in terms of the changes in the economy of Williston. These changes are 
described and related to the causal development in a following section.
The Oil Industry
The autonomous factor inducing change in the area was the abrupt 
development of an industry completely new to the region. There had 
been interest and activity related to oil in the region for many years. 
The early activity was largely speculative, involving the sale of mineral 
leases based upon limited, intermittent and unsuccessful drilling ac-
tivity. At the time of the present discovery, there was little or no interest 
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among the general population in the oil potential of the area. The dis-
covery well unleashed a psychological force which was intensified by 
the great need of the area for supplemental income and employment 
and by the fact that earlier failures had eliminated many expectations 
for this line of development.
In this type of situation, the petroleum extracting industry is par-
ticularly well suited to induce a wave of secondary development based 
upon the psychological and economic impacts of direct oil activity. As 
an industry, it is somewhat unique in the present American economic 
scene. It is a heterogenous mixture of speculative finance, production 
and service. It is a hard, driving, competitive business with the over-
tones of a circus and is encompassed in the speculative manipulation 
of a legislative session. In its totality it is as much a movement as an 
enterprise.
It is doubtful whether any other act of industrial development with 
equivalent economic potential can generate the psychological impact 
that is induced by an oil discovery. The search for oil involves several 
major acts of chance and provides an area of speculation for those who 
participate on the fringe. The speculative nature of oil development 
originates in two facts. First is the fact that in spite of the great im-
provement in the techniques for the study of the subsurface geological 
structure, there is no way to prove the presence of an oil reserve except 
to drill for it. Well drilling is an expensive operation, in particular when 
drilling depths are great. The cost of an exploratory well may range 
from 50,000 dollars to twice or three times that amount. The prob-
ability of success for a wildcat well is probably about 10 percent for 
the nation as a whole. On the other hand, the potential rewards are 
sufficient to induce many gamblers, large and small, to join the game.
A second condition adding greatly to the psychological impact is 
that the oil producer seldom owns the right to the oil which he hopes 
to discover and produce. He must obtain these rights by lease or in rare 
instances by purchase of the mineral rights. The rental that he must pay 
for the right to explore and produce oil on another’s land will depend 
largely on the amount of interest by others and thus on the competition 
for lease rights. Delay rentals may vary from ten cents a mineral acre 
when there is little prevailing interest to more than one dollar when 
there is an actual oil show in the area. Further, it is customary for the 
lessee to pay a bonus at the time of leasing. Bonus payments may range 
from ten cents or even nothing to ten dollars or more.
To maximize his potential gain and to assure an unrestricted right 
to exploration, the producer must acquire mineral leases without ini-
tiating competition by his own acts of acquisition. Yet, the earlier he 
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moves, the less information at his disposal with which to improve his 
estimate of the probabilities of success. As in stud poker, every turn of a 
card adds to one’s knowledge of the probable value of the hand. At the 
same time, it increases the cost of staying in the game.
The oil game is played by amateurs and professionals. The fervor 
with which it is played is due in part to the fact that nearly everyone 
can get into the game. The sharp trading in leases adds to the cross 
current of rumor and confusion. The competitive pressures on rental 
price induce an optimism and excitement in the community that may 
easily lead to a rate of investment in other areas of local economy which 
are not warranted by the realities of the situation.
The pattern of lease buying in the Williston Basin has been de-
scribed in an excellent pamphlet by Stanley Voelker of the North Dakota 
Agricultural College. He notes that Amerada Petroleum Corporation 
and Hunt Oil Company were assembling lease blocks early in 1948. 
By September 1949, several companies and brokers were competing 
for leases and slightly more than 120,000 mineral acres had been 
leased. In this early period, delay rentals averaged 13 cents a mineral 
acre, as did bonus payments. In the next six months, ending with the 
completion of the discovery, well acreage leased increased 189 percent 
and average delay rentals and bonus payments increased to 20 cents 
and 21 cents respectively. The most intense leasing activity began at 
the time of discovery in April, 1951. By the end of October of the same 
year, more than 568,000 additional acres were brought under lease. 
Average delay rentals had increased to 85 cents and bonus payments to 
1.52 dollars per mineral acre. In terms of monthly rates, leasing activity 
in the seven months following discovery was 215 percent of the rate in 
the six months preceding activity. At the beginning of leasing activity, 
82 percent of all leases were at 10 cents an acre. In the period after 
discovery, 99 percent were at one dollar or more. Dr. Voelker estimates 
that bonus payments varied from less than 10 cents (in some cases, 
nothing) to an extreme of 135 dollars in a few cases in the oil field area.
Data comparable to Dr. Voelker’s data for Williams County are not 
available for other areas. However, the location of the proven oil fields 
indicates that the leasing pattern for Mountrail County was very similar 
to that of Williams County. As wildcat drilling extended through the 
Williston Basin, in attempts to define the area, lease activity occurred 
in nearly every area of the state. The extent and rapidity of the action 
is evident in the fact that by January 1954, 67 percent of the land area 
of North Dakota was under oil or gas leases. The boom characteristics 
of this phase of the oil development are indicated in a comparison of 
North Dakota and Oklahoma, a state with a much older oil extraction 
industry. These two states are of nearly equal size, yet only 39 percent 
of Oklahoma’s land area was under lease.
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In contrast to these indications of extremely rapid development in 
the Williston area, nearly all of those persons who came into the area 
with oil producing or contract and service companies felt that the Wil-
liston Basin development was restrained. At least, its development was 
slow relative to their experience in the Texas, Oklahoma and Wyoming 
areas.
This restraint is explained in several ways. Physical factors such as 
the greater than average drilling depth, the extreme cold of prolonged 
winters and the geographical isolation of the area all add to drilling 
costs and discourage marginal independent producers.
Institutional factors, in particular such political issues as depletion 
allowances, production tax rates, well spacing and production allow-
ances appear to have encouraged major producers to move slowly in 
an effort to improve their position of power. These issues are discussed 
elsewhere in this study. From the standpoint of economic impact, it 
should be noted here that the domination of the Williston Basin Devel-
opment by the Amerada Petroleum Company was generally believed 
by those interviewed to be a paramount factor in the relatively slow 
development of the area. The position taken by the corporation on 
oil issues was almost universally echoed by the local business people 
where the success of their business ventures was contingent on oil re-
lated expansion.
In the development of an oil reserve, charges are often levied against 
the producers concerning intentional restraint of the development, 
usually by the owners of mineral rights. Some land owners insisted 
that supposed dry wells were potential producers. They believe that the 
producing company is exercising a means of market control in a glutted 
domestic market. This type of attitude may be more prevalent in the 
Williston area than in many other oil producing regions of the United 
States, first, because the isolation of the area, the supply problem in the 
national market, the lack of refining facilities and the limited means of 
transport of crude combined to create serious market problems. This 
situation was not relieved until the completion of the Standard Oil Re-
finery in Mandan and the pipelines from it to the east.
Second, the Williston development has been dominated by one 
major producing company, Amerada. It is more logical to attribute 
monopolistic activities to a dominant firm than to assume conspiracy 
among many otherwise competitive firms. The records of the State Ge-
ologist indicate that by mid-year 1954, drilling permits had been issued 
to more than 150 producing companies. Many of these are large and 
established firms. Many others were “one-shot” combinations of indi-
viduals or business firms joined for the single purpose of producing 
one well.
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Although the large number of “wildcat” operations provide an il-
lusion of feverish competitive activity and support the psychological 
pitch of the community, a very large proportion of exploration and pro-
duction has been conducted by Amerada. By mid-year 1956, there were 
699 wells producing oil in the state. Nearly 76 percent of these (533) 
were drilled on leases owned by this company. Eight of every ten bar-
rels of oil produced in the state prior to 1956 were produced through 
Amerada wells. Eighty-five percent of the state’s oil output was pro-
duced in one of two fields, the Beaver Lodge and Tioga fields. Amerada 
produced 84 percent of this output.
It appears quite probable that Amerada did follow a very conser-
vative development policy, as many employees of the company and its 
drilling contractors have stated. Such a policy may have been intended 
to serve the industry in the power struggle on regulatory issues. It 
seems also to have served the community by permitting a more orderly 
development with fewer stresses and unwarranted actions than might 
have been experienced under other conditions.
Economic Impacts
Oil field exploration and development has affected the local economy 
in quantitative and qualitative ways. It has increased the population, 
income and employment of the area. It has also changed the structure 
of the labor force and of business. The measurement of these changes is 
complicated by the fact the area of development is extensive and transi-
tory. As was noted above, leasing activity has extended throughout the 
state, geological survey has also moved over a large area, and drilling ac-
tivity in a particular location varies from week to week. The employees 
of a producing company and those who provide contract services are 
scattered in varying patterns among the many fields under production 
or areas under exploration.
Consequently, the measurements of income and employment, re-
lated to the industry, described below, have for the most part been 
derived by allocation of aggregate amounts on the basis of measures of 
activity such as the number of wells drilled or the volume of production. 
The basic data from which the allocations were derived were obtained 
from the individual well records of the State Geologist. In some cases, 
the results of allocation may differ slightly from later summary fig-
ures due to two major causes. One is the fact that the disposition of 
a well may change, the other, that the completion date of a well does 
not indicate accurately the period in which drilling activity occurred, in 
particular if completed early in the year.
199
In the structure of the petroleum industry, the producing com-
pany is the prime mover and the primary source of direct income. It 
initiates exploration, assembles lease blocks, sells and distributes the 
recovered oil. Most of the drilling activity is accomplished by a hier-
archy of specialized subcontractors. Nationally, about 90 percent of 
all drilling is done on subcontract. In turn, drilling contractors con-
tract for such specialized services as logging and cementing wells, 
rig moving and acidizing. The extent of sub-contracting complicates 
income accounting when income is accounted for on a cost basis. To 
avoid these complications, estimates of total cost have been based on 
average cost per well in North Dakota in 1954. These costs were then 
allocated by aggregating the major expenses of firms engaged in crude 
petroleum extraction and those in oil and gas field contract services. 
Major expenses include contract expenses only if they cannot be allo-
cated within the major industry group.
Apart from leasing activity and geophysical exploration, the be-
ginning of the present oil development was in 1950 and the initial 
production year was 1951. Tables XXXVI and XXXVII indicate the 
rapidity of development and the concentration of activity in Williams 
and Mountrail Counties. By the end of the study period, the preponder-
ance of drilling activity had moved out of the two county area although 
the area continued to produce nearly 90 percent of the state output of 
petroleum.
TABLE XXXVI
WELLS COMPLETED IN NORTH DAKOTA—BY AREA AND BY 
PRODUCING STATUS, 1951–1954
 1951  1952  1953  1954 
 P* NP** P NP P NP P NP
Williams County 1 0 80 17 119 10 107 13
Mountrail County 0 0 10 2 42 2 42 6
Other 0 9 2 58 19 85 39 136
 —— —— —— —— —— —— —— ——
State 1 9 92 77 180 97 188 155
Total Wells (Yearly) 10  169  277  343 
Total Wells 
(Cumulative) 10  179  456  799 
* Producing Wells.
** Non-Producing Wells.        
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TABLE XXXVII
PRODUCTION OF CRUDE PETROLEUM, NORTH DAKOTA AND 
SELECTED AREAS, 1951–1954 (THOUSANDS OF BARRELS)
 1951 1952 1953 1954
Williams County 25 1,481 4,248 4,135
Mountrail County 0 91 900 1,253
Other 0 26 218 637
 —— —— —— ——
North Dakota 25 1,598 5,466 6,025
It should be noted in the drilling record that in the wildcat area only 
two of eight wells drilled have produced oil. Within the area nearly nine 
of every ten wells drilled have produced oil, although not always con-
tinuously in commercial quantities. This fact adds to the concentration 
of oil related income in the two county area in view of the additional 
cost of completing and equipping a producing well.
These data indicate the concentration of oil production in Williams 
and Mountrail counties in the years prior to 1955. Further, nearly two-
thirds of all production in other areas of the state occurred in McKenzie 
County; most of it in the Charlson (Madison) field. McKenzie County 
adjoins Williams County on the south and is relatively isolated from 
areas to the east by the Missouri River. It is a part of the Williston 
trade area, and a very large part of oil related income originating in this 
county is spent in Williston.
On the basis of this record of drilling activity and oil production 
it is estimated that the total income derived from oil field expendi-
tures in North Dakota amounted to approximately $700,000 in 1951. 
By 1954, annual expenditures had increased to nearly $33,000,000. 
These estimates do not include income derived from mineral leases, 
bonuses, oil royalties, the sale of mineral deeds or expenditures for the 
improvement of oil lands. The latter estimates are discussed below. 
Table XXXVIII contains estimates of expenditures by county and state 
for the years 1951–54. It is probable that they understate actual expen-
ditures in 1951 due to the reliance on well drilling activity as the basis 
of estimate. Developmental activities such as geophysical exploration 
tend to be underestimated by this technique.
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TABLE XXXVIII
EXPENDITURES BY THE CRUDE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN 
NORTH DAKOTA, 1951–1954 (THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
 1951 1952 1953 1954
Williams County 120 10,890 15,220 13,940
Mountrail County  1,350 5,270 5,530
Other 580 3,960 7,780 13,500
 —— ——— ——— ———
North Dakota 700 16,200 28,270 32,970
The potential effects of these expenditures on the economy of the 
area is limited by two factors. First, in oil field exploration and petro-
leum production, labor costs are small relative to the costs of supplies 
and machinery. Second, few of the materials and none of the equip-
ment used is produced in the area or in the state. Of the amount spent 
for such goods, only that portion that is attributed to transport and 
distribution accrues to the benefit of the local economy. Further, the 
supply of drilling materials and equipment is a specialized area of 
business. The major suppliers follow the field establishing branch 
distribution outlets in competition for the market. Although these 
units may provide additional income to the area through consumption 
expenditure by staff and in the construction of service facilities, the 
major portion of their revenue is used to pay for a product produced 
elsewhere. For example, a major cost of completing a well is the cost 
of casing. Several major steel companies have established distribution 
centers in Williston and Tioga. These distribution points are relatively 
small establishments with few employees. The wage and salary income 
originating in their activity is a very small portion of the total expendi-
ture for their product.




EXPENDITURES BY OIL PRODUCERS AND OIL AND GAS 
FIELD CONTRACTORS BY TYPE OF EXPENDITURE BY AREA, 
1951–1954 (THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
 Wages & Supplies,  Machinery   Not Total
 Salaries Minerals,       & Allocated
  Fuel &  Equipment
  Energy
Williams County     
1951 18 24 64 17 123
1952 1,714 2,318 5,225 1,632 10,890
1953 2,285 3,091 7,665 2,176 15,218
1954 2,123 2,873 6,910 2,023 13,930
 ——— ——— ——— ——— ———
Period 6,140 8,306 19,854 5,848 40,160
Mountrail County     
1952 213 286 652 201 1,353
1953 780 1,054 2,695 742 5,273
1954 850 1,149 2,723 809 5,530
 ——— ——— ——— ——— ———
Period 1,844 2,489 6,070 1,752 12,156
North Dakota     
1951 174 235 127 165 701
1952 2,963 4,006 6,411 2,822 16,202
1953 4,871 6,589 12,167 4,639 28,266
1954 6,015 8,136 13,084 5,729 32,964
 ——— ——— ——— ——— ———
Period 14,023 18,966 31,789 13,355 78,133
In the four years after 1950, oil activity, exclusive of the acquisition 
of mineral rights, cost more than 40 million dollars in Williams County 
and over 12 million in Mountrail. Of these amounts, approximately 8 
million was spent for wages and salaries by oil producers and contrac-
tors. They spent nearly 11 million on supplies, minerals and fuel, and 
more than twice that amount (26 million) on machinery and oil well 
equipment. The total expenditure includes nearly 14 million dollars 
that has not been allocated by type of expenditure. These unallocated 
expenditures contain two major accounts; the entrepreneurial profits 
of contractors and expenditures for contract services outside of the in-
dustry group.
Of major importance in estimating the direct impact of the oil de-
velopment on the local economy is the fact that less than 16 percent 
of the total expenditure was for wages and salaries. It has been noted 
above that a very small proportion of expenditures of other types ben-
efit local establishments and payrolls.
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In contrast to oil field expenditures, income from mineral leases 
and royalty payments are received in large part by the landowners 
of the area and are a source of additional consumption expenditure. 
The magnitude of income of this type has been estimated for the years 
1948–53 on the basis of the Voelker study for Williams County. The 
pattern of leasing activity has been described above where it was noted 
that the leasing of mineral rights began in 1948. In the first two years 
of activity, total payments for leases and bonuses in Williams County 
are estimated at less than $50,000. By 1951, lease activity in the area 
reached a peak and bonus payments above exceeded one million dol-
lars. By the end of 1953, royalty payments had reached the same level 
and offset the decline in bonus payments. Total income from mineral 
rights approximated $2,000,000. Due to the sale of mineral acres by 
mineral deed it is impossible to estimate the proportion of lease and 
royalty income accruing to original owners in the area. In 1951, the 
value of mineral acres sold was slightly more than three million dollars. 
Approximately one-third of the acreage sold was sold by owners, the re-
maining two-thirds by brokers. Income derived from sales are a type of 
transfer payment and duplicate in part the income received from lease 
payments and oil royalties. In one sense, the owner is receiving a pre-
payment of lease and royalty income with the sale of mineral acreage. 
The speculative gains of brokers are primarily transfers of income 
from other persons or corporations and are not usually net addition to 
income.
Data on the pattern of leasing activity in Mountrail County are not 
available. In view of the location of the major proven fields, it is prob-
able that the pattern approximates very closely that of Williams County 
and that income from leases and bonuses is only slightly less than the 
amounts indicated in Table XL.
TABLE XL
DELAY RENTALS, BONUS PAYMENTS AND OIL ROYALTIES TO 
INDIVIDUALS, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES, WILLIAMS COUNTY, 1948–1953. 
(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
 Delay   Bonus  Royalties Total
 Rentals  Payment
1948–49 19  25  44
1950 50  36  86
1951 332  1,139 6 1,447
1952 644  224 374 1,242
1953 650  60 1,074 1,784
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A. The Business Structure
In view of the volatility of the business expansion during the period 
of oil development and the high mortality of small business ventures 
during the period, it is extremely difficult to describe the pattern of 
change that occurred. Data from the 1948 and 1954 Census of Business 
indicate that the number of establishments in the trade and service in-
dustries increased by 32 percent in Williams County and declined by 11 
percent in Mountrail County. The net increase in Williston included 82 
of the total net increase of 133 establishments in Williams County. Yet 
a comparison of the Williston telephone directories for 1950 and 1953 
indicates that the number of new establishments operating in the area 
during the period was much greater than census data suggest.
The 1953 directory listed 132 trade and service establishments that 
were not listed in 1950, exclusive of 33 firms supplying the oil industry 
and 24 firms in oil field contract services. Further, the 1950 directory 
listed 40 such establishments not listed in 1953. This difference in the 
number of establishments reported results in part from definitions of 
business establishments, in part from the inadequacy of directory in-
formation, and in part from changes in ownership and in the name 
of the establishment. Together, these factors account, however, for a 
relatively small part of the difference. Direct investigation verified the 
extremely large turn-over in establishments in the early period of oil 
development.
Table XLI below offers some comparison of the number of estab-
lishments for selected years.
TABLE XLI 
NUMBER OF ACTIVE BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENTS BY TYPE 
OF ESTABLISHMENT, TRADE AND SERVICE INDUSTRIES, 
1948–1954, WILLISTON, NORTH DAKOTA
 19481 19502 19532 19541
Wholesale Trade: 21 19 50 46
Retail Trade:  127 142 169 153
Food Stores 16 16 26 22
Eating & Drinking 25 28 29 28
General Merchandise & Apparel 16 16 16 15
Furniture & Appliances 9 9 14 9
Automobiles & Gasoline 23 33 36 32
Lumber & Hardware 16 17 19 15
All other 22 23 29 32
Service 63 59 79 91
1. U.S. Department of Commerce, Census of Business.
2. Derived from local census and telephone directories.   
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The estimates derived for 1950 and 1953 are the number of estab-
lishments active in that year. As was noted above, these point data 
obscure the number of establishments entering and leaving the area 
during the period and estimates of payrolls, income and employment 
for the area are understated by such data.
Within this limitation, the major changes in the business structure 
of the study area appear to have been in the number of new establish-
ments in wholesale trade and in the service industry. In absolute terms, 
Williston experienced a very large proportion of the total increase 
and Tioga and environs much of the residual gain. Mountrail County 
gained only in the number of service establishments and had a net loss 
in the number of firms in wholesale and retail trade. Williston con-
tained 73 percent of the total increase in Williams County. It had 86 
percent of new firms in wholesale trade, nearly 60 percent of new retail 
establishments and a little more than half of the net addition to the 
service industry. In relative terms, the greatest change in the trade and 
service structure was in wholesale trade, an increase of 119 percent. The 
greatest change in the Tioga area was in service, a gain of 104 percent. 
These two measures describe the pattern of development in the area, 
the concentration of oil field suppliers in Williston and of subsidiary 
services in the oil field area.
Changes in the sales, receipts and payrolls of the three industry 
groups are shown in Table XLII. Sales and receipts in Williams County 
in 1954 exceeded the 1948 level by 24,319,000 dollars or 51 percent. 
The gain in Williston was 19.3 million dollars, an increase of 71 per 
cent over 1948 and nearly 80 percent of the county gain. Williston also 
received 94 percent of the increase in wholesale sales and nearly 80 
percent of the gain in service receipts.
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TABLE XLII
SALES, RECEIPTS AND PAYROLLS IN TRADE AND SERVICE IN-
DUSTRIES, 1948 AND 1954—WILLISTON, WILLIAMS COUNTY 
AND MOUNTRAIL COUNTY (THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
  Sales & Receipts Payrolls 
  1948 1954 1948 1954
Wholesale Trade:    
 Williams County $25,628 $39,000 $551 $1,541
 Williston 10,763 23,377 338 1,073
 Mountrail (D) (D) (D) (D)
Retail Trade:    
 Williams County $21,207 $30,357 $1,653 $3,030
 Williston 15,601 20,914 1,277 2,294
 Mountrail County 8,112 10,839 454 763
Service:    
 Williams County $972 $2,769 $166 $523
 Williston 781 2,168 153 476
 Mountrail County 178 426 16 52
U.S. Department of Commerce: 1954 Census of Business.   
 
Business expansion added nearly three million dollars to payrolls 
in Williams County, with the greatest absolute gain in retail trade and 
the greatest relative gain in the service industry. Three-fourths of the 
increase in payrolls occurred in establishments located in Williston. 
Mountrail County had modest gains in payrolls in retail sales and ser-
vices, however, the gain in this county as a whole was less than a third 
of the increase in the same industry groups in Williston.
One general indication of the effect of oil activity on the trade struc-
ture of the area and the state may be inferred from state data on sales 
tax collections for the period 1950–1953. (TABLES XLIII AND XLIV.)
TABLE XLIII
SALES TAX COLLECTIONS FOR SELECTED COUNTIES AND 
THEIR SUB-DIVISIONS, 1950–1954 
(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
  1950 1951 1952 1953
Williams County $375.7 $407.7 $578.6 $788.9
 Williston 288.6 318.4 460.1 614.8
 Ray 22.2 23.1 34.6 45.5
 Tioga 11.6 12.8 30.4 70.9
Mountrail County 148.6 155.5 158.9 173.9
 Stanley 62.7 62.6 65.2 74.0
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TABLE XLIV
PERCENT OF STATE SALES TAX COLLECTION BY SELECTED 
COUNTIES AND THEIR SUBDIVISIONS, 1950–1954
  1950 1951 1952 1953
Williams County 3.32% 3.37% 4.70% 6.30%
 Williston 2.55 2.63 3.74 4.91
 Ray .20 .19 .28 .36
 Tioga .10 .11 .25 .57
Mountrail County 1.31 1.29 1.29 1.39
 Stanley .55 .52 .53 .59
SOURCE: North Dakota Tax Department, Sales Tax Division.    
 
Both counties and their major subdivisions gained relative to the 
state in sales activity as reflected by tax collections. The gain in Moun-
trail County and in Stanley was slight and occurred late in the period 
as exploration spread away from the site of discovery. In Williston and 
Tioga, the gains were immediate and large. It is descriptive of the pat-
tern of development that in 1950, tax collections in Ray were nearly 
double those in Tioga. By 1953, collections in Tioga were almost 50 
percent greater than in Ray.
A second general indicator of changes in business activity is found 
in bank deposit data for the area.1 These data indicate that the banks in 
Williams County experienced virtually no net increase. The following 
data for banks in the ten northwestern counties indicate the relative 
rates of increase.
1 The analysis of bank deposit changes was made by W.E. Koenker, Professor of 
Economics, The University of North Dakota.
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County    Percentage Change in Total Deposits












Nine counties other than Williams +.18
The increase in deposits in Burke County is attributable almost en-
tirely to the deposits placed in the new bank at Powers Lake, only about 
ten miles from the production area.
Despite the fact that a considerable portion of the oil production 
area lay in Mountrail County, there seems to have been little effect on 
deposits in banks in that area. The bank at Stanley, which was only 
about 20 miles away, experienced a ten percent decline in total deposits 
during the four year period.2 The banks at Newtown and Parshall were 
too remote, too far off of Highway Two, to experience much effect from 
the oil business.
Except in accounting for the new bank at Powers Lake, the major 
impact of the oil development seems to have been in the two banks 
at Williston and the banks at Tioga and Ray. These banks had the 
following percentage increase in demand and time deposits between 
December 31, 1950, and the end of 1954.
Williams County Banks Percentage Increase in Deposits
 Demand   Time  Total
Ray—Citizens State Bank 57 41 54
Williston—American State Bank 36 62 42
Williston—First National Bank 31 50 37
Tioga—(New bank in 1951)   
Total for all banks in the County   48
2 During the last portion of this period; however, most of the oil companies 
operating in the area were beginning to maintain accounts at this bank as well 
as at the banks in Williams County. These accounts were drawn upon to make 
lease rental and royalty payments in the area.
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In contrast with the banks at Williston and Ray having increases 
ranging from 37 to 54 percent in total deposits, none of the other banks 
in the ten county area had increases in excess of 16 percent. This in-
cluded the three banks in Minot which had increases of only about 2 
percent during the period.
Since the banks in the other nine counties located in the same gen-
eral area of the state experienced virtually no net gain in total deposits, 
it seems logical to assume that the increases experienced by the banks 
in Williams County are attributable directly or indirectly to oil. In abso-
lute amounts, this increase amounted to about six and one-half million 
dollars, an increase from $13.4 million to $19.9 million.
The increase in demand deposits was somewhat less than that for 
time deposits. This increase in demand deposits is significant since only 
one other bank in the ten state area had an increase in excess of ten per-
cent. Two thirds of these banks experienced decreases in deposits. This 
increase in demand deposits in Williams County banks reflected the 
increased number of households and business firms serviced by these 
banks.
Percentage data on time deposits are somewhat more unreliable for 
comparison purposes since some of the smaller banks began making 
real efforts to attract time deposits during this period. Total time de-
posits, however, for all banks in the nine counties other than Williams 
County increased by only 13 percent. This was in contrast to the 60 
percent increase in time deposits in the Williams County banks.
A concomitant of an increase in deposits is usually a comparable 
increase in loans and investments. In Williams County loans increased 
by 189 percent or an increase from about 3 million to 8.6 million dol-
lars. This increase was very much in excess of the 45 percent increase 
for the other nine counties. In only one other county was the increase 
in excess of 80 percent.
This was a period of rather substantial expansion in loans 
throughout the state and some decline in assets held in the form of U.S. 
government bonds and other securities. The expanding communities 
served by the banks in Williams County, however, provided substantial 
outlets especially for housing and installment loans.
Data for two of the banks in the county indicate the following per-
centage increases in major loan categories.
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  Percentage Increase
  Dec. 1950 to Dec. 1954 
 Bank A Bank B
 Medium Size  Large
Commercial and Industrial Loans 83 130
CCC Loans 390 26
Other Loans to Farmers 242 286
Real Estate Loans 1430 86
Installment Loans  
Auto 1350 217
Other 1700 267
The phenomenal increase in real estate and installment loans in the 
medium sized bank was a reflection of a marked change in the pattern 
of lending. Many North Dakota banks in this size category were just 
beginning to make loans of this type. Obviously, however, in this case 
the oil boom provided a much enhanced opportunity for loans in these 
categories. This is confirmed by the very marked increase in install-
ment lending by the large bank which even in 1950 had a substantial 
amount of this kind of paper.
Another indication of the financial impact of the oil industry is to 
be found in sales of savings bonds. Since these are limited as to type of 
purchaser and to the amount which may be held, they provide some 
indication of liquid savings held by individuals. The growth in savings 
bond sales in Williams County and the decline in most of the other 
counties in the northwestern portion of the state is shown in the fol-
lowing tabulation. Sales for the two year period of 1954 and 1955 are 
compared with the two year period of 1949 and 1950, because indi-
vidual year comparisons are apt to be erratic.
Only two of the ten counties had significant increases. The increase 
in Divide County is attributable to exceptionally good crops in both 
1954 and 1955. There has been a declining amount of income from 
lease rentals in this county, so this factor would not account for any 
of the difference. Some of the increase in bond sales may be due to a 
rather aggressive “pushing” of bonds on the part of the Crosby bank. 
The increase in Williams County is largely attributable to the oil devel-
opment. Part of it, however, is also due to the better than average crop 
in these two years. The data seem, therefore, to indicate that, while 
some of the increase in savings bond sales may be due to oil, that factor 
may be no more significant in this respect than a better than average 
crop.
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 Decrease 1949 and 1950 to  











Total (nine counties other than Williams County) –13
Total for North Dakota –17
B. Construction
The major part of contract construction stemming directly from oil de-
velopment and nearly all construction induced by it have occurred in 
two areas, Williston and Tioga and its environs. Apart from these two 
localities, only Ray with two trailer camps and an unwarranted res-
idential development and Stanley with modest residential expansion 
show any evidence of oil related influence on construction activity.
The pattern of construction activity in Williston is evident in an 
analysis of building permit valuations from 1950 to 1954. The value 
of construction covered by permits was $1,620,000 in 1950 and 
$1,380,000 in the following year. It increased abruptly in 1952 to 
$5,371,000 and reached peak at $7,241,000 in 1953. (SEE TABLE 
XLV)
TABLE XLV
VALUE OF BUILDING PERMITS, BY TYPE OF CONSTRUC-
TION—WILLISTON, NORTH DAKOTA, 1950–1954 
(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
Type of Construction 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
Residential $719 $761 $3,622 $3,707 $1,186
 New 634 657 3,311 3,472 1,053
 Remodel 95 105 311 235 133
Public and Other: 154 315 538 1,474 641
Commercial 737 303 1,211 2,060 1,217
All Types 1,620 1,380 5,371 7,241 3,044
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Residential construction provided the major part of building ac-
tivity in the four years after 1950. Approximately 54 percent of the total 
value of permits issued was in residential construction. In 1951, only 
61 new dwelling units were authorized. In 1953, permits were issued 
for 273 units and for 324 units in the following year. By 1954, a sur-
plus of housing was apparent in the community, in particular in rental 
apartments. The number of units declined to 84 and the value of con-
struction authorized was less than half of the number in the preceding 
year.
This abrupt increase in 1952 over 1951 was without question a re-
sponse to the very strong pressures exerted by the influx of population 
with the discovery of oil. Although there had been a significant expan-
sion in residential building after 1948 following a peak farm income, 
there was little vacant housing for the addition of several hundred mi-
grant families. The “boom” characteristic of residential building activity 
in Williston is obvious when compared to new residential construction 
authorized in all urban areas of the state.
TABLE XLVI
PERCENTAGE CHANGE FROM PRECEDING YEAR IN URBAN 
RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZED, NORTH DA-
KOTA AND WILLISTON, 1950–1954
Area: 1951/1950 1952/1951 1953/1952 1954/1953
Williston +4% +376% +5% –70%
North Dakota –20% +20% +15% +20%
SOURCE: Derived from original data in office of Williston City Engineer.  
  
The impact of preliminary oil activity was more than adequate to 
offset a general decline in 1951. Activity moved dramatically to a high 
plateau where it remained relatively constant through 1953. It fell 
sharply in 1954 and continued to decline through the first half of 1955.
Non-residential building responded to the new development in a 
similar way although with less force. It, too, is largely induced in a sec-
ondary manner rather than by the immediate needs of the oil industry. 
Further, the lag in activity was greater in this area of construction, since 
a greater proportion of expenditure appears to have been induced by 
secondary demand. The major construction items by or for the oil 
industry were an office building for Amerada, a small refinery and a 
number of warehouses or combination office-warehouses for major 
suppliers and contract service firms. Both office and refinery were 
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authorized in 1952 and more than 50 percent of the value of warehouse 
permits issued, were issued in the same year.
In the five years extending through 1954, the permit valuation of 
the offices and warehouses noted above were less than 11 percent of the 
total value of private non-residential building authorized. In contrast, 
the valuation of utility construction (primarily telephone communica-
tion) was 26 percent of the total, hotels and motels nearly 21 percent 
and stores and service stations, 20 percent.
The secondary effects of oil development acting through wage and 
salary payments, delay rentals, royalty payments and taxes, combined 
with the pressures exerted by a rapid increase in population, are evident 
in public expenditures. Within five years, Williston spent 740,000 dol-
lars on school construction, 675,000 dollars on church buildings and 
790,000 dollars for additions to hospital and clinic facilities. Another 
half million was spent by the county for a new courthouse in 1953.
Comparing Williston to all urban places in the state, an index of 
building permit valuations based on the 1947–49 average indicates that 
activity in Williston greatly exceeded the state pattern (SEE TABLE 
XLVII).
TABLE XLVII
INDEX OF BUILDING PERMIT VALUATIONS, ALL URBAN 
PLACES OF NORTH DAKOTA AND WILLISTON, 1950–1954
1947 to 1949 = 100
 
 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
North Dakota 201 115 133 201 167
Williston 188 160 625 842 354
SOURCE: Williston public records and U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.     
Since building permit valuations are not available for Mountrail 
County or other areas of Williams County, a precise description of 
building activity in these areas is not possible. Inspection of the areas 
suggests that there was very little primary or secondary construction 
in Mountrail County and that the pattern of activity in the Tioga area 
was similar to that of Williston in every respect save one. In Tioga, the 
major proportion of construction originated in the oil industry. Major 
expenditures by the industry included several million dollars by the 
Signal Oil and Gas Company for a gas refining plant just east of the 
community. Amerada constructed a multi-unit “village” for its field 
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personnel south of Tioga and several suppliers and contract service 
firms erected office and storage facilities within and adjacent to it.
Although commercial development was far less impressive in Tioga 
than in Williston, it occurred in a community that at the beginning 
of oil activity was rapidly becoming a “ghost town.” Hotel, restaurant 
and entertainment and recreation facilities were virtually non-existent, 
and the community had no paved streets, sewage system, or municipal 
water supply. The oil industry literally created a new and living com-
munity from the old.
In addition to the large number of oil field workers moving into 
the area, the construction of the gas refining plant employed more 
than 300 people at peak activity. Many oil field workers, in particular 
drilling crews, own and live in trailers. Although large trailer camps 
were established in Tioga and vicinity, many migrants were forced to 
move into intolerable housing conditions. In several cases, abandoned 
grain storage sheds were moved into crowded rows and, after some 
slight renovation, rented at exorbitant prices as family dwellings. By 
1954, two relatively large housing projects were nearing completion, 
reducing the demand pressure and eliminating much of the market for 
sub-standard housing.
The completion of the gas refinery and other major construction 
projects had restricted the boom activity in construction in 1954. By 
June of that year, unemployment was a more pressing problem for con-
struction workers than were housing accommodations.
C. Labor Force and Employment
Changes in population in the area between 1950 and 1954 have been 
discussed in another section of this study. It is only necessary to re-
peat here that the attraction of employment opportunities created by 
the oil industry and the employment pattern of that industry brought 
many migrants into the area, expanding the size of the labor force. Over 
the period, Williston gained nearly 32 percent in number of inhabi-
tants, Ray over 100 percent and Tioga and its environs more than 450 
percent.
In contrast Stanley experienced an increase of less than 11 percent 
and Mountrail County and all other areas of Williams county had pop-
ulation losses.
The extent to which these population gains resulted from in-mi-
gration is evident in the statistics derived from the population sample 
census in 1954. (SEE TABLE XII.) One of every three persons living 
in Williston in that year did not live there in 1950. Nearly 28 in 100 
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persons came to Williston from beyond the borders of the two study 
counties. The proportions of migrants into the smaller communities of 
Ray and Tioga are much larger. In both communities, approximately 
65 percent of the 1954 population entered the area after 1950. Less 
than 5 percent of the migrants into Ray and 10 percent of those into 
Tioga were former residents of Williams or Mountrail county. In the 
Tioga environs, only 10 percent of all inhabitants were 1950 residents 
in the two-county area.
The impact of this migration in the local labor force was much 
greater than population changes indicate. This fact is a result of the 
age structure of in-migrants, the majority of whom are relatively young 
and within the normal limits of work life. In Williston, more than 63 
percent of all in-migrants were between the ages of 19 and 50. Of those 
resident in Williston in 1950 and residing there in 1954, only 41 per 
cent were in this age category. These differences in age between “na-
tives” and migrants also hold in every “oil” location in the study area. 
One aspect of this situation affecting the local economy, other than 
in terms of the labor force, is that these young migrant families had a 
large number of children in the younger school ages. The great increase 
in the school age population required new schools in Tioga and Ray, as 
well as Williston. The school at Ray was completed about the time that 
migrant population, primarily families of drilling crews, began to move 
on to other locations.
The impact of oil development on primary and secondary em-
ployment has been relatively great. The effect was not as great as the 
business leadership of the area assumed. One indication of the differ-
ence between the illusion of growth commonly held and the reality of 
the situation is in local population estimates. In 1954, the Williston 
Chamber of Commerce estimated the population of Williston to be 
12,000, compared with the estimate of 9,717 derived from the sample.
Of these two estimates, the study figure must be credited with the 
highest validity on the basis of the employment estimates explicit in 
it. Two estimates of employment are available for Williston for July 
1954. One is the sample estimate. The other is the estimate of the State 
Employment Service based on their sample of business establishments. 
Allowing for differences in the structure of these two samples, they 
compare very favorably. (SEE TABLE XLVIII.)
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TABLE XLVIII
EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY AND OCCUPATION, 1950 AND 
JULY 1954, WILLISTON, NORTH DAKOTA
   Williston  % Change   % Change
  1950 1954 1954 1950–54 1950–54
  (census) (sample) (NDES) (sample) (NDES)
Agriculture 150 180  +20 
Mining & Construction 235 494 477 +110 +103
Manufacturing 120 181 190 +50 +58
Transportation, 
Construction and 
Public Utilities 535 461 387 –14 –28
Trade 880 1054 1199 +20 +36
Finance, Insurance & 
Real Estate 72 98 87 +36 +21
Source 679 727 774 +7 +14
Public Administration 126 221 248 +75 +97
No Data 76    
All Occupation 2863 3416 33621 +19 +24
 1Excludes Agriculture  
Professional 256 330  +17 
Farmer 113 153  +35 
Manager, Proprietor, 
Official 338 586  +73 
Clerical 351 411  +17 
Sales  343 384  +12 
Craft, Foreman, Kindred 448 489  +9 
Operatives 333 359  +8 
Service 363 366  +1 
Farm Laborer 27 27  0 
Other Laborer 200 311  +56 
NEC. 71    
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce. 1950 Census of Population.  
   
The survey sample shows a total non-agricultural employment of 
3,236, a gain of 19 percent over 1950. The ES figure is 3,362, a gain of 
24 percent over the census estimate of 1950. The similarity of the two 
figures suggests that unless there has been a significant decline in labor 
force participation rates, the local estimate of population change must 
be excessive.
Nothing in the characteristics of the local population suggests that 
the proportion of the population in the labor-force has changed in 
significant degree. While the number of children and young persons 
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under age 20 has increased since 1950, the proportion of the popula-
tion over 65 years of age has declined. The off-setting effects of these 
changes and the migration of relatively large numbers of unmarried 
males into the area limit the possibility of a major decline in labor force 
participation rates.
It will be noted in Table XLVIII that although the two estimates 
of employment by industry do not agree in magnitude, they do agree 
in the direction of change in every industry sector. In each case, the 
greatest gain was in mining and construction, followed by public ad-
ministration and manufactures. In both samples, the service industry 
demonstrated the least positive gain and both agree that transporta-
tion, communication and public utilities had a decline in employment. 
In absolute terms much of the new employment was in mining, con-
struction and trade. The study sample shows an increase of 433, and 
the ES sample 561 in these industry groups, compared to total gains of 
523 and 649 respectively.
The small differences in the two samples can be explained in the 
fact that the study sample measures the employment of persons living 
in Williston without regard to their place of employment. Thus it tends 
to overstate employment in mining and construction in Williston since 
many persons dwell there who perform their employment in the oil 
fields. On the other hand, it is probable that a relatively large per-
centage of persons living outside of Williston, but employed there, are 
employed in trade and service and that employment in these industries 
is under-stated in the sample. Since the two samples measure em-
ployment in different terms, it is expected that the ES estimate should 
exceed the sample estimate. It should be noted that the survey sample 
is structured in the same manner as the decennial census and is the 
only one of the two measures that is comparable to it. Conversely, the 
ES sample is structured like the Census of Business.
Occupational changes in Williston suggest the pattern of business 
change. A detailed business census indicated that the intensive change 
in employment was slight and that most new employment was in firms 
new to the area. Further, most of these new establishments were small. 
Other than the largest oil producing companies, and major drilling 
companies, only one oil-related firm employed a large number of per-
sons. In all other industry components, the small firm pattern was 
characteristic. As a result, the greatest change in occupation was that 
of managers, proprietors, and officials: a gain of 73 percent over 1950.
Detailed employment data for Ray, Tioga, Stanley and the rural 
impact areas are contained in tables XLIX, L, and LI. The impact of 
drilling activity and related construction on Tioga and Ray is obvious. 
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Nearly half of all employment in Ray and more than half of that in 
Tioga and its environs was in mining and construction. Stanley also 
suggests this employment effect with nearly a third in these industries. 
The importance of the location of a large drilling company in Ray is 
reflected by the large proportion of the labor force classified as opera-
tives, nearly 41 percent. Similarly, nearly 35 percent of all employees in 
Tioga were in this category with another 14 percent in the category of 
craftsman and foreman. The latter category reflects the construction of 
Signal Oil and Gas Company’s oil refinery. The project was the major 
employment in the area.
TABLE XLIX
LABOR FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT, PERSONS 14 YEARS AND 
OLDER, SELECTED AREAS, 1954
        Impact     Tioga &
 Williston   Ray   Counties Stanley  Environs
 Male Female Total M F T M F T M F T M F T
Employed 
 2548 868 3416 424 59 483 612 20 632 462 123 585 824 86 906
Unemployed 
 57 25  82 3 6 9 4 ..... 4 6 5 11 17 8 29
TOTAL LABOR FORCE 
 2605 893 3498 427 65 492 616 20 636 468 128 596 841 94 935
Keeping House 
 8 2025 2033 ..... 326 326 0 423 423 ..... 338 338 4 534 538
In School 
 147 216 363 21 28 49 33 56 89 28 50 78 41 61 102
Unable to Work 
 155 98  253 21 7 28 20 4 24 43 35 78 27 12 39
Retired 
 145 ..... 145 29 ..... 29 4 8 12 15 ..... 15 31 ..... 31
Other 
 21 17  38 4 ..... 4 20 ..... 20 3 ..... 3 3 ..... 3
No Data 
 44 28  72 1 3 4 4 4 8 13 5 18 31 3 34
TOTAL NOT IN LABOR FORCE 
 520 2384 2904 76 364 440 81 495 576 102 428 530 137 610 747
TOTAL IN AGE GROUP 
 3125 3277 6402 503 429 932 697 515 1212 570 556 1126 978 704 1682
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.     





       Impact     Tioga &
  Williston Ray   Counties  Stanley  Environs
 Male Female Total M F T M   F T M F T M F T
Employed 
 97.8 97.3 97.7 99.3 90.8 98.2 99.4 100.0 99.4 98.8 95.7 98.2 98.0 90.9 97.0
Unemployed 
 2.2 2.7 2.3 0.7 9.2 1.8 0.6 ...... 0.6 1.2 4.3 1.8 2.0 9.1 3.0
Total Labor Force 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Keeping House 
 1.6 84.9 70.7 ...... 89.6 74.0 ...... 85.5 73.4 ...... 78.9 63.7 2.2 87.6 72.0
In School 
 28.2 9.1 12.5 27.6 7.6 11.1 40.8 11.3 15.4 30.9 11.6 14.8 31.1 10.0 13.8
Unable to Work 
 29.8 4.0 8.7 27.6 1.9 6.3 24.7 0.8 4.2 42.4 8.2 14.8 20.0 2.0 5.3
Retired 
 28.2 ...... 5.0 38.2 ...... 6.6 4.9 1.6 2.1 12.1 ...... 2.8 22.2 ...... 4.1
Other 
 4.0 0.4 1.3 5.3 ...... 1.0 24.7 ...... 3.5 3.0 ...... 0.6 2.2 ...... 0.4
No Data 
 8.1 1.2 2.5 1.3 0.9 1.0 4.9 0.8 1.4 12.1 1.3 3.3 22.2 0.4 4.5
Total Not In Labor Force 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.
 
TABLE L
EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY, SELECTED AREAS, 1954
  
   Impact 
   Counties  Tioga
   Williams  and
  Ray Mountrail Stanley Environs
Agriculture 58 524 30 72
Mining and Construction 237 60 186 498
Manufacturing, Durable ...... ...... ...... ......
Manufacturing, Non-Durable ...... ...... 5 ......
Transportation, Communications 
and Public Utilities 46 16 57 66
Trade 83 20 147 130
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 5 ...... 16 9
Service 31 4 88 72
Public Administration 5 ...... 36 17
No Data 18 8 20 42
TOTAL 483 632 585 906




   Impact
   Counties  Tioga
   Williams  and
  Ray Mountrail Stanley Environs
Agriculture 12.1 82.9 5.1 8.0
Mining and Construction 49.0 9.5 31.8 55.0
Manufacturing, Durable ...... ...... ...... ......
Manufacturing, Non-Durable ...... ...... 0.9 ......
Transportation, Communications
and Public Utilities 9.6 2.5 9.8 7.3
Trade 17.2 3.2 25.2 14.4
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 1.3 ...... 2.8 1.0
Service 6.4 0.6 15.0 8.0
Public Administration 1.3 ...... 6.1 1.9
No Data 3.1 1.3 3.3 4.5
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.    
TABLE LI
EMPLOYMENT BY TYPE OF OCCUPATION, 
SELECTED AREAS 1954
 
     Tioga
   Impact  and
  Ray Counties Stanley Environs
Professional 6 12 46 17
Farm 37 479 28 55
Managers 31 4 74 81
Clerical 25 8 44 87
Sales 31 4 71 24
Crafts 49 12 52 130
Operatives 197 52 97 315
Services 25 8 52 46
Farm Laborers 22 40 3 17
Other Laborers 34 4 96 101
No Data 26 9 22 33
TOTAL 483 632 585 906




    
  Tioga
   Impact  and
  Ray Counties Stanley Environs
Professional 1.3 1.9 7.9 1.9
Farm 7.6 75.8 4.7 6.1
Managers 6.4 0.6 12.6 8.9
Clerical 5.1 1.3 7.5 9.6
Sales 6.4 0.6 12.1 2.6
Crafts 10.2 1.9 8.9 14.4
Operatives 40.8 8.3 16.8 34.8
Services 5.1 1.3 8.9 5.1
Farm Laborers 4.5 6.4 0.5 1.9
Other Laborers 7.0 0.6 16.4 11.2
No Data 5.7 1.3 3.7 3.8
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.     
The employment distribution of residents compared with migrants 
is shown in Table LII below.
TABLE LII
PERCENT BY INDUSTRY OF ALL PERSONS EMPLOYED IN 1954 
WHO LIVED IN THE SAME AREA IN 1950, WILLISTON AND 
OTHER IMPACT AREA
 1950 Residence 
1954 Employment: Williston Other Impact Area
Agriculture 90% 95%
Mining and Construction 51 23
Manufacturing 69 100
Transportation, Communication 
and Public Utilities 79 59
Trade 70 65
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 74 63
Service 81 69
Public Administration 67 80
All Industries 71% 58%
SOURCE: Projected from sample census.   
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While 7 out of 10 persons employed in Williston in 1954 lived in that 
community in 1950, only 4 of every 10 employed in other study areas 
were 1950 residents of the area. In both areas, the greatest penetration 
of migrants was into the mining and construction industry. Less than 
a quarter of those employed in this industry outside of Williston were 
native to the area of employment. In Williston, the numbers of natives 
and migrants in the industry were nearly equal. In the smaller commu-
nities and in the rural impact areas, there was no other industry group 
in which migrants were employed in greater proportion than they bear 
to the total labor force. Natives of the area while being interviewed 
often complained of the fact that the oil industry favored migrants in 
employment. In the long term, it may be that this factor is favorable to 
the community. When oil activity moves out of this area, those who will 
first suffer employment loss are those who came to the area in search of 
employment. The sustaining effects of oil derived income supplements 
may be adequate to maintain employment in the secondary industries 
in which the majority of “residents” are employed.
Chapter 8




That oil changed the economic trajectory for Williston and Williams County in 
North Dakota is made clear by the data contained in the 1958 Williston Report. 
The consequences of oil industry growth are ongoing. In many ways the growth 
and development of Williston and the surrounding areas is a familiar story of 
technological progress combined with fortuitous circumstances and appro-
priate resource endowments. While not identical to the situation in Silicon 
Valley, the application of hydraulic fracturing to “tight” shale oil formations, 
such as those found in the Bakken Formation of North Dakota and Montana, 
represented a new opportunity for oil in North Dakota and the Williston area. 
Comparison of the current boom with the descriptions and data provided by 
the 1958 Report show that the region has gone through a third “boom” (the 
second having happened in the 1980s; see Rundquist and Vandeberg, current 
volume), a rarity in economic history, and is making even larger changes in 
economic growth and development than the first time. 
Growth and economic development are common goals for communities of 
all shapes and sizes, though success in these areas is rarely absolute and often 
involves ambiguities or mixed signals. There are all sorts of ways to measure 
economic consequences, such as growth rates, economic impacts, or unem-
ployment rates. Media reports during the 2008–14 boom focused on factors 
like the unemployment rate, oil output, income, and tax revenues. To accu-
rately convey the story of the economic consequences it is important that the 
selected measures show the rare story of overnight success in Williston over 
the last decade, but set against the backdrop of the last fifty years. 
The data also need to reflect the challenges in telling this story and avoid 
overselling both the struggles and the successes. Striking this balance re-
quires a broader view of the economic data punctuated by key outcomes and 
224
occurrences. Some direct comparisons to the 1958 Report are possible, but in 
other cases, certain measures are more relevant to the most recent boom (and 
unavailable with respect to the first). The press attention focused on the oil 
industry, and rightly so. However, a focus on the economic consequences for 
Williston based solely on the performance of the oil industry is too narrow, as 
the 1958 Report showed. While oil is clearly the impetus for change, we need 
to understand the broader changes that occurred. At the time of this writing, 
Williston, the Bakken shale formation, and the state of North Dakota have 
been through one complete oil cycle, and that is the proper geographic scale 
for the analysis, unlike in 1958. And while commodity cycles are not foreign 
to these areas, the experience is more commonly felt in the agriculture sector. 
Kelley recognized the same situation with underemployment, migration being 
motivated as one of the “alternatives to continued employment in agriculture” 
(p. 189). With one iteration complete, government, companies, and workers 
now enter a learning phase where adjustments to the supply chain, employ-
ment circumstances, technology, and other factors occur. (For a journalistic 
account, see Brooks 2015; Yardley and Killelea 2016; “Bakken Seems to Be in a 
Steady Growth Cycle” 2018.) 
What this means is that some of the euphoric praise for the industry has 
now settled to a low roar. There was a stark realization that oil prices can and 
do decline, and consequently so do other measures of economic activity in the 
Bakken region, such as level of employment. Oil is not gone and is not likely to 
disappear anytime soon, and it still represents an important economic engine 
and opportunity for Williston, the surrounding communities, and the state 
of North Dakota as a whole (Smith 2018). However, the path of decline from 
peak prices, including job losses and tax revenue shortfalls, represents an im-
portant part of a revised attitude towards oil and the related economic activity. 
While an economy is made up of more than numbers reflected in gross income 
or employment, the statistics are—or can be—the unbiased part of the dis-
cussion around the story of growth and development.
During the most recent boom, the story of the Williston economy in many 
ways became the story of the entire Bakken oil region and the state of North 
Dakota as a whole. This identification was more than symbolic; in many ways 
the singular focus of North Dakota business and industry became integration 
within the supply chain for the oil industry, expanded beyond the regional 
nature the last time. For a micropolitan area like Williston, or the larger Bakken 
area, to become the vital cog in the economy of the state (and so important as 
a source of growth) is an amazing story. In that regard, then, the consequences 
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of oil also offer a perspective and a frame of reference with respect to the oil 
economy. Economic history, like most history, reflects the circumstances of the 
time during which the writing occurred. Perspectives change over time, and 
thus the important constraint on this assessment is that it comes at the end of 
the first fracking-induced up-and-down cycle, while the industry continues on 
the way up for a second time. 
 To measure and discuss the consequences of oil, there first needs to be a dis-
cussion of what happened with oil. The oil price and quantity data are relevant 
as a starting point and are interesting in their own right. The dramatic changes 
due to the oil industry can then first be seen through changes in taxable sales 
and purchases. The sales data provide a sense of the enormous change that 
occurred as a result of changes in business and consumer practices. The conse-
quences for labor markets are the next topic of discussion. Labor was in short 
supply as oil prices took off and the voracious appetite for workers created 
large changes in labor force and compensation, a situation described in 1958 as 
“persistent underemployment” (Kelley, p. 189). There is a problem with labor 
market information, however. There is a very real prospect that the oil industry 
never sated its appetite for workers and as such the data, as impressive as they 
are, did not complete their upward adjustments (Milijkovic and Ripplinger 
2016). To broaden the perspective, the examination turns to other income and 
employment data, looking at both general numbers and sector-specific infor-
mation. The last industry identified for special attention is construction. The 
stories about inadequate housing and “man camps” make a look at the data for 
this industry necessary. As mentioned before, indicators of the consequences 
of oil abound and in fact depend on one’s definition of the term “economic.” 
I do not discuss crime data here, though that could be thought an economic 
consequence of oil (see, for instance, Peterson 2012; Eligon 2013; Jayasundara, 
Heitkamp, and Ruddell 2016; Heitkamp and Mayzer 2018). Nor is there a dis-
cussion of government budgeting or social service provision. Choices need to 
be made in any undertaking of this sort and these very important topics are 
left to other authors or other volumes for investigation and discussion.
Oil Price and Output
The attention given to oil in North Dakota might lead one to believe discov-
eries of oil and development of fields are recent activities when in fact the 
North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources data on oil go back to the 
1950s, and the first Williston Report came out in 1958. The long presence of oil 
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does not imply a lack of volatility. As we will see in this section, there has been 
significant volatility in the oil industry and Williams County in particular. 
The geographic area comprising the Bakken varies somewhat (see Wills, cur-
rent volume, and Rundquist and Vandeberg, current volume). There are many 
other counties included in the overall Bakken region, from both North Dakota 
and Montana, although Dunn, Mountrail, McKenzie, and Williams counties 
in North Dakota were some of the most productive. The focus on Williston di-
rects us towards these counties and Williams County in particular, as Williston 
is the seat for Williams County. 
Potential profits drive expansion and contraction in the oil industry as they 
do in all business sectors. The confluence of price and technological develop-
ment in the form of hydraulic fracturing created a profitable opportunity for 
oil in the area around Williston. As we will see, the technical ability to recover 
oil and the profitability of actually recovering the oil are not identical, although 
they both represent an important part of the recent changes in Williston.
The monthly North Dakota first purchase price for oil from mid-1977 to 
mid-2019 in North Dakota is shown in Figure 8.1. From mid-1977 to the end 
of the twentieth century, the price moved within a relatively small band, a low 
of $8.41 per barrel and a high of $41.77. When adjusting for inflation, with 
January 2000 as the base period, the spread widens from $8.88 at the low 
end to $79.82 at the high end. At that time, it started a prolonged, though not 
straight-line, increase for much of the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
After January 2000 the low price per barrel was $16.80 while the high was 
$126.88. Adjusting for inflation again the spread is reduced where the low is 
$16.04 and the high is $98.62. Even when we control for inflation the price 
increase was sizable and impressive and the response of oil activity to the ele-
vation in prices was predictable, though possibly not to the extent eventually 
seen.
Annual oil production in the state of North Dakota increased dramatically 
(Figure 8.2). Prior to the onset of the price increases in 2000, there was only 
a three-year period from 1983 to 1985 when state production exceeded 50 
million barrels per year. In fact, after declining as low as 27.6 million barrels, 
production did not exceed 50 million barrels again until 2008. The eventual 
peak in production occurred in 2015 at more than 400 million barrels of oil 
per year. From the start of the series in 1951 to the peak in 2015, annual oil 
output increased at an annual growth rate of 16.38 percent, with most of the 
growth clearly coming late in the period as a response to the increase in the 
prices. The Bakken region was a significant driver of the eventual growth as 
Figure 8.3 illustrates.
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Figure 8.2 also displays the distinction between this report and the 1958 Re-
port. The production levels are not even remotely similar. There were increases 
in both time periods under analysis, but the scale of the increase in the current 
episode is amazing by comparison.
Figure 8.1. North Dakota first purchase oil price, 1977–2019 
(source: Energy Information Administration 2019)
Figure 8.2. North Dakota annual oil production, 1951–2018 (source: North 
Dakota Department of Mineral Resources 2018)
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The Bakken region was not always an important part of oil production in 
North Dakota. Prior to 1981 the highest percentage of North Dakota oil pro-
duction coming from the region was only 5.28 percent. This is consistent with 
the perception that it was expensive to extract oil from the tight oil formations 
like the Bakken and therefore prices needed to rise significantly above their 
long-run average. In the early 1990s there was a brief increase in the share of 
state production coming from the Bakken, though it quickly dropped back to 
the normal, lower contribution. After 2000 there was a significant change. 
In fact, at the end of 2004, Bakken oil production was still only 2.04 percent 
of total state output. By December 2005 the amount increased to 3.74 percent, 
with a further increase to 8.81 percent by December 2006. By the end of 2007 
Bakken oil production was just shy of 25 percent of the state total at 24.38 
percent, and its share continued to grow. By June 2012 the Bakken region rep-
resented over 90 percent of the state’s oil production and remained above that 
level since crossing the threshold.1
Earlier production graphs may give the perception that there was no vol-
atility in oil production for the Bakken region. This is not the case, as the 
monthly percentage changes in Bakken oil production show (Figure 8.4). The 
1 The highest percentage is also the last available observation at the time of writing, May 2018, 
at 95.61 percent.
Figure 8.3. Bakken oil production as a percentage of total North Dakota oil 
production, 1954–2019 (source: North Dakota Department of Mineral Re-
sources 2019a, 2019b)
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period from the 1950s to 1970 experienced high monthly percentage changes 
in production, both positive and negative. This would not be surprising during 
the start-up phase of oil exploration and production in the industry. To re-
move those early effects Figure 8.5 starts with 1974, removing about the first 
twenty years of exploration but allowing for the oil embargo price shock of the 
1970s to show in the data. 
Figure 8.4. Monthly percentage change in Bakken oil production, 1954–2019 
(source: North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources 2019a)
Figure 8.5. Monthly percentage change in Bakken oil production, 1974–2019 
(source: North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources 2019a)
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There were no moves up or down in excess of 100 percent as happened in 
the earlier graph. The volatility of the 1970s is quite noticeable at the early end 
of this figure. What is more notable and important for the growth story of Wil-
liston, the Bakken region, and the state as a whole is the period surrounding 
2010. This was a time of significant expansion of the oil sector. During the 
eighty-four months from January 2006 to January 2013, there were only 
sixteen months where the monthly percentage change in oil production was 
negative. The average percentage change in production for positive months in 
this time was 9.2 percent while the average percentage decline was 4.6 percent. 
Oil became a more secure sector in the regional economy at this time, as these 
production data demonstrate. The transition into permanence can be seen in 
the data related to spending, such as taxable sales and purchases.
Taxable Sales and Purchases
Clearly oil price and production experienced significant changes over this time 
period. Evaluation and assessment of the consequences are made all the more 
difficult and, at some level, chaotic in that the bulk of the changes occurred in 
a condensed time frame. One way to proceed is to consider the larger conse-
quences of business and consumer spending decisions. There were discussions 
of similar factors in the first report (for example, Table XLII, p. 206). 
The micropolitan area of Williston has always been important to Williams 
County and the Bakken area in general as the most accessible urban location 
within the oil producing region (see Table 8.1). From 1998 to 2017 the city of 
Williston accounted for 82 percent of taxable sales and purchases in Williams 
County. During that time the percentage never dropped below 75 percent and 
was as high as 95.4 percent in 2015. Of note is the fact, however, that as the 
oil activity in the Bakken increased, Williston accounted for less of Williams 
County taxable sales and purchases because economic activity spread beyond 
the Williston borders into the county and the entire Bakken region. 
However, as the oil industry developed and expanded within the Bakken 
region and the state, the city of Williston became more significant for the state 
as a whole, a contrast with the earlier growth story. While important for the 
region, the discussion did not, and likely could not, attach similar importance 
to oil and the region within the state’s economy. Williston taxable sales and 
purchases in 1999 accounted for slightly more than 2 percent of the total tax-
able purchases for the state. For some sense of scale, in the same year, Fargo 
(the state’s largest city) accounted for 22.4 percent of the taxable sales and 
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purchases in the entire state. Oil activity increased taxable sales and purchases 
in the city of Williston and Williams County as a whole such that at its peak 
the city of Williston accounted for 12.8 percent of state taxable sales and pur-
chases in 2011, which was more than the 12.3 percent accounted for by Fargo. 
Williston remained in this position for the next three years before falling back 
down below 10 percent of the state taxable sales and purchases in 2015. For 
contrast, Table XLIV (p. 207) in the 1958 Report listed a peak value for Wil-
liams County of 6.3 percent. 
TABLE 8.1. 
TAXABLE SALES AND PURCHASES FOR SELECT REGIONS, 1998–2017 
(SOURCE: NORTH DAKOTA OFFICE OF THE STATE TAX 
COMMISSIONER 1998–2017)
Year Williston Williams Co. Fargo Cass Co. North Dakota
  
1998 150,295,787 165,470,498 1,442,140,395 1,610,533,335 6,476,111,865
1999 140,483,646 156,152,168 1,539,637,392 1,728,696,608 6,863,857,581
2000 169,947,181 189,571,906 1,531,075,477 1,730,867,919 6,826,387,672
2001 187,935,122 210,858,980 1,576,834,106 1,784,909,487 7,147,128,090
2002 172,187,821 190,365,110 1,621,210,606 1,837,923,479 7,044,743,275
2003 183,836,462 204,255,883 1,716,327,256 1,942,797,279 7,347,458,242
2004 210,877,027 236,898,107 1,828,816,117 2,100,762,530 8,000,269,656
2005 270,115,186 300,664,981 1,868,107,039 2,140,351,698 8,566,950,882
2006 357,546,219 398,381,346 1,981,270,180 2,262,165,598 9,284,289,973
2007 439,619,535 504,284,708 2,086,245,604 2,377,531,817 10,251,031,277
2008 773,170,192 903,807,261 2,195,210,182 2,500,612,201 12,397,074,757
2009 675,040,776 799,497,870 2,129,797,379 2,417,009,645 11,743,211,404
2010 1,336,306,479 1,611,720,192 2,221,235,368 2,526,120,822 14,137,315,824
2011 2,521,286,467 3,226,767,967 2,422,391,342 2,775,649,629 19,690,371,061
2012 3,518,532,535 4,688,118,804 2,640,098,193 3,055,069,906 25,290,676,807
2013 3,378,607,395 4,400,324,668 2,690,898,800 3,125,583,081 25,464,563,890
2014 3,682,778,083 4,732,830,190 2,797,822,914 3,256,646,158 28,222,431,451
2015 2,264,499,283 2,373,326,151 2,738,758,575 3,199,609,785 22,881,848,847
2016 1,085,477,900 1,142,355,580 2,578,604,632 3,001,106,671 17,328,567,822
2017 1,378,456,764 1,449,029,110 2,439,546,655 2,874,488,805 17,900,699,259
Spending decisions by businesses clearly changed as a result of oil. These 
data represent only consumption- and investment-type spending by individ-
uals and businesses. Absent from these data is spending on labor resources. 
The labor market in the region experienced significant changes as a result of 
the oil boom as well. 
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Labor Market Consequences
As mentioned earlier, one of the most important economic consequences from 
growth in any one sector relates to the labor market changes and the perma-
nence seen in those markets. Oil activity was the impetus for other changes 
in economic structure and performance in the Williston area. The sinking of 
new wells requires a significant amount of labor that was clearly unavailable in 
Williston at the time of the first price increases. Figure 8.6 demonstrates that 
the Bakken area did not have spare capacity with people waiting for oil prices 
to rise enough to generate interest in local production. It also documents the 
success of importing more labor resources into the region, as neither Williston 
nor the state of North Dakota had labor supply sufficient to accommodate the 
scale of the increase in oil production, let alone any other industries seeing 
growth at the time. 
The increase in labor force was nothing short of amazing, rising from a level 
of around 10,000 at the beginning of 2000 and increasing to around 33,000 
by 2015. As oil prices cooled and economic activity related to oil decreased, 
the labor force retreated to a level still more than double what it had been in 
2000. The pace of increase and the ever-present volatility in the economy make 
breakdowns of the data into industry segments questionable, seen in the first 
report as well (for example Table XLVIII, p. 216). We can use other data to 
provide some evidence of impacts on other sectors.
Figure 8.6. Williston labor force, 1990–2019 (source: Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics 2019a)
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While there is little dispute that oil was the sector driving economic growth 
and expansion, the key question is whether the gains in that sector transferred 
to others. Figure 8.7 displays the average wage in natural resource jobs in Wil-
liams County, which increased by substantial amounts from 2001 to 2018. In 
that time frame, wages more than doubled, while employment in the same 
sector increased more than twenty times (Figure 8.8). It is important to note 
that the natural resource sector jobs were always, on average, higher paying 
than the overall average job in Williams County. Even though the employment 
level declined in the last few years because of reduced oil prices, the wage 
level did not follow suit. This fact demonstrates the importance of the sector 
and the beginning of the preeminence of the sector in the regional economy. 
Another significant outcome of the economic transformation in the Bakken 
region is that the average weekly wage for all private employment in Williams 
County more than tripled during the growth in oil prices, and remained near 
peak levels through 2018. 
The rest of the county economy enjoyed similar change, driven by the 
success of the oil industry and its supply chain. This pattern included the in-
crease as well as the decline in employment seen as oil prices declined. The 
connections between the various data indicate the importance of oil activity 
as a keystone of the local economy and the source of much of its growth and 
economic development. 
One added value of looking at employment is the ability to discern better 
the additional employment effects from the oil sector. The comparison of nat-
ural resource and all occupations, along with the share of overall employment 
represented by natural resource employment, offers a better look at the labor 
market impacts beyond the gross measure of labor force. What we see is that 
the natural resource sector introduces significant employment impacts be-
yond its own industry. 
Natural resource employment and overall employment moved on the same 
general, shallow upward trend from 2001 to 2010. There were some minor 
added ups and downs in overall employment that seem not to come from the 
natural resource sector over this time, although they do not move employment 
away from the overall trend. Both lines increase after 2010, but the increase 
in overall employment appears higher for the overall employment series. As 
an example, the increase in natural resource employment from January 2010 
to June of 2012 was 9,850 people. The overall increase in employment for the 
same period was 21,887 people. This difference is significant because it means 
there was job growth beyond the oil sector alone, some 12,037 to be precise. 
However, it means that the oil sector jobs accounted for 45 percent of the total 
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Figure 8.8. Williams County employment, 2001–18 (source: Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2019b, 2019c)
Figure 8.7. Williams County average weekly wage, 2001–18 (source: Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2019b, 2019c)
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Figure 8.9. Williams County employment, 2001–18, all occupations excluding 
natural resources (source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 2019b, 2019c)
Figure 8.10. Williams County natural resources employment as a share of all 
occupations, 2001–18 (source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 2019b, 2019c)
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increase in employment over that time period. It is difficult to imagine the 
ability to handle the influx of more workers, though it appears there was a 
need for more. This gap implies a failure to fully capitalize on the significant op-
portunity presented by oil development due to a binding labor constraint. To 
facilitate this discussion Figure 8.9 presents the natural resources employment 
as before, and then deducts that series from the overall employment. 
It is not surprising that the gap between the two series narrows, further 
evidence of the importance of the oil sector. It is easier to identify when the oil 
impacts transferred to other sectors in this graph. After mid-year 2012, the ad-
justed overall series rises more sharply than the natural resources employment 
data. That pattern continues until the end of 2014, at which time both series 
start to take a significant and sharp drop. Another way to think about this 
is through the percentage of overall employment represented by the natural 
resources sector (Figure 8.10). 
Despite the increases in both types of employment, the oil sector increased 
its share of overall employment with only a few periods of retreat from 2001 
to early 2012, at which time it accounted for over 40 percent of employment 
in Williams County. This was a significant concentration of employment in the 
one sector paying higher wages, and therefore the jobs there filled first. 
Labor markets are vital to the story in North Dakota. However, during much 
of the current oil expansion North Dakota experienced persistent shortages of 
labor, which is to say, job openings in excess of the number of people available 
and able to work.2 These circumstances suggest labor market variables, while 
important to consider, are potentially biased, or at least less informative than 
usual, as economic indicators. Curtailed growth due to a lack of population 
growth or willingness on the part of people to migrate in numbers sufficient 
to fill positions can bias downward the relative contribution or importance 
of sectors. Such a bias may influence the relative importance of a sector in the 
economy.
Income and Earnings
In an attempt to overcome this problem, I report income and earning measures 
in addition to employment and wage measures. The income and earning mea-
sures counteract some of the potential bias in labor market measures. A sector 
facing a labor shortage and an inability to readily hire sufficient workers locally 
2 Such information can be gleaned from the North Dakota Workforce Intelligence Job Open-
ings Reports prepared by Job Service North Dakota for various time periods.
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will likely increase wages in an effort to attract more workers. Greater wages 
should increase total earnings and compensation in the sector. As a result, even 
if employment is not increasing, the compensation to that sector should rise 
and indicate increasing vitality and importance in the region.
There was a major change in the classification of industries in this time 
with the switch from the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) system to the 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) for the 2001 data 
and later. These changes in classification represent important changes in eco-
nomic and industrial structure occurring in the United States and the world, 
but they also make comparisons of data difficult. The SIC system includes data 
from 1969 to 2000, while only NAICS data are available for 2001 and beyond. 
The per capita personal income in the Williston micropolitan area saw a sig-
nificant increase over this time as well. In nominal terms it was $3,406 in 1969. 
Peak per-capita income occurred in 2014 at $128,586, again in nominal terms. 
This is per capita, not per worker, so it includes the entire official population, 
even those not working. The implied annual growth in per-capita personal in-
come over that time period was 8.4 percent. When adjusted for inflation the 
growth rate remains 4 percent per year.
The Williston micropolitan area earning structure was closely tied to com-
modity prices, whether viewed through the lens of agriculture or energy 
extraction. There is a certain volatility that comes from these sectors, and the 
importance of the sectors does not always show up directly in numbers. Farm 
earnings, for example, ranged from a low of –5 percent of total earnings to a 
high of 39.6 percent. The average of farm earnings as a share of total earnings 
from 1969 to 2000 was right around 8 percent. The next two highest averages 
over this time period were mining (almost exclusively oil and gas extraction) 
and services. The highest subcategory within services over this period was 
health services, at 11 percent. Manufacturing in the Williston micropolitan 
area ranged from a low of 2 percent to a high of 8.88 percent.
A similar story plays out from 2001 to 2016 with the NAICS data. Manu-
facturing earnings range from a low of 1.09 percent to a high of 3.39 percent. 
Even though there is significant economic growth in income and other met-
rics, this growth does not transfer to or transform the manufacturing sector 
in Williston. Some may view this as a lost opportunity for economic diversifi-
cation, but as the price of oil demonstrates, the returns on energy activity are 
high and investment in that specific activity could be viewed as nothing less 
than rational. 
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Oil and gas extraction changes significantly between the two classification 
schemes. From 1969 to 2000, under the SIC scheme, oil and gas extraction 
ranged from 9.6 to 36.9 percent, averaging 20.6 percent per year. Oil and gas 
extraction after 2001 averaged 4.6 percent only with a range from 2.7 to 8.4 
percent. The incredible increase in the volume of activity would seem to con-
tradict these percentages, though it becomes easier to understand when we 
look at the category of support activities for mining, broken out under mining 
in the NAICS scheme. Support activities ranged from 11.6 to 41.3 percent, 
averaging 27.8 percent per year. The two combined show an increase in ac-
tivity after the price increases commenced at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century.
The breakout into services and extraction is also important, although it 
does not represent diversification with respect to the industrial base of the 
area. Extraction was the important basic activity that created and allowed for 
extensive add-on activities in the form of service provision. The amount of 
41.3 percent represents a significant addition to the activity. At its peak in Wil-
liston, the general category of mining was almost 44.2 percent of the nonfarm 
private earnings (Figure 8.11). 
With respect to general economic sector rivalries in North Dakota, agricul-
ture tends to be pitted against energy, a situation that has been exacerbated 
since the rise of shale oil in the Williston area. With respect to proprietors’ 
income in the Bakken area, there is a noticeable divide between farm and 
Figure 8.11. Williston farm and nonfarm proprietors’ income, 1969–2017 
(source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 2019a, 2019b)
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nonfarm income. The separation between the two is not significant prior to 
2000, although for the most part nonfarm proprietors’ income exceeds that 
of farm proprietors. After 2000 there is a rapid increase in farm income as 
agriculture increases, but it still cannot keep pace with the nonfarm revenues. 
One industry sector singled out for attention here is construction. Construc-
tion, particularly of housing, was an important additional consequence of the 
economic changes in Williston. 
Construction
Construction received special attention in the 1958 Report (p. 211), and it is 
important to provide a parallel look during this oil episode. Housing was a con-
stant source of friction and debate in Williston during and after the recent oil 
expansion (Brue 2007; Dalrymple 2015; Jean 2016). An area known for lack 
of housing during a boom and for man camp-type residences might appear 
to have low shares of earnings in construction. Similar issues occurred in the 
1950s too, with a discussion comparing “trailer camps and an unwarranted 
residential development” in some areas to permitted increases elsewhere (p. 
211). The limitations on available labor would also be a significant contrib-
utor to a reduced upper bound on this sector. In the SIC data the average share 
of nonfarm private earnings was 7.4 percent, and although it did move higher 
in the post-2001 NAICS data to 10.5 percent, construction of buildings repre-
sented only 1.9 percent of earnings. However, the nonfarm private earnings 
increased by so much over this time that this amount is a smaller slice of a 
much larger pie. A better indicator of the consequences in this area comes from 
building permits data (Figures 8.12 and 8.13).
The permits data provide a look at both the local housing market and the 
change in construction activity outside the direct benefits to the oil industry. 
The number of permits for buildings demonstrates a sizable increase occurring 
contemporaneously with increased oil prices and activity in the oil sector. Si-
multaneously the average number of units with permits increased, although it 
lagged a bit until economic prosperity was more entrenched. Consistent with 
the labor constraint in the sector, there were some booms and busts in the 
building activity level as well, seen in the decline in permits and the transition 
into larger numbers of units with lower numbers of building permits. Other 
chapters focus on the various social and demographic aspects that led to a 
willingness to move into newly built units. One issue with the housing market 
was a desire to avoid overbuilding in case oil was a transitory economic phe-
nomenon without sufficient staying power to develop long-term population 
changes.
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Figure 8.13. Unit counts for Williams County building permits, 1990–2018 
(source: Housing and Urban Development 2019)
Figure 8.12. Williams County building permits for units in single-family struc-
tures, 1990–2017 (source: Housing and Urban Development 2019)
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Conclusions
The book is not closed on the Williston economy and the oil industry in North 
Dakota. The fact that this is an update on an excellent report about an oil 
boom from the 1950s in the same area is evidence of that. The fact that this is 
a first fracking-induced cycle makes this an important ongoing topic for study, 
while the forecasts attempt to predict variations in the next cycle. Oil prices 
fluctuate based on policies and events far beyond the reach of individuals and 
companies in Williston and the state of North Dakota. As a result, company 
production decisions and strategies are not completely determined by events 
on the ground. Such a lack of control over economic direction is a difference for 
many communities, specifically those in western North Dakota. 
What the information in this chapter demonstrates is that oil is unlikely 
to disappear as an economic driver in Williston and surrounding areas, even 
though it did before. Global politics and policy, as well as the importance of 
the energy sector in the economy, make such a decline unlikely. This chapter 
does not attempt to end discussions, but rather looks to continue them from 
the 1958 Report by pairing them with other important topics. The addition of 
a second commodity-based industry in the region further entrenches a poten-
tial high return, high volatility paradigm for the local economies and possibly 
the state as well. As the second cycle starts for Williston and the Bakken, it 
is clear there is still a need for planning. The first cycle caught many of the 
policy makers off guard, both in the region and outside of it. The primary con-
cern is still expanding employment in oil and leveraging that growth for other 
sectors while improving the quality of life in the region. There should also be 
continued and increased focus on the impacts generated by economic growth 
on non-economic factors such as population growth and distribution, social 
infrastructure, and physical infrastructure, many of which are covered in the 
rest of this book. 
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Chapter 9
Social Change in the Basin1
Robert B. Campbell
Along with the demographic, the economic, the political and the geo-
graphic changes, specifically social change was expected—and social 
change there has been in the Williston Basin area since the discovery 
of oil. General social change occurs in three broad kinds of situations: 
(1) where a homogeneous society is suddenly confronted by people 
who differ from its members in background, and thus in attitudes and 
values; (2) where innovations, especially technological ones, are intro-
duced into a static social organization system necessitating changes in 
that system to “absorb” the innovation; or (3) where a stable popula-
tion has a sudden change in numbers. Theoretically any such situations 
would be marked by a conflict in values and would become “social prob-
lems,” that is, conditions which are considered undesirable in terms of 
the previously existing values of the society. Typically those changes 
which result in the greatest conflict in the society are those which are 
brought in from outside the system, perhaps because the society is not 
likely to have set up techniques for handling such changes. There is 
likely to be no consensus as to how the situation should be dealt with; 
consequently the society will be characterized, however temporarily, by 
a conflict in attitudes. Social change proper occurs in the resolution of 
attitude differences and in the elimination or control of the “undesir-
able” conditions.2
The sociological research part of this project was posited on the 
assumptions of this theory of social change, and it was designed to dis-
cover what value conflicts and what “problems” occurred as a result 
of the large immigration of people from other parts of the country. It 
was hypothesized that: (1) local organizations which were purely social 
1 Conclusions drawn in this section are based exclusively upon the field work 
done in the summer of 1954. All supplementary information of later date is 
identified as to date.
2 From the sociological point of view situations are never inherently problem-
atic; they become problems only when they are defined as undesirable by the 
people involved in them.
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would not attempt to attract migrants into membership while those 
which were primarily economic or religious would make the attempt; 
(2) migrants, as a category, would be the objects of negative attitudes of 
the local citizenry; and (3) various kinds of social problems, such as in-
creased crime, immorality, and low-grade housing, would arise. These 
hypotheses were based upon the theoretical assumptions that the local 
social organizations already in existence would be defensive as to their 
unity and would tend to repel outsiders, that the migrants would be 
defined as “outsiders” representing different values from those of the 
natives, and that the presence of a large number of new people would 
cause the existing societal organization to fail to operate in a way that 
was satisfactory to its new, as well as many of its old, members. With 
respect to this last, it was assumed that some of the old residents would 
define change itself as a problem and would resist any efforts at reorga-
nization of the community while others would seek change but would 
not agree as to how the change should be brought about. The former 
would tend to have negative attitudes toward the migrants, the latter 
would tend to align themselves with the migrants.
A. Local Organizations and Group Membership
Local organizations in Williston were affected only slightly by the in-
flux of new residents. (It must be remembered that Williston—the only 
urban place in the research area and, thus, the only one having a rela-
tively complete institutional organization—had only a 32% population 
increase as compared to 105% in Ray and 253% in Tioga, the two small 
trade centers.) Few of these organizations deliberately recruited new 
members in the migrant category, although apparently only one or two 
avoided, however indirectly, such membership. One group (social, ed-
ucational and service) having twenty members responded to questions 
about the number of “oil-related” participants and the kind of effort 
made to get such participation as follows: “This is a small study group 
with a limited membership, thus your questions do not apply.” Another 
group (social, fraternal and service) which had two of its 45 mem-
bers “oil-related” and which was making no effort to get “oil-related” 
participation, reported that “membership is by invitation or transfer 
only. Invitations are primarily to local women.” This latter group also 
answered the question as to what problems had been created for the or-
ganization by the oil development as follows: “A minor problem seemed 
to develop as prospective transferees moved here; however, very few 
are here long enough to become members of our chapter.”
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The most typical attitude expressed by organization officers was 
that the migrants who wanted to join were welcome but that the orga-
nization did not make a special effort to get them to join. For example, 
only two churches reported that they made a special effort to attract 
migrant participation and could estimate the number of such partic-
ipants; and one of these expressed its limitation in the fact that “‘oil 
people’ are mainly from areas where the ——— Church is not strong.” 
Most of the organizations polled (SEE TABLE LIII) had an increase in 
membership as a result of the population increase.
While the primarily social organizations showed almost no incli-
nation to recruit members from among the migrants, neither did the 
religious and fraternal organizations. This generalization is indicated 
more markedly by the existence of two particular groups in Williston. 
The first of these was a new church (“H” IN TABLE LIII), the Southern 
Baptist Church, which was organized in 1953 apparently to minister 
to the unfulfilled spiritual needs of the large southern contingent of oil 
workers, who provided three-fourths of its membership. This group, 
with its 65 members, had already outgrown its building in its one full 
year of existence. The other group was a purely social one, the Ladies 
Petroleum Club, which was composed exclusively of women involved 
directly or indirectly with oil development and which had reached its 
physical limit in membership in 1954. The group was organized in the 
middle of 1952 and in one year’s time increased its membership from 
55 to 125 (the limit). That the group felt the lack of local group invita-
tion is indicated in this voluntary comment on the questionnaire:
Probably worth mentioning is the fact that this club was organized 
for the purpose of enabling oil wives to get acquainted and as a 
means of furnishing them with some type of social life probably not 
offered any other place. Frequently it is difficult for new people to 
step into many of the older activities of a community.
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TABLE LIII
MEMBERSHIPS IN POLLED CHURCHES AND NATIONAL FRA-
TERNAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WILLISTON, 1950–1954, AND 
1954 “OIL RELATED” MEMBERSHIPS
Churches  Year   Oil Related 
      Memberships   
 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 (1954)
A 175 185 215 215 250 20
B 220 ...... ...... ...... 325 40
C 80 85 86 99 95 ......
D 50 50 60 65 65 ......
E 15 15 24 26 32 ......
F 25 30 48 57 68 ......
G 93 93 101 110 123 15
H ...... ...... ...... 11 65 48
Fraternal Organizations      
Elks 745 831 876 973 997 175
Moose 1421 1626 1479 1445 1578 95
Some of the data above, particularly those in the “oil related” memberships 
column, represent the best estimate the ministers or presidents could make.  
    
The main business group in Williston was reported by residents in 
informal conversations to have made a complete and deliberate change 
from having no migrant members to providing special positions for 
them. At the time of the project field work there were representatives 
of the petroleum industry in the business group, and there were reports 
that the business group had brought them into membership for the 
specific purpose of eliminating some of the conflict which was devel-
oping. (An interesting sidelight on the social level of this relationship is 
the observation of the researchers that there were two distinct informal 
groups which met almost daily for lunch in a popular Williston cafe. 
The “old” business group met for lunch, as it had for years, at a table re-
served for it in one part of the cafe; the “new” group, predominantly oil 
men, met at another table at the same time. The humor in the situation 
was apparent at least to the latter in that they had adopted a name for 
themselves which was a “take-off” on the name of the former, like, for 
example, “long-snorters” and “short-snorters.”)
In general, then, the hypothesis that local social organizations 
would not recruit migrants while religious and economic organi-
zations would do so was only partially supported. The social groups 
had not attempted to bring in the new oil people, but neither had 
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the religious organizations to any substantial degree. The business 
group had brought in oil people, but it did so relatively lately and, in 
a sense, under the duress of a potential conflict situation. These con-
clusions, drawn from the analysis of the organizations, are supported 
by responses obtained from heads of households in Ray and Williston 
concerning their organization memberships (TABLE LIV). Not only 
did “old” residents belong to organizations significantly more than did 
“new” residents, but the association between length of residence and 
organization membership was greater in Ray than in Williston.
TABLE LIV
MEMBERSHIPS IN ORGANIZATIONS FOR 
OLD AND NEW RESIDENTS, BY LOCALITY 
(RAY AND WILLISTON), 1954
Locality  Old residents New Residents Total 
Number of 
Memberships Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Ray (Total) 60  100 64 100 124 100
One or more 37 62 18 28 55 44
None  14 23 39 61 53 43
No data  9 15 7 11 16 13
Chi-square is 17.9 for 2X2 table, omitting “no data”; C = .37*   
   
Williston (Total) 349 100 164 100 513 100
One or more 229 66 79 48 308 60
None  116 33 79 48 195 38
No data  4 1 6 4 10 2
Chi-square is 12.1 for 2X2 table, omitting “no data”; C = .15*   
   
* C, coefficient of mean square contingency, is a measure of association whose 
maximum value of .707 for a 2X2 table, thus these may be considered “mod-
erate” amounts of association.     
 
No attempt was made to poll the organizations in the smaller com-
munities on the assumption that they would be few and small. There 
were indications, on the basis of the residence sample interviews, that 
on a general social level organizational conflict was closer to the surface 
there than in Williston, reaching even to the level of political action 
(SEE PAGES 131–6). The ex-mayor of one of the communities cited 
the existence of an oil organization which had effected a considerable 
opposition to him in the previous election because of his refusal to make 
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concessions to oil interests. In both localities (Ray and Tioga) at least 
semiformal organizations came into existence to press for change or for 
maintenance of the status quo. Both places were caught with a virtual 
lack of services for the expanded populations. The desire, particularly 
of newcomers, for what they considered basic and necessary services 
resulted in what was described by participants as a battle between the 
“progressives” and the “conservatives.” In one of the places these or-
ganizations were the “wets” and the “drys” in the issue as to whether 
a water system should be installed. Paving and sewer system were 
other issues around which informal groups arose. In one sense these 
issues actually cemented relations between newcomers and some of the 
long-term residents much faster than might otherwise have occurred 
because the migrants, demanding the services, were joined by many of 
the regular residents. Some of the latter mentioned with obvious pride 
and respect that their community now had an active business group 
which was leading toward a general progress. (One such group was 
the “J-C-ettes,” composed of oil workers’ wives and the wives of local 
businessmen, which not only had a political and economic influence 
but which had a strong social effect in terms of developing favorable 
attitudes toward the oil people and toward change.)
Conflicts on the personal level in Ray and Tioga were more apparent 
than in Williston not only in the aforementioned political issues but also 
in general attitudes about people of one sort or another. One woman, 
whose son was a leader in the fight for the water system, reported that 
her neighbor had not spoken to her for a year as the consequence of the 
fight. Others referred to the “backwardness” of the native residents, to 
the “riff-raff” who came in to work the oil fields, and to the destruction 
of the close friendly relations between town and country since the busi-
ness had begun to cater to oil workers, such statements reflecting an 
outspoken but numerically small group of people. (In interpreting the 
detailed material on personal and social attitudes, the reader should 
bear in mind a possible overall explanation of differences in the degree 
of value-conflict between Williston and the other two centers—Wil-
liston tended to draw the “white-collar” oil workers, Tioga the more 
nearly permanent oil field workers—the better paid, supervisory field 
personnel—and Ray, the transient and temporary employees.)
These differences are supported indirectly by the facts (SEE TABLE 
LV) that Williston’s population was 66% “native” (i.e., present before 
April 1950) as contrasted with Tioga’s 33% and Ray’s 39%. Of the Wil-
liston population only 4% resided in trailers, while Tioga and Ray had 
21% and 38% respectively. (The 1955 observation that Ray had lost the 
most population was further evidence in this regard.)
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B. Intergroup Attitudes
The gross indications of conflict between “new” and “old” residents, 
while important in the situations in which they were found, were not 
sufficient to support the hypothesis that there would be generally-held 
negative attitudes of each grouping toward the other. One aspect of 
the study was an attempt to discover whether such attitudes were 
widespread and more nearly constant than the temporary conflicts 
centering around political issues. This attempt was somewhat super-
ficial because of the impracticality of “depth interviewing” as far as the 
purposes of the general study were concerned, but it was suitable to 
give the broad type of answer sought.
The most important conclusion about the intergroup attitudes is 
that the new residents of Williston who had met many of the old ones 
had a good opinion of them almost without exception, 99% of them 
having expressed this in answer to the direct question: Have you met 
many of the new residents (since 1950) of Williston?* If “yes,” what 
do you think of them generally? (SEE TABLE LVI.) (The researchers 
missed what might have been a good chance to test the secondhand 
nature of stereotypes and prejudices when the 58 heads of households, 
38% of the total, who replied that they had not met many of the old 
residents were not asked their opinion of old residents.)




PERCENT RESIDENCE (1954), 1950 RESIDENCE, TYPE OF 
DWELLING: BY PERSONS, WITH “SAME RESIDENCE” PER-
CENT AND WITH PERCENT OF PERSONS IN TRAILERS
   Total         Percent of
Persent Residence Number of Types of Dwelling   Persons in 
  1950 Residence Persons Single Trailer Multiple Other Trailers
Williston 2335 1687 98 548 2 4.2
 Williston 1544 1246 12 284 2 0.8
 Other N.D.  374 229 38 107 ...... 10.2
 All other areas 417 212 48 157 ...... 11.5
 Williston % 66.1 73.9 12.2 51.8  
Tioga 616 419 131 66 ...... 21.3
 Tioga 202 151 8 43 ...... 4.0
 Other N.D. 224 168 45 11 ...... 20.1
 All other areas 190 100 78 12 ...... 41.1
 Tioga % 32.8 36.0 6.1 65.2  
Ray 470 218 177 73 2 37.7
 Ray 181 148 17 16 ...... 9.4
 Other N.D. 62 18 16 26 2 25.8
 All other areas 227 52 144 31 ...... 63.4
 Ray % 38.5 67.9 9.6 21.9  
Stanley 560 365 109 81 5 19.5
 Stanley 351 279 13 56 3 3.7
 Other N.D. 131 74 40 15 2 30.5
 All other areas 78 12 56 10 ...... 71.8
 Stanley % 62.7 76.4 11.9 69.1  
Williams County 285 278 4 3 ...... 1.4
 Williams County 236 236 ...... ...... ...... 0.0
 Other N.D. 16 12 4 ...... ...... 25.0
 All other areas 33 30 …... 3 ...... 0.0
 Williams County % 82.8 84.9 0.0 0.0  
Mountrail County 116 116 ...... ...... ...... ......
 Mountrail County 104 104 ...... ...... ...... ......
 Other N.D. 12 12 ...... ...... ...... ......
 All other areas 0 0 ...... ...... ...... ......
 Mountrail Co. % 89.7 89.7 ...... ...... ...... ......
The distribution of opinions of both old and new residents of Wil-
liston as to whether or not newcomers had been accepted into the 
community is, perhaps, of even more interest. As Table LVII shows, 
a total of 96% of the old residents and 95% of the new residents 
thought that newcomers had been accepted, 92% and 89% respec-
tively expressing no qualifications to their opinions. Only 3% of the 
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old residents and 4% of the new believed that newcomers had not been 
generally accepted.
TABLE LVI 
NEW RESIDENTS’ OPINION OF OLD RESIDENTS, 
WILLISTON, 1954
 Have Met Old Residents
        
    No Total
Opinion No Yes * Yes ** Data Number Percent
Good  41 17  58 81
Good, qualified  8 5  13 18
Poor  1   1 1
Total of Opinions  50 22  72 100
No Opinion  2 1   
No Data  10 9  19 
Does not apply*** 58   11 69 
TOTAL 58 62 32 11 163 
Percent*** 38 41 21   
* (Unqualified)      
** (Qualified)      
*** Omitting “no data” with respect to having met old residents—The “does not 
apply” arose from the interviewing procedure of not asking opinions of those 
who had not met many of the old residents.     
 
TABLE LVII
OPINIONS OF OLD RESIDENTS AND 
NEW RESIDENTS AS TO WHETHER NEWCOMERS HAD BEEN 
ACCEPTED INTO THE COMMUNITY, WILLISTON, 1954
 Old Residents New Residents  
Accepted? Number Percent Number Percent Total
TOTAL 349   164  
Yes 294  92 124 89 418
Yes, qualified 13  4 9 6 22
No, qualified 1   0  1
No 8  3 6 4 14
Indefinite 4  1 1 1 5
Total of Opinions 320  100 140 100 460
No opinion 22   14  36
No data 7   10  17
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These facts certainly do not indicate the hypothesized negative at-
titude towards the migrants as a category or any reaction back toward 
the “natives”; furthermore, they appear to be out of harmony with some 
of the description of the conflict and lack of association in organiza-
tions in the previous section. This disharmony is “more apparent than 
real.” Firstly, these facts were obtained from Williston residents, and 
Williston had a minimum of conflict about migrants for reasons de-
scribed earlier. Facts from Ray, Tioga, and particularly the rural areas 
pointed up a greater measure of negative attitudes. Secondly, none of 
the failures to recruit migrants into organizations carried with them 
any overt negative attitude, that is, the officers of organizations did not 
express any antipathy toward migrants in describing their membership 
and recruitment policies. The failure to recruit migrants might be as 
indicative of the organizations’ failure to identify migrants as a separate 
category as of the negative attitude respecting the category. Finally, the 
research was conducted late enough in the development that tenden-
cies to generalize negative attitudes may have been dissipated because 
of the increased and increasing opportunities for association on a per-
sonal level between members of the two categories. What may have 
been general negative attitudes as a consequence of isolated contacts 
could not be expected to persist when contacts became more frequent 
and more personal. The conflicts may have represented issue differ-
ences rather than residence differences—at least this conclusion is 
more consistent with the facts than is the hypothesis that there would 
be generalized, negative categorical attitudes.
C. Social Problems
In order to avoid the prejudices or preconceptions of the researcher, 
a social problem is considered in this report as any situation which is 
reported by people involved in it as undesirable and, therefore, about 
which they express a negative opinion, possibly indicating a tendency 
to act to change the situation. From this point of view a situation may 
not be a problem to the participants despite the fact that the observer 
is disturbed by it. An example of a situation of this sort is one of the 
residences in Ray which, according to a consensual estimate of three 
of the researchers, was about 6 feet by 8 feet and 7 feet high. Not once 
did a resident of the town express a negative attitude about this partic-
ular “house,” not to mention a small bus which had become someone’s 
home. This simply was not considered a problem in Ray to the knowl-
edge of the participants in the research project.
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1. Housing
As one might easily suppose on the basis of the tremendous popula-
tion changes reported earlier, housing was one of the major social (and 
personal) problems in the area. Even though the population peak had 
been passed, there was still a pressure for permanent-type housing in 
parts of the area. An interesting paradox is, however, that some rental 
housing in both Williston and Ray was “going begging” in 1955, thus 
creating what might be a noticeable economic problem. Realtors in 
all three localities were still building extensively in 1955 to meet their 
estimates of the market for homes, thus changing the situation which 
constituted a problem for many of the migrants.
According to local businessmen in Williston, the explanation of the 
paradox was that the demand for temporary housing had been met but 
that there was a backlog of demand by residents in temporary housing 
for permanent homes. Their theory was that many people had to take 
substandard housing during the boom, but in 1954 they were seeking 
better housing; thus there was an upward mobility toward the best 
housing, tending to eliminate the social problem of low-grade housing. 
The evidence presented in favor of the theory was that a number of 
homes which were being built by a Williston contractor had already 
been spoken for and that he planned to start an even larger number as 
soon as he could do so.
On the other hand, a government official reported that employment 
and wages had not risen sufficiently to meet the costs of better housing. 
As new homes became available in Williston they were filled by those 
families who were already living in the more expensive rental units, 
thus there was a gap which was not being filled from below because of 
the inability of the “common laboring man” to pay the high rents.3
The observations of the researchers tended to support this latter 
view. That there was a general social problem in housing was evidenced 
by the often-mentioned concern about the “flats” (a low-grade housing 
area of Williston) and the shared idea among business people that 
more and better housing was in continuous demand. That the general 
mobility upward was not taking place was indicated by the stability of 
the “flats” population and the availability of a number of high rental 
apartments (observed in both 1954 and 1955).
In Ray the “wrong side” of the problem was even more obvious. 
Local business interests built a large number (34 units) of high rental 
3 The extent of the rent pressure is indicated, perhaps, in the fact that Repre-
sentative Burdick was quoted in the newspapers in February 1956 as reporting 
the government’s approval of Williston as a low-rent government housing area.
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apartments (duplex and four-plex) to relieve the pressure of trailer and 
basement dwelling, only to find that the demand for such residences 
was insufficient to make them pay. The bulk of the migrants were tem-
porary residents who either could not afford the apartments or were 
satisfied to reside in their trailers. (Most of the trailer residents were 
employed by a drilling company which provided large, new trailers for 
low rent, the rent being applied toward the purchase of the trailers so 
that the renter would obtain ownership if he remained with the com-
pany for a certain length of time.)
However much the trailers represented a social problem for the 
home owners in Ray, the fact remained that they were not a problem 
for their inhabitants. They were, rather, the solution to the problem of 
high rents. The trailer camps provided ample facilities for those inhab-
itants, apparently.
A major housing problem arose in Tioga out of an interesting 
migration situation. Tioga had a considerably greater proportion 
of in-migration of North Dakotans than did either Williston or Ray 
(TABLE LVIII). Of the total population of Tioga 36% came from other 
parts of North Dakota while the corresponding figures for the other 
places were 16% for Williston and 13% for Ray. The Tioga migrants, 
particularly the North Dakotans among them, did not find available to 
them the opportunities for rental trailer residence that characterized 
Ray. Neither did the Tiogans have much opportunity for multiple-type 
dwelling units, which had only 5% of the North Dakota migrants living 
in them (as compared to 45% for North Dakota migrants who resided 
in Ray in 1954.) The result was that Tioga generally had recognizably 
poorer housing than the other two places, composed partly of older 
trailers and partly of make-shift single dwellings. The prime problem, 
on the basis of local comment as well as being the one the observations 
of the researchers indicated, was a single dwelling housing group (12 
or 16 units). These were reported as being “grain bins” and “chicken 
sheds” which had been hauled in from a farm to be rented. One of the 
residents of Tioga commented on them approximately as follows:
Did you see those grain bins down the street? People are living in 
those. I don’t see how anyone could rent them. They can’t be very 
substantial; they’re not very heavy. I sat here one morning and 
watched two of them being carried on one truck.
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TABLE LVIII
TYPE OF DWELLING BY PRESENT RESIDENCE (1954) 
AND BY 1950 RESIDENCE, 
FOR THE THREE MAIN LOCALITIES OF THE AREA
Present Residence    Type of Dwelling 
  1950 Residence Total Single  Trailer Multiple
 100% 72% 4% 24%
Williston 100% 2335 100% 1687 100% 98 100% 550
  Williston 66 1544 74 1246 12 12  52 286
  Other N.D. 16 374 14 229 39 38  19 107
  All other states 18 417 12 212 49 48  29 157
 100%  68%  21% 11%
Tioga 100% 616 100% 419 100% 131 100% 66
  Tioga 33 202 36 151 6 8  65 43
  Other N.D. 36 224 40 138 34 45  17 11
  All other states 31 190 24 100 60 78  18 12
 100% 46% 38% 16% 
Ray 100% 470 100% 218 100% 177 100% 75
  Ray 39 181 68 148 10 17  21 16
  Other N.D. 13 62 8 18 9 16  38 28
  All other states 48 227 24 52 81 144  41 31
These were actually one-room sheds with a loft which served as 
supplementary sleeping space and was accessible by ladder. They were 
made of low grade lumber which was covered, top and sides, by tar-
paper roofing material.
Generally speaking, then, the increase in population created a situ-
ation of tight, “substandard” housing which was interpreted variously 
as a social problem—high rental apartment vacancies in Williston and 
Ray and grain bins in Tioga. There were other housing situations which 
properly were personal rather than social problems as herein conceived. 
Examples of these were the following:
a. One person reported that Tioga was going to require that all 
residences, including trailers, be connected to the sewer lines. 
He didn’t know what to do because he couldn’t comply in his 
trailers’ present location and he didn’t know where he could 
go.
b. A man who had just arrived in Tioga with his family met the 
interviewer in the yard of a small hut. He opened the con-
versation (after the usual introduction by the interviewer as 
to why he was there) by asking, “Can you do anything about 
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this? How can they expect a man to live in something like 
that? I’ve come all the way from (a southern state) because of 
my job and I’ve never had to live in anything like this before.”
Additional Aspects of the Housing Situation… Despite the fact 
that only “problem” situations were hypothesized for the specialized 
research, this report would be incomplete without some description 
of the objective situation in housing. Referring back to Table LVIII, 
72% of the Williston population, 68% of the Tioga population, and 
only 46% of the Ray population resided in single dwellings. In 1950, 
according to the U.S. Census of Housing, the figures for residences by 
type were 55% single dwellings for Williston and 92% single dwellings 
for Williams County rural nonfarm areas; these suggest that there was 
a great relative decrease in the supply of single dwellings in Ray and 
Tioga and an increase in the supply for Williston.
Trailers were ordinarily located in camps which were limited in the 
space they had available. As the picture indicates, the ground space 
allotted to each trailer household was small—an estimated 20’ by 40’ 
area being typical (inclusive of that part occupied by the trailer itself ).
RESIDENCES—TIOGA, N.D., SUMMER, 1954
The rapid increase in population created tremendous pressure on local housing 
resources. These sheds were hauled in by truck from a nearby farm to be used as 
family residences.
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There was not nearly the crowding that these observations might 
suggest, since all three localities had space available in the immediately 
surrounding areas. The big trailer camps appeared at the north and 
south edges of Ray, the east and south edges of Tioga, the north edge 
of Williston, and in what has been called herein the “Tioga environs.” 
This last was a completely new settlement area from U.S. Highway No. 
2 into Tioga (a distance of about 4 miles). There were several trailer 
camps in this particular area and a complete village of low-rent, per-
manent type single dwellings (including garages) which were provided 
by one of the oil companies for its permanent, operating staff.
All three localities had whole areas of new rental and/or ownership 
single dwellings amounting, at least in Williston, to separate commu-
nities in the sociological sense. The northwestern edge of Williston 
had been expanded several block depths with new houses, new stores, 
and a new school to provide for the numerous children in the area. 
An exclusive, high-cost housing development occurred in the northeast 
corner of Williston, inhabited by both “old” and “new” residents in the 
city. Ray and Tioga have their new streets of new residences, too, the 
latter particularly having a “new community” on the south side of the 
railroad, inhabited primarily by migrants who are associated with the 
petroleum industry. As mentioned earlier (cf. Wills) one is impressed 
on first arriving in Ray or Tioga by the obvious combination of the new 
and the old in the residential as well as other building. Most buildings 
appear as being either pre-World War II or post-1952.
2. Crime and Immorality
As soon as one hears that a particular place is a “boom” area, he is likely 
to think of a general laxity of law enforcement or, at least, of a greater 
incidence of loose spending for illegal and barely legal pleasures. 
Couple that conception with the idea that there has been a considerable 
increase in population composed largely of unmarried men in “rough” 
occupations and the ingredients are complete for a common-sense 
prediction that criminality and immorality will be greatly increased. 
Such a prediction would have been only partly correct, apparently, in 
the Williston Basin. Assuming that there are some exceptions to a gen-
erally useful theory, the problem is to explain why some things did not 
occur as well as why some did.
First, the assumption that a large proportion of the increased popu-
lation was composed of unmarried men was contrary to the facts. The 
bulk of the oil field workers not only were married but had children. 
(In both Ray and Tioga only about one-fourth of the men were single.)
260
Second, there was a general provision of increased law enforcement 
facilities. As the data presented in Table LIX indicate, Williston had an 
increase in expenditure for the purpose of expanding the police protec-
tion as well as increases in revenues from fines levied against offenders. 
There had been an increase in police department employees from 6 in 
1949 to 13 in 1954.4 Ray had employed a full-time policeman who was 
reported by the citizens as being “tough” on violators of any sort but 
particularly on speeders, speeding having been apparently the main 
problem. The situation there was that U.S. Highway No. 2 ran directly 
through the town and the highway carried a tremendously increased 
traffic flow between Williston and Tioga. (SEE PAGE 41)
4 Uniform Crime Reports for the United States, Semiannual Bulletin, Vol. XXV, 
No. 1, 1954 and Vol. XX, No. 1, 1949.
RESIDENCES—RAY, N.D., SUMMER, 1954
Regular employees of established drilling companies brought their housing 




WILLISTON EXPENDITURES AND RECEIPTS, FISCAL YEARS* 
1950–51 TO 1953–54, FOR SELECTED ITEMS
  
   EXPENDITURES
Year Police   Liquor
 Magistrate’s Police Prisoner Licenses Total
 Courts
1950– $2,142.00@ $18,113.82 $1,711.50  $97,545.58
1951 $2,142.00@ 15,045.76@   63,554.22
1951– 3,173.00@ 24,753.53 2,512.00  108,934.76
1952 3,173.00@ 19,104.46@   72,729.56
1952– 4,791.30@ 42,770.70 4,086.11  164,859.05
1953 4,791.30@ 34,119.84@   110,955.17
1953– 3,471.40@ 49,176.34 1,892.38  203,984.21
1954 3,471.40@ 43,079.81@   144,661.47
 
  RECEIPTS    
1950–     
1951 8,644.70   14,500.00 94,886.56
1951–     
1952 14,499.00   17,500.00 131,426.10
1952–     
1953 35,110.50   18,916.67 189,035.30
1953–     
1954 27,006.00   19,250.00 178,281.02
@ Salaries     
* To get approximate semiannual data, figure 40% for first half, 60% for second 
half year     
Third, drunkenness was prevented from developing to the problem 
proportions it might have reached by a combination of already ex-
isting circumstances. Williston had already put into operation a police 
technique for controlling excessive drinking prior to the peak in oil de-
velopment migration. The Williston officials had been considering the 
migrant farm labor population as a source of the prospective problem 
and had instituted a system of quick pick-ups in the “skidrow” section. 
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(In Williston the taverns tended to be concentrated within a 3-block 
area, thus it was possible to station one or two policemen in the area 
during the peak periods of activity, particularly Saturday nights.) This 
system was supplemented by an informal one which was probably un-
known to the local officials. One owner-operator of a quiet but fairly 
popular tavern reported that he had avoided trouble with the police 
because “once trouble starts in a tavern they will really check on you.” 
His solution was not the curtailment of beer sales, but the personal care 
of the over-imbiber by sending him home in a taxi at his (the tavern 
owner’s) expense. He had never been bothered by the police because 
no difficulty had resulted from drinking in his establishment. Another 
factor which probably helped prevent a drunkenness problem was the 
attitude of the local judiciary (at least prior to 1955 when a local “rev-
olution” occurred with respect to arbitrary and selective enforcement 
of the law by Williston police). The police magistrate penalized to the 
maximum offenders of the drinking laws. (SEE TABLE LIX).
Fourth, a main source of drinking and gambling activity was 
available immediately outside the area, thus what might have been a 
problem within the area was removed. An active gambling, drinking, 
dining and dancing “club” just across the Montana state line attracted 
a large clientele from the oil development area although it has been 
restricted since the field survey following a raid in which the gambling 
devices were confiscated. Any compelling urges to participate in rela-
tively large-scale gambling could be satisfied through this well known 
channel.
Finally, evidence is lacking that there was a greater inclination 
among migrants than among “natives” to participate in illegal and 
“fringe” types of activity, although some of the people interviewed 
referred to one particular kind of illegality which was attributed exclu-
sively to oil field workers. There were a few instances when, apparently, 
migratory workers wrote “bad checks” or moved out from under debts. 
The rural residents in the area were particularly disturbed by this be-
cause it resulted in a complete redefinition of the relationship between 
themselves and the businessmen in small centers. Where formerly they 
had been able to cash checks at any business place without even con-
sidering having to identify themselves, now they could not cash checks 
at these places at all.
There were no indications available to the researchers that there 
had been a notable increase in, or even the presence of, organized crim-
inal or immoral activity—gambling houses, theft rings, “protection” or 
houses of prostitution. There were two known prostitutes in Williston, 
but in no sense were their activities organized, continuous or flagrant.
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These explanations account for the absence of readily observable 
behaviors in contradiction to the mores and laws, but official statistics 
show that the “problem behaviors” which were expected did occur.
TABLE LX
WILLISTON POLICE MAGISTRATE’S CASES, SEMIANNUAL, 
JULY 1952 TO JUNE 1954
 DRIVING LIQUOR   
 Reckless Speeding  Open Drunk
Half-Year Driving Stop  Drunk Bottle and
  Sign Driving in Car Disord.    Misc. Total
1952—2nd 49 490 41  50 668  219   1517
1953—1st 80 418 67  28 529  118   1240
1953—2nd 95 287 72  44 529  194   1221
1954—1st 56 101 43  39 329  173   741
GRAND FORKS (a city three times as large—for comparison)      
1954—1st 60 120 32  12 286*
*This does not include 14 cases of disorderly conduct.     
   
COMPARISON OF WILLISTON CASE RATE WITH THAT FOR 
THE NATION FOR CITIES OF COMPARABLE SIZE, ON TWO 
COMPARABLE TYPE OFFENSES, 1953
 Williston rate US rate
 cases/100,000 pop. cases/100,000 pop.    
 (computed at Williston for cities of 2,500-
Offenses 9,500 pop.) 10,000 pop.** Williston Cases
Drunk driving 1454.5@ 346.0  139 
Drunkenness 11109.0 1714.0  1058 
@ This category may not be directly comparable, inasmuch as “drinking and 
driving” or “driving while having been drinking” might more nearly characterize 
the Williston situation.      
** IBID.      
As Table LX indicates, Williston had a large number of cases in which 
offenders were held for prosecution (and a comparison of the total 
number of cases in this table with the receipts of the police magistrates 
court in Table LIX indicates the financial punishment of the offenders). 
The sample figures for Grand Forks, North Dakota, a city more than 
twice the size of Williston, and for two comparable offenses nationally 
for cities of the same size make possible a gross interpretation of the 
greater frequency of offenses (and/or prosecution) than one would ex-
pect of a city like Williston.
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The reader might well ask at this point if the researchers had their 
eyes shut in order to cite these statistics in the same paragraph in which 
the “absence of readily observable behaviors” was mentioned. In the 
monthly figures, furthermore, June 1954 (one of the months in which 
the field research was conducted) exceeds all the months in the bien-
nium except March for the number of offenses, 178 as compared to 202 
for these months. The explanation, it appears, is the quick apprehen-
sion of offenders (particularly liquor) which was mentioned earlier.
Returning to the conception of social problems with which this 
analysis was approached, the only situations which were represented as 
social problems by residents of Williston in the area of immorality and 
illegality were the drinking-fighting incidents involving, for the most 
part, immigrant farm labor and the drinking-driving activities of the 
Williston young people, neither of which could be attributed (except 
very indirectly through economic change) to the oil development.
3. Welfare Activities
There are a number of institutionally-recognized “social problems” 
which were little, if at all, affected by the development of oil in the Wil-
liston Basin. Old age cases, aid to dependent children cases and the 
like were simply not changed materially by the situation. There was, 
however, an increase in the incidence of payments to transients who 
were temporarily unable to leave the area. The Williams County office 
of welfare services reported as their biggest new problem the number 
of transient persons who moved in after hearing about the “big oil 
boom,” who should not have moved and who had become stranded. 
The Mountrail County office had had an increase in cases involving 
negligence of children and tracing of people, but payments to cases had 
not been affected materially by the oil development.
4. The Public Service Situation
Some of the social service or community service agencies encountered 
problematic situations which were, at least, indirect social problems, 
that is, situations about which the public through its agencies desired 
change toward a more acceptable alternative.
a. Schools. In all three communities there arose the necessity of ex-
panding school facilities to relieve crowding in both space and time. 
In Williston, for example, 22 elementary class rooms had been con-
structed and 26 persons had been added to the staff to accommodate 
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the 36% increase in enrollment between 1950 and 1954 (SEE TABLE 
LXI). The superintendent has calculated, as nearly as was possible, that 
about 24% of the total enrollment was “oil-related.” In Ray and Tioga 
emergency measures, such as the split day, had to be taken because of 
the tremendous expansion in enrollment. All three communities have 
expanded the physical plants considerably.
TABLE LXI
WILLISTON PUBLIC SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AND EMPLOY-
MENT, OCTOBER, 1950–1954
  1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
Enrollment 1508 1639 1524 1815 2041
Employment 60½  62½ 63 73½ 86
b. Library. An interesting change occurred in the Williston Li-
brary service, although the librarian was so pleased that she was more 
inclined to call it a solution rather than a problem. There was a dis-
proportionate participation in library services by migrants (including 
children) and a “revival of local interest” following a general revision of 
the library in 1951. The circulation of library materials had increased 
373% from 1950 to 1954 (SEE TABLE LXII). There had been, further-
more, increased monetary contributions by the local citizens and the 
donation of technical books by a large oil company.
TABLE LXII
WILLISTON LIBRARY CIRCULATION, FISCAL YEARS 1950–1954
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
7,967 13,925 24,303 32,826 37,679
c. Post Office. One of the most serious problems encountered by 
a specialized public service agency was the situation in the Williston 
post office. The building was much too small to admit easy handling 
of the increased volume of business, particularly since much of that 
increase involved commercial and transient (general delivery) mail. On 
one Monday alone a special test conducted by the postmaster indicated 
that one single company had over 1000 pieces of mail. The situation 
was equally difficult because of the relatively continuous necessity of 
reorganizing the carrier service and expanding it into new areas. Table 




WILLISTON POST OFFICE; ANNUAL RECEIPTS AND FIRST 
CLASS MAIL PIECES HANDLES, 1950–1954
 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954*
Annual Receipts ($) 109,184 114,154 140,192 150,074 ......
Pieces of 1st-class 1,594,120 1,720,300 2,121,096 2,281,323 1,078,005*
* January 1–June 30 only.
d. State Employment Service. The State Employment Service en-
countered an increased demand for its services in both directions, 
for workers and for jobs. It had problems in both directions, finding 
enough workers in 1952, finding enough jobs in 1954. There was a con-
tinuous increase in the use of its facilities despite these labor supply 
and demand fluctuations because of the increase of total employment.
e. Newspapers. The increase in population was accompanied by a 
corresponding increase in the circulation of newspapers in Williston, 
local circulation people maintaining that the newcomers did not differ 
from the older residents in their interest in the coverage of local papers.
TABLE LXIV
WILLISTON NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION, AVERAGE, 1950–1954 
        
 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 
    1st half/ 1st half/ 1st half/
    2nd half 2nd half 2nd half
Williston 
Herald 42001 ...... 5981 5739/6438 6775/7021 7112/......
Williston 
Plains 
Reporter ...... ...... ...... ....../...... ....../...... 32002 
Minneapolis 
Star and 
Tribune3 ...... 200 300 450 550 600 
1. Circulation manager’s estimate for January.
2. Publisher’s estimate.
3. Circulation manager’s estimates      
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Summary of Investigated Social Changes in the Williston Basin and 
Conclusions
Social changes—changes in numbers and kinds of people, in attitudes, 
in organizations, in personal and agency actions—were general as 
a consequence of the oil discovery and its development. Certain hy-
pothesized changes, however, did not occur in Williston to any marked 
extent. Economic and religious organizations made no special attempts 
to attract migrants into their memberships, although there were no evi-
dences that migrants were unwelcome. Migrants were not disapproved 
of categorically except by a small number of people in the rural areas. 
There were value conflicts, particularly in Ray and Tioga, but enough of 
the “natives” joined forces with the migrants that the opponents tended 
to be labeled “progressives” and “conservatives” rather than “old” and 
“new” residents. The opinion was general among both natives and mi-
grants that the latter had been accepted into the community.
Some of the hypothesized changes or failure to change were borne 
out at least partly. Social groups did not recruit migrant members. At 
least two groups were organized by Williston migrants—a Southern 
Baptist Church and a social club for the wives of oil workers. There 
were social problems but they were far short of the anticipated mag-
nitude. Housing of the “right” type was short, and there were a few 
indications of general dissatisfaction about it. There were high rates 
of minor offenses against the law, but there were no indications of or-
ganized crime. There were no serious complaints about the migrants 
being responsible for the increased offenses. Special problems were 
created for various public service agencies: schools were crowded and 
additions had to be built; the library, the post office and the state em-
ployment service all encountered considerable increases in the demand 
for their services; the local governments had to provide new and ex-
panded services.
Most of the evidence presented is of the descriptive survey type in 
keeping with the general purpose of the study. It is, at best, suggestive 
with respect to any general theory of social change. On the other hand, 
the description itself could have general usefulness for the officials and 
interested citizens in any community which is confronted with rapid 
change in helping them anticipate the kinds of actions which they 
might have to take. There is no question that the people of the Wil-
liston Basin knew little or nothing as to what to expect, consequently 
many of their actions and reactions contributed little to the solution 
of their problems or of the general situation. In our opinion (the data 
were not and are not available to express these as facts or as systematic 
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predictions): realtors over-extended themselves into the construction 
of residences for which there was no continuous, or future, demand; 
many North Dakotans migrated to the Basin in anticipation of unlim-
ited opportunities only to find no more opportunities than in the areas 
they left; school officials committed too much permanent building 
expansion;5 a general spirit of over-optimism, reflected in expansions, 
investments, and population estimates, left the citizens unprepared to 
handle the out-migration and the decrease in economic activity which 
had already begun in 1954. (One of the unfortunate aspects of a re-
port of this sort is that some of the predictions which are practically 
useful are not available early enough. We could have predicted fairly 
accurately the amount of immediate decrease in Tioga’s population as 
we were conducting the fieldwork because of our knowledge that par-
ticular individuals already knew the dates on which they were to be 
transferred. Furthermore, we could have predicted the decrease in ac-
tivity because of the knowledge we obtained about the relative number 
of employees needed in exploratory as compared to development ac-
tivity in the oil fields. The predictions of this sort that we expressed 
orally tended to be ridiculed as obviously wrong or as attempts to de-
valuate the importance of the oil development to the state of North 
Dakota. This reaction, itself, would be an interesting study.)
The total report is, in effect, a case study and as such tends to give 
the appearance that it is a description of unique situation. The practical 
usefulness of such a report depends in large measure on the applica-
bility of the results to other situations of the same sort. The following 
quotation indicates the similarity of the consequences of oil develop-
ment to those of industrial development in the small community; if 
North Dakota is successful in its attempts to attract industry the pic-
ture will be repeated.6
The information in this study illustrates the nature of social changes which 
are almost certain to occur in a community as a consequence of industrial 
development in or near its borders. The need for increased and improved 
trade facilities develops, and the demand for various public-supported ser-
vices grows. Sewage disposal, street improvements, additional water supply, 
expanded hospital facilities and more school buildings were problems which 
5 It is our prediction that the population of Ray and Tioga will decrease mark-
edly from the 1954 figures, thus tending to leave a surplus of classroom space. 
This will be no total loss by any means, since the communities will at least have 
modern buildings which they would not have had otherwise.
6 C.R. Hoffer and W. Freeman, Social Action Resulting from Industrial Devel-
opment, Michigan State University Agricultural Experiment Station. Special 
Bulletin 401, September 1955, pp. 29–30.
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were present in Mohawk, as they are likely to be in any community which has 
rapid increase in population.
The ways in which communities deal with these problems are varied. Sys-
tematic and scientific planning to take care of needs as they arise would be the 
ideal course to follow, but many communities are not successful in achieving 
this goal. In most instances, the need becomes very great—sometimes critical—
before a community will act. Mohawk, for instance, did not make definite plans 
to build a sewage disposal plant until the village was threatened with a court 
action. Such situations emphasize again the need of city and county planning 
as a basis for community action in response to social change.
In Mohawk, as in most communities, different points of view emerged in 
regard to the various action programs proposed to meet community needs. 
These views varied along a continuum from opposition to change to support 
for it. Such attitudes are characterized in different ways—conservative or pro-
gressive—old or new—reactionary or progressive. The name is not particularly 
important. The significant point is that in community action such divergent 
points of view are almost certain to rise.
Many of the old roots in Mohawk, that is the residents who had been in the 
community for a long time, tended to take the cautious, conservative position 
in regard to community action. Those who became residents as a consequence 
of industrial development favored a more aggressive program of community 
action. As in other similar situations, these points of view had to be harmo-
nized, at least to the extent that some kind of social actions to meet community 
needs could be accomplished.

Chapter 10
Social Impacts of Oil Development
Rick Ruddell and Heather Ray
North Dakota experienced three oil booms between 1951 and 2008, and while 
the effects of the 2008–14 boom and the subsequent cycle of slowdown and 
expansion are still playing out as this book goes to press, each of these expan-
sions in oilfield activities presented a set of distinctive economic, political, and 
social benefits and challenges for local and state governments. To a large ex-
tent these three factors are inextricably connected, economic activities being a 
key driver of political behavior as well as shaping a boom’s social impacts. With 
respect to economic activity, for example, between 1951 and 1955, oil produc-
tion in North Dakota increased from less than 30,000 barrels to 11 million 
barrels per year (North Dakota Industrial Commission 2019). That increased 
production, however, occurred primarily in Mountrail and Williams counties, 
and while oilfield activities disrupted the lives of local residents, these effects 
were generally contained in a relatively small geographic area and for a rela-
tively short period of time.
The 2008 boom, by contrast, saw oil production increase in the Bakken re-
gion of North Dakota from less than a half-million barrels per month right 
before the boom to a peak of over 361 million barrels in December 2014 
(North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources 2019). When the June 
2014 price of oil reached $112 per barrel, that production represented $44 
billion in revenue, a figure that does not count the revenue from natural gas. 
The 2008 boom was also spread across seventeen counties, although most oil 
was extracted in four of those (North Dakota Workforce Intelligence 2018). In 
contrast to what happened during the 1950s and 1980s booms, the economic 
benefits and the political and social impacts rippled from the Williston Basin 
throughout the entire state. Not only did the 2008 boom have a significant 
statewide impact, but extraction activities have waxed and waned since then 
and peaked in 2019. Thus, when examining the impacts of a resource-based 
boom, we have to consider the location, magnitude, and duration of the activi-
ties. Table 10.1 provides a framework for better understanding resource-based 
booms based on these three factors. 
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TABLE 10.1. 
LOCATION, MAGNITUDE, AND DURATION OF 
NORTH DAKOTA OIL AND NATURAL GAS BOOMS
Boom (Era)  1951–4  1981–6  2007–19
Location   2 counties 4 counties 17 counties
Duration   48 months 60 months 152 months
Magnitude  Minor  Minor  Major
Prior research shows that a common set of social problems emerge after the 
rapid population growth and industrialization associated with resource-based 
booms; these outcomes are called boomtown effects or social ills. The Gov-
ernment of New Brunswick (2012, 5) observes how these social ills include 
increased levels of crime, substance abuse, sexually transmitted infections, a 
lack of safe and affordable housing, higher levels of community dissatisfaction, 
growing child welfare, mental health, and social service caseloads, increased 
hospital admissions, and an inability to meet the need for health, education, 
public safety, and social services. Although no two booms are the same, Ruddell 
(2017, 16–18) contends that booms have a life cycle that starts with a rapidly 
growing population that overwhelms local government services, breaks down 
community order, and reduces the residents’ quality of life. 
Despite the existence of a growing body of research highlighting the chal-
lenges of resource-based booms, local government officials have often failed to 
learn from the mistakes their predecessors made, and most rural governments 
lack the capacity to effectively manage these events (Morrison, Wilson, and 
Bell 2012). Oil company officials, by contrast, are more familiar with the ups 
and downs of commodity-based business cycles and have learned to manage 
the expansion and contractions. 
Although studies focusing upon a single boom and bust, such as the con-
ditions described in the 1958 Williston Report or North Dakota government 
reports about the 1981–6 boom (see Heck 1992), provide us with insight into 
the impacts of booms occurring in the past, we have to be careful consumers 
of that research. Jacquet and Kay (2014) argue that the findings of research 
about rapid growth communities prior to 2000 provide limited insight about 
contemporary booms. They say that the economic and social conditions and 
demographic makeup in rural America—where most booms occur—have 
undergone a profound change in the past four decades. For example, booms 
occurring after 2000 are distinctive because many regions are experiencing 
cycles of boom, bust, and recovery over periods spanning decades. As oil and 
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natural gas prices decrease, wells are shut down and personnel laid off, but as 
prices increase, wells are reactivated and workers rehired. Communities in the 
Bakken are experiencing this cycle, and after the downturn in drilling in the 
2008 boom when production bottomed in 2016, there was a subsequent 51 
percent production growth by midyear 2019 (North Dakota Department of 
Mineral Resources 2019).
Most social problems associated with booms are interrelated (Gilmore 
1976). Fernando and Cooley (2016) contend that all boomtowns suffer from 
an inability to provide enough safe and affordable housing to meet demands. 
High housing costs force those without homes into unsafe, temporary, or un-
desirable living conditions. Temporary or makeshift housing arrangements can 
also contribute to crime as living in cramped and unsuitable conditions leads 
to tension and conflict and can result in increased family violence (Jayasun-
dara, Heitkamp, Mayzer, Legerski, and Evanson 2016). Furthermore, as rents 
increase and quality of life decreases, some longtime community residents on 
fixed incomes move to more affordable communities. The presence of these 
longtime residents, however, is important for building community resiliency 
through their volunteerism and support of family members, such as providing 
low-cost child care (Flanagan, Heitkamp, Nedegaard, and Jayasundara 2014).
Moreover, reducing the proportion of established community residents 
increases antisocial behavior and crime because informal social controls are 
weakened (see Freudenburg 1986). A lack of safe and affordable housing also 
leads to other social problems, and some women, for example, may feel forced 
to stay in dysfunctional or abusive relationships as they rely upon their part-
ner’s housing (Jayasundara, Legerski, Danis, and Ruddell 2019). Writing about 
women in resource-based communities, Amnesty International (2016) has 
described this problem as a form of precarity, saying that some women are 
only one argument away from living on the street, as there are so few housing 
alternatives. Last, a lack of affordable housing makes it difficult to recruit 
human service personnel into education, health-related, or law enforcement 
jobs (Jayasundara, Heitkamp, and Ruddell 2016).
Social Impacts of the 1951–4 Boom: A Brief Overview of the Williston Report
The authors of The Williston Report describe the social impacts of the 1950s 
boom and identify the biggest challenge as that of responding to the rapid 
population increase. From 1950 to 1954, the population of the oil-producing 
areas in Williams County increased by half (50.5 percent), whereas Mountrail 
County experienced a 6.1 percent growth (Wills, p. 53). Similar to other 
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booms, the population increase in those counties was driven primarily by men, 
and in Williston the gain between 1950 and 1954 was 33.6 percent men and 
29.8 percent women (Wills, p. 56). One challenge in fully understanding the 
population changes in a resource-based boom county, however, is that some in-
dividuals are missed in the census counts. These so-called shadow populations 
are often living in nontraditional housing arrangements such as man camps 
(see Caraher, Weber, and Rothaus, current volume), campgrounds, or other 
out-buildings in the countryside. Campbell (p. 252) notes, for example, that a 
very high population of long-term county residents were living in trailers after 
the boom.
One of the strengths of the analyses presented in the 1958 Williston Report 
is related to the research strategies used by these scholars. Campbell, for ex-
ample, surveyed newcomers and established residents from the oil-impacted 
counties about their perceptions of the boom. Moreover, these residents were 
asked about their behaviors, whether they had met new residents to their 
community, and what they thought of them (the newcomers were also asked 
about their perceptions of the community). These researchers also went to 
community-based organizations such as churches to solicit additional infor-
mation about the boom. So what did these efforts tell us about the 1950s 
Williston boom?  
Similar to the case in other resource-based booms, the characteristics of 
these newcomers to the Williston Basin—many of whom were from out of 
state—may have been threatening to longtime community residents. Some 
of these newcomers were from minority racial and ethnic backgrounds, and 
because most of these oilfield personnel were shift workers, it was difficult for 
them to join local organizations or develop a stake in the community. Inter-
estingly, many newcomers had families, which differentiated this group from 
similar groups in other boomtowns, where the influx of new residents in-
cluded primarily young men with few attachments to the community. Despite 
this influx of families, Campbell writes that few newcomers became members 
of local churches or joined fraternal organizations. 
Researchers found evidence of tension or conflict between the newcomers 
and longtime residents, and Campbell says these disagreements were some-
times based on the perception that newcomers were “riff-raff” and their 
presence disrupted existing relationships (p. 250). Other community-level 
conflicts emerged over disagreements about development, although those 
disputes did not seem to result in long-term problems. When asked whether 
newcomers had been accepted into the community, only 3 percent of longtime 
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residents said they had not, while a similar proportion of newcomers (4 per-
cent) expressed the same feeling (Campbell, p. 253).
When it comes to describing the social problems related to the boom, 
the challenges identified by Campbell are similar to those reported in other 
studies of rapid growth communities: a severe housing shortage, an uptick in 
disorder and crime (and especially offenses related to alcohol abuse), a rise in 
traffic flow and congestion, the challenges of dealing with transients seeking 
work, and the increased demand on public services and local businesses. With 
respect to the municipal or county services, for instance, school enrolments 
increased and the library’s book circulation grew fourfold (Campbell, p. 265). 
Increased demands were also placed on state and federal agencies, and the 
state employment service was busy during both the boom and the bust, while 
the post office was overwhelmed with business-related mail. 
To accommodate these demands, many human service agencies expanded 
capacity in terms of increased office space and personnel, although these solu-
tions became problems once oil production waned and county populations 
dropped. One of the hard lessons learned in the oil-impacted communities 
was the risk of making long-term investments in physical infrastructure, 
such as housing, in these places as investors lost money when the population 
decreased in the bust. This lesson may have reduced interest in investing in 
housing developments in subsequent booms.
Altogether, a review of The Williston Report shows that the rapid population 
growth led to a severe housing shortage and government services, and local 
businesses struggled to meet their demands. While the results of surveys re-
vealed the presence of tension between newcomer populations (“outsiders”) 
and the existing residents (“insiders”), Campbell and his colleagues found that 
most new residents felt accepted. Yet, the 1950s boom was distinctive as it 
lasted only four years and its impact centered primarily on two counties. One 
interesting question is the degree to which municipal leaders learned from this 
experience, and whether the social impacts of the post-2000 resource-based 
boom were similar to ones that occurred earlier.
Social Impacts of the 2008 Boom
Every resource-based boom is distinctive in regards to its location, duration, 
and magnitude, but one common factor is the inevitable bust (Marais and Nel 
2016). With respect to North Dakota, the 1950s oil and gas boom-and-bust 
cycle was followed by a similar one in the 1980s. The boom that started in 
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2008 differed from the prior booms because of the massive scale of the de-
velopment and duration of the boom, and because extraction activities were 
being carried out over an entire region, rather than in several out-of-the-way 
counties. Kelsey, Partridge, and White (2016) describe how the increasing 
value of oil and natural gas, combined with the introduction of hydraulic 
fracturing (or “fracking”) enabled producers to extract oil from areas where 
conventional drilling was not profitable. Taken together, these factors resulted 
in a “perfect storm” that led to unprecedented levels of oil and natural gas 
production in sparsely populated rural counties throughout the Bakken (Mon-
tana and North Dakota), Eagle Ford (Texas), and Marcellus (Pennsylvania and 
New York) regions. Of all these locations, however, the oil boom in the Bakken 
had the most significant social impact, especially considering an almost 1300 
percent increase in oil production between January 1, 2007, and May 31, 2019 
(North Dakota Industrial Commission 2019). 
Both the rapid population increase and industrialization in the 2008 North 
Dakota boom differed from its 1950s counterpart in a number of ways. When 
it comes to population growth, Scheyder (2016) reports that over 80,000 
people came to North Dakota to work in the oil and gas and supporting indus-
tries. It is not surprising these newcomers had a disruptive impact, especially 
considering there were fewer than 660,000 residents in the entire state pop-
ulation before the boom. As was the case during prior expansions in oilfield 
activities, many of these newcomers were young men, but in contrast to the 
1950s boom described in the Williston Report, few brought their families to 
the oil patch. The fastest population growth occurred in the early phase of this 
boom as a greater number of workers was required to drill the wells and to 
construct the infrastructure, such as plant structures, railways, and pipelines, 
that move these commodities.
The stressors placed on the communities affected by a rapid population in-
crease depend upon the community’s resiliency and the characteristics of the 
newcomers. Some of these new residents stay a short time, thus increasing 
the population turnover. The deployment of the workforce might also influ-
ence the social ills experienced in a boomtown. Depending on the location of a 
boom, many of the out-of-town personnel live in company housing, and either 
fly (or drive) in and out on a rotating work schedule (e.g., two-weeks on, and 
two-weeks off). These full-time workers and part-time residents will typically 
have little investment in community life. Taken together, the rapid growth 
and population turnover contributes to community instability by reducing in-
formal social controls, which in turn increases disorder and crime. Population 
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growth can also have a corrosive effect on some communities by increasing 
conflict between different groups of longtime residents as well as the longtime 
residents and newcomers (Ruddell 2017). 
There is a predictable set of outcomes when the population of young men 
with little stake in a community increases and the informal controls decrease, 
and these ill effects were reported after the 2008 boom. Incidents of alcohol 
and drug abuse increased. Women reported being hounded by men and feeling 
unsafe, and a growing number of them experienced assaults and stalking 
(Jayasundara, Heitkamp, Mayzer, Legerski, and Evanson 2016). Law enforce-
ment agencies in the Bakken reported a substantial increase in calls for service 
beyond what could be expected by a population increase (Dahle and Archbold 
2105; Montana All Threat Intelligence Center and North Dakota State and 
Local Intelligence Center 2012). 
The second factor common to all resource-based boom towns or counties 
is the increased level of industrialization that reduces the residents’ quality 
of life. Loh and Loh (2016) describe how noise, light, and water pollution are 
common by-products of resource extraction. One factor differentiating the 
2008 boom from the prior booms was the introduction of fracking, which is a 
technologically complex undertaking requiring massive investments in mate-
rial and personnel. For example, Kondash and Vengosh (2015, 276) point out 
that between 3.6 and 6 million gallons of water are required to frack each well, 
and this water must be hauled by trucks, which creates traffic-related prob-
lems such as congestion, the destruction of roadways, and a rise in the number 
of collisions. A series of surveys carried out in one boomtown over almost a 
decade reveals that aggressive, dangerous, and drunk driving are among the 
greatest concerns of community residents (Britto 2016).
Boomtown Effects after 2008
Every rapid growth community differs in the extent to which social problems 
affect its residents. The magnitude, duration, and location of the 2008 boom 
in the Bakken created a situation where the impacts of these factors were 
many times those experienced in the 1950s. One of the challenges of fully 
understanding the extent of these social problems was the exaggeration by 
the media of the impacts of the boom, as news accounts featured sensational 
headlines such as “crime turns oil boomtown into Wild West” (Ellis 2011), a 
theme that was repeated in magazine articles, blogs, news reports, and televi-
sion series over a seven-year period (Ruddell 2017). But were those accounts 
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accurate? In what follows, we provide a short summary of the boomtown ef-
fects in the Bakken region by drawing on official government statistics and the 
perceptions of human service workers and police officers.
One of the challenges of relying upon official statistics to assess the impact 
of rapid population growth is that booms are often located in out-of-the-way 
places where local governments have often done an incomplaete job of col-
lecting and reporting statistics about the demand and delivery of human 
services. Thus, educational or health agencies might not formally track in-
formation about their students or patients regarding their origins or other 
characteristics, such as their histories of special needs. As a result, after the 
population surges, local agencies frequently scramble to justify additional 
funding from the state or federal governments to manage the increased de-
mand, but lack accurate pre-boom statistics. Researchers and journalists have 
consistently reported how the demands for services exceeded the capacity 
to respond effectively in the health (McChesney 2012), education (Schafft, 
Glenna, Green, and Borlu 2014), and social services (Weber, Geigle, and Bark-
dull 2014).
With respect to crime, Ruddell, Jayasundara, Mayzer, and Heitkamp (2014) 
analyzed the pre- and post-boom crime statistics in Montana and North 
Dakota counties affected by the expansion in oilfield activities. One of the dif-
ficulties in carrying out this type of research is that sparsely populated rural 
counties did not consistently report their annual crime-related statistics to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation for its annual Uniform Crime Report. One of 
the barriers to researchers interested in studying crime in these rural coun-
ties is that police departments or sheriff ’s offices are not required to submit 
statistics about the crimes reported to them, the number of arrests made by 
their deputies or officers, or the calls for services their agencies receive. Unless 
those statistics are accurately reported, our knowledge of crime in these rapid 
growth communities will continue to be incomplete.
When frontline human service workers from education, health, public safety, 
and social service agencies were asked about the impact of the boom, they 
clearly indicated their workloads became overwhelming and their agencies 
lacked the resources to adequately manage demands. Because these officials 
work directly with clients, their perceptions and insights are important when 
considering the social impacts of rapid population growth. In order to better 
understand the impact of the boom, Flanagan, Heitkamp, Nedegaard and 
Jayasundara (2014, 93) conducted focus groups with human service workers, 
and the consensus was that while many North Dakotans benefited from the 
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boom, these workers carried the burden. They found that the boom had the 
following impacts:
• Changes in the nature of service delivery: The workloads and the complexity 
of cases these workers managed increased, and many of the clients these 
workers served had serious addictions issues.
• Difficulties in hiring and retention: Agencies lost staff members to more 
lucrative jobs in the oilfield, and it was difficult to replace them as the 
high costs of living in boom counties made it difficult to recruit. Conse-
quently, the workloads of existing workers increased.
• Lack of training to meet changing needs: The increasing complexity and seri-
ousness of cases required additional training, although agency staff had 
few opportunities to participate in training and their agencies lacked the 
funds for training.
• Insufficient services to address needs: In addition to high workloads, many 
organizations lacked the physical resources to meet client demands; do-
mestic violence shelters, for instance, did not have enough beds and  some 
abused and vulnerable women were told to seek help in other counties.
• Economic realities of resource allocations: Workers reported that their 
funding agencies were reluctant to expand the capacity of local services 
because they felt the boom would be short-lived. (Flanagan et al. 2014, 
94–100)
Altogether, a lack of resources forced agency staff to exercise creativity in 
order to meet an almost relentless demand for services with no corresponding 
increase in funding or staffing. Respondents indicated they engaged in more 
partnerships, coordinated activities to reduce duplication, and sought donors 
to fund their efforts (Flanagan et al. 2014). Human service workers made a 
similar set of observations about the impacts of the oil boom, mentioning a 
discrepancy between the caseloads they reported to the agencies that funded 
them and their actual workloads. They also described how shortages in areas 
such as housing contributed to crime and reported that clients showed up 
at human service agencies with a greater set of unmet needs (Jayasundara, 
Heitkamp, and Ruddell 2016, 72). As Everingham, Devenin and Collins (2015) 
observe about the impact of resource-extraction in Australia, “the beast doesn’t 
stop.”
Police scholars have also examined the impact of the oil boom on officers 
policing North Dakota counties. Dahle and Archbold (2015, 810) describe how 
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police workloads—as indicated by calls for service—increased in oil-impacted 
North Dakota towns and cities between 2000 and 2013. Although some agen-
cies, such as the Minot Police Department, had relatively modest increases in 
calls (26.4 percent), Williston, which was the epicenter of the boom, experi-
enced a 857.5 percent increase in calls. While workload demands increased 
exponentially, these agencies were slow to add additional officers or to re-
ceive budget increases that were commensurate with the new demands. The 
complement of sworn officers in Williston, for example, increased from twen-
ty-one to thirty-eight (81 percent) in those thirteen years, and their annual 
budget tripled. These results were similar to those published in the Montana 
All Threat Intelligence Center and North Dakota State and Local Intelligence 
Center (2012) report. The question that follows those statistics is how officers 
manage these expanding workloads.
Dahle and Archbold (2015, 811–16) asked three questions about managing 
the impacts of rapid population growth on crime in North Dakota, and after 
analyzing the responses of 101 police officers and sheriff ’s deputies in focus 
groups, they observe:
• The impact of rapid population growth on police organizations: Over two-
thirds (67 percent) of respondents reported that their agencies lacked 
the resources to keep up with workloads, although half of their agencies 
hired additional personnel. Participants said that the quality of their ser-
vices decreased as officers were more reactive (and no longer had time to 
spend explaining their actions with the public) and were not engaging in 
informal community-building efforts. 
• The impact of changing work environments on police organizations: Not only 
did calls for service related to disorder and crime increase, but officers 
were responding to very high numbers of traffic-related incidents. Offi-
cers also reported that there was a cultural change in their communities, 
and they believed that some outsiders had little stake in them. They 
were also perceived as having less regard for the law than established 
residents. Participants said they had less time for informally interacting 
with teachers, students or business owners due to workload demands. 
Similar to the results reported by the human service workers in Jayasun-
dara, Heitkamp, and Ruddell’s (2016) study, the high workload demands 
increased the number of collaborative relationships with other law en-
forcement agencies.
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• The impact of rapid population growth on police resources: Almost one half 
of the respondents said their organizations were “stretched thin,” and 
even though most agencies hired additional officers, the recruiting and 
training of these new officers (in the academies and in the field) placed 
additional demands on their operations. Although the opportunity to 
work overtime increased due to the staffing shortages, working longer 
hours contributed to burnout and fatigue. Participants also reported 
that the resources needed for their operations, such as office space or jail 
cells and vehicles, did not meet their needs.
A consistent theme underlying the observations of human service workers 
and law enforcers is that workload expectations became unreasonable and the 
ability of their agencies to provide responsive services decreased as the boom 
progressed. Agencies already criticized for being reactive could no longer en-
gage in preventative activities, and almost all respondents said that the quality 
of their services suffered. In some cases, the human service agencies did not 
have the resources to help some clients. 
Summary and Conclusions
The 1950s boom in the Williston Basin resulted in a rapid population increase 
that placed great demands on local businesses and human service agencies. 
But as Campbell observes, the boom was relatively short-lived, and local 
governments overcame these shortcomings. The boom starting in 2008, by 
contrast, had a much greater social impact due to its longer duration and its 
impact on all aspects of community life, starting in the Williston Basin and 
radiating throughout the state. Whereas prior booms were contained to sev-
eral counties, the 2008 boom had a profound effect throughout western North 
Dakota and eastern Montana. The final chapters about the 2008 boom have 
not been written, and the oil and gas extraction activities have persisted for 
over a decade, albeit with a slowdown from 2014 to 2016 before production 
increased and then peaked in 2019 (North Dakota Department of Mineral 
Resources 2019). This brings us to the question of what we have learned from 
this comparison of the booms in different eras.
Thomas, Smith, and Ortiz (2016) contend that if a social problem can 
be predicted, it can be prevented. For the most part, the social impacts of 
the rapid population growth and industrialization associated with a re-
source-based boom can be foreseen, and local and state government officials 
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can act proactively to mitigate the worst aspects of these booms by leveraging 
resources and participating in intergovernmental collaborations (Smith, Hag-
gerty, Kay, and Coupal 2019). Research from over four decades has provided 
us with a good understanding of the impact of rapid population changes in 
sparsely populated rural communities and the interconnectedness of the social 
problems that emerge during a boom. Based on those observations Ruddell 
(2017) developed a list of fifteen steps that local governments can take to mit-
igate the crime-related and other social problems caused by a natural-resource 
boom. Local government officials can tailor those strategies for the distinctive 
conditions in their jurisdictions. Regardless of where and when a boom occurs, 
however, attempts to reduce the social ills occurring in these places must be 
broad-based, integrated, and start with the assumption that all resource-based 
booms eventually bust. 
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Making Home in the Bakken Oil 
Patch
William Caraher, Bret Weber, and Richard Rothaus
If not for the dated photographs, the 1958 Williston Report’s treatment of 
housing could apply to the early twenty-first century Bakken boom. Both 
1958 and the early twenty-first century witnessed the arrival of temporary 
workers who impacted the region’s older communities even more than the rig 
counts or the barrels of oil sent to market. In both eras, the influx of a rapidly 
changing workforce produced high rents, limited housing options, and created 
a sense of social disruption. 
During the Bakken’s most recent boom, we led the North Dakota Man Camp 
Project. Like the authors of the Williston Report, we brought a multidisciplinary 
team to the Bakken oil patch (for a review of this project see Caraher, Weber, 
Kourelis, and Rothaus 2017; Caraher and Weber 2017; Caraher, Weber, and 
Rothaus 2016; Barkdull, Weber, and Geigle 2016). Our project focused on doc-
umenting the material and social lives of the workers living in the wide range 
of workforce housing sites across the region. The North Dakota Man Camp 
Project and the Williston Report both captured a moment in the dynamic space 
of the Bakken. Indeed, the rapid pace of change and the resulting housing 
crisis and social disruption appear to be a common feature to resource booms 
around the world (Ruddell and Ray, this volume). Booms can create collisions 
when they bring the needs and capital of the global center to rural peripheries 
(Caraher 2016), and when “outside” workers arrive in the region and interact 
with longer-term, more established residents. Despite these structural similar-
ities, there are differences in terms of the scope of the two Bakken booms, each 
involving distinct policy reactions and economic and political contexts. As a 
result, we located the twenty-first century Bakken boom within its particular 
historical context and framed our attention to workforce housing amid the 
growing concern for housing in the late modern world (Madden and Marcuse 
2016).
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This chapter provides a critique of the 1958 Report’s treatment of housing, 
a consideration of the emergent perspectives on workforce housing in the 
present, and an overview of our research of temporary workforce housing. It 
concludes with a consideration of how economic booms and busts manifest 
and accelerate changing ideals about domesticity and the political ramifica-
tions of these changes for community in the context of global capital. 
Summary of the Williston Report with Special Attention to Housing
The 1958 Williston Report provides an invaluable snapshot of the 1950s oil 
boom. It describes the scale of the boom, confronts the challenge of counting 
and documenting a mobile and temporary workforce, and wrestles to measure 
the impact of social change. In the absence of consistent and high-resolution 
data, the authors of the Williston Report supplemented their study with inter-
views and more impressionistic readings of the situation. Our work follows 
similar patterns.
The Williston Report is very much a report, and it approached aspects of 
the 1950s oil boom largely on its own terms. There is little effort to locate 
the 1950s Bakken boom within the history of the state, the region, or larger 
conversations about extractive industries and the associated changes in the 
mobility of the American workforce in the postwar era. As the authors note, 
their report is a case study rather than a policy brief or an argument for under-
standing the broader causes and patterns of social change. 
That being said, Campbell and his colleagues’ observations are not without 
judgment. They assert that some of the housing in the Bakken, particularly 
around Tioga was, indeed, “substandard,” including tar-paper shacks and struc-
tures rough enough to be thought of as “grain bins.” Photos from the 1950s 
showed light-weight, closely-spaced buildings that could be moved two at a 
time with a farm truck (p. 258–2). Interviews with one resident confirmed 
their unsuitability, noting, “How can they expect a man to live in something 
like that? I’ve come all the way from (a southern state) because of my job and 
I’ve never had to live in anything like this before” (p. 258). These temporary 
houses were not the only solution to the housing boom: communities like Ray 
and Tioga also subdivided more substantial, existing structures to accommo-
date workers, and Williston and Tioga built new housing. Additionally, both 
then and now, as is common in boom areas around the globe, some oil com-
panies provided mobile housing units to accommodate their employees in the 
oil patch, though this is generally done for more highly skilled workers and 
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management, with the rest of the workforce largely left to find their own way 
with limited options (Weaver 2010; Van Bueren 2002; Caraher 2016).
In the 1950s, the tight housing market caused by the boom motivated com-
munities and developers to invest in housing, but, ironically, most of it was 
expensive and high quality, built to attract individuals with higher incomes 
who already enjoyed stable housing. As a result, new construction did little 
to alleviate the housing challenges facing workers who only intended to stay 
in the region temporarily or who did not enjoy high salaries or wages. Fur-
ther aggravating the immediate situation, new construction motivated policy 
makers to limit the extent and impact of temporary housing, which further 
limited available choices for temporary residents. This dynamic has seemingly 
recurred in each subsequent boom in the Bakken.
The authors of the Williston Report hinted at an analysis that considered 
the social and political dynamics of housing, but, despite the changes taking 
place across the region, they shied from considering housing to be a genuine 
“social problem” (p. 257). Instead, there was a tendency to acquiesce. Quotes 
from longer-term residents suggest a sense that something was wrong with 
the workers who seemingly chose to live in “substandard” temporary workforce 
housing. One Tioga resident commented that “I don’t see how anyone could 
rent” the available housing, suggesting that there was something wrong with 
the workers rather than the housing (p. 256). Workforce housing was pri-
marily seen as an individual problem and the responsibility of the workers. 
Rather than a social responsibility, temporary workforce housing became an 
inconvenience for longer-term residents to endure. In this regard, the 1958 
Report echoed many of the sentiments expressed to members of the North 
Dakota Man Camp Project during our research. Housing remained “disturbing 
to the researcher” (p. 254), but longtime residents only rarely articulated it as 
a problem for the workers. Whether the discussion was about RVs or modular 
crew camps, long-term residents tended to view them as necessary solutions, 
or even evils, to tolerate and eventually banish, rather than seeing the housing 
shortage as a social problem to be solved. The Williston Report demonstrates 
what is probably obvious for all who have experienced booms: housing and the 
resulting tensions between existing communities and new arrivals is a recur-
ring, key dynamic of booms related to extractive industries.
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Historiography of Short-term Housing and Home
The Williston Report appeared at a transformative time for scholars considering 
new forms of American housing in the post-war era, particularly in the Amer-
ican west, and the report anticipated a twenty-first century global housing 
crisis emerging around the time of the Bakken boom. John Bickerstaff Jack-
son’s 1953 study of the “westward moving house” (Jackson 1953), and his late 
1950s research on housing in the Four Corners area of the American south-
west (Jackson 1960) recognized housing in the west as a distinct phenomenon 
adapted both to the identity of the owner and to the economic needs of a re-
gion. More recent studies on temporary worker housing during World War II 
(such as Foster 1980; Mitchell 2012), and on the rise of mobile homes and RVs 
as expressions of the tension between mobility and stability in the American 
suburbs (Jackson 1984; White 2001), likewise saw the middle of the twentieth 
century as a period during which housing and concepts of domesticity came 
to intersect with new materials, plans, and social roles (Berger 1961; Duncan 
and Duncan 2004). Set against this backdrop, Campbell and his colleagues’ 
ambivalent attitude toward the housing problem in the 1950s Bakken likely 
reflected the significant changes taking place within American attitudes to-
ward the house and domesticity during the same decade (see Hayden 1984 for 
the classic treatment of this period; Miller 2010).
Sixty years after the Williston Report, United Nations’ experts warned of a 
global housing crisis largely driven by financial speculation (Johnstone 2017). 
The intense commodification of housing has increased the mobility of global 
capital in ways that have harmed the housing security of multiple populations. 
There has been a dramatic expansion of ad hoc housing around urban areas 
in the global south, worsened challenges associated with housing the growing 
number of refugees and migrants in the global north, and—as is the case in 
the Bakken—greater numbers of laborers engaged in precarious manufac-
turing jobs, construction projects, and other short-term ventures. Activists and 
scholars alike recognize that the housing needs of workers, migrants, refugees, 
and urban dwellers are a matter of social, economic, and environmental justice. 
Recent critiques have made clear, for example, that the Williston Report’s pre-
scient observation that the tendency of developers to invest in high cost and 
high profit units at the expense of affordable housing, when multiplied across 
the global stage, has contributed to the global housing crisis (for example, 
Madden and Marcuse 2016). 
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Indeed, for those interested in the housing-related challenges of the twen-
ty-first century, the 1958 Williston Report is almost uncannily relevant, even if 
it might strike the modern readers as calloused. For a start, the Report’s non-
chalant assertion that in many cases housing problems represented more of 
a “personal” problem than a larger social one, forecast the tendency of many 
twenty-first century policy makers to turn a blind eye to the reality that 
temporary housing represents a compromise negotiated across a dramatic 
power imbalance. This imbalance separates workers and employers, shapes the 
attitude of the Bakken counties’ longer-term residents, and colors prevailing 
attitudes of society at large. Attitudes toward domesticity favor home own-
ership, but the material, economic, and environmental limits present in the 
industrial wilderness of the Bakken, and the attitudes and policies promul-
gated by state and local communities, tend to marginalize temporary labor and 
limit their housing options. Workers, migrants, other marginalized groups find 
themselves in a social bind where status is tied to a preference for single-family 
home ownership in an environment where that is largely not possible. 
For their part, longtime residents often seek to alleviate the pressure of 
global and national financial capital that directly impacts their lives (increased 
housing costs, social disruption, etc.) by leveraging their access to local and 
regional political and social capital at the expense of temporary workers (for 
some of this see Olive, current volume). In this context and in this contest, 
the temporary housing in the Bakken and the conditions that produced it 
emerge as less than an exceptional response to an unexpected boom and more 
of a grim model for housing the growing class of precarious workers in the 
twenty-first century. In other words, the “personal” problem of housing in the 
Williston Report masked deep issues that would come to the fore over the next 
sixty years.
North Dakota Man Camp Project’s Approach to Housing in the Bakken
The NDMCP looked at workforce housing in the Bakken both directly and 
as a lens on shifting ideals about work and home. We considered the lives of 
temporary workers and longer-term residents, and how both negotiated the 
practical realities of housing, home, and community. We looked at the mate-
rial and social aspects of various forms of workforce housing, and how the 
resulting constraints and opportunities shaped personal wellbeing amid the 
intersection of the private and the political. Over the course of five years, we 
developed a longitudinal sample of workforce housing sites in the Bakken that 
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reflected a wide range of forms, practices, and experience in North Dakota’s 
Williams and McKenzie counties. The resulting archive consists of nearly 
10,000 photographs, dozens of hours of video, and interviews with camp resi-
dents, managers, owners, as well as local officials in the Bakken.
Neither the Williston Report nor our own work ever offered precise counts 
of workers in relation to available housing. Both numbers were so rapidly fluc-
tuating that such attempts were not practical, and such a count was simply 
outside the scope of our research focus. However, in the process of dissem-
inating our findings we were often pressed for such data. Some illustrative, 
point-in-time estimates help to address this. In 2012, the North Dakota Pe-
troleum Council estimated that the boom had created 65,000 jobs, with a 
state population of just over 700,000. At that same time, the Department 
of Commerce estimated the number of “available beds” in crew camps at just 
15,119, suggesting that fewer than 25 percent of the new workers would have 
been readily accommodated by temporary workforce housing. These figures 
also neglect those who came to the Bakken looking for work and housing but 
then left, usually due to the lack of affordable or available housing. Further, in 
consideration of the tension between the workers and the longtime residents, 
many of the camps dwarfed neighboring communities in terms of population. 
In terms of population alone, several of the worker settlements would have 
been counted among the state’s twenty largest cities. 
Like the Williston Report, we observed workers living in substandard, over-
priced, and cramped housing vulnerable to the vagaries of North Dakota’s 
weather, and we recognized the range of housing options as well as the ways 
workers modified their temporary accommodations to endure the seasons 
and to enhance their domestic lives. But we also strove to be more nuanced in 
capturing the changing conditions throughout the boom and the subsequent 
slowdown, and to monitor the changes brought on by the increased inven-
tory of permanent housing, the decline in employment opportunities in the 
oil patch, and the policy-driven legal challenges to the provisional use permits 
under which many temporary man camps functioned. 
The eventual decline in the number of jobs we observed parallels the ob-
servations made in the Williston Report. For instance, Tioga saw an easing of 
housing pressures with the completion of a gas plant and other regional proj-
ects in 1954 (p. 214). We saw similar outcomes in Tioga and, perhaps most 
dramatically, in Watford City. The completion of major infrastructure projects 
(especially roads and pipelines), and the increase in housing inventory, allevi-
ated some of the pressure on workforce housing, and we worked to capture the 
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ways that the end of the most intense phases of booms tend to reveal and even 
highlight the underlying tensions and flows of capital that the earlier frenetic 
pace, optimism, and opportunism tend to obscure.
The issues of housing and home in the Bakken oil patch must also be consid-
ered in relation to the reality that many of the workers who lived in temporary 
housing were victims of the housing crisis and the Great Recession of 2008. 
There were some parallels with the earlier, nationwide, 1952 recession, and the 
acute, post-World War II housing shortage. But that is where the similarity 
mostly ends. The earlier period was one where lifetime employment with 
a single employer was relatively common. That was also the dawn of a bur-
geoning, suburban domesticity. In contrast, after 2008, many of the workers 
who came to the Bakken continued to pay mortgages on distant homes in 
other states, while others had left properties that were underwater, hoping to 
start anew in the Bakken. These were workers who understood the likelihood 
of job insecurity and multiple, shifting employers over the course of a career. 
Indeed, many had weathered previous booms that shaped their attitudes to-
ward housing and home. One woman, a veteran of the Alaska oil boom, warned 
in an interview in the fall of 2016, “Don’t count on the oil field … when it’s good 
it’s great, but when it tanks, it affects an entire community.”1 She described her 
and her husband’s experience: 
When the oil tanked up there, and the oil went away, I lost my job, his 
overtime got cut. So our primary home … we couldn’t afford the big mort-
gage on it anymore, so that got foreclosed on, and we had another little 
rental house that we sold at a huge loss.2 
Near the end of the interview she wistfully hinted at the long-term nature of 
booms in extractive industries with a courageous sense of humor: “My dad has 
seen the oil field rise and fall a couple times, and he kinda tried to warn us, but, 
you know, we said the oil field is so big, it’s going to last forever!”3
1 NDMCP Personal Interview FT 12_3 October 28, 2016. A note on citations: those in 
footnotes indicate interviews conducted by the North Dakota Man Camp Project, the Field 
Trip (FT) number during which the interview occurred, the randomly assigned number of 
the interview, and the date when it was conducted. While we have worked to obfuscate the 
identity of the interview subject, all individuals signed consent forms with the understanding 
that anonymity was not guaranteed. Those forms are on file with the authors.
2 NDMCP Personal Interview FT 12_3 October 28, 2016.
3 NDMCP Personal Interview FT 12_3 October 28, 2016.
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Bakken observers have noted the hard reality that families exchanged the 
stability of a house for a trailer, mobile home, or room in a prefabricated 
man camp (see Briody 2017; Rao 2018). The juxtaposition of the subprime 
mortgage crisis and the challenges associated with workforce housing in the 
Bakken illustrate the changing nature of work and home in the twenty-first 
century (e.g. Gold 2014). 
Making Home in the North Dakota Oil Patch
The Williston Report and our research both describe workers dismayed about 
the high cost and wretched quality of the housing available to them. We might 
assume that workers in the 1950s, like those we spoke with, struggled to de-
velop domestic norms, worked to transform temporary housing into homelike 
spaces, and sought other ways to improve their situation. Regardless, our re-
search focused on these dynamics to a much greater degree than did the 1958 
Report. To facilitate that focus, we utilized a three-level typology to describe 
the different forms of temporary workforce housing. 
The NDMCP started its research at the end of the most hectic phase of the 
oil boom during which the most ad hoc camps, which we categorized as in-
formal Type 3 camps, emerged and dissipated across the region. These included 
sites like the infamous Williston Walmart parking lot camp, local city parks, 
and the sudden overcrowding of recreational camping sites across the region. 
The temporary shelter created in Williston’s Concordia Lutheran church’s 
basement by Rev. Jay Reinke (chronicled in the documentary The Overnighters 
[Moss 2014]), represents a dramatic but not entirely unique variation on 
the kinds of spontaneous settlements that appeared in the earliest days of 
the boom (Briody 2017). These existed in the liminal space between official 
and unofficial policies, the vagaries of law enforcement attitudes, changing 
housing options, and local goodwill. The precarity of these camps seemed to 
create a greater degree of interdependence and even an ephemeral sense of 
community. But as administrative infrastructure and more formal forms of 
temporary housing slowly developed during the early chaos of the boom, un-
certainty tipped against these camps and their number and visibility slowly 
dissipated. 
More persistent than the Type 3 camps, Type 2 camps consisted largely of 
RVs arranged in lots with electrical and water hookups. These camps presented 
more conventional opportunities for homemaking and were both a major 
source of housing for many workers and a particular focus of our research (see 
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Caraher et al. 2016). Occupants enhanced and expanded their living spaces 
through the construction of elaborate “mudrooms” which occasionally ex-
ceeded the size of the original units and could include bunks, living spaces, and 
additional storage. There were also outdoor improvements on the small lots 
including gardens and various features to delineate some semblance of private 
space. This making of outdoor living spaces was a consequence of the cramped, 
spatial limits of life in an RV; interestingly, the mudrooms also provided fea-
tures of traditional suburban life. The construction of elaborate mudrooms 
expanded the useful space of the RV units but also allowed residents to 
demonstrate proficiency in building, and created an opportunity to formalize 
and personalize the entrance to their units. The Type 2 camps had a blurred, 
suburban look to them, with informal neighborhoods and some limited sense 
of community. These camps typically had investors from outside the region 
and local management who worked with residents and nearby communities 
to create rules that governed the extent to which residents could modify their 
units. Most importantly, despite the often ramshackle appearance of some of 
these camps, they offered the closest alternative to late twentieth century U.S. 
norms of domesticity.
Type 1 camps, often referred to as crew camps or lodges, offered modular, 
mobile housing typically managed by national or even global logistics com-
panies. These were sometimes fenced in with security gates and prohibitions 
against alcohol, firearms, or guests. They generally accommodated workers 
from larger companies that reserved blocks of rooms for time-specific projects. 
Such workers tended to move through the region in shifts of three or four 
weeks of relatively constant work, followed by one or two weeks off. In general, 
these camps had more formal, on-site, management and security. While some 
offered the convenience of meals, these camps generally offered only minimal 
amenities akin to economy motels. They also restricted the opportunities to 
customize spaces. Most residents lived at these facilities for a limited number 
of weeks and then departed the camp for a week or two. Some took their pay-
checks and left for mini-vacations or cruises, while others returned home to 
domestic dynamics strained by distance, work schedules outside of the norm 
of a forty-hour work week, and chores and other family tensions that had been 
waiting during their absence. Either way, when they returned to the camp, 
they were generally lodged in different rooms, with virtually no opportunity 
for customized spaces or any semblance of private domesticity. Our experi-
ence as temporary workers in the Bakken involved repeated stays in one of 
these camps, which provided a practical alternative to tracking down scarce 
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and overpriced hotel rooms. We rarely stayed for more than one night, and 
we found them to be eminently convenient. However, the enforced, apolitical 
existence with little to no sense of continuity or community meant that these 
offered the least opportunity for human interaction. Type 1 camps offered the 
most efficient, but the least human, way for temporary workers to be moved in 
and out of the Bakken like replaceable parts.
Man Camps and the Policy Realm
The majority of policy makers seemed to share the view of E. Ward Koeser, 
president of the Tioga city commission in Williams County, who regarded 
“man-camps as being somewhat a necessary evil” (Klimasinska 2013). As such, 
the state’s general policy response was to rely on existing code, impose mini-
malist safety standards, utilize ad hoc efforts to limit the spread and longevity 
of man camps, and alter that course only when pressed. State policy makers 
tended to focus on short-term, financial considerations. 
Despite clear distinctions from other forms of lodging, the most directly 
relevant policies connected either to motel and hotel regulations, or to mobile 
home and RV parks, and focused almost exclusively on “fire, life, and safety.”4 
The origin of policies governing temporary labor housing were coincident with 
the state’s earlier booms, though they were largely driven by federal responses 
to the development of mobile homes in the 1950s, and federal designations 
created by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the 
1970s, rather than more specific efforts to control or enhance housing during 
the previous booms. 
The major policy revisions during the twenty-first century boom clarified 
the definition of temporary work camp housing and set five-year time limits 
with the requirement that owners remove the housing and “all related above-
grade and below-grade infrastructure within one hundred twenty days after 
the temporary work camp housing is vacated” (NDCC 54-21.3-02.8 and 54-
21.3-04.3). By 2014, many camps had already outlived the five-year limit, 
and by September of that year, headlines in the Williston Herald announced, 
“Companies facing millions in fines for temporary housing,” with twenty-nine 
separate housing units approaching locally imposed expiration dates (Bell 
2014; Barkdull et al. 2016).
Highly-impacted communities in the heart of the oil boom tried to regulate 
man camp proliferation, especially in response to overwhelmed infrastructure. 
4 NDMCP Personal Interview FT 10_8 August 1, 2015.
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For instance, local waste treatment facilities were only able to accommodate 
so many new toilets flushing into the system. State officials noted marked 
improvements in the ability of local governments to plan and control these de-
velopments, but, despite being awash in oil revenue, the state generally avoided 
direct assistance, leaving local governmental entities mostly on their own. As 
described by one long-term state official, “there was no state funding for any of 
this. The counties and cities came up with their own money to put their own 
inspection departments in place.”5 Communities such as Watford City, caught 
in the crosshairs of some of the boom’s busiest activity and traffic, had no plan-
ning department through the first years of the boom. The speed with which 
local entities were able to develop local ordinances and administrative staffing 
and support for inspection and enforcement varied greatly. With generally 
insufficient funding and policy support—and a lack of housing for newly 
hired bureaucrats!—local and state officials developed new collaborations and 
communicated with one another in novel ways to deal with the explosion of 
temporary labor housing.
State officials, acutely aware of the challenges, largely had their hands tied 
in terms of providing assistance. As noted by one official, “When this first hit 
there were a lot of problems because a lot of cities and counties had no over-
sight and no local building codes.”6 
The typology developed by the North Dakota Man Camp Project, juxtaposed 
with the framework of policies regulating temporary workforce housing, sug-
gests insufficient state support of local communities. The unfortunate results 
included overcrowding, price-gouging, dismal living conditions, and atten-
dant social problems that persist in North Dakota’s oil patch. In the face of 
such realities, North Dakota Governor Jack Dalrymple announced with his 
second biennial “no growth” budget that despite the state having “the nation’s 
strongest economy,” government needed to “become more creative and more 
efficient” (Smith 2014). Almost inexplicably, amid the rapid growth there were 
calls for austerity, especially in relation to government oversight. 
“What can you do?” is a familiar question uttered by both the longtime 
and newer community residents and government officials when asked about 
boom-related housing challenges. This oft-repeated question, once unpacked, 
reveals assumptions nested within the larger cultural, socioeconomic, and po-
litical contexts of North Dakota’s oil patch that privilege market forces as the 
best possible means of addressing human wellbeing (for example, Abromovitz 
5 NDMCP Personal Interview Admin Interviews March 21, 2014.
6  NDMCP Personal Interview Admin Interviews March 21, 2014.
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2012). And yet, the growing power of global corporate capital increases the 
difficulty of addressing local issues of social and economic justice when other 
countervailing forces (such as the governor or the state legislature) cannot or 
will not act (for example, Sewpaul 2013). 
A series of constraints and influences shaped the availability and character 
of housing during the twenty-first century Bakken boom. A growing ap-
prehension about the informal Type 3 camps led to stricter enforcement of 
existing ordinances governing casual sleeping in parks. The Williston Walmart, 
for example, abandoned its support for an informal, chainwide policy that al-
lowed travelers with RVs to stay overnight in their parking lots after public 
pressure and a spate of police calls (Woods and Brooks 2012). Local camping 
sites, for visitors to the Theodore Roosevelt National Park or Lake Sakakawea, 
enforced maximum stays to manage the influx of workers using these sites for 
housing (see Briody 2017). 
Despite the contingency of these sites, it is clear that they played an im-
portant role in both housing and creating spaces for community among new 
arrivals to the region. In 2012, we visited a small Type 3 camp that had accom-
modated a group of carpenters from Idaho working on a nearby construction 
site along with some other new arrivals to the Bakken. This group arranged 
their RVs and tents around a common space, socialized, shared meals and 
chores, and even helped those who had not found work. As one resident put 
it: “We’re like brothers, like a family.” Despite this sense of family, she also ad-
mitted, “the living conditions are terrible here. Like people are shitting behind, 
in the trees, past the trees right there. There’s flies everywhere … It’s fricking ter-
rible living conditions.”7 When another resident of the same camp was asked 
how he survived living in a shelter belt while looking for work, he responded, 
“Well that’s where the camaraderie thing comes in—every night we sit around 
the fire and joke and carry on, do stuff. They’ve got these little air pistols and 
they’re all the time shooting each other. A lot of these guys are young and … full 
of it … But that’s what breaks the monotony, you know? Because we have each 
other.”8 In our experience as researchers, the Type 3 camps had the greatest 
sense of community, but the least comfortable living environment and very 
little stability.
A few months later we returned to discover that the RVs and tents of the 
camp had been removed, leaving behind only fresh tire tracks from a tractor 
in the snow and a full cooler of beer. All indications suggested that law 
7 NDMCP Personal Interview FT 1_21 August 9, 2012.
8  NDMCP Personal Interview FT 1_12 August 8, 2012.
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enforcement or a local landowner removed this camp without much advance 
notice. By 2014, most cities in the oil patch had enacted, or were more actively 
enforcing, ordinances limiting the number of RVs on private property within 
city limits. Rev. Reinke’s shelter at Concordia Lutheran Church finally closed 
when pressure from local residents forced the city to act (Briody 2017; Moss 
2014).
Type 2 camps built to accommodate RVs in individual lots have continued to 
house temporary workers in the region months and years after the apparent 
bust. Despite their sometimes scrappy appearance, these camps attracted na-
tional investors with modest upfront costs, limited staffing expenses, and the 
opportunity to charge high rents. Ideally, once built, these camps required only 
limited maintenance, but frozen water and sewage pipes in the winter, the 
need to add amenities like the internet to stave off competition or playgrounds 
to address state requirements, and costly updates to sewage and water systems 
(sometimes accompanied by lawsuits against the builders or previous owners) 
all suggest that these camps may have had more ongoing costs than owners 
had anticipated. 
One camp owner on the eastern edge of the patch just off Route 2, who had 
a background in finance and construction, told us that a group of “finance” 
investors had asked him to get involved because of the trouble that they had 
been experiencing with contractors. This was a common problem throughout 
the state at the height of the boom due to the shortage of tradespeople, espe-
cially in relation to all the available work. He had arrived in 2012 near the peak 
of the boom, but noted, “the park’s never made money … here’s what happened: 
the park was built incorrectly to begin with.” As a result, “we’re working with 
the state, we’re putting in new water lines throughout the whole park … we’re 
in a litigation issue with the sub [contractor] …”9 The camp had fewer residents 
during each of our subsequent visits. From a peak of nearly one hundred, by 
April 2018, only two renters had been there through the winter. One had vis-
ible water connection problems.
Type 2 camps sprang up along the major thoroughfares and around the 
major intersections in the Bakken. Like the 1950s boom, the course between 
Route 2 and the city of Tioga, and then extending through the northern ap-
proach to Williston on Route 85, was a busy stretch for temporary workforce 
housing. Distinct from the 1950s boom, in the more recent boom Watford City 
also witnessed a significant influx of workers, accommodated through a halo 
of RV parks extending along the city’s western and southern sides. Watford 
9 NDMCP Personal Interview FT 10_1 July 31, 2015.
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City hosted a variety of camp types ranging from the unique, massive indoor 
RV park, which offered climate-controlled stalls for individual RVs, to a series 
of smaller camps lining the slopes of the rolling landscape. In 2016, a tornado 
ripped through one of these RV parks, demonstrating the fragility of these 
light-weight aluminum and fiberglass boxes designed more for easy transport 
than persistent, multi-season habitation.
In interviews with residents of these camps at the height of the boom, we 
often heard about the sense of community and the freedom available in Type 
2 camps, especially in contrast to the institutional-style Type 1 camps. One 
camp owner described the Type 1 camps as “just the same thing over and 
over … there’s no community about it. ’Cause you’re in there, it’s like this big 
system. [laughs] You come in, you eat, they take everything from you, you 
shower, you’re gone.”10 In contrast, another owner described his Type 2 camp 
as promoting “families, dogs, kids. So, it’s temporary housing, but some of these 
people bring their families for the summer, and [the families] go back for the 
winter, but they’ll stay here.”11 The degree of community is debatable, though 
fears about crime in these camps were, in our experience, greatly exaggerated. 
The lived experience existed somewhere between the hysteria about crime and 
the hyperbole about community (but see Berg-Burin, current volume; Ruddell 
and Ray, current volume).
Many had what we playfully called by the neologism “Bakktimism,” which 
referred to the persistent optimism expressed by residents of the Bakken. De-
spite the dangers and demands of the work, fluctuations in oil prices, the high 
cost of rent, the dust and heat in the summer, the frozen pipes, snow, and cut-
ting wind of the winter, and the mud of the springtime thaw, residents of Type 
2 camps almost universally remained positive about their situation. Maya Rao 
recently offered the Gramscian observation (Rao 2018) that this optimism 
represents faith in the long-term power of capitalism and hard work to reward 
short-term risk and discomfort. One particularly illustrative form of Bakk-
timism emerged in a conversation with a man who operated a salvage yard 
that bought and sold RVs and RV parts. When asked if he might make North 
Dakota his “permanent” home, he replied, “Well, I’m 62 years old, I’m going to 
do my best to maybe put in another five years … I hope to ride it out, there’s a 
millionaire dream here, there’s great possibilities.”12 He was living in one of the 
10 NDMCP Personal Interview FT 10_1 July 31, 2015.
11 NDMCP Personal Interview FT 4_6 August 21, 2013.
12 NDMCP Personal Interview FT 4_7 August 22, 2013.
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most marginal camps we ever visited, but his story was more common than 
eccentric and captured a common sentiment.
Many camp owners shared this confidence. While some made back their 
initial investments in the first year or so, the persistence of these camps 
demonstrates an ongoing willingness, as the boom retreated, to operate the 
camps with significantly lower rents and lower occupancy. However, the re-
ceding boom also led others to close their camps, usually because of changing 
local policies or growing competition from hotels and apartments.
The range of optimism among owners and on-site managers also reflected 
their varying commitments to the neighboring communities. Some were 
deeply involved in local affairs and lived locally, while the majority lived outside 
the region. One park owner who had moved to the Bakken from Oregon and 
built his business a few miles south of Watford City stated:
We are North Dakotans. We are licensed. My corporation is licensed. My 
cars are. We moved. My kids started businesses here. We’re part of the 
community … [W]e broke an acre off here and an acre for my partner, and 
this is our home … We vote. We’ve been to the planning meetings.13
Camp owners and, more importantly, managers, also expressed a wide range 
of attitudes toward the conditions in their camps. Some, for example, took 
pride in the cleanliness of their facilities, emphasized the family friendly atmo-
sphere, and paid careful attention to infrastructure and upkeep. A manager of 
a large RV park outside of Williston remarked, 
It’s our community. It’s not an RV park. When you asked me what it is, it’s 
Williston Fox Run. I did not say it’s an RV camp because that’s not what we 
want here. If you notice, our lots for these RVs and trailers are quite large 
so that they do have a little piece of home for a yard, for whatever they 
need. Our lot sizes are 30 by 90 feet. You can go to other places and they 
are 20 by 40. It’s almost three times the size.14 
Other camps appeared to take a more laissez-faire approach with certain 
camps garnering the reputation for drug use, prostitution, and other illegal 
and undesirable activities. 
13 NDMCP Personal Interview FT 4_6 August 21, 2013.
14 NDMCP Personal Interview FT 1_2 August 10, 2012.
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As policies toward RV parks changed at the municipal level, camp managers 
tried to enforce the rules, but the dynamic character of the boom made solu-
tions difficult. As a manager of a camp near Ross observed, “There was no one 
here to train me on everything, so I’ve had to learn all myself.”15 Camp man-
agers sought to address the rules, but there was only ever limited support or 
enforcement from state and county workers overwhelmed by the increased 
workload and the changing policy environment. Indeed, as late as 2011, ac-
cording to the executive director of the county’s Job Development Authority, 
“McKenzie County had no land use plan or planning and zoning.”16 And even 
once policies were established, efforts to place inspectors in the field ran up 
against the same challenges impacting healthcare workers, law enforcement, 
educators, etc.: as counties developed the necessary social infrastructure to 
ramp up enforcement, they ironically ran up against the housing shortage. 
Specific rules and regulations, much less policies, remain murky on the 
ground. Williston, for example, enacted ordinances limiting the size and func-
tion of mudrooms in RV parks within city limits. In 2012, a camp manager 
said, “We do check [mudrooms] out and make sure they meet the fire code and 
that they’re not built shoddily, so that if the wind comes up 80 mph, it’s not 
going to blow away. That’s what we do.”17 A year later, they required that resi-
dents limit their mudrooms to twelve-by-eight feet.18 Another camp manager 
claimed that mudrooms could be any size as long as they maintained a ten-foot 
clearance between the buildings.19 In other words, just as a camp’s policies work 
only as well as the ability of the manager to enforce them, this same thing 
extends to the state, county, and city laws. 
The fate of Type 1 camps during the receding boom was reported on a nearly 
weekly basis in 2015 and 2016 as the city of Williston expanded its extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction to include land on which several man camps operated. In 
response to Williston’s requirement that all man camps close by September 1, 
2017, Target Logistics, one of the largest man camp operators in the region, 
sued the City of Williston to prevent having to shut down its large facility at 
the northern edge of the city. Other Type 1 facilities around Williston and 
Tioga unsuccessfully requested that their sites be rezoned as hotels. Most of 
15  NDMCP Personal Interview FT 10_7 July 31, 2015.
16 NDMCP Personal Interview FT 5_1 August 11, 2014.
17  NDMCP Personal Interview FT1_2 August 10, 2012.
18 NDMCP Personal Interview FT 4_2 August 22, 2013.
19 NDMCP Personal Interview FT 7_4 December, 2014.
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these larger facilities have since closed. The actual physical removal of these 
Type 1 man camps is a particularly significant aspect of temporary workforce 
housing during a boom. The units themselves can be removed by a truck and 
are sometimes sold individually to buyers who pay for removal and transpor-
tation. However, the land where they stood will require significant reclamation 
work to approach pre-camp condition. Since most of the land was leased from 
local farmers, there is significant tension between out-of-state investors, their 
local managers, and the landowners. At a camp outside of Alexander, North 
Dakota, a Type 1 camp removed their units, but left the farmer with electrical, 
sewage, and water pipes below the ground and a thick level of gravel and dirt. 
As the camp failed, the farmer stopped being paid and lamented that land 
would never again be farmable. Elsewhere, a land owner took a camp owner to 
court after he tried to sell 110 acres of the farmer’s land: “I gave them a long-
term lease which I shouldn’t have done. Then I found out they were trying to 
sell this 110 acres out from underneath me and I got pissed off and took them 
to court … And [now] the only ones making money is the lawyers.”20 Tempo-
rary housing may have been a “necessary evil” to address the housing crisis, but 
the failure to create more effective policies, the insufficient funding, and the 
lack of enforcement has meant ill effects persisting long after the boom times. 
Visions of Home after the Boom
Compared to 2012, housing and related infrastructure in the Bakken region 
looked very different by 2018. Like in the 1950s, the Bakken boom introduced 
a ring of new housing to Williston. By 2018, Watford City was surrounded with 
subdivisions, a new high school, and a four-lane road routing traffic around 
downtown. On the one hand, these new developments demonstrate that 
Bakken communities continue to value permanent housing with the benefits 
of increased tax revenue and a greater sense of community and stability. In 
many ways, the interest of workers and the Bakken communities intersect in 
their shared desire for a sense of home. On the other hand, it remains unclear 
whether residents of these new homes and apartments will stay in Watford 
City as the workforce needs of the Bakken oil patch ebb and flow with the price 
of oil, the requirements of drilling and fracking oil wells, and the lure of oppor-
tunity elsewhere. The Bakken landscape changes daily by the ongoing removal 
of Type 1 camps, the gravel scars on the landscape, and the obvious decline 
in boom and bustle as oil companies shift resources in workforce and capital 
20  NDMCP Personal Interview FT 12_2 October 28, 2016.
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elsewhere. The role of outside capital in funding the boom, creating temporary 
housing, and new development remains obvious as well. It remains to be seen 
whether the post-boom landscape will inform future policies and serve as a 
reminder of the speed of twenty-first century capital and the vagaries of home 
in the global economy.
A new subdivision east of Watford City provides a hint. In the spring of 2018, 
the driveways and front lawns were already filled with work trucks beneath 
banners advertising units with four bedrooms and four baths. Rather than 
family housing, this arrangement would accommodate the same temporary 
workers as the man camps they replaced. Despite bucolic names suggesting 
suburban domesticity, the frequent architectural references to shipping con-
tainers, including corrugated siding and narrow dimensions, do little to hide 
the likely transient reality. Ironically, the struggles for domesticity represented 
by decorated mudrooms and desperately planted gardens in the Type 2 camps 
gave way to an implicit temporary character that shaped much of the “perma-
nent” housing in the same region. 
The NDMCP, the 1958 Report, and Other Contemporary Bakken Research
There are certainly commonalities between the housing related issues described 
in the Williston Report and our own observations. Perhaps even more surpris-
ingly, there are echoes from North Dakota’s earliest extractive industry boom 
periods, namely the original agricultural booms that brought large numbers of 
European immigrants who similarly struggled with the tension between recre-
ating the domesticity they had known and the needs for temporary workforce 
housing exemplified by the Bonanza farms. Like the Type 1 lodges of the boom 
we studied, some of the “permanent” housing that was built during the late 
1800s and early 1900s was packed up and shipped off to the next boom (as 
was the case with the Sears kit houses from that period). Also, then as now, 
there were abandonment processes as technological advances in agriculture 
meant diminished workforce needs, leaving the elements to slowly erode the 
physical remnants of communities.
More poignantly, our work is distinct from the Williston Report in its consid-
eration of both a more global and historical context. After an initial attempt 
to simply consider the role of man camps in relation to the current, short-lived 
oil boom, we struggled to see what the camps might reveal about housing tem-
porary workers in relation to extractive industry booms. Then, as we engaged 
that work, we came to understand that the phenomenon we were studying 
might be even more broadly generalizable. We came to see the impact of global 
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neoliberal policies, and the accompanying market for a “just-in-time” work-
force. One result is that housing, to a greater degree than has previously been 
the case, has become a disposable commodity, intentionally serving global 
capital rather than individuals, families, or communities. One consequence of 
that economic dynamic is the surrender of political capacity. While interview 
respondents often concentrated on the tension between the longtime resi-
dents of the host communities and the workers living in temporary housing, 
we came to see the manner by which both “sides” received only limited benefit 
from the boom, especially in contrast to the great wealth transferred to out-
side investors, many of whom rarely or never set foot in North Dakota. 
Our contribution to Bakken research is that we did not view the workers 
(and their families!) as feral intruders. Instead, we demonstrate that both the 
new workers and the longer-term residents were caught in a global struggle 
outside their control. Instead of seeing mercenary workers in conflict with 
“genuine,” “native” North Dakotans, we saw both groups struggling to exer-
cise their limited agency to either hold on to, or to create and engage, a sense 
of home and community amid the hectic, even chaotic environment of an oil 
boom. The decision-making processes impacting their lives was determined 
less by local and state policy makers, and more by neoliberal policies and the 
influence of global capital. 
Oil booms can simultaneously be a blessing and a curse. Having lost pop-
ulation for decades, many towns in western North Dakota had struggled to 
keep grocery stores open, let alone schools or medical services. In contrast, 
Brad Bekkedahl, a Williston City Commissioner declared, “This is a time of 
opportunity. It’s a time of growth. And it’s a time of amazing prosperity and 
wealth coming into our community” (Holeywell 2011). Others simultane-
ously lamented the challenges brought about by the market-fueled, locally 
inflationary economy. Dennis Lindahl, a city councilman in Stanley noted that 
“merchants are able to charge an increased rate. Folks in town sometimes get a 
little upset from supporting the industry while not receiving benefits.”21 And 
clearly, even for oil boom boosters like Bekkedahl, the market does not have all 
the answers. In the fall of 2014, Bekkedahl, as a Republican candidate for state 
senate, was supportive of a change in the state’s oil production tax to address 
Williston’s projected need of more than $1 billion in infrastructure needs by 
2020. But, of all the economic struggles and challenges, the nexus issue in the 
oil patch continues to be housing—part of a global crisis that continues to be 
framed primarily as a local problem.
21  NDMCP Personal Interview FT 12_2 October 28, 2016.
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Chapter 12
Drinking, Drugs, and Long Waits: 
Community Members’ Perceptions 




Unlike the previous oil boom cycles in North Dakota’s history, the bust did 
not immediately follow the boom from 2008–14. It was more of a downturn. 
While the slowdown has had obvious economic effects on the state’s economy, 
the social effects on communities are not as clear cut. Residents living in the 
oil-impacted areas of western North Dakota have witnessed firsthand the 
changes in their community due to population growth, stresses and strains 
on infrastructure, and use of community services. While numerous national 
media outlets have devoted resources to cover the boom, they have relied 
mainly on outsider reporting, where much of the material comes from budget 
reports, unemployment figures, real estate costs, census data, and oil and gas 
forecasts. Although these numbers paint a holistic picture of the economic 
impacts, what is missing is the insider perspective featuring community mem-
bers’ responses in their own words. For that reason, this chapter will look at 
how community members have perceived the impacts of the oil boom on the 
health of their community and how their perceptions align with other boom-
town communities.
Community member feedback has been gathered in community health 
needs assessments (CHNAs), which document people’s perceptions and con-
cerns regarding community assets. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires 
1  An earlier version of portions of this chapter appeared in “Help Wanted: Health Care 
Workers and Mental Health Services: An Analysis of Six Years of Community Concerns from 
North Dakota’s Oil Boom Residents,” Journal of Rural Studies 63 (2018): 15–23. Republished by 
permission of Elsevier.
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every nonprofit hospital to conduct a CHNA once every three years, and this 
assessment cycle provides a systematic data stream to compare and contrast 
identified community concerns over the years. Part of the CHNA process is to 
identify community needs, prioritize them, and then address them through 
an annual implementation strategy. At the time of this writing, two cycles of 
CHNAs have been conducted by critical access hospitals located in western 
North Dakota. In this analysis, seven individual CHNA reports are compiled 
and the aggregated data are examined to better understand local experiences. 
Defining Oil Patch Communities and Assessment Cycles
The Bakken Formation lies under five counties in western North Dakota 
(Dunn, McKenzie, Mountrail, Stark, and Williams). This resource-rich area is 
known as the oil patch. Five critical access hospitals are located within it. Since 
community impacts from the oil boom spill out to other counties, this analysis 
also includes critical access hospitals located in Crosby (Divide County) and 
Kenmare (Burke County). 
Figure 12.1. Sites where CHNAs were performed (Crosby, Kenmare, Tioga, 
Stanley, Williston, Watford City, and Dickinson) (image source: David Veller)
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The first round of CHNAs was conducted in oil-impacted counties between 
2011 and 2013. This cycle coincides with the peak of the oil boom. The second 
cycle of CHNAs was completed between 2014 and 2016. Now it is time to 
look at how the prioritized needs have changed against the backdrop of oil’s 
downturn. What community concerns are constant? Which have dissipated 
as a result of the slowdown? What new concerns are emerging as the oil boom 
moves from the discovery to the maintenance phase? The lingering effects of 
the oil boom remain to be determined, and consulting qualitative data from 
community members living in the boom area provides firsthand accounts 
about the impacts in people’s own words.2
CHNA Overview
In order to qualify as a tax-exempt charitable organization, hospitals have long 
been required to demonstrate a strong commitment to promoting the health 
of their surrounding communities. Typically, the community benefit has come 
in the form of charity care where the hospital provides free or reduced cost 
care to patients who are unable to pay for it (IRS 1956). Due to concerns that 
hospitals were not adequately contributing to improving their local communi-
ties, the ACA increased the community benefit reporting and mandated that 
all nonprofit hospitals conduct a community health needs assessment or pay 
an annual fine (IRS 2011). 
The purpose of the assessment is to describe the health of the local com-
munity, identify needs or service gaps, prioritize concerns, and identify ways 
to address them. Assessing community health is not new; hospitals have 
been conducting assessments and identifying health service inequalities for 
decades (IRS 1969). However, the ACA mandate has institutionalized the rou-
tine practice of conducting a CHNA and, as a result, has provided data that are 
systematically reported and publicly available. The three-year cycle affords a 
comparative analysis of needs identified at a certain time, needs that remain 
over the course of the years, and new needs that emerge. With the second cycle 
of CHNAs completed, we are able to benchmark needs over time. The backdrop 
of the oil boom and subsequent downturn provide an exciting time to analyze 
the community health concerns that were prioritized in the two assessment 
cycles.
2 See the appendix at the end of the chapter for a list of CHNA reports.
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Methods to Conduct a CHNA
While the methods to conduct a CHNA are vague, the federal guidelines 
stipulate that the assessment process involve broad community input, in-
cluding participation from public health experts and those who interact with 
medically underserved, low-income, and minority populations (IRS 2011). Al-
though methods differ between assessments, as a whole, the goal of a CHNA 
is to solicit community input related to health and healthcare. The CHNA 
process used with North Dakota hospitals derives from National Center for 
Rural Health Works and Catholic Health Association models. It is informed by 
both primary data, related to community member interviews, focus groups, 
and surveys, and secondary data, related to health behaviors, conditions, risks, 
and outcomes.
The CHNA process is informed by a community-based participatory research 
framework whereby the researchers enlist community members as co-partici-
pants in the research process. In this way, community members are invited to 
identify not only community problems but also ways to address them. This act 
of doing research with—not on—participants is a key characteristic of com-
munity-based participatory research and fosters rapport between researchers 
and participants as they are both unified in a common goal to improve com-
munity health (Guba and Lincoln 1994; Ainsworth and Schmidtlein 2013). 
Moreover, the resulting partnership between community members and aca-
demic, organizational, healthcare, and governmental representatives allows 
for multiple perspectives and expertise to engage and develop solutions to 
community health concerns (Schulz, Israel, and Lantz 2003).
CHNA Process
Seven out of thirty-six critical access hospitals in North Dakota are located in 
communities within the oil patch (Crosby, Dickinson, Kenmare, Stanley, Tioga, 
Watford City, and Williston). In each of these communities, one-on-one key 
informant interviews were conducted in person or by phone with selected 
members who were identified as having insights into the community’s health 
needs. Generally, four to nine interviews were conducted in each commu-
nity. Topics included community assets and challenges, general health of the 
community, community concerns, and suggestions for improving the com-
munity’s health. Focus groups consisted of 11–25 community members with 
representation from schools, faith-based organizations, social service agencies, 
healthcare services, senior services, and businesses and economic agencies, as 
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well as law enforcement and elected officials. The same questions posed in the 
key informant interviews were asked during the focus group. 
Content analysis of the responses from key informant interviews, focus 
groups, and open-ended survey questions was conducted using a grounded 
theory approach. Grounded theory provides order from the plethora of feed-
back by developing categories through an ongoing process of comparing units 
of data. This constant comparative method allows for flexibility within the 
categories; as the analysis continues, themes emerge and an analytical frame-
work takes shape (Lindlof and Taylor 2011). For example, responses such as 
“shortage of primary care physicians” and “not enough healthcare staff” or 
“lack of specialists” or “need more docs” were grounded into the category of 
“healthcare workforce shortage.”
Additionally, each community customized a survey that was available at local 
businesses and health clinics. For broader distribution, an electronic version 
of the survey was promoted in local media outlets and through social media. 
The survey tool was designed to gather residents’ perceptions about commu-
nity assets and concerns, understand the attitudes about the overall health of 
the community and hear suggestions for improvement, and learn how local 
healthcare services were used. Average survey response rates hovered around 
10–15 percent of the county’s population, which is slightly lower than the 20 
percent average rate for unsolicited surveys (Fink 2003). The survey was not 
intended to be a scientific or statistically valid sampling of the population, but 
another tool to gain qualitative data.
Sample Characteristics
The survey asked several demographic questions about gender, race, age, 
education, employment status, marital status, and annual income. In both as-
sessment cycles, the majority of respondents identified as Caucasian females, 
with almost twice as many women completing surveys as men. The majority of 
respondents were married, worked full time, had a technical degree or a bach-
elor’s degree, and were considered longtime residents, living in the community 
for twenty or more years. Mean annual household income was reported be-
tween $100,000 and $149,000. There was a slight change in age between the 
two cycles. The majority of respondents in the first CHNA cycle were 55–64 
years of age, whereas the second CHNA cycle had younger participants, most 
being 25–34 years of age. Relative to North Dakota state demographics, re-
spondent characteristics were representative of demographics for oil patch 
counties (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). 
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Prioritization of Needs
Once the data were analyzed and synthesized, they were presented at a com-
munity meeting. After a discussion of the findings, community members were 
asked to identify on a ballot what they perceived as the top five community 
health needs. Prioritization criteria included a need’s burden on the commu-
nity, its scope, its severity, or its urgency. The results were totaled and the most 
frequently cited concerns were included as priority needs in the CHNA report. 
This prioritized list fulfilled the mandate of the ACA, offered guidance for 
what the hospital should address in its implementation strategy, and provided 
an emerging picture of community-articulated concerns. 
Oil Patch Concerns: Then and Now
While there was not a systematic documentation of concerns from North Da-
kota’s first oil boom, the effects of oil development as identified in the 1958 
Williston Report reveal considerable community impacts. If a community-based 
health needs assessment had been implemented during the 1951–4 timeframe 
in Williston, the prioritized needs would likely have included transportation, 
housing, and strains on social and public services. Table 12.1 summarizes 
needs conveyed in The Williston Report. 
TABLE 12.1. 
SUMMARY OF PRIORITIZED NEEDS: 1951–4
Needs
1. Lack of transportation resources
2. Lack of housing
3. Lack of social services
4. Overcrowded schools 
5. Strained communication resources
Transportation needs stemmed from increased wear and tear on the roads 
from heavy truck traffic and increased traffic. Housing was deemed substan-
dard and rents were high. Social services were taxed, both in welfare and state 
employment services. Migrants who moved to Williston to capitalize on the 
oil boom often got stranded there, which increased welfare case management, 
including a rise in cases of child neglect. Also, increases in population ushered 
in demand for workers and jobs. Other significant problems included strains 
on public services such as schools and communication systems. Schools were 
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overcrowded and facilities had to be expanded to accommodate more students. 
Communication systems like the postal service were overburdened to accom-
modate the increase in commercial and residential mail (Campbell, current 
volume).
To compare how the needs of the 2008–14 oil boom compare to those 
described sixty years earlier, a methodical review of each community’s priori-
tized needs was conducted and individual needs were aggregated with an eye 
to emerging trends in oil-impacted communities. An inventory of community 
member concerns voiced in response to the 2008–14 oil boom provides a new 
perspective on social impacts. Traffic safety and housing are needs shared 
between then and now. However, the focus on healthcare and mental health 
shortages, which are largely absent in the 1958 Report, received the most at-
tention now.
In the recently conducted CHNAs, similar methodologies were used in both 
assessment cycles, allowing for a valid comparison with the same seven crit-
ical access hospitals in the oil patch. This consistency in methods provides the 
ability to examine the impact on communities and benchmark change over 
time. Table 12.2 displays the significant needs that were most frequently 
ranked as most prevalent, most persistent, and most substantial.
TABLE 12.2. 
THE BAKKEN: ASSESSMENT CYCLES
CHNA Cycle 1: 2011–13 CHNA Cycle 2: 2014–16
1. Healthcare workforce shortage 1. Mental health (including alcohol  
     and drug use and abuse)
2. Mental health  2. Healthcare workforce shortage
(including excessive rates of drinking)
3. Access to needed  3. Lack of child care
equipment/facilities
4. Traffic safety 4. Lack of resources for agin
     population
5. Lack of affordable housing 5. Rising costs of health insurance 
Since the top two needs received significantly more votes than the others, the 
focus of this analysis is on the top two prioritized concerns from each CHNA 
cycle. At a glance, the prioritized needs have not changed significantly over 
the span of the past two assessments, but a closer analysis of how the needs 
are articulated reveals the nuances and impacts of the oil boom. Healthcare 
workforce shortage and mental health remain the most pressing community 
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concerns, with alternating order of importance, during the peak of the boom 
as well as during the downturn. Yet the ways in which these concerns are ex-
pressed show granular details of community impact. To better understand the 
circumstances characterizing the categories of healthcare workforce shortage 
and mental health, specific responses are provided in community members’ 
own words and are then contextualized against the backdrop of the oil boom.
CHNA Cycle 1 (2011–13), First Prioritized Need: Healthcare Workforce Shortage
In the first assessment cycle, community member feedback indicated a variety 
of concerns relating to access to healthcare providers, retention and recruit-
ment of providers, and increased burden on emergency medical services. 
Therefore, the category of healthcare workforce shortage encompasses these 
needs. 
In regards to healthcare availability, the influx of people led to more demand 
for services. Patients experienced long waits and limited appointments: “There 
are long waiting times to get in. We have the same number of providers, but 
probably three times the population.”3 The increase in demand also lessened 
rapport between providers and their patients; community members perceived 
this tension as doctors were forced to see more patients and spend less time 
with each: “My doc doesn’t have time to chat with me anymore.”
Additionally, the demand for healthcare backlogged appointments so pa-
tients either had to wait months or travel to alternate facilities if they couldn’t 
afford to wait: “No appointments are available. An appointment just to get 
seen is four to five weeks out. There’s no walk-in clinic or urgent care.” The ex-
tent of traveling for healthcare added to the stress and financial impact on 
patients, in addition to delivering an economic hit on the community: “There’s 
frustration over trying to get in to see a provider. It can be a 3–4 day wait, so 
they go out of town.” For some community members, a visit to the doctor may 
include expenses for gas, food, and lodging on top of medical bills. 
Retention and Recruitment of Providers
The problem posed by the increase in demand for healthcare services was com-
pounded by the challenges communities faced to retain and recruit providers. 
High turnover among healthcare providers impacted access to services and 
3 All unattributed quotations come from community members’ responses gathered during the 
CHNA process.
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continuity of care: “The staff is overworked and there are not enough doctors 
and nurses for the current population to receive a sustainable, high quality of 
service.” Some of the smaller critical access hospitals had only one doctor on 
staff. The increase in patients strained already limited resources: “We need a 
second doctor to relieve the on-call burden resting on the sole doctor.” Some 
medical professionals left to take advantage of the handsome pay the oil in-
dustry offered: “We don’t have the funds to pay our healthcare staff the wages 
they need to compete with the oil field business. We need to pay the employees 
that are willing to make this their home competitive wages so that we can 
focus on keeping workers long term.” Others left town due to the extent of 
change experienced in their community or their inability to afford the sky-
rocketing rent. During this time, Williston was listed as the most expensive 
place to rent a home in the United States, with Dickinson positioned as fourth 
most expensive (McCormick 2014). 
Moreover, with the influx of population and the increased need for services, 
hospitals had little time to focus on recruiting efforts: “Our community is 
changing very rapidly with the oil industry. Healthcare employee recruitment 
has not been able to keep up.” Rural healthcare recruiting is a consistent chal-
lenge; of the primary care physicians who practice in North Dakota, 75 percent 
practice in urban areas (Center for Rural Health 2017). There are almost twice 
as many patients per physician in large rural areas than urban areas, and more 
than five times as many patients per physician in small/isolated rural areas 
(see Trinity Kenmare Community Hospital 2016). Recruiting specialists is 
even harder.
Nationally, the healthcare workforce shortage has been widely documented 
in the United States (Hempell et al. 2016; Derksen and Whelan 2009; Florell 
2009; Commonwealth Fund 2017). According to the National Rural Health 
Association, demand for more healthcare professionals is expected to rise with 
aging Baby Boomers (Burrows, Suh, and Hamann 2012). With over 20 percent 
of Americans living in rural areas, yet served by less than 12 percent of the 
nation’s physicians, healthcare workforce shortage is a formidable national 
problem (Hempel et al. 2016). Rural economic income disparities, smaller 
numbers of rural health professional training sites, and lower reimbursement 




A plurality of responses pertained to emergency services that are unique to the 
oil boom. Typically, the nature of most ER calls prior to the oil boom related 
to farming and ranching accidents, fires, and traffic accidents. However, the 
nature and frequency of the calls has changed since the oil boom: “Trauma 
here can be so diverse—crushed by rig, crushed by equipment, falling off rig, 
stomped by cattle.” The diversity of calls also necessitates specialized training 
to deal with the chemical and environmental hazards of oil extraction.
Oil work is physical and dangerous, with an increased risk for accidents be-
cause of the heavy machinery, hazardous chemicals, long hours, and inclement 
weather conditions. 
From 2009–13, usage of ER services in the Bakken quadrupled. Plus, the 
increase in wait times to see a doctor prompted greater usage of the emergency 
room: “It’s not uncommon to wait 4–8 hours to get seen in the ER. If the am-
bulance brings you in, you go to the top of the list, so people are calling 911 for 
little things.” Overuse of the ER taxed personnel, where concerns of quality of 
care were prevalent: “We need more full time emergency services personnel. 
I feel that they are overworked. This may cause concerns in patient care, and 
things may get missed that are clinically significant.”
It is important to note that many emergency medical services were provided 
by volunteer squads. Although in the past volunteer EMS squads may have 
been able to meet the community’s needs, the demand exceeded the supply. 
Additionally, the amount of ER activity was taking its toll on the volunteers, 
professionally and personally. Members of the volunteer squads may have 
been granted leave time from work to attend to a call, but the increase in 
calls hampered work productivity: “Some employers pay volunteers for when 
they’re on a call, but not all employers do.” While communities have considered 
paying their EMS volunteers a salary, it is often economically unfeasible: “We 
need to look at professionally staffed EMS. It could take up to $1 million/year 
to do that appropriately.”
Comments from EMS volunteer squad members convey the extent of ex-
haustion and personal strain: 
• “The only way I can get away from the calls is if I leave town.” 
• “We see daily traffic accidents.” 
• “I am so, so tired.” 
• “I don’t sleep well anymore.”
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CHNA Cycle 1 (2011–13), Second Prioritized Need: Mental Health, Including Ex-
cessive Rates of Drinking
The second most prioritized community concern during the first CHNA cycle 
pertained to alcohol abuse and excessive rates of drinking. Embedded in this 
need is a larger problem of addiction, related to both alcohol and drugs, and the 
need for counseling and services. While this is classified as a behavioral issue, it 
is often associated with underlying mental health issues. 
One trend to emerge from the community member responses that cannot 
be ignored is that of ascribing addiction and drug usage to “transients.” Almost 
half of all CHNA comments related to this need referenced transients or oil 
workers:
• “Addiction and substance abuse are becoming a bigger issue with a larger 
volume of transient people.” 
• “It’s the nature of oil rig work. Some guy’s working 140 hours and it’s hard 
to stay awake so they’re reaching for prescription drugs to help stay 
awake. Our company has had to get rid of multiple employees because 
of alcohol issues.” 
• “Substance abuse treatment is a need with the increase in transient 
population.” 
• “Addiction and substance abuse has gone up since the oil boom.” 
• “Addiction and substance abuse is a major problem on reservation and oil 
fields. We need an addiction counselor.” 
• “Transient workers transport drugs.”
• “Surge in the abuse of bath salts, cocaine and meth.”
• “Everyone I talk to in town says there is an increase in drug use because of 
transient workers and the growing workforce.” 
This attribution aligns with an ethnocentric attitude where newcomers are 
viewed as “outsiders.” As one oil boom resident said, “The people that come 
here to work are not the cream of the crop” (personal communication, October 
28, 2015). The construction of an “outsider” category differs from longtime 
residents who are viewed as “locals”; the two groups are perceived to have 
different values and views which shape their identities and interactions with 
each other (Matarrita-Cascante et al. 2017). This classification creates an “us” 
versus “them” dichotomy which works to divide the community and implicates 
“transients” as being responsible for bringing the problems. The “newcomer” 
and “longtimer” distinction is common in boomtown studies where fear of 
320
crime and drugs is indicative of social disruption experienced in boom com-
munities (Freudenberg 1982). Yet this negative attitude is missing from the 
1958 Report. While newcomers were called “riff raff” and “alien people,” there 
was little overt antagonism exhibited toward them and they were generally 
accepted into the community. Once the two groups interacted, their attitudes 
and opinions of each other were overwhelmingly positive (Campbell, p. 253). 
The changes in population may account for some of the differences in inter-
group attitudes. With Williams County witnessing a 32 percent population 
change from 2010–13 and neighboring McKenzie and Mountrail Counties 
reporting 46 percent and 22 percent population changes respectively, the 
number of newcomers arriving in the oil patch was overwhelming (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2010). By comparison, in the 1950s, Williams County experienced a 27 
percent population increase whereas Mountrail County reported a decline of 
5.5 percent (Willis, p. 53). Rapid population growth can lead to a breakdown 
in municipal services, intensifying economic costs to provide community ser-
vices to new residents (Little 1977), and increases in crime, traffic, accidents, 
and suicide (Kennedy and Mehra 1985; Seydlitz 1993). Previous researchers 
looking at boomtown communities have concluded that they enter a period 
of crisis and loss of traditional routines and attitudes, disrupting individuals’ 
mental health, worldview, and social networks (England and Albrecht 1984). 
The population influx and resulting social disruption may have hindered com-
munity organizations’ and residents’ ability to reach out to new people.
Regardless of perceptual and population differences, addiction and drug use 
are the symptoms of a larger mental health problem. The emphasis on mental 
health aligns with boomtown phenomena and extraction scholarship stem-
ming from research conducted in Colorado, Utah, Louisiana, West Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, and Canada. Rapid changes in population and development are 
associated with mental health problems (Bacigalupi and Freudenburg 1983). 
Research on energy boomtowns has shown that the incoming workforce ac-
counts for a substantial portion of the service demand. Many accounts have 
testified to the characteristics of the initial surge of oil boom workers: mainly 
men, unskilled but resilient, coming to North Dakota to earn money to make a 
better life for themselves (Rao 2014). Yet this workforce often lacked housing, 
health insurance, and money management skills once payday came (Bohnen-
kamp et al. 2011). 
In 2014, when oil was at $100 per barrel and cash flow was high, crime, 
drugs and prostitution rings flourished (Horwitz 2014; Ruddell and Ray, cur-
rent volume). The limited infrastructure of these small, rural, western prairie 
towns and the harsh winter climate may have exacerbated the temptations. As 
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one resident stated, “Once you bought a new truck, there isn’t much to spend 
your money on out here except booze, drugs, and women” (personal commu-
nication, December 2, 2015). A report issued to the Center for Community 
Vitality regarding Bakken oil counties stated, “Most rural communities do not 
have experience with economic growth, so the real issue is learning how to 
effectively deal with that growth” (Bohnenkamp et al. 2011, 22). 
Entrepreneurs, drug cartels, and organized criminals flocked to western 
North Dakota to try to capitalize on the emerging market (Valencia 2015). 
With thousands of men away from home, holed up in remote places with cash 
in their pockets, the Bakken was a ripe market for sex trafficking (Boyle 2015; 
Berg Burin, current volume). A rise in narcotics and opiates, such as heroin 
and methamphetamines, as well as human trafficking had the FBI worried (Va-
lencia 2015). These circumstances provide context regarding the initial mental 
health concern. Community participants echoed the nationwide concern over 
the increased distribution and use of heroin. According to the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (2015), heroin use in the United States has 
increased among men and women of all age groups and income levels. It has 
more than doubled among young adults in the 18–25 age bracket in the past 
decade.
CHNA Cycle 2 (2014–16), First Prioritized Need: Mental Health, Including Alcohol 
and Drugs among Youth
In the second CHNA cycle, the same focus on addiction emerged, but the con-
cern centered on youths’ alcohol and drug use: “Youth mental health is the 
most important because in my mind, it drives all the other issues. Unwell 
youth make unwell adults.” Some community members attributed teen alcohol 
and drug usage to broken homes, low self-esteem, new drug mixtures, and de-
pression. A clear theme to emerge among community member comments is 
the need for more mental health and substance abuse resources and funding: 
“Mental health and substance abuse needs more resources to hire people. We 
need early intervention and more dollars for kids.”
Of note was the fact that oil field workers or perceived “outsiders” were men-
tioned only once: “Mental abuse treatment services are needed here. At most 
of the child protection meetings there [are] addiction issues and also with the 
oil field workers that is a high rate.” This change in perception may suggest 
that oil field workers are integrating into the community. Length of residence 
has been associated with fear of outsiders and crime. In boom communities, 
five years is generally the threshold for when outsiders are perceived as locals 
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(Freudenberg 1982). This second cycle of CHNAs marks a five-year timespan 
from the peak of the oil boom and may indicate less division between outsider 
and longtime residents. 
Consistent with oil boom research, mental health problems and clinical case-
loads often increase for non-oil boom workers (Bacigalupi and Freudenburg 
1983). Age plays a significant factor when assessing quality of life in boom-
towns (Finkle 2015). As reinforced by the community member comments 
above, youths living in boomtowns are found to be more alienated, isolated, 
and confused than other youth (Freudenburg 1979) whereas longtime resi-
dents often retreat as a result of experiencing loss of sense of community 
(Cortese and Jones 1977). Further research by Freudenburg (1984) indicates 
adolescents exhibit less satisfaction and greater alienation in post-boomtown 
communities.
Now, although the oil boom has slowed and much of the workforce has left, 
it is not necessarily the case that the problems have disappeared. The price of 
drugs, like the price for oil, has decreased, making them more accessible. The 
price for meth has dropped 75 percent from the height of the boom, down to 
$800 per ounce (Monke 2016). “Methamphetamine use in North Dakota is 
epidemic,” according to Stark County State’s Attorney Tom Henning; metham-
phetamine arrests increased 22 percent from 2012 to 2016 (Mook 2017). Use 
of heroin and other opiates like fentanyl are causing overdoses and deaths, and 
with so many people addicted to these drugs and unable to hold down a job, 
there is a rise in burglaries, theft, and traffic violations (Mook 2017). 
CHNA Cycle 2 (2014–16), Second Prioritized Need: Healthcare Workforce Shortage, 
Including Access to Aftercare and Specialists
While healthcare workforce remained an oft-cited concern in the second 
cycle of CHNAs, it was downgraded to the second prioritized need. The way 
it was expressed in this period focused on a desire for extended care, in the 
form of evening and weekend hours, and access to specialists: “We need ac-
cess to healthcare on weekends without having to go to the ER.” Community 
participants expressed concern over the times during which they were able 
to see a medical provider outside of the emergency room: “I have gone to the 
walk-in clinic in town at noon and been told they were not taking any more 
patients for the day.” A clinic’s operating hours are similar to the hours worked 
by an average working adult (for example, 8:00am to 5:00pm, Monday through 
Friday), which can limit the ability of working adults and school children to 
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access those healthcare providers: “Doctor will not make appointments after 
3:00pm. Many people cannot take off work to go to the doctor. I work until 3:45 
and need to have late day appointments.” Keeping a healthcare appointment 
may mean taking time off work, which may pose financial and professional 
consequences.
In terms of specialists, while demand exists, it may not be large enough to 
warrant a fulltime provider of specialty services. Some specialists are available 
on a rotating weekly or monthly basis, but that schedule may not be frequent 
enough for some. Specific requests for specialists included pediatrics, OB-GYN, 
dermatology, cancer care, and pain management.
What Has Changed in the Last Two CHNA Cycles?
Taking inventory of community member concerns voiced in response to the 
2008–14 oil boom provides new perspective on social impacts. While the pre-
vailing concerns from the most recent oil boom are focused on healthcare and 
mental health, traffic safety and housing are needs that are shared between 
then and now. 
Healthcare Workforce Shortage
In both assessment cycles, the lack of healthcare workers impacted community 
members’ ability to access healthcare. In the first cycle, this need centered on 
service delivery, recruitment, and emergency services, whereas in the second 
cycle, it was predominantly expressed as limited access to after-care and spe-
cialists. This change in articulation from service delivery and ER services to 
aftercare and access to specialists highlights a healthcare need that is less acute. 
With the drop in oil prices during the second assessment cycle, populations 
declined and development slowed, which may have decreased the need for 
healthcare providers and ER services. 
Mental Health: Addictive Communities
Specific to North Dakota’s oil boom, previous research identified the themes 
of social disruption (due to rapid population influx), loss of identity, and un-
certainty and anxiety (Becker 2016). The emphasis on mental health services, 
including alcohol and drug use and abuse and the need for treatment centers, 
not only aligns with these themes but also supports the social disruption 
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hypothesis. However, this need is unique to the recent oil booms. The 1958 
Report claims there was not a remarkable increase in crime or immoral activity 
and drunkenness was swiftly addressed (Campbell, p. 259; for a contrary 
view, see Berg Burin, current volume).
As substance abuse was prioritized as a community concern in both assess-
ment cycles, the underlying addictive theme carried over to other facets of 
oil boom phenomena. North Dakota may be classified by what Freudenburg 
(1992) calls an addictive economy, which is marked by continual boom and 
bust cycles. North Dakota is vulnerable to this addictive tendency due to the 
volatility of oil prices, the uncertainties of employment and development, and 
the imprecise measures of oil forecasting. 
While community members’ responses attest to the similarities in expe-
rience with community members from other extraction communities, the 
extent of their disruption may be uniquely their own. Although this author 
has previously questioned whether the oil boom has been a blessing or a curse 
for western North Dakota communities (Becker 2016), Freudenburg (1984) 
has argued that a better question to ask is to what degree communities experi-
ence negative change. This question assumes oil boom communities experience 
adverse conditions and positions the oil boom as a curse. While no two com-
munities experience energy development the same way, characteristics such as 
population density, history with extractive industries, and type of extraction 
may affect residents’ perceptions (Finkle 2015). In this regard, North Dakota 
should fare pretty well as longtime residents may recall previous boom and 
bust cycles. 
In addition, there still may be a silver lining if we extend our scope and look 
at the health of oil patch communities longitudinally. Boomtown research has 
shown that a recovery phase occurs after the bust, where community members 
adapt to their new community and experience enhanced levels of community 
satisfaction and dimensions of wellbeing ten to fifteen years after the boom 
(Brown, Dorins, and Krannich 2005; Smith, Krannich, and Hunter 2001). This 
was the case at the tail end of the 1950s boom as it was reported that one 
year post-boom, community conditions were stabilized and settled (Campbell, 
current volume).
The prediction by some analysts that oil prices will remain stagnant over 
the next few years may help North Dakota to transition into a recovery phase 
(FIBO Group 2017). However, the recent rise in oil prices and production 
has left Lynn Helms, the Director of North Dakota’s Department of Min-
eral Resources, tentatively optimistic (Hughlett 2018). In fact, the state may 
be gearing up for another mini-boom, with the increase in oil production 
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projected to be on pace to beat the 2014 record (Hughlett 2018; Flynn, current 
volume). Either way, the uncertainty of the future can add to the overall anx-
iety and strain on mental health.
 
Implications
The CHNA’s design emphasis on qualitative data highlights the value of con-
ducting key informant interviews and focus groups as a legitimate data source 
to help take the pulse of the community. This methodological consideration has 
special significance in rural areas where there is a dearth of healthcare research 
(Hart et al. 2002). Moreover, gaining access to rural community members can 
be difficult for researchers who are often perceived as outsiders and regarded 
with skepticism (Becker 2015). Outsider bias runs strong in rural areas and is 
especially acute in the medical profession, where residents prefer to interact 
with long-established local residents rather than newcomers (Bushy 2006). As 
Kathleen Norris writes in her book Dakota: A Spiritual Geography, “an expert 
is someone who’s fifty miles from home” (1993, 55). This statement attests 
to the tendency of locals to refuse to accept information that comes from the 
“outside” world, including accounts published in national media. 
Since this analysis stems from community members’ views and voices, the 
hope is that not only will residents listen to the community health concerns, 
but also accept and act upon them. The inclusion of local voices helps to lend 
credibility to insider knowledge, and the alignment of their responses with 
boomtown phenomena on a national scale validates their lived experiences.
Conclusion
The need for more healthcare workforce and mental health resources provides 
a glimpse of the impacts that the oil boom has caused at the community level. 
As a research tool, the systematic and cyclical CHNA data can provide mean-
ingful and relevant data that aid in understanding lived experiences. One of 
the unanticipated outcomes of the Affordable Care Act is that it has produced 
a data set that adds a humanistic quality to the oil boom story. The priori-
tized list of community concerns can inform policy makers and stakeholders 
about places where more resources are needed to target solutions aimed at 
addressing the needs of North Dakota constituents. While we wait for future 
CHNA cycles to occur, it is important to compare concerns and benchmark 
change over time. This longitudinal research sheds light on how contemporary 
energy development evolves with time and how the ebbs and flows of oil boom 
activity affect community health. 
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Boomtown Bias: Reflections on the 
Past, Present, and Future of Prosti-
tution and Sex Trafficking in 
North Dakota
Nikki Berg Burin
In American public memory, the phrase “boomtown” often brings to mind 
images of the Old West—a time and place where small, rural communities 
were transformed by significant and swift economic and demographic growth, 
as well as by the social problems that accompanied such changes. Boomtown 
narratives typically follow the same progression. There is a discovery of rich 
natural resources, followed by a rapid influx of outsiders, especially men, and 
particularly young, rowdy bachelors. Then there is the building of saloons, pool 
halls, and brothels, followed by the mayhem of drinking, gambling, violence, 
and fornication. In such narratives, these changes threaten the stability and 
safety of otherwise wholesome communities. Among the most prominent vil-
lains in such stories are prostitutes who occasionally receive public sympathy, 
but more often than not experience public condemnation. Also present in 
boomtown narratives are the victims—typically innocent, chaste girls tricked 
or forced into a life of vice. 
This familiar trope of bachelors, prostitutes, immorality, and crime in boom-
towns is not unique to the Old West, but rather transcends time and place. 
Strikingly similar versions of this story made the rounds during North Dakota’s 
agricultural boom at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth 
century, as well as during the state’s oil boom in the early twenty-first century. 
In both cases residents bemoaned the noticeable presence of bachelors, prosti-
tutes, commercial sexual activity, and the trafficking of innocent girls in their 
rapidly changing communities. And in both cases the state responded with 
legislation to crack down on the perceived problems. 
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Robert Campbell anticipated finding similar problems and discontent in 
his study of the social impact of North Dakota’s oil boom in the 1950s. In his 
chapter in the 1958 Williston Report, Campbell hypothesized that “various 
kinds of social problems, such as increased crime, immorality, and low grade 
housing, would arise” as a result of the influx of immigrants into North Da-
kota (p. 246). Yet upon conducting his research, Campbell found that “there 
was a surprising absence of social problems” in the Williston area. According 
to Campbell, “There were no indications available to the researchers that there 
had been a notable increase in, or even the presence of, organized criminal or 
immoral activity—gambling houses, theft rings, ‘protection’ or houses of pros-
titution.” While there were two “known prostitutes” in the area, he argued that 
“in no sense were their activities organized, continuous, or flagrant” (Campbell, 
p. 13 and p. 262). 
Was 1950s Williston an anomaly among boomtowns? Perhaps, but it is 
likely that there is more to the story than Campbell uncovered. There are at 
least four problems with his analysis that collectively demonstrate the need for 
more research on the topic. First, Campbell did not conduct an in-depth study 
of commercial sex in boomtown Williston. It was one of several social problems 
that he touched on in just one chapter of a lengthy report. As such, it is not 
surprising that his analysis of this particular issue was limited to a handful of 
surface level observations. Second, it seems that even his cursory analysis was 
cut short by the influence of the boomtown trope described above. Campbell 
expected to find rampant prostitution, and when he did not see it, he ceased 
exploring. Third, his intentionally narrow scope of inquiry into prostitution 
and unintentional boomtown bias caused Campbell to overlook relevant his-
torical contexts. The anti-vice laws passed in the state legislature during the 
Progressive Era, which stayed on the books until the late twentieth century, 
worked to obscure but not necessarily eliminate the presence of prostitution 
during the time when Campbell was writing. Fourth, Campbell did not have 
access to the wealth of research on the commercial sex industry that exists 
today. Given what we now know about the complex nature and intersections 
of prostitution and sex trafficking, it is likely that Campbell’s conclusions were 
curtailed by a limited analytical framework.
I do not attempt to fill the gaps in Campbell’s empirical research with this 
essay, but instead offer a critical analysis of his observations on prostitution 
in 1950s Williston so as to provide guidance about the kinds of questions and 
methods that should be applied to an in-depth historical study of the topic. My 
analysis has three parts: first, a brief overview of the Progressive Era anti-vice 
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legislation that drove the commercial sex industry underground and perhaps 
out of Campbell’s sight by the 1950s; second, a critique of the indicators he 
provided as evidence for the lack of social problems during the oil boom—
all of which are flawed when applied to prostitution and sex trafficking; and 
third, an overview of North Dakota’s legislative response to prostitution and 
sex trafficking during the state’s twenty-first century oil boom, which reveals 
the progress and stagnation of the state’s understanding of these issues and 
offers insights into how one might go about a new study of boomtown pros-
titution and sex trafficking in 1950s North Dakota. In all three periods the 
nuanced reality of the commercial sex industry and the complex experiences 
of the people within it have been obscured by the persistent influence of the 
boomtown trope. 
Progressive Era Anti-Vice Laws
In its inaugural session in 1862, the Legislative Assembly of Dakota Territory 
laid the foundation for the subsequent 150 years of prostitution and human 
trafficking legislation in North Dakota. Lawmakers determined it was illegal 
for any person to engage in “open lewdness or other notorious act of public 
indecency … or maintain or keep a lewd house or place for the practice of forni-
cation” (Dakota Territory Legislative Assembly 1862, ch. 9, sec. 126). Generally 
speaking, lewdness was understood to be an indecent sexual act done openly 
and with the possibility or intent of corrupting the community’s sexual mo-
rality. The sexual morality at risk of corruption was marital fidelity and the 
chastity of single women, particularly single white women. The most obvious 
sites for such corruption were so-called disorderly houses—brothels, saloons, 
and gambling halls—which meant that such establishments were early targets 
for legislators. In fact, by the second legislative session in the winter of 1862–3, 
the legislative body adopted a new penal code that included a separate statute 
condemning such businesses as seedbeds of lewdness and increasing the pen-
alties for operating them in the communities of Dakota Territory (Dakota 
Territory Legislative Assembly 1862–3, ch. 10, secs. 4–10). In other words, 
while it was problematic for an individual to commit an act of lewdness, it 
was a far more serious crime to promote and facilitate sexual immorality in a 
public, commercial setting.
Lawmakers added another level of criminality related to the commercial sex 
industry in 1865 when they passed Dakota Territory’s first anti-sex-trafficking 
laws. The pair of laws criminalized the act of enticing any unmarried female 
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“of previous chaste character” under the age of twenty-five into prostitution 
and of abducting any female under the age of fifteen for the same purpose 
(Dakota Territory Legislative Assembly 1864, penal code sec. 328–9). While 
present-day North Dakotans might applaud territorial lawmakers for taking 
an anti-trafficking stance at such an early date in the state’s history, a closer 
look at the legislation reveals significant flaws. Only girls and single women 
under the age of twenty-five were considered legitimate victims of sex traf-
ficking. Married adult women and all women over the age of twenty-five were 
excluded as potential victims, as well as all boys and men. Also excluded from 
the ranks of potential victims were girls and women who were not of “previous 
chaste character.” This exception is not surprising, given nineteenth-century 
sexual scripts and gender prescriptions, which demanded female sexual purity, 
but this fact makes it no less problematic in terms of practical consequences 
for victims of sex trafficking. The law validated society’s bias against women 
and girls who fell outside the boundaries of acceptable femininity and female 
sexuality by choice or otherwise, and, as a result, it directed exploiters to vul-
nerable prey who would not be protected by the state. 
The practice of narrowly defining sex trafficking victims within the law held 
well beyond the territorial period. While compiling its laws for the first time 
in 1895, the state of North Dakota amended the territorial trafficking statutes 
and, in short, expanded by three years the age range of girls who could be traf-
ficking victims in the eyes of the law, but reduced by five years the age range 
for potential adult victims (North Dakota Legislative Assembly 1895, secs. 
7165–6). Both changes reflect the white slavery panic of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, which sensationalized the kidnapping and se-
duction of those deemed innocents by society—chaste white girls and young 
women. These were the victims in the commercial sex industry according to 
turn-of-the-century North Dakotans and Americans more generally. Individ-
uals who performed commercial sex acts for hire and who did not fall within 
this narrowly defined category of sex trafficking victims were assumed to be 
willful prostitutes who, whether truly autonomous or not, had no legal pro-
tection from or recourse against commercial sexual exploitation or trafficking. 
The legal marginalization of women who performed commercial sex acts in 
the state’s early years was reinforced when lawmakers passed a statute in 1901 
regarding the slander of females. The law stated that it was illegal to expose 
any female over the age of twelve who was “not a public prostitute” to “hatred, 
contempt, or ridicule” by disparaging her virtue or chastity (North Dakota 
Legislative Assembly 1901, ch. 175, sec. 1). While it true that individuals who 
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performed commercial sex acts were not chaste, the law was not about sex 
per se, but rather about a woman’s character. This statute made it clear that 
in the eyes of the law prostitutes were sullied women and that no one could 
disparage their virtue (physical or moral), for it was already compromised.
The combination of anti-sex-trafficking laws and the laws against slandering 
women reveals that at the turn of the twentieth century the state of North 
Dakota understood all women over the age of twenty who were involved in the 
commercial sex industry to be willful prostitutes and that all prostitutes were 
unworthy of protections from the state, at least in terms of slander and com-
mercial sexual exploitation. “Hatred, contempt, and ridicule” of such women 
was reasonable and legal. This was obviously problematic for adult trafficking 
victims, but it was also problematic for autonomous sex workers, for women 
who entered the life because of limited options or out of necessity, and, of 
course, for those who were prevented by individuals, society, or circumstances 
from leaving commercial sex work. Legislators’ creation of laws that protected 
“virtuous” women and that degraded or allowed for the degradation of others 
reinforced society’s bias and firmly planted it within the legal system. When 
force and choice are the only publicly accepted means of entry into prostitu-
tion, it becomes easy for lawmakers and society to identify clear-cut villains 
and victims. By creating laws based on this simplistic understanding of the 
women and girls who performed commercial sex acts, legislators obscured the 
various forces that brought individuals of diverse backgrounds into the life, as 
well as the complex forms of victimization they experienced within it. Such 
laws also made empowerment within the commercial sex industry much more 
difficult for consensual sex workers to obtain.
As North Dakota moved into the twentieth century, the legislature con-
tinued the trend of protecting “legitimate” victims of sex trafficking and 
enacted new laws overtly condemning those defined by the state as prosti-
tutes. For instance, the 1895 statute on the abduction of girls for the purpose 
of prostitution identified as victims only those who were taken from their par-
ents or legal guardians. In 1903 the legislature amended the statute to include 
“any friendless female under the age of eighteen years” (North Dakota Legisla-
tive Assembly 1903, ch. 149, sec. 7166). This suggests an increased awareness 
among legislators of the vulnerabilities of homeless, abused, and abandoned 
youth and was a positive step forward. In 1909 the state recognized that any 
unmarried female of previously chaste character could potentially be inveigled 
into a house of prostitution, not just those under the age of twenty (North Da-
kota Legislative Assembly 1909, ch. 88, sec. 8899). The legislature also passed 
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a new statute that same year that made it unlawful to “detain any woman 
against her will by force, threats, putting in bodily fear, or by any other means, 
at a house of ill-fame, or any other place … for the purpose of prostitution” 
(North Dakota Legislative Assembly 1909, ch. 89, sec. 1). In short, by 1909 
the state broadened the definition of sex trafficking and expanded the pool of 
potential victims. 
Around the same time, however, legislators passed new vagrancy laws that 
stigmatized and further marginalized prostitutes and many others. Up to this 
point, prostitution was not explicitly identified as a crime in the North Dakota 
Penal Code. Prostitutes could be arrested on charges of public lewdness or as 
a public nuisance, but unlike those who facilitated prostitution or engaged 
in human trafficking, prostitutes were not specifically named as criminals in 
the statutes in the first forty-two years of Dakota Territory and North Da-
kota history. That changed in 1903 with the introduction of vagrancy laws. 
The list of people who qualified as vagrants was long and included “common 
night walkers; lewd, wanton and lascivious persons” (North Dakota Legislative 
Assembly 1903, ch. 206, sec. 1). Given the limited opportunities for gainful 
employment by homeless, runaway, and orphaned girls and single women 
without familial or financial support and given the willingness of exploiters 
to take advantage of others’ vulnerabilities, it is very likely that victims of 
commercial sexual exploitation could be and were treated as criminals under 
the vagrancy law. The “friendless female” clause in the statute criminalizing 
the abduction of girls for the purpose of prostitution and the removal of age 
limitations in the law criminalizing the deception of females into prostitution 
would not offer protections for all women and girls reluctantly caught up in 
the commercial sex industry. Abduction and seduction were not and still are 
not necessary conditions for those who unwillingly enter the life. For many, 
entry into commercial sex was and continues to be an issue of survival. What 
drew them and “friendless females” of all ages to the commercial sex industry? 
The need for food, shelter, and money. For these women and girls, North Da-
kota law made it clear there was to be little help or sympathy. Victims deemed 
worthy of legal protections were those who were forced, coerced, or deceived. 
Destitution and the lack of options were irrelevant when even a hint of choice 
was detectable.
And what about the women who willfully chose prostitution—those who 
envisioned economic independence, an opportunity for sexual freedom, or 
a way to take control over their lives and bodies? For Progressive-era North 
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Dakotans and Americans more generally these women were beyond the pale. 
In 1909, nearly sixty years after the passage of Dakota Territory’s first law 
regulating commercial sex, North Dakota defined and explicitly outlawed pros-
titution with its own law for the first time. A prostitute was defined as any 
female who frequented or lived in houses of ill-fame or who was paid for sex 
(North Dakota Legislative Assembly 1909, ch. 87, sec. 1). Arresting individuals 
for prostitution when there were few alternative employment opportunities 
for women only served to increase the social and economic vulnerability of 
those who labored as prostitutes. Moreover, the 1909 law had little chance of 
accomplishing lawmakers’ objective of stopping the spread of vice in North 
Dakota, for not only did it fail to address the reasons why women and girls 
participated in prostitution, but it was also put in place without a companion 
law that addressed the demand for commercial sex. 
Following suit with the rest of the country, early North Dakota lawmakers 
condemned and punished the women performing commercial sex acts rather 
than targeting the buyers who fueled the industry. Anti-prostitution activ-
ists like the purity reformers of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union 
(WCTU) had long been critical of this sexual double standard and promoted 
demand-reduction as a strategy for diminishing the commercial sex indus-
try.1 However, from the state’s territorial period up through the end of the 
Progressive Era, lawmakers did not embrace the WCTU’s preventative initia-
tives or its efforts to advance “one standard of morality for men and women” 
(WCTU of North Dakota 1895). It wasn’t until 1919—a full decade after the 
state criminalized prostitution—that lawmakers declared it illegal to “receive 
any person into any place for the purpose of prostitution” (North Dakota 
Legislative Assembly 1919, ch. 190, sec. 1).2 This was the state’s first law that 
explicitly targeted buyers of commercial sex acts. Fears about the spread of 
venereal disease during and after World War I led the legislature to declare the 
passage of anti-prostitution laws an emergency “necessary for the immediate 
preservation of the public peace, health and safety” (North Dakota Legislative 
Assembly 1919, ch. 190, sec. 8).
1  This is not to say that buyers could patronize prostitutes without potential legal risks. In the 
late nineteenth century they could be charged with lewdness or public indecency and at the 
turn of the twentieth century habitual buyers could also be arrested on vagrancy charges. 
2 The Legislature also broadened the definition of prostitute by changing the law’s gendered 
language from “female” to “someone” and added individuals who had “indiscriminate sexual 
intercourse without hire” (North Dakota Legislative Assembly 1919, ch. 190, sec. 2).
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As the early legislative history of North Dakota reveals, the driving impulse 
of anti-vice laws in the territory and then state has been a desire to penalize 
“deviant” women, to protect some—but not all—victims of commercial sexual 
exploitation, and to punish some—but not all—exploiters. This approach was 
adopted during the social, economic, and demographic upheavals of North Da-
kota’s agricultural boom in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
and fit well with the common trope of boomtown villains and victims, which 
was part of public discourse at the time. The collection of early anti-vice laws 
set the stage for those engaged in or on the periphery of the commercial sex 
industry for decades to come, including Robert Campbell, who expected to find 
a visible rise in the number of prostitutes and customers in the western part of 
the state during the 1950s oil boom. By this time, though, the state’s anti-vice 
legislation had been in place for over fifty years and had effectively driven the 
business of commercial sex underground and generally out of plain sight. It’s 
not surprising, therefore, that Campbell’s surface level study uncovered “no 
indications” of “immoral activity” in the Williston area. Taking this historical 
context into consideration, as well as what we now know about the commercial 
sex industry, we can see that some of Campbell’s observations about the lack of 
social problems during the oil boom—namely prostitution—are problematic. 
Crime and Immorality During the 1950s Oil Boom
Campbell writes in the 1958 Report:
As soon as one hears that a particular place is a “boom” area, he is likely 
to think of a general laxity of law enforcement or, at least, of a greater 
incidence of loose spending for illegal and barely legal pleasures. Couple 
that conception with the idea that there has been a considerable increase 
in population composed largely of unmarried men in “rough” occupations 
and the ingredients are complete for a common-sense prediction that 
criminality and immorality will be greatly increased. (p. 259)
Campbell’s prediction was indeed common sense, for it reflected some 
historical realities of past boomtown experiences around the country and be-
yond. The problem, however, is that there is far more nuance to the commercial 
sex industry and prostitution specifically than such common sense predictions 
capture. While Campbell acknowledged that there were likely “some excep-
tions to [this] generally useful theory,” he proceeded to outline five indicators 
that explained “why some [crime and immorality] did not occur as well as why 
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some did” (Campbell, p. 259). As we’ll see, these indicators do not provide 
sufficient explanation or evidence for what appeared to Campbell to be a lack 
of commercial sexual activity in the Williston area. Instead, his indicators serve 
as an invitation for more research on the topic than Campbell was able or in-
terested in conducting at the time.
Indicator 1
First, the assumption that a large proportion of the increased population 
was composed of unmarried men was contrary to the facts. The bulk of 
the oil field workers not only were married but had children. (Campbell, 
p. 259)
As discussed earlier, a key component of the boomtown trope is the presence 
of sexually charged, unattached bachelors driving the demand for commercial 
sex. While a thriving bachelor culture often does support a thriving commer-
cial sex industry, the lack of bachelors or, rather, the abundance of married 
fathers, does not mean there is no demand for commercial sex in a commu-
nity. As recent studies have shown, the buyers of commercial sex come from all 
backgrounds and engage in the practice for a wide variety of reasons, including 
not feeling comfortable asking their wives to perform certain sexual activities.3 
In fact, in their 2017 report on buyers, a research team funded by the Women’s 
Foundation of Minnesota found that the predominant buyers of commercial 
sex in the state were married, middle-aged, white men (Martin, Melander, 
Karnik, and Nakamura 2017). While the marital and parental status of new 
or old residents in Williston during the 1950s oil boom is not irrelevant to a 
study of prostitution, it is also not a reliable marker of increased morality or 
immorality in the community. 
Indicator 2
Second, there was a general provision of increased law enforcement fa-
cilities … Ray had employed a full-time policeman who was reported by 
the citizens as being “tough” on violators of any sort but particularly on 
speeders, speeding having been apparently the main problem. (Campbell, 
p. 260)
3  For research on the buyers of commercial sex, see Bernstein (2001) and Durchslad and 
Goswami (2008).
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Campbell’s implication is that the expansion of law enforcement kept 
immoral crimes at bay. That may very well have been the case in terms of pros-
titution during the 1950s boom. The laws were certainly unfriendly to those 
engaged in prostitution and the presence of extra officers to enforce those laws 
might have given pimps, prostitutes, and buyers pause before engaging in the 
trade in the Williston area. However, it is unclear whether officers of the law 
had any particular incentive to look for and disrupt acts of prostitution. Even 
if there wasn’t a special incentive, doing so would require extra work. Speeding 
was a socially tolerable and visible crime that was committed and punished 
with frequency. Prostitution, on the other hand, was covert and stigmatized, 
which made it more difficult for law enforcement officers to locate and for re-
searchers to quantify. Perhaps law enforcement knew what to look for in terms 
of underground acts of commercial sex, went looking for it, and found few or 
no cases of crimes being committed. Campbell suggests, though, that some-
thing else might have been going on. He noted that there were “two known 
prostitutes in Williston, but in no sense were their activities organized, con-
tinuous, or flagrant” (p. 262). Without more evidence it is difficult to know 
the extent to which the activities of these individuals were organized, but it 
is fair to suggest that at this historical moment they couldn’t risk their own 
well-being or livelihood with continuous or flagrant acts of commercial sex. 
That Campbell describes these individuals as “known prostitutes” raises the 
question of whether there was a communal acceptance of prostitution so long 
as prostitutes kept to themselves and kept moving. If this kind of behavior was 
acceptable and not pursued by law enforcement, it is probable that there were 
more than two prostitutes making their way in and out of the region during 
this time and even more buyers.  
Indicator 3
Third, drunkenness was prevented from developing to the problem 
proportions it might have reached by a combination of already existing 
circumstances. (Campbell, p. 261)
Campbell points to various techniques to control drunkenness that Wil-
liston had in place prior to the boom. For example, law enforcement placed 
extra officers in the areas of town where seasonal laborers resided so as to 
make quick arrests for public intoxication, and tavern-owners often called 
taxis for intoxicated patrons. While there is no reason to doubt these efforts 
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helped control the rates or potential damage of drunkenness, they likely had 
little effect on the commercial sex industry in the region. At this point in time 
brothels were not operating in taverns (at least not openly) and drunkenness 
is not a necessary element for the purchase of commercial sex.
Indicator 4
Fourth, a main source of drinking and gambling activity was available im-
mediately outside the area, thus what might have been a problem within 
the area was removed. An active gambling, drinking, dining and dancing 
“club” just across the Montana state line attracted a large clientele from 
the oil development area … (Campbell, p. 262)
Of all the indicators provided by Campbell as to why there was not a “no-
table increase in, or even the presence of … immoral activity” in the Williston 
area, this may be the most problematic. More research is needed on the na-
ture of the club mentioned by Campbell and its surrounding community, but 
the fact that North Dakota residents crossed state lines to engage in certain 
frowned-upon (if not illegal) activities raises the question whether procuring 
commercial sex was also easier there. If so, this means that even if there were 
no prostitutes in the Williston area (aside from the two who were known), 
there were likely buyers. Since Campbell puts prostitution under the umbrella 
term of immoral activities, the presence of buyers in the community must also 
be identified as part of the problem even if their purchases were being made 
elsewhere. Like many late nineteenth and early twentieth century North Da-
kota lawmakers, Campbell seems at risk of dismissing as inconsequential the 
demand side of the issue. 
Indicator 5
Finally, evidence is lacking that there was a greater inclination among mi-
grants than among “natives” to participate in illegal and “fringe” types of 
activity … (Campbell, p. 262)
With this statement Campbell challenged the accuracy of the boomtown 
trope in which outsiders are typically blamed for the problems that often 
arise in boom areas. Criminal or immoral activity is never exclusive to new-
comers. The increased presence of a new population of people and especially 
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unattached men might exacerbate or shine a light on existing problems, but the 
new arrivals are not necessarily the cause of those problems. When it comes to 
prostitution in the Williston Basin during the boom, it appears few people—
newcomers or longtime residents—were arrested for buying commercial sex. 
Does this mean it wasn’t for sale there and so they went elsewhere? Does it 
mean the residents and newcomers alike weren’t interested in commercial 
sex? Does it mean that law enforcement looked the other way when it came to 
buyers or perhaps to prostitution as a whole? Or does it mean that by this time 
the longstanding laws and social norms had driven the practice so far under-
ground that it ceased to be perceptible to the untrained eye? A combination of 
some or all of the above is likely.
Campbell conducted his study at a time when prostitution and sex more gen-
erally were not discussed in public (at least not in small town North Dakota). 
Prostitution was an underground activity in every sense of the word and had 
been driven there as a result of the panic launched by the state’s first popu-
lation boom at the end of the nineteenth century. Campbell understandably 
expected to find an increase in prostitution during the 1950s oil boom, but 
it appears that his analysis fell sway to the boomtown trope of brothels and 
deviant women. When he did not see either in the form he expected, his anal-
ysis came to a close. What he didn’t account for was the influence of the laws 
penalizing prostitution, which had long been on the books. His surface-level 
observations may ultimately be proven correct, but for now they raise more 
questions than they answer and, as such, they serve as a terrific springboard 
for further research about prostitution during North Dakota’s oil boom in the 
1950s. However, as the state’s twenty-first century oil boom reveals, such a 
study must also include the topic of sex trafficking. This issue, which caused 
much hand-wringing in the Progressive Era and informed many of the an-
ti-vice laws for the first half of the twentieth century, was entirely absent in 
Campbell’s analysis. Yet given the presence of sex trafficking and prostitution 
in the state’s first and most recent booms, it was likely present in the 1950s 
as well. While the Progressive Era residents, anti-vice activists, and lawmakers 
engaged in a fair amount of sensationalism regarding so-called “white slavery,” 
the recent boom in North Dakota’s Bakken region and the anti-trafficking 
efforts (both promising and problematic) of activists and lawmakers provide 
some guidance not only for tackling human trafficking, but also for tackling a 
renewed study of prostitution and sex trafficking in Campbell’s Williston.
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Prostitution and Trafficking Laws During the Twenty-first Century Oil Boom
As news outlets around the state, the country, and even the world began re-
porting on the enormous boom in oil production and population in western 
North Dakota in the first decades of the twenty-first century, they also began 
to report on what appeared to be a simultaneous surge in prostitution, espe-
cially in areas surrounding the man camps near the Bakken oil fields. American 
society had changed considerably since the time of Campbell’s report, with sex 
and even prostitution being common parts of popular culture and discourse. 
As such, it’s no surprise that the presence of the commercial sex industry 
was more readily apparent to residents in the twenty-first century than in 
mid-twentieth century. However, the response of the general public to the 
seeming rise of commercial sex in their community harkened back to that of 
their nineteenth century ancestors, for many residents complained about the 
sordid influence of prostitutes on their communities. Such complaints were 
soon followed by concerns about high rates of sex trafficking and the threat 
of innocent girls being kidnapped by traffickers (Berg Burin 2016). As was the 
case 120 years earlier, these concerns were not baseless. There was an increase 
in prostitution and sex trafficking in the Bakken. Like their nineteenth century 
ancestors, lawmakers responded to these developments. 
By the time of North Dakota’s twenty-first century oil boom, human traf-
ficking had long since been on the radar of national and global lawmakers. 
The United Nations took over international anti-trafficking efforts from the 
defunct League of Nations in 1949 with the Convention for the Suppression 
of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others. 
The UN’s Commission on the Status of Women had also been monitoring and 
advocating for international action against sex trafficking and exploitation 
within prostitution since the 1940s. This work was continued by the UN’s 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
during the 1960s and beyond. As awareness of modern day slavery spread 
across the globe in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, the UN 
gathered in Palermo, Italy, in 2000 and passed the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (a supple-
ment to the 2000 Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime).4 As 
the world’s “first global legally binding instrument with an agreed definition on 
trafficking,” the protocol was intended to protect the human rights of victims 
4  For a fulsome description of the United Nations’ efforts to address human trafficking in the 
twentieth century, see Reanda (1991).
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of trafficking and help coordinate international efforts to combat the crime 
(UNODC 2000). At the same time the United States passed its first federal 
comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation with the Trafficking Victims Protec-
tion Act of 2000, which has been reauthorized four times (most recently in 
2013) and which seeks to prevent severe forms of trafficking, protect victims, 
and prosecute exploiters. The federal government also passed the Justice for 
Victims of Trafficking Act in 2015, which strengthened the government’s as-
sistance for victims, created a survivor-led U.S. Advisory Council on Human 
Trafficking, and made buyers of commercial sex from trafficking victims cul-
pable for trafficking offenses (United States Department of State 2018). In 
addition, many local, national, and international NGOs were organized in the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first century dedicated to combating human 
trafficking. As a result of these developments, sex trafficking had become a hot 
topic in news and entertainment media. While increased media attention led 
to increased public awareness, much of the coverage included (and still does 
include) sensationalized images and stories of scantily clad girls in chains. Such 
images are reminiscent of the white slavery panic and perpetuate the false as-
sumptions of a bygone era.
North Dakota residents and lawmakers were not blind to these develop-
ments and in the face of the demographic changes of the oil boom they were 
compelled to take action. As it turned out, the Uniform Law Commission 
(ULC, a nonprofit organization dating back to the nineteenth century, which 
promotes consistency across states in various areas of law) created a Uniform 
Act on Prevention of and Remedies for Human Trafficking in 2013. As the 
ULC states, the model legislation “provides the three components necessary 
for ending human trafficking: comprehensive criminal penalties; protections 
for human-trafficking victims; and public awareness and prevention methods” 
(Uniform Law Commission 2018). Through the persistent efforts of anti-traf-
ficking advocates and supportive lawmakers, the North Dakota state legislature 
adopted the ULC’s Uniform Act on trafficking in 2015 and, as a result, took its 
strongest stance on human trafficking in 153 years of lawmaking (North Da-
kota Legislative Assembly 2005, ch. 117). The most significant changes from 
the previous anti-trafficking legislation include the following provisions:
• The past sexual behavior of victims is not admissible in court. 
• Minors who provide commercial sex for hire are presumed to be children 
in need of protective services and are immune from prostitution charges. 
(This is known as Safe Harbor legislation).
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• Adult trafficking victims have the opportunity to vacate and expunge con-
victions for crimes that they committed as a result of being a victim of 
human trafficking.
• Victims are eligible for state-funded services.
• The Attorney General is authorized to make a grant or contract with 
government units, tribal government units, and non-governmental or-
ganizations to expand and develop services for victims.
• Organizations and units that receive grants or make contracts with the 
Attorney General must provide numbers and demographic information 
for the purpose of data collection. 
• Enhanced penalties will apply to people who purchase commercial sex 
from a minor, from a known trafficking victim, and from all others, in-
cluding the possibility of required participation in an offender education 
program on the negative consequences of the commercial sex industry.
With its adoption of the Uniform Act on Human Trafficking, the North 
Dakota Legislature took an important step forward in the fight against sex 
trafficking. In addition to putting increased responsibility on exploiters—both 
traffickers and buyers—the statutes set the foundation for data collection 
so that the state can better understand and address the problem as it exists 
in North Dakota. Moreover, by attaching a fiscal note to the legislation, leg-
islators empowered organizations to proactively combat human trafficking. 
The legislation would reek of insincerity without the provision of funds for 
training legal system professionals and enhancing support services. By creating 
the opportunity for survivors to vacate and expunge convictions for crimes 
committed while a victim a trafficking, lawmakers revealed their increased 
awareness of the various forms of manipulation and exploitation that victims 
can endure in a trafficking situation. Finally, the legislation emphasizes the 
lack of consent for minors providing sex for hire regardless of their personal, 
criminal, and sexual history. The legislature reinforced this new approach to 
minors in the commercial sex industry by changing the definition of prostitute 
from “individual” to “adult” (North Dakota Legislative Assembly 2015, ch. 109, 
sec. 12.1-29.02).
While these significant legal changes reflect a renewed and more critical 
approach to combating sex trafficking in North Dakota, the state still has a 
way to go in shedding its outdated and harmful “boomtown” approach to sex 
trafficking and prostitution. For example, much like the state’s early anti-traf-
ficking laws, the Uniform Law protects only certain victims of trafficking. Safe 
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harbor provisions are for minors. Adult victims of trafficking must present ev-
idence of force, fraud, or coercion to prove they are indeed victims of trafficking 
and not consenting prostitutes who can still be charged as criminals under 
the state’s prostitution laws. As victims of trauma and complex manipulation, 
providing such evidence can be incredibly difficult. Even getting survivors to 
recognize their victimization can be difficult. Moreover, while a sex trafficking 
victim can apply to have prostitution charges vacated, this can be a grueling 
and retraumatizing process for many individuals. Law enforcement officers 
who have received training on sex trafficking are encouraged to take a vic-
tim-centered approach when encountering adults engaged in prostitution and 
to use their discretion when deciding whether to charge them with a crime or 
direct them to services. But the law still provides a narrow definition of legit-
imate victims, which has the effect of shaming and putting at risk those who 
fall outside that definition.5 
North Dakota state law continues to see the selling of commercial sex as a 
black and white issue represented by the binary of criminal prostitutes and 
trafficking victims. The reality, though, is that many adults engaged in the 
labor of prostitution move back and forth along a spectrum between consent 
and force, empowerment and oppression. This large gray area is something the 
law does not yet fully recognize, much to the detriment of autonomous and 
reluctant sex workers, as well as adult trafficking victims. By looking at the 
issue through a human rights lens rather than that of criminal justice alone, 
the legislature could enhance protections for all individuals who engage in 
prostitution and reduce the rates of those who do so reluctantly or by force. 
At the heart of a human rights approach to prostitution and sex trafficking is 
attentiveness to the social, economic, and political conditions that contribute 
to one’s vulnerability to commercial sexual exploitation.6 Legislators need to 
address poverty, housing insecurity, affordable healthcare, and job opportu-
nities in their communities. Many individuals in the life “choose” to engage in 
that line of work out of economic necessity and a lack of viable alternatives. 
Exploiters are also quick to capitalize on the vulnerabilities of those experi-
encing economic and housing insecurity by providing the basics of survival 
5 It is also notable that the North Dakota legislature added a section to the Uniform Law on 
Human Trafficking that prevents service providers from informing victims of their full repro-
ductive healthcare choices, which can be seen as a form of state control over victims’ bodily 
autonomy. See North Dakota Legislative Assembly (2015, ch. 109, sec. 12.1-41-20).
6 For a discussion of a human rights approach to human trafficking, see O’Connell Davidson 
(2015) and Kempadoo (2015).
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and reaping the economic benefits of their victims’ unfree labor. Legislators 
must also address discrimination on the basis of one’s race, sexual orientation, 
and gender identity, for across the nation girls and women of color, as well as 
individuals of all sexes who identify as LGBTQ+, are overrepresented among 
sex trafficking victims and sex workers. Exploiters feed off the marginalization 
of these groups. Legislators must also provide funding for mental health and 
social services, including the child welfare system, substance abuse programs, 
and domestic and sexual violence services. Victims of sex trafficking and 
commercial sexual exploitation frequently come into the life already having 
experienced violence, emotional abuse, or neglect.7 Legislators must also fund 
education and support services within schools so as to prevent and detect traf-
ficking and exploitation and, of course, to provide better opportunities in life 
for all children. When education budgets are slashed, the vulnerabilities of at-
risk youth increase. Legislators who take a human rights approach must also 
address the humanity and rights of sex workers who have been and continue 
to be dehumanized by the public, a portion of their customers, and the legal 
system. Criminalizing their labor without sufficiently addressing the above 
issues does nothing but put them at greater risk for exploitation and marginal-
ization. If legislators are serious about increasing public safety and decreasing 
sex trafficking and the negative effects of prostitution, they need to address 
the conditions that create these problems and the human rights of all those 
who perform commercial sex for hire, regardless of the reason.
A Human Rights Approach to Campbell’s Study
A human rights approach to prostitution and sex trafficking would not only 
help legislators take meaningful steps to solve the problems associated with 
these issues, but it would also help guide scholars who seek to uncover and 
make sense of the history of sex trafficking and prostitution in North Dakota 
and beyond. Campbell wrote at a time in which prostitution had been driven 
underground by the laws of an earlier era. Those laws reinforced society’s 
condemnation of false villains (all prostitutes) and disregard of many hidden 
victims and exploiters all the way up through the twenty-first century. While 
the state’s legislative history illuminates North Dakotans’ willingness to en-
gage with social problems, as well as the advances the state has made on the 
issues of sex trafficking and exploitation within prostitution, it also reveals the 
7 For a discussion of the abuse and neglect many victims of sex trafficking experience before 
being trafficked, see Lloyd (2011).
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historical and continued bias and blind spots of lawmakers, their constituents, 
and even researchers. 
The impact of late nineteenth-century anti-vice laws on prostitution during 
Campbell’s time and his own expectations about what he would find in 1950s 
boomtown Williston undoubtedly contributed to what he observed to be the 
absence of prostitution. As the state’s first and most recent economic booms 
reveal, prostitution and sex trafficking are present and always have been in the 
state. Moreover, where there is one, the other can usually be found. A human 
rights approach to these issues will allow new researchers to look back at the 
1950s Williston area in Campbell’s study and ask questions that are better 
suited for recovering the stories of people and activities relegated to the mar-
gins of society and history, no matter how few or many there are. A renewed 
study will take the boomtown trope for what it is—a historical stereotype 
with some truth and lots of fiction—and dig into the nuances of the complex 
problems and people associated with prostitution and sex trafficking. Doing so 
will bring the experiences, needs, and rights of victims, survivors, and autono-
mous sex workers into the light.
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Chapter 14
Conclusion: Reading The Williston 
Report Sixty Years Later 
Kyle Conway
In their chapter about the social effects of North Dakota’s most recent oil 
boom, Rick Ruddell and Heather Ray warn that although studies such as the 
1958 Williston Report “provide us with insight into the impacts of booms oc-
curring in the past, we have to be careful consumers of that research” (p. 272). 
The change communities undergo now is more intense than in the past, the 
boom-bust cycle faster, and the effects more widely spread. Direct compari-
sons are useful, but they do not tell us everything.
There are other reasons to read the 1958 Report critically or even skeptically. 
William Caraher, Bret Weber, and Richard Rothaus, for instance, identify as-
pects of housing that the authors of The Williston Report did not see. Longtime 
residents appeared to suggest that “something was wrong with the workers 
who seemingly chose to live in ‘substandard’ temporary workforce housing,” 
and consequently, “Rather than a social responsibility, temporary workforce 
housing became an inconvenience for longer-term residents to endure” (Car-
aher et al., p. 289). This blindspot was a result of the failure by the authors of 
the 1958 Report to reflect critically on their categories of analysis. As Caraher 
and his coauthors point out, they defined a social problem as “any situation 
which is reported by people involved in it as undesirable and, therefore, about 
which they express a negative opinion, possibly indicating a tendency to act 
to change the situation” (Campbell, p. 254). In effect, they took as their only 
point of reference the perspective of the people they surveyed or interviewed, 
people who—understandably enough—were concerned primarily with their 
own lives and the local effects of the boom. The closest they came to ques-
tioning this definition was to remark, “From this point of view a situation 
may not be a problem to the participants despite the fact that the observer is 
disturbed by it” (Campbell, p. 254). In other words, they saw the definition’s 
shortcomings in reference only to their own personal frames. They did not ask 
about systemic problems, nor did they examine structural causes and effects.
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Historian Michel-Rolph Trouillot (1995) provides a useful framework for 
describing this shortcoming. He speaks of “silences” or omissions that are in-
troduced into the historical narrative at different places, in particular,
the moment of fact creation (the making of sources); the moment of 
fact assembly (the making of archives); the moment of fact retrieval (the 
making of narrative); and the moment of retrospective significance (the 
making of history in the final instance). (1995, 26)
The different silences build on each other: a gap in sources affects the way 
historians assemble facts and then weave them into a story. Put another way, 
the authors of the 1958 Report asked only about residents’ personal opinions 
about housing but neglected the structural dimensions of housing, such as the 
role of preexisting social networks embedded in a specific historical context, 
in helping people find and maintain homes (fact creation). They then incorpo-
rated this selective set of facts into their report (fact assembly), leading them 
to tell a story where inadequate housing was—to their surprise!—not the 
problem they thought it would be (fact retrieval). Readers six decades later 
encounter a history of relative harmony among new and longtime residents, 
despite the occasional minor conflicts (retrospective significance). By identi-
fying these silences, Caraher and his coauthors make them “speak”—that is, 
they use them to reveal something about the original authors’ situation that 
they themselves might not have recognized, namely their assumptions about 
the individual, rather than social, causes and effects of social problems.
This is a useful exercise, one that Nikki Berg Burin undertakes in her chapter 
about human trafficking in the Bakken. The 1958 authors write,
There were no indications available to the researchers that there had been 
a notable increase in, or even the presence of, organized criminal or im-
moral activity—gambling houses, theft rings, “protection” or houses of 
prostitution. There were two known prostitutes in Williston, but in no 
sense were their activities organized, continuous or flagrant. (Campbell, 
p. 262)
Berg Burin suggests, however, that the authors missed something—the 
facts they assembled were incomplete because, she argues, when they did not 
find what they expected to find, they stopped looking. They looked for public 
examples of prostitution when they were more likely to be hidden from view, 
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and they presumed that if the single men who flocked to Williston were not 
buying sex, then no one was, neglecting the likelihood that married men might 
buy sex, too.
Of course, this exercise is not free of ambiguity. Making silences speak is 
not the same as finding new facts. Its value lies in the way it raises questions 
about why silences exist in the first place—what forces, that is, work together 
to produce and maintain them. That is the question the conclusion explores. 
What did The Williston Report leave out, and what social or political forces 
contributed to that exclusion? It considers two silences in particular: Native 
Americans are absent from the text, as is almost any discussion of the environ-
ment. The conclusion ends by asking about future readers. If reading about an 
oil boom sixty years after it took place can shed new light on the era in which 
people wrote it, what will readers in 2078 think of this book?
Native Americans
Native Americans are completely absent from the 1958 Report. In some ways 
this is surprising: part of the Fort Berthold Reservation, for instance, home to 
the MHA Nation (the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara), is in Mountrail County 
not far from Tioga, one of The Williston Report’s areas of focus. In other ways, 
it is not surprising at all: The Williston Report is a product of its time, where 
the dominant mythology was that of the frontier. In fact, the Report opens by 
evoking that myth, framing (non-Native) residents’ presence as the result of 
struggle by generations of settlers to tame the land: 
Directly or indirectly, almost every resident had relied primarily upon the 
thin cover of soil, upon the vagaries of a capricious weather and upon the 
biological rhythm of plant and animal life for his livelihood and for his 
welfare … Several generations in that place had brought about a pattern of 
living, an adjustment of man to land which was established and mature. 
(Wills et al., p. 7)
This myth is of a piece with the dominant narrative of the era. For instance, 
the American Petroleum Institute, a trade association formed after the First 
World War, produced a series of movies about oil exploration to supplement 
the other “educational” materials it published (as mentioned by Talbot, p. 
356
151). One film, American Frontier (API 1953), was even about Williston.1 It 
tells the heroic story of a self-described “wheat farmer and school teacher” 
named Nils Halverson, who is willing to take risks in the name of progress. 
Much like The Williston Report, it opens with the myth of the frontier, as its 
title suggests. Over swelling music and images of empty highways blown over 
with snow (Figure 14.1),2 the narrator says,
Not so long ago, this was frontier. Listen closely, and you’ll hear the old 
ghost-echo of covered wagons, the phantom shadows of pioneers, fighting 
for their lives against the wilderness. Lean men, hard as hickory, lonely 
women, wearing their dreams like a bit of bright calico. They began with 
nothing—with their bare hands and a bucket of hope, breaking the land 
of freedom’s plow, planting towns with names as American as a banjo 
tune: Fargo, Stampede, Blue Grass, Beaver Lodge, Lincoln Valley, Williston.
The plot revolves around the oilmen coming to Nils’s farm to persuade his 
family to lease their mineral rights. Companies are exploring the area, but 
nothing happens until one day when Nils comes home from teaching and his 
wife says the oilmen are drilling a well on a neighbor’s farm. Curious, they go 
to see it and talk to the man in charge of drilling. Staring out at the prairie, ad-
miring the derrick putting in the well, the oilman says it will cost half a million 
dollars, but with only a slim chance of success: “That’s the oil business, a real 
gamble. One out of nine, with half a million riding on the play” (Figure 14.2).
“Pretty tough odds,” Nils says.
“Plenty a man willing to take it,” the oilman replies, “especially when there’s 
a chance of profit.” He pulls an arrowhead out of his pocket. 
“Indian arrowhead?” Nils asks. 
“Yeah,” he says, “found it right over there, where we put the rig. It’s for luck—
we’re going to need it!” (Figure 14.3)
1 At least ostensibly. The very first sentence of the film, meant to situate the action for the 
viewer, is nonsense: “The wind blows west from the Great Lakes.” Anyone who has lived in 
Williston knows, first, that the wind comes from the west and blows toward the east, and, 
second, that the closest Great Lake is 700 miles away.
2 American Frontier is in the public domain. All screenshots come from archive.org.
357
Figure 14.1. “The old ghost-echo of covered wagons, the phantom shadows of 
pioneers…” (source: American Frontier, API 1953)
Figure 14.2. “That’s the oil business, a real gamble. One out of nine, with half a 
million riding on the play.” (source: American Frontier, API 1953)
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The arrowhead is the only indication of Native Americans in the film. Its 
function in the plot, not to mention the broader social narrative shaping the 
plot, is twofold: it relegates Native Americans to history, and it transforms their 
historical presence into a token of luck, which ultimately serves the interests of 
the oil business. The film, like The Williston Report, erases Native Americans at 
the moments of fact creation and assembly (they are present only in the token 
of the arrowhead), fact retrieval (except for this token, they are otherwise ab-
sent), and finally, if we take this film at face value, retrospective significance.
It is important, in that respect, to remember, as Sebastien Braun (2016, 95) 
reminds us, that “frontiers exist as frontiers for outsiders, on the same land that 
is home to locals.” Despite the absence of Native Americans in The Williston Re-
port (and American Frontier), they were living in the Williston Basin during the 
1950s oil boom, just as they live in the Bakken region now (see Rundquist and 
Vandeberg, p. 77, and Olive, p. 164). Their perspective, absent in The Wil-
liston Report, is present in other places. For instance, during the fight against 
the Dakota Access Pipeline in 2016, David Archambault (2016), chair of the 
Standing Rock Sioux tribe, explained his opposition to the pipeline by placing 
it in the context of other historical injustices committed against the people 
he represented. One of these, the creation of the Garrison Dam to control the 
Figure 14.3. An arrowhead for good luck. (source: American Frontier, API 1953)
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flow of the Missouri River in the 1950s, occurred at roughly the same time as 
the 1950s boom. Archambault (2016, par. 8) explains that it “took our river-
front forests, fruit orchards and most fertile farmland,” and he shows how its 
creation was part of an ongoing cycle of broken promises. 
In this way, he helps fill in the gaps in The Williston Report, whose authors 
started from a different set of epistemological assumptions. Where they 
treated problems caused by oil as distinct from other problems, Archambault 
did not, showing instead how the damming of the Missouri River and the con-
struction of the Dakota Access Pipeline were part of a broader pattern. Put 
another way, The Williston Report seeks to explain social problems, such as they 
were, as symptoms of the oil boom. Archambault, in contrast, explains both 
the destruction caused by the Garrison Dam and the risks associated with oil 
exploration as symptoms of the U.S. government’s failure to deal fairly with 
Native Americans (Conway and Duguay 2019). For him, these events fall into 
the same category, and his account of the Garrison Dam helps with the pro-
duction of historical narrative (that is, the moment of fact retrieval) by making 
it possible to reconstruct those facts about Native communities during the 
1950s oil boom to which contemporary non-Native scholars do not have direct 
access. 
It also brings into sharp relief the different ways Native and settler commu-
nities organize their accounts of history. The authors of The Williston Report 
treated problems caused by the oil boom as independent of other problems, 
whose causes they saw as unrelated to oil. So did non-Native leaders during 
the conflict over the Dakota Access Pipeline, in contrast to Archambault. That 
compartmentalization was politically expedient in that it allowed North Da-
kota’s political leaders in 2016 to argue in favor of the pipeline and against 
the protests (and protestors) (Conway and Duguay 2019). In a similar way, 
it made it possible for the authors of The Williston Report not to ask about the 
effect of the 1950s boom on Native communities, a decision that contrib-
uted—indirectly, at least—to the conditions in which the conflict over Dakota 
Access took place six decades later.
The Environment
Another silence in The Williston Report concerns the environment. In fact, the 
word environment appears in only one place, where it refers to the state’s eco-
nomic environment (Kelley, p. 190), although ideas related to the physical 
environment do appear in the authors’ descriptions of the impact of the boom 
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on roads (Wills, p. 44–50). They also appear in their discussion of pipelines 
(Wills, p. 50, and Talbot, p. 121) and flaring, or the burning of excess nat-
ural gas (Wills, p. 51), but again in the context of politics (in the case of 
pipelines crossing state borders) or the economy (in the case of flaring).
Simply put, the authors of The Williston Report are not concerned with the 
effect of the boom on the air people breathe or the water they drink. They 
differ in this respect from the authors of the chapters that update the 1958 
Report, some of whom do address these concerns, albeit in works not included 
in this volume. Both William Caraher and Bret Weber in The Bakken: An Archae-
ology of an Industrial Landscape (2017) and Rick Ruddell in Oil, Gas, and Crime: 
The Dark Side of the Boomtown (2017) address the pollution caused by oil devel-
opment, related not just to fracking but also to flaring, wastewater, oil spills, 
and the illegal dumping of toxic waste, as well as light and noise pollution, all 
of which affect residents’ quality of life (Ruddell 2017, 108–11; Caraher and 
Weber 2017, 21–2).
What accounts for this silence in the 1958 Report? Here, as above, the prox-
imate cause is the authors’ reliance on their informants (who were concerned 
with their immediate circumstances) to identify and define social problems. 
Although the conservation movement in the United States had existed since 
the nineteenth century, led by people like Henry David Thoreau and later John 
Muir, concerns about conservation had not entered the public consciousness 
to the degree they would even a few years later when Rachel Carson published 
Silent Spring (1962). In other words, although this omission might appear 
strange to contemporary eyes, environmental issues did not yet have the ur-
gency they have since come to have. Atmospheric rates of the greenhouse gas 
carbon dioxide (CO2), for instance, which had held more or less steady at about 
280 parts per million (ppm) since biblical times, had risen, but only to 313 
ppm in 1951 (IAC 2016; see Figure 14.4).3 Their rise since then has been more 
dramatic, reaching nearly 400 ppm by 2014 and 407 ppm by 2018 (IAC 2016; 
Harvey 2018).
To explain this silence in greater detail would require an exercise of intel-
lectual archeology that is beyond the scope of the concluding chapter of an 
edited volume. It would involve, for instance, digging down to the unspoken 
3 Note that the turning point after which CO2 rates rose without falling again came in the 
1780s, at the beginning of the geological epoch that Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer (2000, 
17) describe as the Anthropocene, a term they choose to designate “the central role of mankind 
in geology and ecology.” For them, the symbolic beginning of the Anthropocene is 1784, the 
year James Watt invented the steam engine. Although change was still gradual at that point, it 
seems well chosen nonetheless.
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assumptions shaping the decision by the 1958 authors to privilege informants’ 
notions of social problems: what were the social and intellectual conditions 
that made their decision appear self-evident? How did those conditions affect 
the moments of fact creation, assembly, and retrieval?
Still, the idea that environmental consequences are greater now is clear in 
many places, not just rising CO2 levels. Pipelines are a concern because people 
are acutely aware of the risks involved in transporting oil, after the explosions 
of trains carrying Bakken oil in Lac Mégantic, Quebec, and Casselton, North 
Dakota, in 2013. They are also a concern because of the threat they pose to 
water supplies, as the protests against the Dakota Access Pipeline showed. 
More broadly, the end of 2018 was marked by the publication of two reports, 
one from the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP 2018), the other 
from the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC 
2018), that sounded the alarm about the risks of climate change and the need 
for immediate action. They describe a cascading series of effects if CO2 emis-
sions go unchecked: sea levels will rise and extreme weather events such as 
hurricanes and wildfires will become more frequent, leading to greater rates 
of poverty in affected areas and causing mass migration as people lose their 
homes or seek homes that are more secure (see Dennis and Mooney 2018; 
Watts 2018). Even North Dakotans, many of whom have resisted the idea that 
climate change is happening or is human-caused, have begun to recognize that 
it is indeed taking place and that it is affecting things they value, especially in 
Figure 14.4. Global rates of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration, Year 
1–2014 (data source: IAC 2016)
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agriculture (Baumgarten 2018). Some have even begun to speak against the oil 
industry in North Dakota, especially in relation to the Dakota Access Pipeline 
(Ruddell 2017, 111–13; Brorby 2017).
How Will People Read this Book Sixty Years from Now?
The nature of the social sciences is such that the authors of a book like The Wil-
liston Report—or Sixty Years of Boom and Bust—assume a certain amount of 
authority with respect to their readers and the people they write about. They 
claim to see things that the people they write about might not see, insight 
they have gained through the tools they use—surveys, interviews, statistical 
analysis, and so on, all designed to provide a broader perspective or ferret out 
hidden patterns.
But their claim to authority does not go untested. The test they face is simple: 
do their readers, including the people they write about, recognize the situa-
tions they have described? In other words, do their descriptions ring true? In 
addition, as they describe what they have observed, they also make predictions 
about the future, at least implicitly, in the trends they use to explain how the 
current situation came to be. Those too can be tested as time passes and new 
readers engage with their work.
In this respect, Robert Campbell makes a revealing comment at the end of 
his chapter on social change in the Williston Basin. The authors of the 1958 
Report saw themselves as being a bit like Cassandra, the figure from Greek my-
thology whose predictions about the future always fell on deaf ears:
One of the unfortunate aspects of a report of this sort is that some of 
the predictions which are practically useful are not available early enough. 
We could have predicted fairly accurately the amount of immediate de-
crease in Tioga’s population as we were conducting the fieldwork because 
of our knowledge that particular individuals already knew the dates on 
which they were to be transferred. Furthermore, we could have predicted 
the decrease in activity because of the knowledge we obtained about the 
relative number of employees needed in exploratory as compared to de-
velopment activity in the oil fields. The predictions of this sort that we 
expressed orally tended to be ridiculed as obviously wrong or as attempts 
to devaluate the importance of the oil development to the state of North 
Dakota. (Campbell, p. 268)
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Might the same be true of Sixty Years of Boom and Bust? This book has cov-
ered a wide range of topics—changes in physical geography, changes in politics 
and the economy, and social changes—over a span of sixty years. The chapters 
describing the 1950s boom covered a lot of ground, and those describing the 
boom in the first decades of the 2000s covered more, addressing issues that 
were not as salient in 1958, such as hospital access and drug use. At the same 
time, this book shares blind spots with The Williston Report. Although some of 
the 2018 authors write about Native Americans, for instance, they focus on 
those aspects most relevant to the questions they are asking, such as Native 
Americans’ role in governance (Olive, p. 164), without going further.
So, how will people read this book sixty years from now? What patterns 
are likely to affect the social fabric of western North Dakota, and what, conse-
quently, will become salient for future readers? In answer to the first question, 
two patterns stand out, at least for the near future. The first relates to climate 
change. The predictions by the Global Change Research Program (USGCRP 
2018) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC 2018) are 
dire, but few countries have succeeded in cutting their CO2 emissions. In fact, 
despite the agreement reached in Paris in 2015 to limit emissions to prevent 
global temperatures from rising by more than 1.5°C beyond pre-industrial 
levels, global CO2 rates rose to record levels by 2018 (Storrow 2018). The pat-
tern is one of missed goals. The demand for oil remains high because it makes 
economic growth possible. It might not be the only energy source, but it is 
more readily accessible than many others.
The second pattern relates to the contradictory logics shaping how people 
interact with and relate to one another. One trend in the United States (and 
elsewhere) is that of the development of diffuse political and social movements 
with loosely related goals, made possible through online social networks that 
allow people to affiliate with each other in ever-evolving ways. Another related, 
occasionally conflicting trend is that of increased political polarization, as the 
networks people join draw them away from those with whom they disagree. 
Oil will continue to shape these logics directly, by bringing people together ei-
ther in support of or in opposition to oil extraction, and indirectly, by shaping 
the conditions in which they meet and the ways they understand their rela-
tionships to each.
It is risky, however, to make anything more than short-range predictions. The 
authors of the 1958 Report could not have foreseen the controversies about 
pipelines, for instance, because the scale of oil production in the first decade 
of the 2000s was beyond anything they might have imagined. Here is where 
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the question of salience matters. What will be salient for future readers will 
depend on a social situation resulting from changes that the authors of this 
book can only imagine. If society has split irreversibly into warring camps that 
refuse to recognize each other’s claims to humanity, perhaps what will be clear 
is our undue investment in tribal identities. If it has not, perhaps it will be our 
ability to overcome the institutional forces that benefit from dividing people 
into groups. Similarly, if global temperatures have risen more than 1.5°C above 
pre-industrial levels, perhaps what will be clear is the depth of our naivety and 
the height of our hubris. If they have not, perhaps it will be a collective sense 
of determination that is not yet apparent in 2018. Tribalism and oil consump-
tion are related, of course, as the competition for resources prompts people 
to divide themselves into groups to gain advantage over their adversaries. 
Those and other factors interact in complex ways. Thus, if this book has shown 
anything, it is that to understand the impact of oil in North Dakota, we must 
be attentive to the play between the global and the local, as western North 
Dakota has become a nexus point in the global flows of oil, capital, people, and 
ideas, through cycles of boom and bust over the past sixty years.
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The information on which this report is based was compiled from the 
results of a census of Williams and Mountrail Counties, from inter-
views with numerous officials, businessmen and local leaders, and from 
a variety of publications and governmental records.
The census of population characteristics and of local opinions was 
conducted during the summer of 1954 in the areas affected by the oil 
development. Because of practical considerations, the affected area 
was divided into the following parts, within which interviews were 
conducted on a sample basis: Williston, Ray, Tioga, “Tioga Environs” 
(a new residential area outside the town itself ), Stanley, and the rural 
impact townships (the 22 townships which encompassed or adjoined 
the field development). Interviews with adult members of the house-
holds—a total of 1,313 interviews—were conducted by the research 
staff using standard schedules designed to obtain information about 
the demographic, social, economic and political characteristics of the 
inhabitants.
Samples were drawn on a random and stratified basis in the fol-
lowing proportions: Williston—25% of the platted areas; Ray—33% of 
the residences; Tioga—50% of the residences; Tioga Environs—50% of 
the residences; Stanley—33% of the platted areas; rural impact town-
ships—25% of the farm areas. Although the remaining areas of the two 
counties were excluded on the assumption that they were not directly 
affected by oil development activity, they were surveyed informally by 
mailed questionnaires in the farm areas (total of above 200) and by 
personal inspection in the nonfarm population centers to check (and 
demonstrate) the validity of the assumption.
All the available supplementary information (such as the U.S. 
Census of Agriculture, records in local offices of state and federal agen-
cies, various indices of population growth) indicates that the samples 
were highly representative of the survey areas and that the projections 
of population numbers and characteristics are accurate within a very 
few percent. In every area which was sampled a double-check was 
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made to determine that every household which belonged in the sample 
was represented and that the number of households represented was 
accurate on the basis of a total residence count.
Additional information on employment, gross sales or receipts, 
gross weekly payroll, value of inventories, gross change in investment, 
and proprietors’ estimates of the impact of oil upon their businesses 
were obtained from 187 businesses in Williston and from 29 businesses 
in Tioga, the two centers most directly affected by the oil develop-
ment. Bank data relating to the general level of economic activity and 
to financial transactions immediately related to oil development were 
collected in Williston, Ray, Tioga and Stanley. Institutional data con-
cerning the membership, policies, plans, and influence on and by the 
oil development were obtained from the agents of 30 organizations and 
institutions representative of the social structure of Williston.
No less important than the data obtained in formal interviews 
involving the use of schedules were the impressions gained and the 
observations made by the research staff as “participant observers,” as 
residents in the area for three months. The staff was rewarded by an 
apparently mutually satisfying relationship with local citizens which 
made possible an almost perfect response to the population and 
opinion census (only 7 refusals in the total 1,313) and a general willing-
ness to discuss local problems and developments in almost every office 
and store which staff members entered. The informal, “unstructured” 
discussions over coffee, across counters and on the sidewalks were 
what gave real content and meaning to the local “boom” and “bust” 
psychology, to the excitement and to the anxiety attached to individual 
oil wells and housing developments and business expansions.
Appendix B
Supplementary Table
1. WILLISTON: TOTAL POPULATION—AGE AND SEX
 Male  Female Male & Female
0–4 785 713  1498
5–9 548 598  1146
10–13 341 330  671
14 40 77  117
15–19 262 354  616
20–29 805 665  1470
30–39 736 718  1454
40–49 533 440  973
50–64 451 493  944
65 and over 346 297  643
TOTAL ALL AGES 4936 4781  9717
No Data 89 96  185
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.   
2. WILLIAMS COUNTY: TOTAL POPULATION—AGE AND SEX
 Male  Female Male & Female
0–4 76 52  128
5–9 92 80  172
10–13 60 28  88
14 4 4  8
15–19 60 48  108
20–29 88 52  140
30–39 96 76  172
40–49 68 64  132
50–64 112 64  176
65 and over 60 40  100
TOTAL ALL AGES 724 512  1236
No Data 8 4  12
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.   
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3. MOUNTRAIL COUNTY: TOTAL POPULATION—AGE AND 
SEX
 Male  Female Male & Female
0–4 28 48  76
5–9 32 20  52
10–13 12 24  36
14 8 4  12
15–19 0 16  16
20–29 36 56  92
30–39 36 16  52
40–49 48 20  68
50–64 52 24  76
65 and over 24 24  48
TOTAL ALL AGES 276 252  528
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.   
4. TIOGA ENVIRONS: TOTAL POPULATION—AGE AND SEX 
 Male  Female Male & Female
0–4 124 129  253
5–9 23 41  64
10–13 5 14  19
14 9 0  9
15–19 14 19  33
20–29 133 125  258
30–39 88 51  139
40–49 27 18  45
50–64 28 10  38
65 and over 0 0  0
TOTAL ALL AGES 506 425  931
No Data 55 18  73
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.   
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5. TIOGA: TOTAL POPULATION—AGE AND SEX
 Male  Female Male & Female
0–4 92 133  225
5–9 108 89  197
10–13 56 43  99
14 14 14  28
15–19 60 61  121
20–29 130 111  241
30–39 142 116  258
40–49 134 80  214
50–64 50 31  81
65 and over 39 31  70
TOTAL ALL AGES 897 711  1608
No Data 72 2  74
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.   
6. RAY: TOTAL POPULATION—AGE AND SEX
 Male  Female Male & Female
0–4 166 138  304
5–9 98 62  160
10–13 49 34  83
14 7 15  22
15–19 55 28  83
20–29 151 174  325
30–39 132 86  218
40–49 49 47  96
50–64 46 30  76
65 and over 50 46  96
TOTAL ALL AGES 816 663  1479
No Data 13 3  16
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.   
372
7. STANLEY: TOTAL POPULATION—AGE AND SEX
 Male  Female Male & Female
0–4 125 118  243
5–9 89 84  173
10–13 39 64  103
14 22 16  38
15–19 55 61  116
20–29 142 145  287
30–39 117 81  198
40–49 67 67  134
50–64 82 65  147
65 and over 45 70  115
TOTAL ALL AGES 822 823  1645
No Data 39 52  91
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.   
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8. MARITAL STATUS FOR THOSE 14 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER, 
1954
 Williston Ray Tioga Tioga Stanley Williams Mountrail
    Environs County County
MALE:       
Married 2401 367 359 229 402 272 112
Single 672 108 185 76 144 200 80
Divorced/ 
separated 13 3 11 ...... ...... ...... ......
Widowed 140 9 19 ...... 23 16 12
No Data 36 16 67 49 ...... 8 ......
TOTAL 3262 503 641 354 569 496 204
FEMALE:       
Married 2236 343 352 232 361 264 108
Single 575 49 60 9 100 60 32
Divorced/
separated 44 9 ...... ...... 3 ...... 4
Widowed 267 25 31 ...... 53 24 16
No Data 18 3 3 ...... 40 4 ......
TOTAL 3140 429 446 241 557 352 160
MALE & FEMALE:       
Married 4637 710 711 461 763 536 220
Single 1247 157 245 85 244 260 112
Divorced/
separated 57 12 11 ...... 3 ...... 4
Widowed 407 34 50 ...... 76 40 28
No Data 54 19 70 49 40 12 ......
TOTAL 6402 932 1087 595 1126 848 364
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.
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9. RELATION TO HEAD OF FAMILY, 1954
 
 Williston Ray Tioga Tioga Stanley Impact Areas:
    Environs Williams & 
      Mountrail
Head 2672 394 404 267 466 460
Wife 2186 354 349 222 380 353
Son 2118 387 339 175 357 504
Daughter 2021 274 325 194 345 328
Lodger—
Hired Worker  205 52 142 60 61 12
Relatives 204 18 35 5 31 95
No Data 311 ...... 14 8 5 12
TOTAL 9717 1479 1608 931 1645 1764
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.     
10. INHABITANTS BY 1950 AND 1954 RESIDENCE
 
1950 Residence   1954 Residence
 Williston Ray Tioga Tioga Stanley Williams Mountrail
    Environs County County
MALE:       
Same 2769 239 283 ...... 412 544 212
Within Area 203 31 79 39 70 31 8
Other ND 473 55 205 93 112 4 20
Contig. States 232 15 68 25 24 19 4
All Other 474 310 170 225 79 50 4
Total 4151 650 805 382 697 648 248
FEMALE:       
Same 2717 227 196 ...... 444 353 159
Within Area 240 30 75 23 89 43 26
Other ND 529 51 135 106 89 6 15
Contig. States 207 9 47 14 21 19 4
All Other 375 208 125 153 62 39 ......
Total 4068 525 578 296 705 460 204
MALE & FEMALE:        
Same 5486 466 479 ...... 856 897 371
Within Area 443 61 154 62 159 74 34
Other ND 1002 106 340 199 201 10 35
Contig. States 439 24 115 39 45 38 8
All Other 849 518 295 378 141 89 4
Total 8219 1175 1383 678 1402 1108 452
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.     
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11. LABOR FORCE STATUS—14 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER
 
WILLISTON RAY IMPACT STANLEY TIOGA  &
  COUNTIES  ENVIR.
Male Female Total M F T M F T M F T M F T
Employed 
2548 868 3416 424 59 483 612 20 632 462 123 585 824 86 906
Unemployed 
57 25 82 3 6 9 4 ...... 4 6 5 11 17 8 29
TOTAL LABOR FORCE 
2605 893 3498 427 65 492 616 20 636 468 128 596 841 94 935
Keeping House 
8 2025 2033 ...... 326 326 0 423 423 ...... 338 338 4 534 538
In School 
147 216 363 21 28 49 33 56 89 28 50 78 41 61 102
Unable to Work 
155 98 253 21 7 28 20 4 24 43 35 78 27 12 39
Retired 
145 ...... 145 29 ...... 29 4 8 12 15 ...... 15 31 ...... 31
Other 
21 17 38 4 ...... 4 20 ...... 20 3 ...... 3 3 ...... 3
No Data 
44 28 72 1 3 4 4 4 8 13 5 18 31 3 34
TOTAL NOT IN LABOR FORCE 
520 2384 2904 76 364 440 81 495 576 102 428 530 137 610 747
TOTAL IN AGE GROUP 
3125 3277 6402 503 429 932 697 515 1212 570 556 1126 978 704 1682
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.     
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12. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR FORCE—14 YEARS OF 
AGE AND OVER
WILLISTON RAY IMPACT STANLEY TIOGA  &
  COUNTIES  ENVIR.
Male Female Total M F T M F T M F T M F T
Employed 
97.8 97.3 97.7 99.3 90.8 98.2 99.4 100 99.4 98.8 95.7 98.2 98.0 90.9 97.0
Unemployed 
2.2 2.7 2.3 0.7 9.2 1.8 0.6 ...... 0.6 1.2 4.3 1.8 2.0 9.1 3.0
TOTAL LABOR FORCE 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Keeping House 
1.6 84.9 70.7 ...... 89.6 74.0 ...... 85.5 73.4 ...... 78.9 63.7 2.2 87.6 72.0
In School 
28.2 9.1 12.5 27.6 7.6 11.1 40.8 11.3 15.4 30.9 11.6 14.8 31.1 10.0 13.8
Unable to Work 
29.8 4.0 8.7 27.6 1.9 6.3 24.7 0.8 4.2 42.4 8.2 14.8 20.0 2.0 5.3
Retired 
28.2 ...... 5.0 38.2 ...... 6.6 4.9 1.6 2.1 12.1 ...... 2.8 22.2 ...... 4.1
Other 
4.0 0.4 1.3 5.3 ...... 1.0 24.7 ...... 3.5 3.0 ...... 0.6 2.2 ...... 0.4
No Data 
8.1 1.2 2.5 1.3 0.9 1.0 4.9 0.8 1.4 12.1 1.3 3.3 22.2 0.4 4.5
TOTAL NOT IN LABOR FORCE 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.     
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13. INDUSTRY GROUP FOR EMPLOYED PERSONS, 1954
   Impact    
   Counties  
   Williams & Tioga and
 Williston Ray Mountrail Stanley Tioga Environs
Agriculture 239 58 524 30 72
Mining and 
Construction 611 237 60 186 498
Manufacturing, 
Durable 21 ...... ...... ...... ......
Manufacturing, 
Non-Durable 89 ...... ...... 5 ......
Transportation, 
Communications,
Public Utilities 513 46 16 57 66
Trade 929 83 20 147 130
Finance, 
Insurance,
Real Estate 130 5 ...... 16 9
Service 581 31 4 88 72
Public 
Administration 165 5 ...... 36 17
No Data 138 18 8 20 42
TOTAL 3416 483 632 585 906
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.    
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14. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRY GROUP FOR 
EMPLOYED PERSONS, 1954
   Impact    
   Counties  
   Williams & Tioga and
 Williston Ray Mountrail Stanley Tioga Environs
Agriculture 7.0 12.1 82.9 5.1 8.0
Mining and 
Construction 17.9 49.0 9.5 31.8 55.0
Manufacturing, 
Durable 0.6 ...... ...... ...... ......
Manufacturing, 
Non-Durable 2.6 ...... ...... 0.9 ......
Transportation, 
Communications,
Public Utilities 15.0 9.6 2.5 9.8 7.3
Trade 27.2 17.2 3.2 25.2 14.4
Finance, Insurance, 
Real Estate 3.8 1.3 ...... 2.8 1.0
Service 17.0 6.4 0.6 15.0 8.0
Public 
Administration 4.8 1.3 ...... 6.1 1.9
No Data 4.0 3.1 1.3 3.3 4.5
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.    
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15. OCCUPATION GROUP FOR EMPLOYED PERSONS, 1954
   Impact    
   Counties  
   Williams & Tioga and
 Williston Ray Mountrail Stanley Tioga Environs
Professional 260 6 12 46 17
Farm 205 37 479 28 55
Managers 533 31 4 74 81
Clerical 383 25 8 44 87
Sales 335 31 4 71 24
Crafts 447 49 12 52 130
Operatives 348 197 52 97 315
Services 328 25 8 52 46
Farm Laborers 27 22 40 3 17
Other Laborers 294 34 4 96 101
No Data 256 26 9 22 33
TOTAL 3416 483 632 585 906
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.    
 
16. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPATION GROUP FOR 
EMPLOYED PERSONS, 1954
   Impact    
   Counties  
   Williams & Tioga and
 Williston Ray Mountrail Stanley Tioga Environs
Professional 7.6 1.3 1.9 7.9 1.9
Farm 6.0 7.6 75.8 4.7 6.1
Managers 15.6 6.4 0.6 12.6 8.9
Clerical 11.2 5.1 1.3 7.5 9.6
Sales 9.8 6.4 0.6 12.1 2.6
Crafts 13.1 10.2 1.9 8.9 14.4
Operatives 10.2 40.8 8.3 16.8 34.8
Services 9.6 5.1 1.3 8.9 5.1
Farm Laborers 0.8 4.5 6.4 0.5 1.9
Other Laborers 8.6 7.0 0.6 16.4 11.2
No Data 7.6 5.7 1.3 3.7 3.8
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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